State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Puglia filed an action against a former employer under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), claiming that his employment was terminated after he complained about his employer's failure to pay him in accord with the Prevailing Wage Act. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that such state-law claim is preempted by federal labor law on multiple grounds and the appellate court agreed. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that a collective bargaining agreement cannot be used by an employer as a defense to a CEPA claim. Also, the Supreme Court found that whether the Plaintiff was terminated because of his complaints was a question of fact and therefore summary judgment should have been denied.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a middle school teacher who had Type 1 diabetes and was injured in school during a hypoglycemic event, sued the Board of Education, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) for failure to accommodate her diabetes. The Superior Court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, and denied the teacher's motion for reconsideration on the ground that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not fired or reassigned, and thus did not have a prima facie claim. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants stating that the LAD's broad remedial purpose may permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who failed to reasonably accommodate disabilities. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that an adverse employment action is not a required element for a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD and concluded that plaintiff’s LAD claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition is not barred by the state's Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). This decision clarified the required elements of a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability under the LAD and also held that the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude LAD claims because it would purportedly result in a “double recovery” to successful plaintiffs.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn consolidated actions, patient's estate and patient's husband brought an action against defendants including physician, hospital's chief executive officer (CEO), and hospital's director of risk management, asserting claims including for malpractice, lack of informed consent, products liability, and punitive damages arising from patient's death from leiomyosarcoma following a laparoscopic hysterectomy performed at the hospital with the use of a power morcellation device. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, which the Superior Court denied. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) the alleged acts or omissions of physician were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages, and (2) the alleged acts or omissions of hospital executives also were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages. Under the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, punitive damages are available only in exceptional cases.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a state trooper, filed suit against his employer New Jersey State Police (NJSP) for racial and disability discrimination. Plaintiff asserted that the NJSP failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disabling medical condition -- ulcerative colitis -- in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In addition, plaintiff complained of retaliatory conduct in violation of the LAD, ADA, and New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). The Superior Court granted a directed verdict for NJSP in part, and, after the trial, entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the remaining claims based on the ADA and CEPA. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) NJSP did not waive its sovereign immunity defense by raising it after the jury's verdict; (2) NJSP was not equitably estopped from raising sovereign immunity defense; (3) CEPA waiver provision did not bar trooper's LAD claim because waiver exception does not apply to those causes of action that are substantially independent of the CEPA claim; (4) the issue of whether NJSP failed to accommodate trooper under the LAD was for a jury to decide; and (5) interests of justice required reinstatement of improperly dismissed LAD claim.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA retired member of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) sought review of PFRS Board of Trustees' (Board) decision to uphold the Division of Pension and Benefits' denial of the member's request to reassign survivors' benefits from his disabled son as an individual to special needs trust (SNT) in his son's name, due to the Board's strict view of how to implement the word “child” in the survivors' benefits statute. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that SNT was permitted to stand in the son's place as beneficiary to whom survivors' benefits were due as both the federal government's Supplemental Security Income and related medical assistance programs and New Jersey's SNT statutes permit the use of self-settled SNTs. The Supreme Court noted that the Board's action requires a disabled child of a PFRS retiree to choose between abandoning the survivors' benefits earned by his parent or forgoing public assistance programs for his medical needs, such choice is unnecessary and unwarranted, and that the Board advances no legitimate public policy through its rigid interpretation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff's work (i.e., removing an old advertisement from a billboard that was raised 59 feet from the ground, attaching extensions using angle irons, nuts, bolts, and nails that would change the dimensions of the billboard to accommodate a new advertisement with different measurements, and then attaching the new advertisement itself) was included in the activities protected under Labor Law § 240(1). Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals found the plaintiff's work to be "altering," under the definition adopted in Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457 (1998), as the work was "a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” that was not “routine maintenance” or “decorative modification."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a teacher who alleged misconduct by her school's principal. Plaintiff alleged that she was fired as a result of discrimination and/or retaliation in the form of homophobic remarks and falsified reports to the Department of Education. The case was dismissed by the New York Supreme Court, because the court found insufficient evidence to show that the homophobic comments made by the employer were related to the firing. The court stated there was no proof that the Principal would not have made the same decision had the Plaintiff's sexuality been unknown or unconsidered. However, the Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence related to the homophobic remarks and other actions taken against the Plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, and the trial court should determine as a matter of triable fact how much the Plaintiff's sexuality weighed into the firing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue in this appeal was whether plaintiff— who acknowledged he was lawfully terminated when convicted of a criminal offense while working for defendant— adequately alleged that defendant violated the antidiscrimination statutes when it denied plaintiff’s application for employment following the completion of a brief jail sentence. Correction Law article 23-A and Executive Law § 296(15) protect certain individuals convicted of criminal offenses from unlawful discrimination when applying for employment or licensing, preventing employers from denying an application for employment solely because the applicant was previously convicted of a criminal offense, subject to certain exceptions. After reviewing the statutory language, framework, and legislative history, the Court of Appeals determined that nothing indicated a legislative intent to exempt a previous employer from the statutes’ reach. Moreover, the undefined term “application,” read in context and given its ordinary meaning, is reasonably interpreted to refer to a request for employment, an event the Court of Appeals recognized may take various forms in different circumstances and which may trigger coverage under the statutes. The Court of Appeals held that the statutes’ application requirement is met when, viewed objectively and in light of the relevant circumstances, an employer would reasonably understand the communications from a prospective employee to be a request for employment. Under the liberal pleading standard for a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint adequately alleged facts supporting the inference that plaintiff applied for employment and was denied solely due to his conviction—and did not compel the conclusion that plaintiff merely protested a lawful termination decision.