State Supreme Court Data Tracker
Use this data to spot trends, anticipate what’s next, and supercharge your advocacy.
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Cahokia Unit Sch. Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker, 184 N.E.3d 233 (Ill. 2021)
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Illinois | 2021 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2021
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2010, Illinois expanded its learning standards and adopted a common core state standard for educational attainment in public schools. The State evaluated school districts based on the percentage of students meeting or exceeding the assessments and assigned additional funding to the most under-resourced districts. Twenty-two Plaintiff school districts jointly sued the Governor and State of Illinois claiming that they had a constitutional obligation to provide the districts with additional funding that is necessary to meet or achieve the learning standards established and expanded by the Illinois State Board of Education. Plaintiffs requested that the court enter judgment for the necessary amounts and to enforce a schedule of payments. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the decisions on the quality of public education and appropriate supporting funds were under the control of the General Assembly. The appellate court affirmed, and highlighted precedent establishing that it is outside the judicial function to determine whether the State is fulfilling its duty of providing a high quality education. Plaintiffs appealed only their claims against the governor to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the claims against the governor were not justiciable, as the governor did not have the authority to provide the school districts with additional funding. Under the Illinois Constitution, the General Assembly is in charge of all expenditures of public funds by the State. Plaintiff's complaint was accordingly dismissed. Justice Neville wrote a special concurrence discussing the shortcomings of school education in Illinois, and that, while there was a need to reconsider a more equitable approach to funding, any solution would be necessarily legislative in nature, not judicial.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2010, Illinois expanded its learning standards and adopted a common core state standard for educational attainment in public schools. The State evaluated school districts based on the percentage of students meeting or exceeding the assessments and assigned additional funding to the most under-resourced districts. Twenty-two Plaintiff school districts jointly sued the Governor and State of Illinois claiming that they had a constitutional obligation to provide the districts with additional funding that is necessary to meet or achieve the learning standards established and expanded by the Illinois State Board of Education. Plaintiffs requested that the court enter judgment for the necessary amounts and to enforce a schedule of payments. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the decisions on the quality of public education and appropriate supporting funds were under the control of the General Assembly. The appellate court affirmed, and highlighted precedent establishing that it is outside the judicial function to determine whether the State is fulfilling its duty of providing a high quality education. Plaintiffs appealed only their claims against the governor to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the claims against the governor were not justiciable, as the governor did not have the authority to provide the school districts with additional funding. Under the Illinois Constitution, the General Assembly is in charge of all expenditures of public funds by the State. Plaintiff's complaint was accordingly dismissed. Justice Neville wrote a special concurrence discussing the shortcomings of school education in Illinois, and that, while there was a need to reconsider a more equitable approach to funding, any solution would be necessarily legislative in nature, not judicial.
Link to Opinion
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Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty, Access to Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty, Access to Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 1997, the investigation into the murders of five individuals went cold. A year later, nineteen-year-old Calloway was questioned by the police about the murders. He confessed to his involvement during the interrogation. During trial, Calloway alleged a range of misconduct on the part of the police during the interrogation, including refusals to allow Calloway to speak to an attorney. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts in 2009, twelve years after the murders. The trial court sentenced Calloway to death. Calloway appealed. On cross-appeal, the State claimed that the trial court should have conducted a hearing in accordance with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) before allowing Dr. Richard Ofshe, an expert witness in the field of false confessions, to testify as an expert. Under the Frye standard, the proponent of the evidence sought to be admitted must prove to the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the scientific principles and methodology of the expert are generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did err when it failed to conduct a Frye hearing before Dr. Ofshe was permitted to testify, however, the Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable possibility that this error affected the verdict and, as a result, found the error to be harmless. In addition, during the pendency of Calloway's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed a judge to make the findings necessary for the death penalty, instead of a jury. Finding Calloway's sentences as contrary to the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), the Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a new penalty phase.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 1997, the investigation into the murders of five individuals went cold. A year later, nineteen-year-old Calloway was questioned by the police about the murders. He confessed to his involvement during the interrogation. During trial, Calloway alleged a range of misconduct on the part of the police during the interrogation, including refusals to allow Calloway to speak to an attorney. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts in 2009, twelve years after the murders. The trial court sentenced Calloway to death. Calloway appealed. On cross-appeal, the State claimed that the trial court should have conducted a hearing in accordance with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) before allowing Dr. Richard Ofshe, an expert witness in the field of false confessions, to testify as an expert. Under the Frye standard, the proponent of the evidence sought to be admitted must prove to the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the scientific principles and methodology of the expert are generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did err when it failed to conduct a Frye hearing before Dr. Ofshe was permitted to testify, however, the Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable possibility that this error affected the verdict and, as a result, found the error to be harmless. In addition, during the pendency of Calloway's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed a judge to make the findings necessary for the death penalty, instead of a jury. Finding Calloway's sentences as contrary to the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), the Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a new penalty phase.
Link to Opinion
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Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Env't Mgmt. Comm'n, 772 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 2015)
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North Carolina | 2015 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2015
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingEnvironmental groups filed a request with the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission seeking a declaratory ruling that would clarify the application of the Commission's groundwater protection rules to coal ash lagoons and require the operators of certain coal ash lagoons to take certain corrective actions regarding groundwater contamination. The groups sought judicial review of the Commission's ruling, claiming the Commission misconstrued the applicable regulations. The North Carolina legislature subsequently passed the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014, which the Defendants then claimed rendered part of the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory ruling moot on the grounds that the new law superseded the prior regulations with respect to the manner in which groundwater violations occurring at certain facilities should be addressed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Defendants and held that enactment of the Coal Ash Management Act rendered the declaratory ruling moot.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Environmental groups filed a request with the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission seeking a declaratory ruling that would clarify the application of the Commission's groundwater protection rules to coal ash lagoons and require the operators of certain coal ash lagoons to take certain corrective actions regarding groundwater contamination. The groups sought judicial review of the Commission's ruling, claiming the Commission misconstrued the applicable regulations. The North Carolina legislature subsequently passed the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014, which the Defendants then claimed rendered part of the Plaintiff's request for a declaratory ruling moot on the grounds that the new law superseded the prior regulations with respect to the manner in which groundwater violations occurring at certain facilities should be addressed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Defendants and held that enactment of the Coal Ash Management Act rendered the declaratory ruling moot.
Link to Opinion
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Cardona v. State, 185 So. 3d 514 (Fla. 2016)
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Florida | 2016 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Florida
Year:
2016
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingCardona was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of her son. During her trial the prosecutor used inflammatory remarks and unprofessional conduct to overzealously seek her conviction and sentence of death. The prosecutor made "racially charged" comments against Cardona, and relied on facts not in evidence when making closing arguments. The Florida Supreme Court overturned the conviction on the grounds that the prosecution's inflammatory arguments and derogatory remarks about the defense improperly influenced the jury. The Court emphasized the importance of fairness, especially in cases involving the death penalty. In addition, the Court made a point to overrule the lower court's decision to not accept IQ tests that showed Cardona had an intellectual disability. The lower court reasoned that several administered tests were not valid because they had to be translated into Spanish to accommodate Cardona. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the lower court holding concluding that accommodations are valid for determining intellectual disability.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Cardona was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of her son. During her trial the prosecutor used inflammatory remarks and unprofessional conduct to overzealously seek her conviction and sentence of death. The prosecutor made "racially charged" comments against Cardona, and relied on facts not in evidence when making closing arguments. The Florida Supreme Court overturned the conviction on the grounds that the prosecution's inflammatory arguments and derogatory remarks about the defense improperly influenced the jury. The Court emphasized the importance of fairness, especially in cases involving the death penalty. In addition, the Court made a point to overrule the lower court's decision to not accept IQ tests that showed Cardona had an intellectual disability. The lower court reasoned that several administered tests were not valid because they had to be translated into Spanish to accommodate Cardona. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the lower court holding concluding that accommodations are valid for determining intellectual disability.
Link to Opinion
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Carlson v. Simon, 888 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2016)
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Minnesota | 2016 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2016
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter declaring his write-in candidacy for President of the United States for the 2016 general election, without a designated vice presidential candidate, Steve Carlson filed a request with the Secretary of State (SoS) for a count of the votes cast for him. The SoS refused the request because it did not “include the name of a candidate for vice-president of the United States” pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.09.3(b). Carlson petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for an order directing the SoS to accept his request. Carlson argued that requiring a vice presidential candidate to be named was an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of write-in candidates and the voters who support those candidates under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court denied the petition, holding that the statute was not unconstitutional because it was a reasonable regulation that promoted the state’s interest in the orderly administration of the election and electoral processes.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
After declaring his write-in candidacy for President of the United States for the 2016 general election, without a designated vice presidential candidate, Steve Carlson filed a request with the Secretary of State (SoS) for a count of the votes cast for him. The SoS refused the request because it did not “include the name of a candidate for vice-president of the United States” pursuant to Minn. Stat. 204B.09.3(b). Carlson petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for an order directing the SoS to accept his request. Carlson argued that requiring a vice presidential candidate to be named was an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of write-in candidates and the voters who support those candidates under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court denied the petition, holding that the statute was not unconstitutional because it was a reasonable regulation that promoted the state’s interest in the orderly administration of the election and electoral processes.
Link to Opinion
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Carney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 77 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2016)
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Illinois | 2016 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2016
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingUnion Pacific Railroad Co. (Union) launched a bridge demolition project with a contractor, Happ’s. Happ’s subcontracted Carney Group to provide the labor for the project. Carney was an employee of Carney Group. During the demolition, a bridge wall collapsed on Carney, severing his legs below the knee. Carney sued both Happ’s and Union for negligence. Happ's settled the claim against it, however, Union refused to settle, arguing that it could not be liable for Carney's injury. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Union, stating that it was not liable for Carney’s injury, as it did not retain control over the project. According to the contract between Union and Happ’s, all supervision, labor, equipment, and materials for the project were the responsibility of Union’s contractor, Happ’s, not Union. The ruling underscores that a party hiring a contractor is not accountable for damages resulting from the contractor's mistakes.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Union) launched a bridge demolition project with a contractor, Happ’s. Happ’s subcontracted Carney Group to provide the labor for the project. Carney was an employee of Carney Group. During the demolition, a bridge wall collapsed on Carney, severing his legs below the knee. Carney sued both Happ’s and Union for negligence. Happ's settled the claim against it, however, Union refused to settle, arguing that it could not be liable for Carney's injury. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Union, stating that it was not liable for Carney’s injury, as it did not retain control over the project. According to the contract between Union and Happ’s, all supervision, labor, equipment, and materials for the project were the responsibility of Union’s contractor, Happ’s, not Union. The ruling underscores that a party hiring a contractor is not accountable for damages resulting from the contractor's mistakes.
Link to Opinion
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Carnival Corp. v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 753 S.E.2d 846 (S.C. 2014)
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South Carolina | 2014 | Housing, Environment |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2014
Topics:
Housing, Environment
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingMultiple citizen groups, including the Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Association, the Charlestowne Neighborhood Association, the Coastal Conservation League, and the Preservation Society of Charleston (collectively, the Plaintiffs), filed suit against Carnival Corp., alleging nuisance and zoning claims related to the use of the Union Pier Terminal in Charleston, which could be brought under the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Plaintiffs claimed that Carnival's cruise ship operations disrupted the historical skyline, caused major traffic congestion, closed public roads, emitted noise pollution, and jeopardized the historic district's listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The case was brought under original jurisdiction, so there is no trial court or appellate court decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the case. First, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing by not alleging a particularized injury. They only asserted generalized grievances, which were insufficient for standing. Issues like traffic congestion, pollution, noise, and obstructed views were deemed non-personal and non-individualized. Second, the Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet the standing requirements under Section 6-29-950 of the South Carolina Code as they failed to allege special damage or neighboring/adjacent property ownership. Section 6-29-950 states that when a building, structure, or land is proposed to be used in violation of any ordinance, then the zoning administrator or a neighboring property owner who would be specially damaged by the violation, may institute an injunction, mandamus, or appropriate action to prevent unlawful construction, maintenance, or use of the building, structure, or land. Additionally, the Court held that South Carolina's public importance exception (which gives standing to plaintiffs where an issue of public importance requires its resolution for future guidance) did not apply to give the Plaintiffs standing.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Multiple citizen groups, including the Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Association, the Charlestowne Neighborhood Association, the Coastal Conservation League, and the Preservation Society of Charleston (collectively, the Plaintiffs), filed suit against Carnival Corp., alleging nuisance and zoning claims related to the use of the Union Pier Terminal in Charleston, which could be brought under the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Plaintiffs claimed that Carnival's cruise ship operations disrupted the historical skyline, caused major traffic congestion, closed public roads, emitted noise pollution, and jeopardized the historic district's listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The case was brought under original jurisdiction, so there is no trial court or appellate court decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the case. First, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing by not alleging a particularized injury. They only asserted generalized grievances, which were insufficient for standing. Issues like traffic congestion, pollution, noise, and obstructed views were deemed non-personal and non-individualized. Second, the Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet the standing requirements under Section 6-29-950 of the South Carolina Code as they failed to allege special damage or neighboring/adjacent property ownership. Section 6-29-950 states that when a building, structure, or land is proposed to be used in violation of any ordinance, then the zoning administrator or a neighboring property owner who would be specially damaged by the violation, may institute an injunction, mandamus, or appropriate action to prevent unlawful construction, maintenance, or use of the building, structure, or land. Additionally, the Court held that South Carolina's public importance exception (which gives standing to plaintiffs where an issue of public importance requires its resolution for future guidance) did not apply to give the Plaintiffs standing.
Link to Opinion
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Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013)
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New York | 2013 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
New York
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA group of longtime heavy smokers brought a putative class action against Philip Morris USA alleging that cigarettes contained unnecessarily dangerous levels of carcinogens. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the smokers' claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on all but one claim, which it certified as a question to the Court of Appeals. That question, was whether New York law recognizes an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for smoking-related diseases by a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with smoking-related disease and who is not under investigation by a physician for such suspected disease. The Court of Appeals held that a threat of future harm is insufficient to impose liability against a defendant in a tort context, because it is a fundamental principle that a plaintiff must sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A group of longtime heavy smokers brought a putative class action against Philip Morris USA alleging that cigarettes contained unnecessarily dangerous levels of carcinogens. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the smokers' claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on all but one claim, which it certified as a question to the Court of Appeals. That question, was whether New York law recognizes an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for smoking-related diseases by a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with smoking-related disease and who is not under investigation by a physician for such suspected disease. The Court of Appeals held that a threat of future harm is insufficient to impose liability against a defendant in a tort context, because it is a fundamental principle that a plaintiff must sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort.
Link to Opinion
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Carter v. Chapman, 270 A.3d 444 (Pa. 2022)
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Pennsylvania | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingVoters in Pennsylvania sued the Pennsylvania Bureau of Election Services and Notaries and the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth claiming that the 2018 Congressional district voting map violated state and federal law. The 2020 Census recorded a population decline in Pennsylvania that required reapportionment of the Congressional districts. A partisan split between the state general assembly, responsible for drawing the district maps, and the governor, responsible for approving the maps, resulted in a stalemate. The Supreme Court intervened, accepting extraordinary jurisdiction, and selected a redistricting map that complied with the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Voters in Pennsylvania sued the Pennsylvania Bureau of Election Services and Notaries and the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth claiming that the 2018 Congressional district voting map violated state and federal law. The 2020 Census recorded a population decline in Pennsylvania that required reapportionment of the Congressional districts. A partisan split between the state general assembly, responsible for drawing the district maps, and the governor, responsible for approving the maps, resulted in a stalemate. The Supreme Court intervened, accepting extraordinary jurisdiction, and selected a redistricting map that complied with the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301.
Link to Opinion
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Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016)
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Florida | 2016 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Florida
Year:
2016
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was injured at work and won a worker's compensation claim against his employer. Specifically, the Judge of Compensation claims awarded claimant's counsel $164.54 for 107.2 hours of legal work based on a mandatory attorney fee schedule that was part of the workers' compensation statutory regime. Plaintiff appealed the constitutionality of the statute setting forth the attorneys' fees conclusive schedule, which also forbid judges from engaging in an analysis of whether the fees obtained were reasonable. Plaintiff argued that this low rate presented a barrier to court for employees in workers compensation lawsuits, and the fee schedule imposed by Florida state law was unconstitutional and a violation of due process. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the Florida law was unconstitutional and a violation of due process because by establishing the irrebuttable presumption that fees according to the schedule were reasonable, the statute precluded every worker from challenging the fee award.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff was injured at work and won a worker's compensation claim against his employer. Specifically, the Judge of Compensation claims awarded claimant's counsel $164.54 for 107.2 hours of legal work based on a mandatory attorney fee schedule that was part of the workers' compensation statutory regime. Plaintiff appealed the constitutionality of the statute setting forth the attorneys' fees conclusive schedule, which also forbid judges from engaging in an analysis of whether the fees obtained were reasonable. Plaintiff argued that this low rate presented a barrier to court for employees in workers compensation lawsuits, and the fee schedule imposed by Florida state law was unconstitutional and a violation of due process. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the Florida law was unconstitutional and a violation of due process because by establishing the irrebuttable presumption that fees according to the schedule were reasonable, the statute precluded every worker from challenging the fee award.
Link to Opinion
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Cedarbrook Residential Ctr., Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 881 S.E.2d 558 (N.C. 2022)
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North Carolina | 2022 | Health Care |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2022
Topics:
Health Care
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiffs, an adult care home facility and its owner, challenged the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS) regulatory actions in response to concerns that DHHS employees identified in the Plaintiffs' facility, including staffing issues, failure to protect patients' privacy when administering medicine, and issues with maintenance of medical equipment such as walkers and wheelchairs. DHHS subsequently reported these concerns in a "Statement of Deficiencies" to the Plaintiff, suspended new admissions to the Plaintiffs' facility, and issued a notice of intent to revoke the facility's license. The Supreme Court considered whether the Plaintiffs asserted valid negligence claims against DHHS, based on the way in which DHHS inspected and took regulatory action against the Plaintiffs' care home facility. The Plaintiffs alleged DHHS breached its duty of reasonable care by conducting an inspection of the Plaintiffs' care home facility, writing and publishing Statements of Deficiencies, issuing a directed plan of protection, and issuing a suspension of admissions which was in place for nearly eight months. The Plaintiffs further alleged they suffered damages in the form of lost revenue resulting from the decreased facility population and increased operating expenses due to the directed plan of protection. The Supreme Court held the Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the claims Plaintiffs sought to assert were not cognizable under the state's Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court also held that Plaintiffs failed to assert a viable negligence claim against DHHS because Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of the type of legal duty owed by the state agency necessary to support their claim.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Plaintiffs, an adult care home facility and its owner, challenged the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS) regulatory actions in response to concerns that DHHS employees identified in the Plaintiffs' facility, including staffing issues, failure to protect patients' privacy when administering medicine, and issues with maintenance of medical equipment such as walkers and wheelchairs. DHHS subsequently reported these concerns in a "Statement of Deficiencies" to the Plaintiff, suspended new admissions to the Plaintiffs' facility, and issued a notice of intent to revoke the facility's license. The Supreme Court considered whether the Plaintiffs asserted valid negligence claims against DHHS, based on the way in which DHHS inspected and took regulatory action against the Plaintiffs' care home facility. The Plaintiffs alleged DHHS breached its duty of reasonable care by conducting an inspection of the Plaintiffs' care home facility, writing and publishing Statements of Deficiencies, issuing a directed plan of protection, and issuing a suspension of admissions which was in place for nearly eight months. The Plaintiffs further alleged they suffered damages in the form of lost revenue resulting from the decreased facility population and increased operating expenses due to the directed plan of protection. The Supreme Court held the Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the claims Plaintiffs sought to assert were not cognizable under the state's Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court also held that Plaintiffs failed to assert a viable negligence claim against DHHS because Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of the type of legal duty owed by the state agency necessary to support their claim.
Link to Opinion
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Centerville v. Knab, 166 N.E.3d 1167 (Ohio 2020)
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Ohio | 2020 | Criminal Justice |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2020
Topics:
Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of making a false report to law enforcement, arising out of incident in which Defendant falsely reported an active shooter situation to city police department. The city asked the trial court to order the Defendant to pay restitution for the costs it had incurred responding to the 911 call and the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution and also sentenced the Defendant to jail, ordered him to pay a fine and to complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and placed him on supervised probation. Defendant appealed arguing that the trial court erred in ordering restitution because the city is not a victim to which restitution can be ordered under Ohio's restitution statute, O.R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) and because the city did not suffer economic loss when its public-safety agencies responded to his emergency call. The city argued that it was entitled to restitution because Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, a provision known as Marsy's Law, expanded the definition of "victim" to include the municipality. The Supreme Court held that a municipality is not a victim entitled to restitution under Ohio's Marsy's victim-restitution law, and that therefore a man did not owe money for making a false report when calling 911 under the mistaken belief that someone was shooting up his house.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant was convicted of making a false report to law enforcement, arising out of incident in which Defendant falsely reported an active shooter situation to city police department. The city asked the trial court to order the Defendant to pay restitution for the costs it had incurred responding to the 911 call and the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution and also sentenced the Defendant to jail, ordered him to pay a fine and to complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and placed him on supervised probation. Defendant appealed arguing that the trial court erred in ordering restitution because the city is not a victim to which restitution can be ordered under Ohio's restitution statute, O.R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) and because the city did not suffer economic loss when its public-safety agencies responded to his emergency call. The city argued that it was entitled to restitution because Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, a provision known as Marsy's Law, expanded the definition of "victim" to include the municipality. The Supreme Court held that a municipality is not a victim entitled to restitution under Ohio's Marsy's victim-restitution law, and that therefore a man did not owe money for making a false report when calling 911 under the mistaken belief that someone was shooting up his house.
Link to Opinion
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Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 329 P.3d 614 (Nev. 2014)
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Nevada | 2014 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2014
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingFour people died from carbon monoxide poisoning while sleeping in a hotel room over the building heater at the Casino West Motel (Casino West). Casino West sought coverage from Century Surety Company (Century Surety), but Century Surety denied the claims based on Casino West's general liability policy. Century Surety claimed its absolute pollution exclusion excludes coverage for injuries arising from the "escape of pollutants." The Ninth Circuit certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court, including whether the pollutant exclusion included carbon monoxide exposure. The Nevada Supreme Court answered that the exclusion was drafted as to include broad inclusion of items as pollutants and was absurd if interpreted as such. Thus, the policy could not be read to cover any damage that carbon monoxide caused and was meant to apply only to outdoor, environmental pollution.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Four people died from carbon monoxide poisoning while sleeping in a hotel room over the building heater at the Casino West Motel (Casino West). Casino West sought coverage from Century Surety Company (Century Surety), but Century Surety denied the claims based on Casino West's general liability policy. Century Surety claimed its absolute pollution exclusion excludes coverage for injuries arising from the "escape of pollutants." The Ninth Circuit certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court, including whether the pollutant exclusion included carbon monoxide exposure. The Nevada Supreme Court answered that the exclusion was drafted as to include broad inclusion of items as pollutants and was absurd if interpreted as such. Thus, the policy could not be read to cover any damage that carbon monoxide caused and was meant to apply only to outdoor, environmental pollution.
Link to Opinion
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Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013)
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Minnesota | 2013 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2013
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant was found guilty of first degree murder and related charges arising out of a motor vehicle collision when he was 17 years old. The district court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Appellant filed a direct appeal which was affirmed on the grounds that the life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was also denied. Appellant then filed a second petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that the prohibition against life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders without consideration of their individual characteristics outlined in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (July 6, 2010), as modified, does not apply to a 17-year-old defendant convicted of first degree murder. Further, the Court held that the prohibition against mandatory life-without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) does not apply retroactively to Appellant's case, because the rule from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases that are pending or not yet final, but not to be applied if the conviction or sentence is final, unless (i) it is a substantive rule that changes the class of persons the law punishes, or (ii) it is a "watershed" rule. While Miller v. Alabama announced a "new rule," (i) was not met because new rule did not eliminate the power of the state to impose life imprisonment without possibility of release on a juvenile offender who committed a homicide offense, but rather invalidating a sentencing scheme that mandated that punishment without consideration of the unique characteristics of the juvenile offender, and other federal decisions have also concluded that the rule is procedural; and (ii) was not met because the holding in Miller v. Alabama does not impact the accuracy of an underlying determination of guilt or innocence, and affects only a small subset of defendants, which implies that the rule does not have fundamental and profound impacts on criminal proceedings generally. As a result, The Supreme Court held that Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of the Miller v. Alabama ruling, and the postconviction court's holding was affirmed.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and related charges arising out of a motor vehicle collision when he was 17 years old. The district court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Appellant filed a direct appeal which was affirmed on the grounds that the life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was also denied. Appellant then filed a second petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that the prohibition against life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders without consideration of their individual characteristics outlined in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (July 6, 2010), as modified, does not apply to a 17-year-old defendant convicted of first degree murder. Further, the Court held that the prohibition against mandatory life-without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) does not apply retroactively to Appellant's case, because the rule from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases that are pending or not yet final, but not to be applied if the conviction or sentence is final, unless (i) it is a substantive rule that changes the class of persons the law punishes, or (ii) it is a "watershed" rule. While Miller v. Alabama announced a "new rule," (i) was not met because new rule did not eliminate the power of the state to impose life imprisonment without possibility of release on a juvenile offender who committed a homicide offense, but rather invalidating a sentencing scheme that mandated that punishment without consideration of the unique characteristics of the juvenile offender, and other federal decisions have also concluded that the rule is procedural; and (ii) was not met because the holding in Miller v. Alabama does not impact the accuracy of an underlying determination of guilt or innocence, and affects only a small subset of defendants, which implies that the rule does not have fundamental and profound impacts on criminal proceedings generally. As a result, The Supreme Court held that Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of the Miller v. Alabama ruling, and the postconviction court's holding was affirmed.
Link to Opinion
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Chandler Telecom, LLC v. Burdette, 797 S.E.2d 93 (Ga. 2017)
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Georgia | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee was seriously injured when he fell while attempting a controlled descent from a cell-phone tower in contravention of instructions by his employer, Chandler Telecom, LLC (Chandler), that technicians must climb down from towers. The State Board of Workers’ Compensation (Board) adopted an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings and concluded that Burdette was barred from receiving compensation because he engaged in “willful misconduct” within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-17 (a). On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an employee may—in deliberate disobedience of his employer’s explicit prohibition—act in a knowingly dangerous fashion with disregard for the probable consequences of that act, and still recover workers’ compensation when injured by that disobedient act. The Supreme Court concluded that intentional violations of employer rules may constitute willful misconduct, however, all intentional violations of employer rules may not bar compensation. An intentional violation bars compensation only when done either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable injurious consequences.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
An employee was seriously injured when he fell while attempting a controlled descent from a cell-phone tower in contravention of instructions by his employer, Chandler Telecom, LLC (Chandler), that technicians must climb down from towers. The State Board of Workers’ Compensation (Board) adopted an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings and concluded that Burdette was barred from receiving compensation because he engaged in “willful misconduct” within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-17 (a). On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an employee may—in deliberate disobedience of his employer’s explicit prohibition—act in a knowingly dangerous fashion with disregard for the probable consequences of that act, and still recover workers’ compensation when injured by that disobedient act. The Supreme Court concluded that intentional violations of employer rules may constitute willful misconduct, however, all intentional violations of employer rules may not bar compensation. An intentional violation bars compensation only when done either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable injurious consequences.
Link to Opinion
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Chappell v. State, 501 P.3d 935 (Nev. 2021)
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Nevada | 2021 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2021
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant attempted to file a third habeas petition challenging his death sentence. He argued that the petition was not procedurally time barred because his counsel at his first postconviction petition was ineffective, creating good cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. However, he raised this claim after he obtained a penalty phase retrial, appealed the judgment from that trial, and a remittitur denying his second post conviction habeas petition was issued. Appellant also asserted that counsel for his second post conviction petition was ineffective. The Court held that a challenge based on inadequate counsel by post-conviction attorneys must be raised within one year after a final written decision by the district court or the issuance of the appellate court's remittitur if an appeal is taken. Since the challenge to Appellant's first post conviction counsel was raised more than a year after the appellate court's remittitur on his first petition, Appellant did not have good cause to excuse the procedural bar on his claim. However, since Appellant challenged the effectiveness of his second post conviction counsel within one year of the remittitur of that petition being issued, he had good cause to excuse the procedural bar.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Appellant attempted to file a third habeas petition challenging his death sentence. He argued that the petition was not procedurally time barred because his counsel at his first postconviction petition was ineffective, creating good cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. However, he raised this claim after he obtained a penalty phase retrial, appealed the judgment from that trial, and a remittitur denying his second post conviction habeas petition was issued. Appellant also asserted that counsel for his second post conviction petition was ineffective. The Court held that a challenge based on inadequate counsel by post-conviction attorneys must be raised within one year after a final written decision by the district court or the issuance of the appellate court's remittitur if an appeal is taken. Since the challenge to Appellant's first post conviction counsel was raised more than a year after the appellate court's remittitur on his first petition, Appellant did not have good cause to excuse the procedural bar on his claim. However, since Appellant challenged the effectiveness of his second post conviction counsel within one year of the remittitur of that petition being issued, he had good cause to excuse the procedural bar.
Link to Opinion
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Charles v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit on behalf of his sister. During discovery, Plaintiff requested documents from Defendant related to adverse medical incidents regarding any physician who was employed by Defendant or arising from care provided by Defendant pursuant to a provision of the Florida Constitution. Defendant argued that certain responsive documents were privileged as "patient safety work product" under the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act. Patient safety work product encompasses any data, reports, records, or analyses which are created for reporting to an outside patient safety organization as a way of decreasing mistakes and increasing the quality of healthcare. The trial court allowed discovery of the documents but was overturned by the appeals court which determined that the documents were protected as "patient safety work product" and that federal law expressly preempted the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court overturned the appeals court decision, determining that the documents sought were not "patient safety work product" under federal law and that the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act did not preempt the Florida Constitution. In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that the purpose of the federal law was to allow medical practitioners to share error information in an attempt to improve care without the fear of liability. The Court went on to note however, that participation in the program is voluntary, and because Florida requires medical practitioners to create these documents regardless of participation, Florida law provides an independent basis for the sharing of such information separate and distinct from federal law. Thus, the documents were not "patient safety work product" and are not privileged. The Court went on to address preemption, noting that the federal law contained no express preemption provision, and legislative history illustrates Congress's intent not to strip citizens of preexisting rights to information disclosure. The Court concluded that "the clear intent of the Federal Act . . . was for the voluntary reporting system to function harmoniously within existing state reporting and discovery laws." The dissent argued that the Court should have dismissed the case because the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal prior to the Court's decision on the merits, and accordingly the Court's decision is "purely [an] advisory opinion."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit on behalf of his sister. During discovery, Plaintiff requested documents from Defendant related to adverse medical incidents regarding any physician who was employed by Defendant or arising from care provided by Defendant pursuant to a provision of the Florida Constitution. Defendant argued that certain responsive documents were privileged as "patient safety work product" under the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act. Patient safety work product encompasses any data, reports, records, or analyses which are created for reporting to an outside patient safety organization as a way of decreasing mistakes and increasing the quality of healthcare. The trial court allowed discovery of the documents but was overturned by the appeals court which determined that the documents were protected as "patient safety work product" and that federal law expressly preempted the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court overturned the appeals court decision, determining that the documents sought were not "patient safety work product" under federal law and that the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act did not preempt the Florida Constitution. In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that the purpose of the federal law was to allow medical practitioners to share error information in an attempt to improve care without the fear of liability. The Court went on to note however, that participation in the program is voluntary, and because Florida requires medical practitioners to create these documents regardless of participation, Florida law provides an independent basis for the sharing of such information separate and distinct from federal law. Thus, the documents were not "patient safety work product" and are not privileged. The Court went on to address preemption, noting that the federal law contained no express preemption provision, and legislative history illustrates Congress's intent not to strip citizens of preexisting rights to information disclosure. The Court concluded that "the clear intent of the Federal Act . . . was for the voluntary reporting system to function harmoniously within existing state reporting and discovery laws." The dissent argued that the Court should have dismissed the case because the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal prior to the Court's decision on the merits, and accordingly the Court's decision is "purely [an] advisory opinion."
Link to Opinion
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Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare Corp., 317 P.3d 182 (Mont. 2014)
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Montana | 2014 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Montana
Year:
2014
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff-employees argued that a change in the Defendant-employer's policies and procedures involving the time paid out for accrued sick leave amounted to a material change in their employment agreement, and filed a class action against their employers when a benefit of paying out accrued sick leave was discontinued. The lower court held for the employer, granting their motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that manuals and handbooks outlining an employer's policies and procedures generally are not considered part of the employment contract on the reasoning that the policies are unilateral rather than bargained-for. Therefore, the termination of benefits outlined in an employer's handbooks did not constitute a breach of an employment agreement that could result in recoverable damages.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff-employees argued that a change in the Defendant-employer's policies and procedures involving the time paid out for accrued sick leave amounted to a material change in their employment agreement, and filed a class action against their employers when a benefit of paying out accrued sick leave was discontinued. The lower court held for the employer, granting their motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that manuals and handbooks outlining an employer's policies and procedures generally are not considered part of the employment contract on the reasoning that the policies are unilateral rather than bargained-for. Therefore, the termination of benefits outlined in an employer's handbooks did not constitute a breach of an employment agreement that could result in recoverable damages.
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Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 358 P.3d 131 (Mont. 2015)
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Montana | 2015 | Environment, Contamination |
State:
Montana
Year:
2015
Topics:
Environment, Contamination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, owners of properties allegedly contaminated by smelting operations, brought an action against the successor-in-interest of such operations, Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), asserting claims for negligence, public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, strict liability, constructive fraud, unjust enrichment, and wrongful occupation. Plaintiffs additionally sought damages for the cost of restoring their properties to their original condition. The district court granted ARCO's motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations, agreeing with ARCO that there was widespread awareness of the contamination, which had ceased 30 years earlier, and, thus, that Plaintiffs should have understood the facts underlying their claims, and timely asserted such claims. In doing so, the district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the continuing tort doctrine, which serves as an exception to the statute of limitations, applied, finding that application of the exception required evidence of continued migration of contaminants, which Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that application of the continuing tort doctrine did not require evidence that contaminants were continuing to migrate. Rather, the Supreme Court determined that while migration is an important factor, it is not determinative or required, and must be considered in light of the reasonable adaptability of the condition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that that the nuisance, trespass, strict liability, negligence, and wrongful occupation claims would not be time-barred if "it can be determined by a finder of fact that the contamination is reasonably abatable" and, therefore, continuing. However, the unjust enrichment and constructive fraud claims were not subject to the continuing tort doctrine and, thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs, owners of properties allegedly contaminated by smelting operations, brought an action against the successor-in-interest of such operations, Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), asserting claims for negligence, public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, strict liability, constructive fraud, unjust enrichment, and wrongful occupation. Plaintiffs additionally sought damages for the cost of restoring their properties to their original condition. The district court granted ARCO's motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations, agreeing with ARCO that there was widespread awareness of the contamination, which had ceased 30 years earlier, and, thus, that Plaintiffs should have understood the facts underlying their claims, and timely asserted such claims. In doing so, the district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the continuing tort doctrine, which serves as an exception to the statute of limitations, applied, finding that application of the exception required evidence of continued migration of contaminants, which Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that application of the continuing tort doctrine did not require evidence that contaminants were continuing to migrate. Rather, the Supreme Court determined that while migration is an important factor, it is not determinative or required, and must be considered in light of the reasonable adaptability of the condition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that that the nuisance, trespass, strict liability, negligence, and wrongful occupation claims would not be time-barred if "it can be determined by a finder of fact that the contamination is reasonably abatable" and, therefore, continuing. However, the unjust enrichment and constructive fraud claims were not subject to the continuing tort doctrine and, thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims.
Link to Opinion
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Christie v. Wayne State Univ., 993 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 2023)
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Michigan | 2023 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Disability Rights |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2023
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Disability Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff brought age and disability discrimination claims against her state university employer under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act following her termination in 2017. Plaintiff claims she worked for defendant for 40 years and received excellent performance evaluations before taking medical leave in 2017. Upon her return to work, Plaintiff alleges she was asked about her age and retirement plans before abruptly receiving her first negative performance review and being fired shortly thereafter. The Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the defendant approximately 17 months after the termination. The Supreme Court found in favor of Defendant and held that under Michigan law (MCL 600.6431(1)) all claims against the state (unless explicitly exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself) must be filed within 1 year after the claim has accrued.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff brought age and disability discrimination claims against her state university employer under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act following her termination in 2017. Plaintiff claims she worked for defendant for 40 years and received excellent performance evaluations before taking medical leave in 2017. Upon her return to work, Plaintiff alleges she was asked about her age and retirement plans before abruptly receiving her first negative performance review and being fired shortly thereafter. The Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the defendant approximately 17 months after the termination. The Supreme Court found in favor of Defendant and held that under Michigan law (MCL 600.6431(1)) all claims against the state (unless explicitly exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself) must be filed within 1 year after the claim has accrued.
Link to Opinion
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Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc. v. State Bd. of Educ., 262 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 2019)
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Florida | 2019 | Education, Access to Education / Funding |
State:
Florida
Year:
2019
Topics:
Education, Access to Education / Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Florida Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's argument that Florida's education system violated Article IX, Section 1(a) of the state constitution, which imposes a "paramount duty to make adequate provision for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education." Petitioners claimed the state was in breach of this duty, due to inadequate school funding and wide disparities in achievement among minority students and those in poorer school districts. The Supreme Court rejected this argument as a non-justiciable political question that would intrude into the legislative and executive branches, as the Court could not decide the appropriate amount of funding for education. With its decision, Florida's Supreme Court ended a lawsuit that had been pending for nearly ten years.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's argument that Florida's education system violated Article IX, Section 1(a) of the state constitution, which imposes a "paramount duty to make adequate provision for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education." Petitioners claimed the state was in breach of this duty, due to inadequate school funding and wide disparities in achievement among minority students and those in poorer school districts. The Supreme Court rejected this argument as a non-justiciable political question that would intrude into the legislative and executive branches, as the Court could not decide the appropriate amount of funding for education. With its decision, Florida's Supreme Court ended a lawsuit that had been pending for nearly ten years.
Link to Opinion
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Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Manor House, LLC, 313 So. 3d 579 (Fla. 2021)
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Florida | 2021 | Housing, Government Actions, Landlord Rights |
State:
Florida
Year:
2021
Topics:
Housing, Government Actions, Landlord Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingManor House, LLC, Ocean View, LLC and Merritt, LLC (collectively Manor House) filed a breach of contract action against Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state run property insurer, to recover extra-contractual, consequential damages for lost rental income as a result of delays in repairing nine hurricane damaged properties (owned by Manor and covered by Citizens) which Manor House claimed were caused by Citizen's procrastination in adjusting and paying claims. The circuit court granted Citizen's motions for partial summary judgment as to Manor House's claims for extra-contractual, consequential damages, but the court of appeals reversed. While the court of appeals acknowledged that the circuit court's finding that the insurance policy, covering the damaged properties, did not provide coverage for lost rent, an injured party in a breach of contract action, such as Manor House, was "entitled to recover monetary damages that will put it in the same position it would have been had the other party not breached the contract." The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Manor House could not recover extra-contractual, consequential damages for lost rental income, because the only amount due to the insured is the amount owed pursuant to the express terms and conditions of the policy. Significantly, the policy did not contemplate payment for lost rent. The Supreme Court indicated that extra-contractual damages could be available in a separate bad faith action pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 624.155, but were not recoverable in the action at issue because Citizens, as a government entity, was immune from first-party bad faith claims.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Manor House, LLC, Ocean View, LLC and Merritt, LLC (collectively Manor House) filed a breach of contract action against Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens), a state run property insurer, to recover extra-contractual, consequential damages for lost rental income as a result of delays in repairing nine hurricane damaged properties (owned by Manor and covered by Citizens) which Manor House claimed were caused by Citizen's procrastination in adjusting and paying claims. The circuit court granted Citizen's motions for partial summary judgment as to Manor House's claims for extra-contractual, consequential damages, but the court of appeals reversed. While the court of appeals acknowledged that the circuit court's finding that the insurance policy, covering the damaged properties, did not provide coverage for lost rent, an injured party in a breach of contract action, such as Manor House, was "entitled to recover monetary damages that will put it in the same position it would have been had the other party not breached the contract." The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Manor House could not recover extra-contractual, consequential damages for lost rental income, because the only amount due to the insured is the amount owed pursuant to the express terms and conditions of the policy. Significantly, the policy did not contemplate payment for lost rent. The Supreme Court indicated that extra-contractual damages could be available in a separate bad faith action pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 624.155, but were not recoverable in the action at issue because Citizens, as a government entity, was immune from first-party bad faith claims.
Link to Opinion
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Citizens Protecting Michigan's Const. v. Sec'y of State, 921 N.W.2d 247 (Mich. 2018)
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Michigan | 2018 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2018
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus ordering that Defendants, the Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers (the Board), reject an initiative petition filed by intervening defendant Voters Not Politicians (VNP) to place on the November 2018 general election ballot a proposed amendment of Article 4, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution that would create an independent citizens commission to oversee legislative redistricting. The issue is whether the voter-initiated amendment proposed by VNP should be placed on the ballot (i.e. is a constitutionally permissible voter-initiated amendment under Constitution 1963, art 12, § 2). The Supreme Court held that to be permissible, a voter-initiated amendment had to propose changes that did not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner equivalent to creating a new Constitution. They reasoned that the Michigan Constitution made it clear that a constitutional convention was required to produce a new Constitution, and the primary substantive limitation in the predecessor provision to art. 12, § 2 originally imposed on voter-initiated amendments was removed more than 100 years ago. The organization's amendment did not propose changes creating the equivalent of a new Constitution where the proposed redistricting commission was materially similar to the commission provided for in the current Constitution. The organization's proposed redistricting standards were similar to the ones presently used. VNP's proposal was found to be a permissible voter-initiated amendment under art. 12, § 2.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus ordering that Defendants, the Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers (the Board), reject an initiative petition filed by intervening defendant Voters Not Politicians (VNP) to place on the November 2018 general election ballot a proposed amendment of Article 4, § 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution that would create an independent citizens commission to oversee legislative redistricting. The issue is whether the voter-initiated amendment proposed by VNP should be placed on the ballot (i.e. is a constitutionally permissible voter-initiated amendment under Constitution 1963, art 12, § 2). The Supreme Court held that to be permissible, a voter-initiated amendment had to propose changes that did not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner equivalent to creating a new Constitution. They reasoned that the Michigan Constitution made it clear that a constitutional convention was required to produce a new Constitution, and the primary substantive limitation in the predecessor provision to art. 12, § 2 originally imposed on voter-initiated amendments was removed more than 100 years ago. The organization's amendment did not propose changes creating the equivalent of a new Constitution where the proposed redistricting commission was materially similar to the commission provided for in the current Constitution. The organization's proposed redistricting standards were similar to the ones presently used. VNP's proposal was found to be a permissible voter-initiated amendment under art. 12, § 2.
Link to Opinion
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Citizens v. Brown, 269 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2019)
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Florida | 2019 | Environment, Climate Change/Global Warming/Emissions |
State:
Florida
Year:
2019
Topics:
Environment, Climate Change/Global Warming/Emissions
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Office of the Public Counsel (OPC) brought suit against the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) after it approved the Florida Power and Light Company’s (FPL) request to recover environmental compliance costs from customers. FPL owns a power plant in South Florida with five power-generation units that are cooled using a closed-loop canal system, meaning no water is taken in or discharged. After decades of operations, the nearby groundwater and the water in the canal developed high levels of salinity. In 2009, FPL entered into an agreement with the South Florida Water Management District stating that the canal was not effective at limiting the amount of saline water that moved into groundwater and created a Monitoring Plan. In relation to this plan, the Commission approved FPL’s request to recover costs related to and anticipated by the plan. In 2015, FPL entered into a separate Consent Agreement requiring the company to “freshen” the canal system and construct related systems to reduce salinity and mitigate the environmental impacts of the canal’s contamination of nearby waters. Claiming that this Consent Agreement was an anticipated evolution of the 2009 Monitoring Plan, FPL successfully petitioned the Commission to recover related costs under a statute aimed at plans that “protect the environment.” OPC challenged the Commission’s approval on the grounds that the Consent Agreement’s goal was righting past harms caused by the canals which could not be protection of the environment because the environment was already harmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s approval of FPL’s cost recovery request, holding that the actions required under the Consent Agreement could be considered actions to protect the environment. The Court reasoned that the word “protect” has a clear and definite meaning that includes protecting currently uncontaminated ecosystems while simultaneously correcting harms that have already occurred. The Supreme Court also upheld the Commission’s determination that the Consent Agreement was an anticipated evolution of the Monitoring Plan because the determination was a finding of fact supported by competent and substantial evidence, not warranting a reversal.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Office of the Public Counsel (OPC) brought suit against the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) after it approved the Florida Power and Light Company’s (FPL) request to recover environmental compliance costs from customers. FPL owns a power plant in South Florida with five power-generation units that are cooled using a closed-loop canal system, meaning no water is taken in or discharged. After decades of operations, the nearby groundwater and the water in the canal developed high levels of salinity. In 2009, FPL entered into an agreement with the South Florida Water Management District stating that the canal was not effective at limiting the amount of saline water that moved into groundwater and created a Monitoring Plan. In relation to this plan, the Commission approved FPL’s request to recover costs related to and anticipated by the plan. In 2015, FPL entered into a separate Consent Agreement requiring the company to “freshen” the canal system and construct related systems to reduce salinity and mitigate the environmental impacts of the canal’s contamination of nearby waters. Claiming that this Consent Agreement was an anticipated evolution of the 2009 Monitoring Plan, FPL successfully petitioned the Commission to recover related costs under a statute aimed at plans that “protect the environment.” OPC challenged the Commission’s approval on the grounds that the Consent Agreement’s goal was righting past harms caused by the canals which could not be protection of the environment because the environment was already harmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s approval of FPL’s cost recovery request, holding that the actions required under the Consent Agreement could be considered actions to protect the environment. The Court reasoned that the word “protect” has a clear and definite meaning that includes protecting currently uncontaminated ecosystems while simultaneously correcting harms that have already occurred. The Supreme Court also upheld the Commission’s determination that the Consent Agreement was an anticipated evolution of the Monitoring Plan because the determination was a finding of fact supported by competent and substantial evidence, not warranting a reversal.
Link to Opinion
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City of Allentown v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Loc. 302, 157 A.3d 899 (Pa. 2017)
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Pennsylvania | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City of Allentown challenged an arbitration panel's imposition of a mandatory shift staffing provision, requiring a certain minimum number of firefighters on duty per shift, pursuant to the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111). The Supreme Court held that the issue of minimum number of firefighters on duty per shift was not a managerial prerogative but rather was a mandatory subject of interest bargaining and upheld the award.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The City of Allentown challenged an arbitration panel's imposition of a mandatory shift staffing provision, requiring a certain minimum number of firefighters on duty per shift, pursuant to the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111). The Supreme Court held that the issue of minimum number of firefighters on duty per shift was not a managerial prerogative but rather was a mandatory subject of interest bargaining and upheld the award.
Link to Opinion
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City of Arnold v. Wage Pol'y Comm. of City of Arnold Police Dep't, 171 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2017)
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Pennsylvania | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City of Arnold, Pennsylvania challenged an arbitrator’s decision to restore the survivor pension benefits of a police officer’s widow based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction given that the widow was not party to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court held that an arbitrator has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a union and a municipality arising out of a surviving spouse’s pension benefit, where the benefit was afforded to the surviving spouse statutorily and incorporated into the parties' CBA.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The City of Arnold, Pennsylvania challenged an arbitrator’s decision to restore the survivor pension benefits of a police officer’s widow based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction given that the widow was not party to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court held that an arbitrator has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a union and a municipality arising out of a surviving spouse’s pension benefit, where the benefit was afforded to the surviving spouse statutorily and incorporated into the parties' CBA.
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City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 794 S.E.2d 162 (Ga. 2016)
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Georgia | 2016 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2016
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City of Atlanta filed a declaratory judgment action in 2015 seeking guidance from the Supreme Court of Georgia as to whether (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without expanding the boundaries of the independent school system of the City to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of the City after the City annexed new property. The action was based on disputes over territory of school systems and the ownership of school property emanating from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. The Georgia General Assembly passed a local amendment in 1950 (1950 LCA) that determined that any school property within the annexed territory would become the property of the City of Atlanta. In 1950, independent school system of the City of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City's municipal government, but was separated into its own entity in 1973. Fulton County Public School District (FCS) moved to intervene on May 15, 2015 in response to the City's argument that 1950 LCA was not properly continued by HB 1620 and should be repealed. The trial court denied the City of Atlanta's motion for summary judgement, granted APS's motion for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and granted FCS's motion to dismiss the City's action. The trial court treated all motions as summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City of Atlanta appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court the trial court's ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued. APS cross-appealed contending that the trial court erred by not finding the City's declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court determined the issue was not ripe for consideration at the time the trial court considered the City's action and vacated the trial court's opinion. The Supreme Court stated that at the time that the trial court considered the motions of the parties, three communities in unincorporated Fulton County had submitted annexation petitions to become part of the City. However, there was no actual annexation of any of the properties. According to the Supreme Court, the trial court should have dismissed the action when filed. The case was vacated and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The City of Atlanta filed a declaratory judgment action in 2015 seeking guidance from the Supreme Court of Georgia as to whether (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without expanding the boundaries of the independent school system of the City to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of the City after the City annexed new property. The action was based on disputes over territory of school systems and the ownership of school property emanating from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. The Georgia General Assembly passed a local amendment in 1950 (1950 LCA) that determined that any school property within the annexed territory would become the property of the City of Atlanta. In 1950, independent school system of the City of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City's municipal government, but was separated into its own entity in 1973. Fulton County Public School District (FCS) moved to intervene on May 15, 2015 in response to the City's argument that 1950 LCA was not properly continued by HB 1620 and should be repealed. The trial court denied the City of Atlanta's motion for summary judgement, granted APS's motion for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and granted FCS's motion to dismiss the City's action. The trial court treated all motions as summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City of Atlanta appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court the trial court's ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued. APS cross-appealed contending that the trial court erred by not finding the City's declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court determined the issue was not ripe for consideration at the time the trial court considered the City's action and vacated the trial court's opinion. The Supreme Court stated that at the time that the trial court considered the motions of the parties, three communities in unincorporated Fulton County had submitted annexation petitions to become part of the City. However, there was no actual annexation of any of the properties. According to the Supreme Court, the trial court should have dismissed the action when filed. The case was vacated and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.
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City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 296 P.3d 461 (Mont. 2013)
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Montana | 2013 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Montana
Year:
2013
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant pled guilty to two misdemeanor sexual assaults in municipal court. As a condition to his probation, the municipal court required Defendant to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and a minimum of six months of therapy. The district court functioned as an intermediate appellate court, and upheld the probation condition, which Defendant appealed, objecting to any condition that he obtain a psychosexual evaluation. The Court held that Section 46-18-111, MCA, requires that a psychosexual evaluation be ordered when the defendant is convicted of an enumerated felony offense, but it does not prevent a court from ordering the evaluation for offenses other than those that are specifically enumerated. The Court agreed with the State's argument that § 46-18-111, MCA, does not categorically prohibit a court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, from ordering a psychosexual evaluation as a condition of a deferred sentence in order to determine what type and how much treatment is necessary for his rehabilitation. The Court noted that a sentencing condition must be reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation or the protection of the victim or society. The Court did not find that the municipal court abused its discretion in requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation, including because there was evidence supporting the municipal court's concerns regarding Defendant's mental health and emotional stability. The Court reasoned that the municipal court was required under the sentencing statutes to fashion a sentence that would address Defendant's need for counseling and rehabilitation, while additionally protecting the victim and the community by ensuring that Defendant received help and did not reoffend. A psychosexual assessment or evaluation was a reasonable first step in developing a counseling or treatment plan that addressed rehabilitation. The Court held that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the district court's decision upholding the municipal court's imposition of the condition that Defendant obtain a psychosexual evaluation.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant pled guilty to two misdemeanor sexual assaults in municipal court. As a condition to his probation, the municipal court required Defendant to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and a minimum of six months of therapy. The district court functioned as an intermediate appellate court, and upheld the probation condition, which Defendant appealed, objecting to any condition that he obtain a psychosexual evaluation. The Court held that Section 46-18-111, MCA, requires that a psychosexual evaluation be ordered when the defendant is convicted of an enumerated felony offense, but it does not prevent a court from ordering the evaluation for offenses other than those that are specifically enumerated. The Court agreed with the State's argument that § 46-18-111, MCA, does not categorically prohibit a court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, from ordering a psychosexual evaluation as a condition of a deferred sentence in order to determine what type and how much treatment is necessary for his rehabilitation. The Court noted that a sentencing condition must be reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation or the protection of the victim or society. The Court did not find that the municipal court abused its discretion in requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation, including because there was evidence supporting the municipal court's concerns regarding Defendant's mental health and emotional stability. The Court reasoned that the municipal court was required under the sentencing statutes to fashion a sentence that would address Defendant's need for counseling and rehabilitation, while additionally protecting the victim and the community by ensuring that Defendant received help and did not reoffend. A psychosexual assessment or evaluation was a reasonable first step in developing a counseling or treatment plan that addressed rehabilitation. The Court held that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the district court's decision upholding the municipal court's imposition of the condition that Defendant obtain a psychosexual evaluation.
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City of Guyton v. Barrow, 828 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 2019)
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Georgia | 2019 | Environment, Actions Against Government |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2019
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA property owner petitioned for review of an administrative law judge's decision affirming the issuance of a permit by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Department of Natural Resources to a city for a wastewater treatment facility. The Supreme Court held that Georgia’s antidegradation rule did not require EPD to complete antidegradation analysis for nonpoint source discharge prior to issuing permit to a city for operation of land application system for treated wastewater because the antidegradation rule merely satisfied state's requirement under the federal Clean Water Act to develop water quality standards applicable to point sources. (Point Sources are any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance such as a pipe, ditch, channel, or tunnel. Non-point sources are those that result from diffuse land use activities entering the waters primarily through indiscrete and less identifiable natural processes such as runoff, precipitation, and percolation.) The Supreme Court held that the text of antidegradation rule did not suggest broader application to include nonpoint sources and the statute requiring permit for nonpoint source discharge did not require antidegradation analysis. Therefore, regulations applicable to land application systems did not refer to antidegradation rule or otherwise require antidegradation analysis.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A property owner petitioned for review of an administrative law judge's decision affirming the issuance of a permit by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Department of Natural Resources to a city for a wastewater treatment facility. The Supreme Court held that Georgia’s antidegradation rule did not require EPD to complete antidegradation analysis for nonpoint source discharge prior to issuing permit to a city for operation of land application system for treated wastewater because the antidegradation rule merely satisfied state's requirement under the federal Clean Water Act to develop water quality standards applicable to point sources. (Point Sources are any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance such as a pipe, ditch, channel, or tunnel. Non-point sources are those that result from diffuse land use activities entering the waters primarily through indiscrete and less identifiable natural processes such as runoff, precipitation, and percolation.) The Supreme Court held that the text of antidegradation rule did not suggest broader application to include nonpoint sources and the statute requiring permit for nonpoint source discharge did not require antidegradation analysis. Therefore, regulations applicable to land application systems did not refer to antidegradation rule or otherwise require antidegradation analysis.
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City of Helena v. Cmty. of Rimini, 397 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2017)
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Montana | 2017 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2017
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that despite a period of non-use, a presumption of non-abandonment of water rights applied where the City of Helena (City) demonstrated its intent to use its entire water right in the future by: (1) constructing a conveyance with the capacity to utilize the City's complete water right; (2) commissioning a report regarding its future use of the water right; and (3) setting up a system to utilize the water right for emergency purposes. The case arose out of a protracted dispute between the City and junior water right holders, Andy Skinner and the Community of Rimini (collectively, the Junior Holders), who objected to the City’s claim to certain water from Tenmile Creek. In reviewing the original dispute, the water master found that the City had abandoned certain of its water rights to Tenmile Creek. The water court reversed and reinstated the City’s full water rights. The Junior Holders then appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the water court concluded that the City was generally entitled to a presumption of non-abandonment, but had abandoned a small portion—.60 cubic feet per second—of its water right. The Junior Holders appealed the ruling and, in reviewing that second appeal, the Supreme Court found that pursuant to a 2005 amendment to Montana Code Section 85-2-227, there was a presumption of non-abandonment for water rights claimed for municipal use by a city if any of four criteria, including the construction and maintenance of a diversion or conveyance structure, was met. Because the City had met the criteria, it was entitled to a presumption that it did not abandon its water right to Tenmile Creek, including the .60 cubic feet per second, notwithstanding any period of non-use. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the water court's conclusion that a presumption of non-abandonment applied to the City, reversed the water court’s determination that the City had abandoned .60 cubic feet per second of its water right, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding the City its full water right in Tenmile Creek.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Supreme Court held that despite a period of non-use, a presumption of non-abandonment of water rights applied where the City of Helena (City) demonstrated its intent to use its entire water right in the future by: (1) constructing a conveyance with the capacity to utilize the City's complete water right; (2) commissioning a report regarding its future use of the water right; and (3) setting up a system to utilize the water right for emergency purposes. The case arose out of a protracted dispute between the City and junior water right holders, Andy Skinner and the Community of Rimini (collectively, the Junior Holders), who objected to the City’s claim to certain water from Tenmile Creek. In reviewing the original dispute, the water master found that the City had abandoned certain of its water rights to Tenmile Creek. The water court reversed and reinstated the City’s full water rights. The Junior Holders then appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the water court concluded that the City was generally entitled to a presumption of non-abandonment, but had abandoned a small portion—.60 cubic feet per second—of its water right. The Junior Holders appealed the ruling and, in reviewing that second appeal, the Supreme Court found that pursuant to a 2005 amendment to Montana Code Section 85-2-227, there was a presumption of non-abandonment for water rights claimed for municipal use by a city if any of four criteria, including the construction and maintenance of a diversion or conveyance structure, was met. Because the City had met the criteria, it was entitled to a presumption that it did not abandon its water right to Tenmile Creek, including the .60 cubic feet per second, notwithstanding any period of non-use. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the water court's conclusion that a presumption of non-abandonment applied to the City, reversed the water court’s determination that the City had abandoned .60 cubic feet per second of its water right, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding the City its full water right in Tenmile Creek.
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City of Houston v. Proler, 437 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. 2014)
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Texas | 2014 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Disability Rights, Employment Discrimination |
State:
Texas
Year:
2014
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Disability Rights, Employment Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingShayn Proler was a firefighter with the Houston fire department. After being accused of not entering a burning apartment building, Proler was reassigned to the firefighter training academy. He objected to the reassignment and was eventually transferred back to a fire suppression crew, conditioned on periodic evaluations. Proler was later diagnosed with "global transient amnesia." After Proler was accused of not being aware of his surroundings and that he was either frightened or in the throes of an acute medical emergency, Proler was assigned to the training academy. Proler filed an administrative grievance seeking reassignment to a fire suppression unit. On administrative appeal, a hearing examiner sided with Proler, who was reassigned to fire suppression. The City appealed to the trial court, alleging jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act and chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. Proler counterclaimed for disability discrimination under federal and state law. Ultimately, after lower court decisions, Proler appealed the claims for disability discrimination to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court agreed with the City that Proler did not suffer from a “disability,” Proler was not reassigned on account of a disability, and that no evidence supported the jury’s findings on such issues. Particularly, the Court found that being unable to set aside the normal fear of entering a burning building is not a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity because “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Accordingly, because the Court found no evidence that Proler was unable to perform a major life activity, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's judgment granting injunctive relief and attorney fees on Proler's disability discrimination claims, and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those claims.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Shayn Proler was a firefighter with the Houston fire department. After being accused of not entering a burning apartment building, Proler was reassigned to the firefighter training academy. He objected to the reassignment and was eventually transferred back to a fire suppression crew, conditioned on periodic evaluations. Proler was later diagnosed with "global transient amnesia." After Proler was accused of not being aware of his surroundings and that he was either frightened or in the throes of an acute medical emergency, Proler was assigned to the training academy. Proler filed an administrative grievance seeking reassignment to a fire suppression unit. On administrative appeal, a hearing examiner sided with Proler, who was reassigned to fire suppression. The City appealed to the trial court, alleging jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act and chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. Proler counterclaimed for disability discrimination under federal and state law. Ultimately, after lower court decisions, Proler appealed the claims for disability discrimination to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court agreed with the City that Proler did not suffer from a “disability,” Proler was not reassigned on account of a disability, and that no evidence supported the jury’s findings on such issues. Particularly, the Court found that being unable to set aside the normal fear of entering a burning building is not a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity because “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Accordingly, because the Court found no evidence that Proler was unable to perform a major life activity, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court's judgment granting injunctive relief and attorney fees on Proler's disability discrimination claims, and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those claims.
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City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchs. Ass'n 550 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2018)
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Texas | 2018 | Environment, Actions against Government |
State:
Texas
Year:
2018
Topics:
Environment, Actions against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA merchants association brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that an ordinance making it unlawful for commercial establishments to provide single-use plastic or paper checkout bags to customers was unenforceable. The Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSDWA) provides that “[a] local government . . . may not adopt an ordinance . . . to . . . prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law.” At issue is whether the TSDWA preempts, and thus invalidates, a local anti-litter ordinance prohibiting merchants from providing “single use” plastic and paper bags to customers for point-of-sale purchases. The trial court upheld the ordinance, a divided court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Texas Supreme Court held that the ordinance was preempted by the TSDWA, because the ordinance’s stated purpose is to manage solid waste and as such the TSDWA prohibits such an ordinance’s adoption by the local government.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A merchants association brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that an ordinance making it unlawful for commercial establishments to provide single-use plastic or paper checkout bags to customers was unenforceable. The Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSDWA) provides that “[a] local government . . . may not adopt an ordinance . . . to . . . prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law.” At issue is whether the TSDWA preempts, and thus invalidates, a local anti-litter ordinance prohibiting merchants from providing “single use” plastic and paper bags to customers for point-of-sale purchases. The trial court upheld the ordinance, a divided court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Texas Supreme Court held that the ordinance was preempted by the TSDWA, because the ordinance’s stated purpose is to manage solid waste and as such the TSDWA prohibits such an ordinance’s adoption by the local government.
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City of Largo v. AHF-Bay Fund, LLC, 215 So. 3d 10 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Housing, Public Accommodation |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Housing, Public Accommodation
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner, the City of Largo (City), brought an action against an affordable housing property owner, Respondent AHF-Bay Fund (AHF), for failure to make payments under a payment in lieu of taxes agreement (PILOT Agreement), which was entered into by the City and AHF’s predecessor in interest. The City argued that under the PILOT Agreement, AHF was required to make payments that equaled the taxes that would otherwise have been owed in connection with AHF’s property but for Fla. Stat. § 196.1978, which provided that certain properties used for affordable housing shall be “exempt from ad valorem taxation . . . .” The circuit court disagreed, finding that the PILOT Agreement violated Fla. Stat. § 196.1978—which it said expressly prohibited ad valorem taxation on properties being used for affordable housing—and was against public policy. The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court reasoned that “the plain language of the statute [Fla. Stat. § 196.1978] does not [in fact] expressly prohibit ad valorem taxation” but rather merely provides an exemption to ad valorem taxation for nonprofit entities who take affirmative action to claim such an exemption. Because the exemption could be waived, and in this case had been waived when AHF’s predecessor in interest made the voluntary decision, via the PILOT Agreement to subject itself to payments equaling the ad valorem tax, the Supreme Court determined that the PILOT Agreement was valid. The Supreme Court indicated that the payments required by the PILOT Agreement were not a “tax” because they were not imposed unilaterally by the government, but rather were the result of a bilateral agreement between two consenting parties.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Petitioner, the City of Largo (City), brought an action against an affordable housing property owner, Respondent AHF-Bay Fund (AHF), for failure to make payments under a payment in lieu of taxes agreement (PILOT Agreement), which was entered into by the City and AHF’s predecessor in interest. The City argued that under the PILOT Agreement, AHF was required to make payments that equaled the taxes that would otherwise have been owed in connection with AHF’s property but for Fla. Stat. § 196.1978, which provided that certain properties used for affordable housing shall be “exempt from ad valorem taxation . . . .” The circuit court disagreed, finding that the PILOT Agreement violated Fla. Stat. § 196.1978—which it said expressly prohibited ad valorem taxation on properties being used for affordable housing—and was against public policy. The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court reasoned that “the plain language of the statute [Fla. Stat. § 196.1978] does not [in fact] expressly prohibit ad valorem taxation” but rather merely provides an exemption to ad valorem taxation for nonprofit entities who take affirmative action to claim such an exemption. Because the exemption could be waived, and in this case had been waived when AHF’s predecessor in interest made the voluntary decision, via the PILOT Agreement to subject itself to payments equaling the ad valorem tax, the Supreme Court determined that the PILOT Agreement was valid. The Supreme Court indicated that the payments required by the PILOT Agreement were not a “tax” because they were not imposed unilaterally by the government, but rather were the result of a bilateral agreement between two consenting parties.
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City of Las Vegas v. 180 Land Co., 546 P.3d 1239 (Nev. 2024)
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Nevada | 2024 | Environment, Actions Against Government, Conservation/Green Initiatives |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2024
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government, Conservation/Green Initiatives
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 1981, the City of Las Vegas zoned 2,200 acres of land called Peccole Ranch to allow for residential densities. In 1986 the City approved a request to zone Peccole Ranch for residential planned-unit development, including golf course acreage. The Peccole Ranch Golf Course was developed between 1992 and 1996. In 1992 the City adopted a new General Plan that classified the golf course as Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space (PR-OS). The land was not rezoned because the 1992 ordinance stated it would not modify or invalidate any zoning designation. A dispute arose when 180 Land Co. applied to develop a 35-acre section of the property, and the City of Las Vegas denied its applications based on significant public opposition and concerns over piecemeal development. 180 Land Co. sued the City for inverse condemnation. The district court found the land's zoning was for residential development and granted 180 Land's request that it was a taking. The Supreme Court found that the land was zoned for residential development, not PR-OS. On the taking's claim, the Supreme Court found it was a per se regulatory taking and 180 Land Co. was owed just compensation. The Court found that the zoning ordinance trumps the designation on the master plan.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 1981, the City of Las Vegas zoned 2,200 acres of land called Peccole Ranch to allow for residential densities. In 1986 the City approved a request to zone Peccole Ranch for residential planned-unit development, including golf course acreage. The Peccole Ranch Golf Course was developed between 1992 and 1996. In 1992 the City adopted a new General Plan that classified the golf course as Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space (PR-OS). The land was not rezoned because the 1992 ordinance stated it would not modify or invalidate any zoning designation. A dispute arose when 180 Land Co. applied to develop a 35-acre section of the property, and the City of Las Vegas denied its applications based on significant public opposition and concerns over piecemeal development. 180 Land Co. sued the City for inverse condemnation. The district court found the land's zoning was for residential development and granted 180 Land's request that it was a taking. The Supreme Court found that the land was zoned for residential development, not PR-OS. On the taking's claim, the Supreme Court found it was a per se regulatory taking and 180 Land Co. was owed just compensation. The Court found that the zoning ordinance trumps the designation on the master plan.
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City of Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist., 307 P.3d 317 (Mont. 2013)
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Montana | 2013 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2013
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City sought judicial review of a decision of the Park Conservation District (PCD) that a certain channel adjacent to a river was part of the natural watercourse of the river and therefore subject to the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act (the Act). The district court affirmed. The City appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Under the Act, a person intending to engage in a “project” to alter or modify the “state of a natural, perennial-flowing stream or river, its bed, or its immediate banks” must notify the applicable local conservation district. A conservation district, when considering whether a river or a portion of it falls under the Act, must base its decision on the “totality of the circumstances demonstrated by the factual record" and the nature of the channel is an important consideration. The City contended that the district court should not have upheld the PCD's decision and pointed to various documents in the record in which the channel was referred to as a "ditch." The City argued that the PCD ignored this evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed determining that the fact that the water right claimants and others referred to as a ditch has marginal relevance to the issue of whether this specific channel comes under the Act. The PCD was not required to defer to references to the channel as a ditch when the actual physical characteristics of the channel clearly showed that it was natural and not a man-made ditch.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The City sought judicial review of a decision of the Park Conservation District (PCD) that a certain channel adjacent to a river was part of the natural watercourse of the river and therefore subject to the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act (the Act). The district court affirmed. The City appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Under the Act, a person intending to engage in a “project” to alter or modify the “state of a natural, perennial-flowing stream or river, its bed, or its immediate banks” must notify the applicable local conservation district. A conservation district, when considering whether a river or a portion of it falls under the Act, must base its decision on the “totality of the circumstances demonstrated by the factual record" and the nature of the channel is an important consideration. The City contended that the district court should not have upheld the PCD's decision and pointed to various documents in the record in which the channel was referred to as a "ditch." The City argued that the PCD ignored this evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed determining that the fact that the water right claimants and others referred to as a ditch has marginal relevance to the issue of whether this specific channel comes under the Act. The PCD was not required to defer to references to the channel as a ditch when the actual physical characteristics of the channel clearly showed that it was natural and not a man-made ditch.
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City of Missoula v. Fox, 450 P.3d 898 (Mont. 2019)
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Montana | 2019 | Criminal Justice |
State:
Montana
Year:
2019
Topics:
Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved § 45-8-351(2) MCA (now repealed) which provided for an exception to the general prohibition upon local government regulation of the purchase, sale or transfer of firearms. In September 2016, the City of Missoula, a self-governing municipality, adopted an ordinance requiring background checks on firearm transfers. The stated rationale for the ordinance was to "close a loophole" in federal law that allowed firearm transfers involving private unlicensed dealers to be without a background check, thus facilitating the transfer of guns to convicted felons and other individuals otherwise banned from owning firearms. The Attorney General later issued an opinion stating that the ordinance violated the Montana State Constitution because Section 45-8-351 generally provides that cities "may not prohibit, register, tax, license, or regulate the purchase, sale or other transfer" of firearms. The district court held that Missoula, a self-governing municipality, may require background checks on firearm transfers without violating the statutory prohibition on local government regulation of purchase, sale, or other transfer of firearms. The Court reversed. The Court noted that the ordinance, as well as the City's arguments and the district court's order, failed to properly apply the standards of statutory interpretation and failed to account for the remaining language within §45-8-351 MCA. The statute explicitly prohibits cities from regulating "purchase," "sale," "other transfer," "ownership," "transportation," and "use." So the ordinance, at a minimum, regulates, in violation of subsection §45-8-351(2) MCA, the "purchase," "sale," and "other transfer" of firearms and "not merely by those who are convicted felons" or otherwise banned from owning firearms, but by everyone who engages in a transaction with a private, unlicensed dealer who does not qualify for an exception under the ordinance. The Court held that while the powers of self-governing local governments must be liberally construed, this presumption cannot override specific legislative preemption.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
This case involved § 45-8-351(2) MCA (now repealed) which provided for an exception to the general prohibition upon local government regulation of the purchase, sale or transfer of firearms. In September 2016, the City of Missoula, a self-governing municipality, adopted an ordinance requiring background checks on firearm transfers. The stated rationale for the ordinance was to "close a loophole" in federal law that allowed firearm transfers involving private unlicensed dealers to be without a background check, thus facilitating the transfer of guns to convicted felons and other individuals otherwise banned from owning firearms. The Attorney General later issued an opinion stating that the ordinance violated the Montana State Constitution because Section 45-8-351 generally provides that cities "may not prohibit, register, tax, license, or regulate the purchase, sale or other transfer" of firearms. The district court held that Missoula, a self-governing municipality, may require background checks on firearm transfers without violating the statutory prohibition on local government regulation of purchase, sale, or other transfer of firearms. The Court reversed. The Court noted that the ordinance, as well as the City's arguments and the district court's order, failed to properly apply the standards of statutory interpretation and failed to account for the remaining language within §45-8-351 MCA. The statute explicitly prohibits cities from regulating "purchase," "sale," "other transfer," "ownership," "transportation," and "use." So the ordinance, at a minimum, regulates, in violation of subsection §45-8-351(2) MCA, the "purchase," "sale," and "other transfer" of firearms and "not merely by those who are convicted felons" or otherwise banned from owning firearms, but by everyone who engages in a transaction with a private, unlicensed dealer who does not qualify for an exception under the ordinance. The Court held that while the powers of self-governing local governments must be liberally construed, this presumption cannot override specific legislative preemption.
Link to Opinion
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City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 419 P.3d 1208 (Mont. 2018)
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Montana | 2018 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Montana
Year:
2018
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAt a University of Montana football game, a peace officer on patrol for underage drinking noticed that Defendant was unsteady and walking arm-in-arm with a friend. Noting the apparent level of intoxication, the officer asked both girls if they were okay and requested their ID's. Defendant could not provide an ID and told the officer that she was no longer a student at the University of Montana. The name and date of birth (DOB) provided by Defendant did not appear in the University's database, leading the officer to believe that she was lying. The officer escorted her to a secluded room in the stadium where she and another officer continued the questioning until the Defendant eventually relented and provided her real name and DOB, which confirmed she was only 20. The officers issued her an order to appear before the Missoula Municipal Court on a misdemeanor minor in possession of intoxicating substance (MIP) offense and a charge of obstructing a police officer's investigation. At trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of her age, arguing that the officers subjected her to a custodial investigation without advising her of her constitutional rights and unreasonably prolonged the investigation. The Municipal Court denied the motion and later found Defendant guilty of MIP. The district court affirmed and Defendant appealed. The Court held that the district court correctly concluded that there was particularized suspicion for the stop and brief questioning about her name and age, and to run such information through the school's database. The Court held, however, that a continuing investigative stop and the related continued questioning did "ripen into a custodial investigation" without a Miranda advisory and warning in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
At a University of Montana football game, a peace officer on patrol for underage drinking noticed that Defendant was unsteady and walking arm-in-arm with a friend. Noting the apparent level of intoxication, the officer asked both girls if they were okay and requested their ID's. Defendant could not provide an ID and told the officer that she was no longer a student at the University of Montana. The name and date of birth (DOB) provided by Defendant did not appear in the University's database, leading the officer to believe that she was lying. The officer escorted her to a secluded room in the stadium where she and another officer continued the questioning until the Defendant eventually relented and provided her real name and DOB, which confirmed she was only 20. The officers issued her an order to appear before the Missoula Municipal Court on a misdemeanor minor in possession of intoxicating substance (MIP) offense and a charge of obstructing a police officer's investigation. At trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of her age, arguing that the officers subjected her to a custodial investigation without advising her of her constitutional rights and unreasonably prolonged the investigation. The Municipal Court denied the motion and later found Defendant guilty of MIP. The district court affirmed and Defendant appealed. The Court held that the district court correctly concluded that there was particularized suspicion for the stop and brief questioning about her name and age, and to run such information through the school's database. The Court held, however, that a continuing investigative stop and the related continued questioning did "ripen into a custodial investigation" without a Miranda advisory and warning in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
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City of Missoula v. Metz, 451 P.3d 530 (Mont. 2019)
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Montana | 2019 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct |
State:
Montana
Year:
2019
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant pled no lo contendere in the Municipal Court to driving under the influence after denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a field sobriety test. A local resident called the police to request that someone check on Defendant, who was in his car outside a local park and did not seem to be moving. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer approached Defendant's car, and Defendant sat up, made eye contact, and rolled down the window to speak to the officer. Defendant argued that the "community caretaker stop" (or "welfare check") ended there—when it was clear he was okay—and that the officer lacked particularized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after the completion of the welfare check. The State argued that the officer obtained particularized suspicion to perform DUI-related investigatory stop prior to the completion of the welfare check because prior to the officer being able to ascertain if Defendant was in need of assistance, he became aware of evidence that the driver had consumed alcohol. The Court held that the municipal court was "flatly wrong," and that a community caretaker stop (or welfare check) must be terminated once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or in need of assistance. Here, none of the officers involved in the encounter even asked about Defendant's welfare. Instead, they assumed he was a potentially intoxicated driver and ran checks on his identification and whether there were any warrants outstanding. Eventually, medical personnel arrived in an ambulance that was called as part of the welfare check. When the medical personnel asked if Defendant was okay or needed help, the officer immediately sent them away. The Court concluded that while the initial contact with Defendant was valid under the community caretaker doctrine, "[v]irtually immediately upon arriving and speaking with [Defendant], it [was] obvious [that officer] was assured that [Defendant] was not in peril or in need of assistance." Therefore, asking Defendant to step out of his car was a seizure that needed to be supported by particularized suspicion, which the officer did not have.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant pled no lo contendere in the Municipal Court to driving under the influence after denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a field sobriety test. A local resident called the police to request that someone check on Defendant, who was in his car outside a local park and did not seem to be moving. Upon arriving at the scene, the officer approached Defendant's car, and Defendant sat up, made eye contact, and rolled down the window to speak to the officer. Defendant argued that the "community caretaker stop" (or "welfare check") ended there—when it was clear he was okay—and that the officer lacked particularized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after the completion of the welfare check. The State argued that the officer obtained particularized suspicion to perform DUI-related investigatory stop prior to the completion of the welfare check because prior to the officer being able to ascertain if Defendant was in need of assistance, he became aware of evidence that the driver had consumed alcohol. The Court held that the municipal court was "flatly wrong," and that a community caretaker stop (or welfare check) must be terminated once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or in need of assistance. Here, none of the officers involved in the encounter even asked about Defendant's welfare. Instead, they assumed he was a potentially intoxicated driver and ran checks on his identification and whether there were any warrants outstanding. Eventually, medical personnel arrived in an ambulance that was called as part of the welfare check. When the medical personnel asked if Defendant was okay or needed help, the officer immediately sent them away. The Court concluded that while the initial contact with Defendant was valid under the community caretaker doctrine, "[v]irtually immediately upon arriving and speaking with [Defendant], it [was] obvious [that officer] was assured that [Defendant] was not in peril or in need of assistance." Therefore, asking Defendant to step out of his car was a seizure that needed to be supported by particularized suspicion, which the officer did not have.
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City of Phx. v. Garretson, 322 P.3d 149 (Ariz. 2014)
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Arizona | 2014 | Housing, Government Actions |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2014
Topics:
Housing, Government Actions
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingProperty owner sought damages, under the eminent domain provision contained in the Arizona state constitution for complete and permanent loss of one of the access points to his property, via a specific abutting street (Jefferson Street), after the City of Phoenix installed light rail tracks and erected a permanent concrete barrier blocking vehicular access to the property. Importantly, the property still had access via a different street (Madison Street). The superior court granted the city’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for a loss of access if the property owner retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the ruling, holding that "when the government eliminates a property owner's established access to an abutting street and the owner retains access from another street, the owner is not necessarily foreclosed from obtaining compensation for damages to the property under the Arizona Constitution." The Supreme Court agreed, holding that a property owner may be entitled to compensation if the government, in the exercise of its police power, eliminates the owner's established access to an abutting roadway, even if other streets provide access to the property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the property owner had a claim for compensation under the eminent domain provision of the Arizona State Constitution when the City completely eliminated his preexisting access to a specific street (Jefferson Street), leaving no means of ingress or egress to that street or any replacement roadway in that location, notwithstanding that access was still available from another street (Madison Street).
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Property owner sought damages, under the eminent domain provision contained in the Arizona state constitution for complete and permanent loss of one of the access points to his property, via a specific abutting street (Jefferson Street), after the City of Phoenix installed light rail tracks and erected a permanent concrete barrier blocking vehicular access to the property. Importantly, the property still had access via a different street (Madison Street). The superior court granted the city’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for a loss of access if the property owner retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the ruling, holding that "when the government eliminates a property owner's established access to an abutting street and the owner retains access from another street, the owner is not necessarily foreclosed from obtaining compensation for damages to the property under the Arizona Constitution." The Supreme Court agreed, holding that a property owner may be entitled to compensation if the government, in the exercise of its police power, eliminates the owner's established access to an abutting roadway, even if other streets provide access to the property. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the property owner had a claim for compensation under the eminent domain provision of the Arizona State Constitution when the City completely eliminated his preexisting access to a specific street (Jefferson Street), leaving no means of ingress or egress to that street or any replacement roadway in that location, notwithstanding that access was still available from another street (Madison Street).
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City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 161 A.3d 160 (Pa. 2017)
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Pennsylvania | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Pennsylvania legislature repealed residency requirements in the Policeman’s Civil Services Act, which had required police officers to be residents of the city at the time of employment. The Act now provides “[a] city of the second class may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” As a result, residency requirements became mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and applicable case law. The City of Pittsburgh entered into negotiations with a police union. The parties reached an impasse, and an interest arbitration award resulted in a 25-air mile radius residency requirement rather than a City-only residency requirement. During arbitration, voters of the City of Pittsburg passed a referendum to amend the city’s home rule charter to require all city officials, including police, to reside within the City of Pittsburg. The Supreme Court held that a municipality's home rule charter provision eliminating a mandatory subject of bargaining for its police officers is expressly preempted and upheld the interest arbitration award.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Pennsylvania legislature repealed residency requirements in the Policeman’s Civil Services Act, which had required police officers to be residents of the city at the time of employment. The Act now provides “[a] city of the second class may require a police officer to become a bona fide resident as a condition of employment.” As a result, residency requirements became mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111), the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and applicable case law. The City of Pittsburgh entered into negotiations with a police union. The parties reached an impasse, and an interest arbitration award resulted in a 25-air mile radius residency requirement rather than a City-only residency requirement. During arbitration, voters of the City of Pittsburg passed a referendum to amend the city’s home rule charter to require all city officials, including police, to reside within the City of Pittsburg. The Supreme Court held that a municipality's home rule charter provision eliminating a mandatory subject of bargaining for its police officers is expressly preempted and upheld the interest arbitration award.
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City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 224 A.3d 702 (Pa. 2020)
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Pennsylvania | 2020 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2020
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA police union challenged the City of Pittsburg’s failure to pay appropriate overtime through arbitration and won. The City of Pittsburg challenged the arbitrator’s decision as legally flawed. The Supreme Court held that even if incorrect, the arbitrator’s decision was binding on the City of Pittsburg. The Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111) has a strong presumption in favor of finality for arbitration awards, which may only be vacated in instances of overt reform of a collective bargaining agreement, not because of the arbitrator’s erroneous interpretations or applications of law
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A police union challenged the City of Pittsburg’s failure to pay appropriate overtime through arbitration and won. The City of Pittsburg challenged the arbitrator’s decision as legally flawed. The Supreme Court held that even if incorrect, the arbitrator’s decision was binding on the City of Pittsburg. The Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111) has a strong presumption in favor of finality for arbitration awards, which may only be vacated in instances of overt reform of a collective bargaining agreement, not because of the arbitrator’s erroneous interpretations or applications of law
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City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 437 P.3d 865 (Ariz. 2019)
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Arizona | 2019 | Environment, Actions against Government |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2019
Topics:
Environment, Actions against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2017, City of Surprise documented its intent to condemn the assets of Circle City Water Company (City Circle), a public service corporation. A residential developer contended that “Circle City [was] obliged under an existing contract to allocate its . . . water for a planned development” and asked the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) to step in after Surprise stated it had no obligation to provide water under the contract. ACC ordered Circle City to file an application to seek authorization from ACC to go forward with its transfer of assets to Surprise and requested a copy of the draft condemnation agreement and a writing to confirm whether Surprise would “assume Circle City’s water contract with the developer.” Surprise filed a special action, alleging that the Commission “acted without jurisdiction” in entering its order. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction over this special action to determine whether a state law that restricts the sale transfer of assets of a utility allows the ACC to condemn the utility and force a transfer. A.R.S § 40-285 provides, "[a] public service corporation shall not sell, lease, assign, mortgage or otherwise dispose of . . . its . . . system . . . without first having secured from the commission an order authorizing it so to do.” The Supreme Court held that the statute does “not give the Commission power over a city’s exercise of eminent domain” and that the ACC "has no role to play in condemnations." Because the statute does not contemplate condemnation, the Supreme Court held that the interpretation of ACC's authority turns on the words "otherwise dispose of" since condemnation is neither sale not a voluntary transfer. The Supreme Court held that condemnations are not covered by the statute since “sell, lease, assign” and “mortgage” are all voluntary transactions, and a condemnation, in contrast, is an involuntary governmental taking of assets.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2017, City of Surprise documented its intent to condemn the assets of Circle City Water Company (City Circle), a public service corporation. A residential developer contended that “Circle City [was] obliged under an existing contract to allocate its . . . water for a planned development” and asked the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) to step in after Surprise stated it had no obligation to provide water under the contract. ACC ordered Circle City to file an application to seek authorization from ACC to go forward with its transfer of assets to Surprise and requested a copy of the draft condemnation agreement and a writing to confirm whether Surprise would “assume Circle City’s water contract with the developer.” Surprise filed a special action, alleging that the Commission “acted without jurisdiction” in entering its order. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction over this special action to determine whether a state law that restricts the sale transfer of assets of a utility allows the ACC to condemn the utility and force a transfer. A.R.S § 40-285 provides, "[a] public service corporation shall not sell, lease, assign, mortgage or otherwise dispose of . . . its . . . system . . . without first having secured from the commission an order authorizing it so to do.” The Supreme Court held that the statute does “not give the Commission power over a city’s exercise of eminent domain” and that the ACC "has no role to play in condemnations." Because the statute does not contemplate condemnation, the Supreme Court held that the interpretation of ACC's authority turns on the words "otherwise dispose of" since condemnation is neither sale not a voluntary transfer. The Supreme Court held that condemnations are not covered by the statute since “sell, lease, assign” and “mortgage” are all voluntary transactions, and a condemnation, in contrast, is an involuntary governmental taking of assets.
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Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. (CCSD) v. Bryan, 478 P.3d 344 (Nev. 2020)
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Nevada | 2020 | LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Youth, LGBTQ+ Discrimination |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2020
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Youth, LGBTQ+ Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs sued a school district for student-on-student harassment after two sixth-graders targeted Plaintiffs' children with sexual slurs, other insults, and physical assaults under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs also claimed the school district failed to conduct an official investigation as required under Nevada law (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388.1351) or to prevent continued harassment. The trial court found for Plaintiffs and the school district appealed. The Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that Title IX's protections against sex-based discrimination extend to prohibit discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals and discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation, as in both situations the perpetrator's view of the victim's sexual orientation is a factor motivating the harassment. The case was reversed and remanded on other grounds.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs sued a school district for student-on-student harassment after two sixth-graders targeted Plaintiffs' children with sexual slurs, other insults, and physical assaults under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs also claimed the school district failed to conduct an official investigation as required under Nevada law (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388.1351) or to prevent continued harassment. The trial court found for Plaintiffs and the school district appealed. The Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that Title IX's protections against sex-based discrimination extend to prohibit discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals and discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation, as in both situations the perpetrator's view of the victim's sexual orientation is a factor motivating the harassment. The case was reversed and remanded on other grounds.
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Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 403 P.3d 1270 (Nev. 2017)
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Nevada | 2017 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA middle school student injured his eye while participating in a floor hockey game during his mandatory physical education class. As a result of his injury, Payo required eye surgery and follow-up care in the following years. Eight years after the initial injury, the now-adult Payo filed a complaint against the school district alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and negligent supervision. Upon motion by the school district, the district court dismissed the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligence per se, while maintaining the claims of negligence and negligent supervision. Following trial, the jury found in favor of Payo and awarded damages. The School District appealed, arguing that the former student's claims were barred under the implied assumption of risk doctrine, that the claims should have been dismissed under the discretionary-function-immunity doctrine (where government defendants enjoy immunity from negligence claims for discretionary functions when the defendant has relied on some policy consideration in exercising their discretion), and that the evidence presented had not supported a finding of proximate causation. First, the Supreme Court held that the implied assumption of risk doctrine does not apply when individuals are required to participate in physical education activities and there is no voluntary exposure to a risk. Second, the Court further held that the discretionary-function-immunity applied to the school district's decision to add floor hockey to its curriculum and to not provide safety equipment. Nonetheless, this immunity did not excuse liability for allegedly negligent administration, instruction, and supervision of the physical education curriculum. Finally, the Court held that Payo had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of proximate causation. While Payo had presented evidence indicating that certain parts of the floor hockey game were improper and outside the scope of the district's rules (such as team size, type of ball used, supervision, etc.), Payo had not demonstrated that any of these were the cause of, or contributed to, the injuries sustained. Lacking proximate causation, the jury could not have properly reached a negligence verdict on the evidence provided.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A middle school student injured his eye while participating in a floor hockey game during his mandatory physical education class. As a result of his injury, Payo required eye surgery and follow-up care in the following years. Eight years after the initial injury, the now-adult Payo filed a complaint against the school district alleging negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and negligent supervision. Upon motion by the school district, the district court dismissed the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligence per se, while maintaining the claims of negligence and negligent supervision. Following trial, the jury found in favor of Payo and awarded damages. The School District appealed, arguing that the former student's claims were barred under the implied assumption of risk doctrine, that the claims should have been dismissed under the discretionary-function-immunity doctrine (where government defendants enjoy immunity from negligence claims for discretionary functions when the defendant has relied on some policy consideration in exercising their discretion), and that the evidence presented had not supported a finding of proximate causation. First, the Supreme Court held that the implied assumption of risk doctrine does not apply when individuals are required to participate in physical education activities and there is no voluntary exposure to a risk. Second, the Court further held that the discretionary-function-immunity applied to the school district's decision to add floor hockey to its curriculum and to not provide safety equipment. Nonetheless, this immunity did not excuse liability for allegedly negligent administration, instruction, and supervision of the physical education curriculum. Finally, the Court held that Payo had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of proximate causation. While Payo had presented evidence indicating that certain parts of the floor hockey game were improper and outside the scope of the district's rules (such as team size, type of ball used, supervision, etc.), Payo had not demonstrated that any of these were the cause of, or contributed to, the injuries sustained. Lacking proximate causation, the jury could not have properly reached a negligence verdict on the evidence provided.
Link to Opinion
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Clark Cnty. v. Bean, 482 P.3d 1207 (Nev. 2020)
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Nevada | 2020 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2020
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA retired firefighter sought permanent partial disability benefits under a previous version of the governing Nevada statute. The retiree argued that the reasoning in DeMaranville v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada, 448 P.3d 526 (Nev. 2019) (DeMaranville) controlled (concluding that a retiree was entitled to death benefits based on the wages earned immediately before retirement) and that he was entitled to a benefits award, while Clark County argued that the reasoning in Howard v. City of Las Vegas, 120 P.3d 410, 412 (Nev. 2005) controlled (concluding that a workers' compensation claimant is not entitled to total temporary disability benefits for an occupational disease manifesting after retirement), negating any benefits award. The Supreme Court held that DeMaranville's analysis of compensation for death benefits (retiree died from a compensable occupational disease years after retiring) was applicable because the regulation governing the calculation of compensation for both types of benefits is the same and that compensation for the employee's permanent partial disability rating must be based on the wages he earned before retiring.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A retired firefighter sought permanent partial disability benefits under a previous version of the governing Nevada statute. The retiree argued that the reasoning in DeMaranville v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada, 448 P.3d 526 (Nev. 2019) (DeMaranville) controlled (concluding that a retiree was entitled to death benefits based on the wages earned immediately before retirement) and that he was entitled to a benefits award, while Clark County argued that the reasoning in Howard v. City of Las Vegas, 120 P.3d 410, 412 (Nev. 2005) controlled (concluding that a workers' compensation claimant is not entitled to total temporary disability benefits for an occupational disease manifesting after retirement), negating any benefits award. The Supreme Court held that DeMaranville's analysis of compensation for death benefits (retiree died from a compensable occupational disease years after retiring) was applicable because the regulation governing the calculation of compensation for both types of benefits is the same and that compensation for the employee's permanent partial disability rating must be based on the wages he earned before retiring.
Link to Opinion
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Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. and Conservation, 481 P.3d 198 (Mont. 2021)
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Montana | 2021 | Environment, Water Rights, Actions against the government |
State:
Montana
Year:
2021
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights, Actions against the government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Montana Supreme Court upheld a Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) decision to grant RC Resources, Inc. (RCR) a water use permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA), which governs who, how much, and for what purpose persons may use water in Montana. In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court striking down the permit thereby rejecting the district court's conclusion that the "legal demands" language of the MWUA required the DNRC to evaluate consumer classification-based nondegredation standards under the Montana Water Quality Act (MWQA), given such were relevant to water quality rather than water availability, which was the subject of the MWUA. The Supreme Court further rejected arguments by the objectors to the permit that the MWUA violated their right to a clean and healthful environment under the state constitution, by denying them an opportunity for advance MWQA compliance review by DNRC as part of the MWUA water use permitting process, given the permit at issue did not authorize degradation of affected surface waters subject to advance environmental review and regulation under more specifically-applicable state and federal regulations. Indeed, the MWUA permit at issue only gave RCR the right to appropriate and use a particular quantum of water for a proposed use and did not directly authorize the mining activity which would be the direct cause of any potential degradation, whether by contaminant discharge or groundwater depletion. If and when the proposed use— i.e. the mining—was independently authorized to proceed it would be subject to a Montana Metal Reclamation Act (MMRA) review, which would incorporate review of the use with MWQA nondegredation standards. Accordingly, the Court found that the limited scope of the MWQA review, in connection with issuance of the MWUA Permit, did not substantially interfere with objectors' right to a clean and healthful environment under the constitution.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Montana Supreme Court upheld a Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) decision to grant RC Resources, Inc. (RCR) a water use permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA), which governs who, how much, and for what purpose persons may use water in Montana. In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court striking down the permit thereby rejecting the district court's conclusion that the "legal demands" language of the MWUA required the DNRC to evaluate consumer classification-based nondegredation standards under the Montana Water Quality Act (MWQA), given such were relevant to water quality rather than water availability, which was the subject of the MWUA. The Supreme Court further rejected arguments by the objectors to the permit that the MWUA violated their right to a clean and healthful environment under the state constitution, by denying them an opportunity for advance MWQA compliance review by DNRC as part of the MWUA water use permitting process, given the permit at issue did not authorize degradation of affected surface waters subject to advance environmental review and regulation under more specifically-applicable state and federal regulations. Indeed, the MWUA permit at issue only gave RCR the right to appropriate and use a particular quantum of water for a proposed use and did not directly authorize the mining activity which would be the direct cause of any potential degradation, whether by contaminant discharge or groundwater depletion. If and when the proposed use— i.e. the mining—was independently authorized to proceed it would be subject to a Montana Metal Reclamation Act (MMRA) review, which would incorporate review of the use with MWQA nondegredation standards. Accordingly, the Court found that the limited scope of the MWQA review, in connection with issuance of the MWUA Permit, did not substantially interfere with objectors' right to a clean and healthful environment under the constitution.
Link to Opinion
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Clark v. State, 883 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. 2023)
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Georgia | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury found the Defendant guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with a shooting death of one individual and the aggravated assault of another. On appeal, the Defendant contented that the trial court applied the wrong standard when it admitted an audio recording of the Defendant’s interview with the lead investigator. The Defendant was 16 at the time of the recording and argued that because of his age, the trial court was required to consider the nine factors set out in Riley v. State to analyze whether the juvenile Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976). The factors that must be considered are as follows: (1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date." Riley, 226 S.E.2d at 926. Taking this as an opportunity to clarify Riley and its progeny, the Supreme Court explained how the nine-factor framework is in tension with the totality-of-the-circumstances test for juvenile waiver set forth in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Fare and Riley, taken together, stand for the proposition that, when a juvenile is involved, “the question of whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police interrogation.” Norris v. State, 651 S.E.2d 40, 41 (Ga. 2007). Because the proper application of a totality of the circumstances test requires inquiry into matters that may fall outside of Riley’s 9 factors, the Court disapproved decisions post-Riley that indicated the framework is required for the analysis. Going forward, Georgia courts will no longer be required to consider Riley's framework. Instead, the issue of whether a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his or her Miranda rights depends on the totality of the circumstances. Because the trial court applied that approach, the Defendant’s claim failed on appeal.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A jury found the Defendant guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with a shooting death of one individual and the aggravated assault of another. On appeal, the Defendant contented that the trial court applied the wrong standard when it admitted an audio recording of the Defendant’s interview with the lead investigator. The Defendant was 16 at the time of the recording and argued that because of his age, the trial court was required to consider the nine factors set out in Riley v. State to analyze whether the juvenile Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1976). The factors that must be considered are as follows: (1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date." Riley, 226 S.E.2d at 926. Taking this as an opportunity to clarify Riley and its progeny, the Supreme Court explained how the nine-factor framework is in tension with the totality-of-the-circumstances test for juvenile waiver set forth in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Fare and Riley, taken together, stand for the proposition that, when a juvenile is involved, “the question of whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police interrogation.” Norris v. State, 651 S.E.2d 40, 41 (Ga. 2007). Because the proper application of a totality of the circumstances test requires inquiry into matters that may fall outside of Riley’s 9 factors, the Court disapproved decisions post-Riley that indicated the framework is required for the analysis. Going forward, Georgia courts will no longer be required to consider Riley's framework. Instead, the issue of whether a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his or her Miranda rights depends on the totality of the circumstances. Because the trial court applied that approach, the Defendant’s claim failed on appeal.
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Clarke v. Fine Hous., Inc., 882 S.E.2d 763 (S.C. 2023)
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South Carolina | 2023 | Housing, Landlord Rights |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2023
Topics:
Housing, Landlord Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingBarry Clarke sued Fine Housing, Inc. for specific performance of a right of first refusal (ROFR). Clarke, who owned a strip club, had a recorded lease with Group Investment Company, Inc. for half the parking spaces at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue. Section 1.1 of the Lease states the Lessee rents the property described in Exhibit A. Section 2.1, in turn, defines the premises as unimproved parking spaces for shared use by both parties. Section 7.1 grants each party use of half the parking spaces, and Clarke admitted his rights were limited to the parking spaces during the Lease term. However, Clarke argued Section 5.2 of the Lease provided him with a ROFR to buy the entire Subject Property. Section 5.2 states, “Right of First Refusal: Lessor grants the Lessee the right of first refusal should it wish to sell." Section 5.2 did not specify whether the ROFR applied to the parking spaces or the entire Subject Property, nor did the Lease outline the purchase price or procedures for exercising the right. In 2007, Group Investment transferred the property to RRJR, LLC (RRJR) for $5. Clarke did not exercise his ROFR, claiming both entities were "the same people." In 2013, RRJR sold the property to Fine Housing for $150,000 without notifying Clarke. Clarke leaned of the sale in 2014 and filed an action for specific performance in 2015. The district court upheld the ROFR, but the court of appeals overturned the decision. Here, the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that the South Carolina common law right of first refusal requires the property owner, when they decide to sell, to first offer the property to the holder of the ROFR. This restrains an owner's power of alienation. There is a restatement factor test to determine whether a right of first refusal unreasonably restrains alienation. The factors include: (1) the legitimacy of the purpose of the right; (2) the price at which the right may be exercised; and (3) the procedures for exercising the right. Here, the Court held that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. First, the Court found that the Lease is unclear as to whether the ROFR encumbers all of the Subject Property or only the leased parking spaces, and this uncertainty as to what property is encumbered by the ROFR supports the conclusion that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Second, the Court held that the complete absence of any method for determining price weighs in favor of a finding that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation, because where a ROFR provides no price terms, a dispute may arise as to whether the holder of the right may purchase the property by matching a third-party offer or only after participating in a bidding war with other prospective buyers. Lastly, the Court held that the ROFR does not provide satisfactory procedures governing the exercise of the right.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Barry Clarke sued Fine Housing, Inc. for specific performance of a right of first refusal (ROFR). Clarke, who owned a strip club, had a recorded lease with Group Investment Company, Inc. for half the parking spaces at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue. Section 1.1 of the Lease states the Lessee rents the property described in Exhibit A. Section 2.1, in turn, defines the premises as unimproved parking spaces for shared use by both parties. Section 7.1 grants each party use of half the parking spaces, and Clarke admitted his rights were limited to the parking spaces during the Lease term. However, Clarke argued Section 5.2 of the Lease provided him with a ROFR to buy the entire Subject Property. Section 5.2 states, “Right of First Refusal: Lessor grants the Lessee the right of first refusal should it wish to sell." Section 5.2 did not specify whether the ROFR applied to the parking spaces or the entire Subject Property, nor did the Lease outline the purchase price or procedures for exercising the right. In 2007, Group Investment transferred the property to RRJR, LLC (RRJR) for $5. Clarke did not exercise his ROFR, claiming both entities were "the same people." In 2013, RRJR sold the property to Fine Housing for $150,000 without notifying Clarke. Clarke leaned of the sale in 2014 and filed an action for specific performance in 2015. The district court upheld the ROFR, but the court of appeals overturned the decision. Here, the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that the South Carolina common law right of first refusal requires the property owner, when they decide to sell, to first offer the property to the holder of the ROFR. This restrains an owner's power of alienation. There is a restatement factor test to determine whether a right of first refusal unreasonably restrains alienation. The factors include: (1) the legitimacy of the purpose of the right; (2) the price at which the right may be exercised; and (3) the procedures for exercising the right. Here, the Court held that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. First, the Court found that the Lease is unclear as to whether the ROFR encumbers all of the Subject Property or only the leased parking spaces, and this uncertainty as to what property is encumbered by the ROFR supports the conclusion that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Second, the Court held that the complete absence of any method for determining price weighs in favor of a finding that the ROFR is an unreasonable restraint on alienation, because where a ROFR provides no price terms, a dispute may arise as to whether the holder of the right may purchase the property by matching a third-party offer or only after participating in a bidding war with other prospective buyers. Lastly, the Court held that the ROFR does not provide satisfactory procedures governing the exercise of the right.
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Clean Air Council v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 289 A.3d 928 (Pa. 2023).
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Pennsylvania | 2023 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2023
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved a challenge to the Environmental Hearing Board's (Board) rule that a private party to an appeal before the Board may not be compelled to reimburse another party unless it pursued or defended the appeal in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The Supreme Court held that this rule was incompatible with Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law. This decision makes it easier for members of the public to get reimbursed for legal costs when they are harmed by polluters and bring successful lawsuits.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
This case involved a challenge to the Environmental Hearing Board's (Board) rule that a private party to an appeal before the Board may not be compelled to reimburse another party unless it pursued or defended the appeal in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The Supreme Court held that this rule was incompatible with Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law. This decision makes it easier for members of the public to get reimbursed for legal costs when they are harmed by polluters and bring successful lawsuits.
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Clean Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 961 N.W.2d 346 (Wis. 2021)
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Wisconsin | 2021 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2021
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) approved a dairy farm's (Kinnard's) application to expand its operation to build a second site and add 3,000 dairy cows. The application required that Kinnard also apply for a reissuance of its Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination Permit System (WPDES) permit for the expanded operation. The DNR approved both. The petitioners-environmental advocacy organizations in this appeal (collectively "Clean Wisconsin") sought review of the issuance of the WPDES permit because they lived near the dairy operation, had private drinking wells, and were concerned that the expansion would increase the risk of groundwater contamination issues. Clean Wisconsin alleged that the reissued permit was inadequate because it did not set a "maximum number of animal units" or "require monitoring to evaluate impacts to groundwater." The petition was initially heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who heard testimony from community members who spoke to the preexisting contamination issues from the Kinnard farm and its impact on their businesses, homes, and lives. The community members all cited the farm as the source of the contamination. Experts also testified on contamination in the community, including that 50% of the private wells in the town were contaminated, 30% had tested positive for E. coli bacteria, and that the land of the Kinnard operation was extremely susceptible to groundwater contamination. Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that DNR should have imposed an "animal unit maximum" to cap the number of animals allowed at the dairy operation, and imposed a groundwater monitoring plan to ensure that the Kinnard farm was meeting its legal obligation under Wis. Admin. Code Sect. NR 243.14(2)(b) to not contaminate well water with manure. The ALJ ordered that the DNR modify the permit with these two measures, the DNR implemented them, and Kinnard farm appealed the implementation. The Supreme Court considered whether the DNR had the explicit authority to implement each of these standards. Kinnard argued that Wisc. Stat. Sect. 227.10(2m) did not explicitly authorize the DNR to impose the two modifications to the WPDES permit, but the DNR and Clean Wisconsin argued that Wisc. Stat. Sect. 283.31(3) allowed the DNR to issue permits for "the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants..." such that the permit complied with "groundwater protection standards." Because both the animal unit maximum and the groundwater monitoring plan were imposed to protect the town's groundwater, the Supreme Court found that under Wisc. Stat. Sect. 283.31, the DNR had explicit authority to impose both modifications to the reissued permit.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) approved a dairy farm's (Kinnard's) application to expand its operation to build a second site and add 3,000 dairy cows. The application required that Kinnard also apply for a reissuance of its Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination Permit System (WPDES) permit for the expanded operation. The DNR approved both. The petitioners-environmental advocacy organizations in this appeal (collectively "Clean Wisconsin") sought review of the issuance of the WPDES permit because they lived near the dairy operation, had private drinking wells, and were concerned that the expansion would increase the risk of groundwater contamination issues. Clean Wisconsin alleged that the reissued permit was inadequate because it did not set a "maximum number of animal units" or "require monitoring to evaluate impacts to groundwater." The petition was initially heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who heard testimony from community members who spoke to the preexisting contamination issues from the Kinnard farm and its impact on their businesses, homes, and lives. The community members all cited the farm as the source of the contamination. Experts also testified on contamination in the community, including that 50% of the private wells in the town were contaminated, 30% had tested positive for E. coli bacteria, and that the land of the Kinnard operation was extremely susceptible to groundwater contamination. Based on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that DNR should have imposed an "animal unit maximum" to cap the number of animals allowed at the dairy operation, and imposed a groundwater monitoring plan to ensure that the Kinnard farm was meeting its legal obligation under Wis. Admin. Code Sect. NR 243.14(2)(b) to not contaminate well water with manure. The ALJ ordered that the DNR modify the permit with these two measures, the DNR implemented them, and Kinnard farm appealed the implementation. The Supreme Court considered whether the DNR had the explicit authority to implement each of these standards. Kinnard argued that Wisc. Stat. Sect. 227.10(2m) did not explicitly authorize the DNR to impose the two modifications to the WPDES permit, but the DNR and Clean Wisconsin argued that Wisc. Stat. Sect. 283.31(3) allowed the DNR to issue permits for "the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants..." such that the permit complied with "groundwater protection standards." Because both the animal unit maximum and the groundwater monitoring plan were imposed to protect the town's groundwater, the Supreme Court found that under Wisc. Stat. Sect. 283.31, the DNR had explicit authority to impose both modifications to the reissued permit.
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