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a non-native English speaker from Argentina, was laid off as part of a company-wide reduction in force and brought action against the company, alleging retaliatory discharge. The employment application between the Plaintiff and the company included a provision requiring the Plaintiff to agree to bring any employment-related cause of action against the company within six months of the challenged employment action and waive any applicable statute of limitations. The Superior Court granted employer's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint as time-barred, as the Plaintiff filed his complaint nine months after his alleged wrongful termination. The employee appealed. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) a private agreement that frustrates the public-purpose imperative of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) by shortening the two-year limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced, and (2) provision of employment application shortening two-year limitations period for claims under LAD was unconscionable. In other words, the Supreme Court argued that the statute of limitations under the LAD cannot be shortened by private contract.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was working with the Millville Rescue Squad (MRS) and began an extramarital affair with an MRS volunteer and Plaintiff’s co-employee wife learned of the affair and reported it to Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. A year later, Plaintiff was terminated from his position, allegedly for “poor work performance” although he had never been subject to formal discipline during the term of his employment. Plaintiff brought action against MRS for violating the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging he was terminated because of his marital status after he revealed that he and his co-employee wife were separated after the affair led to irreconcilable discord between the Plaintiff and his wife. Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal, which the Superior Court granted on the ground that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements required to succeed on his gender and marital status LAD claims. Employee appealed. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the LAD’s prohibition against discrimination based on “marital status” extends to a person who has separated from their spouse and is in the process of obtaining a divorce. The Supreme Court held that: (1) “marital status” within the meaning of LAD included those who are single or married and those who are in transition from one "status" to another, and (2) evidence presented a jury question regarding whether the employee was terminated because of his marital status.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company hired to provide janitorial services for a retail store, was injured when he fell from a four-foot-tall ladder while dusting a six-foot-high display shelf. He brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against J. Crew, the retail store, and The Mercer I LLC, the building owner. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. J. Crew moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that plaintiff was not engaged in a "cleaning" activity within the meaning of the statute. Outside the context of commercial window washing, the Court of Appeals determined that an activity cannot be characterized as "cleaning" under Labor Law § 240(1) if it is routine (in the sense that it occurs frequently); it requires neither specialized equipment or expertise, nor the unusual deployment of labor; it involves insignificant elevation related risks comparable to those inherent in typical domestic cleaning; and is unrelated to any ongoing construction, renovation, painting, alteration or repair project. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dusting of a six-foot-high display shelf could not be characterized as "cleaning" but was routine maintenance, falling outside the ambit of the statute.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRespondent owns and operates a sand and gravel mine on a 50-acre property in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County. In 2019, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved Respondent's permit to increase the depth of its mining operations, finding that the proposed sand mine deepening would not significantly impact groundwater quality, air quality, traffic or solid waste production. The petitioners -- the Town of Southampton, several neighboring landowners, and civic and environmental organizations -- brought an action against Respondent and the DEC to annul the 2019 renewal permit. Petitioners argued that Respondent improperly sought to expand the mine's operations through a renewal permit to avoid the restrictions of the state's Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), which bars the DEC from processing all permits to mine in covered counties, including applications for renewal and modification permits when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined." While the Court of Appeals held the ECL contemplates that a mining applicant may have prior non-conforming use rights and requires DEC to defer to local town zoning laws when reviewing applications for mining permits, it rejected Respondent's claim that mine owners have a constitutional right to mine their parcels to an indefinite depth. As a result the Court of Appeals held that the permits must be annulled since the extent of Respondent's prior non-conforming use could not be determined. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court to remand to DEC for further proceedings.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff reported alleged misconduct engaged in by the then-Commissioner and First Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation to his immediate supervisor and the agency's Inspector General. After plaintiff was retaliated against for his report, he commenced an action pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75-b (the statute governing retaliatory action by public employers). Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to comply with Civil Service Law § 75-b by not reporting the allegedly wrongful actions to the appointing authority (which under these facts were the defendants) before reporting to the Inspector General. The Court of Appeals held that because plaintiff's appointing authorities were defendants, and because he understandably did not report their alleged misconduct to them, strict compliance with the reporting requirements of Civil Service Law § 75-b would not serve the purpose of the statute - therefore, plaintiff's good faith effort to comply was sufficient under Civil Service Law § 75-b.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Court of Appeals was whether New York education law permits a county to charge back to a town the amount the county paid on behalf of town residents for attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Court of Appeals held that the county can collect chargebacks. Under New York education law, funding for community colleges is derived from the state, the local sponsor, and individual students. For nonresident students, meaning students who live within New York but outside the region where the community college is located, the local sponsor can chargeback the operating costs to towns and cities in the student's county of residence. FIT, which originally only offered two-year associate degree programs, was authorized in 1975 to expand to bachelors and masters degree programs while still being financed and administered as a community college. Because the expansion of degree programs resulted in higher operating costs, in 1994 the state passed a law that obligated the state to reimburse counties for charges incurred for nonresident students attending FIT, but stopped appropriating finds for the reimbursement in 2001. In 2011 the county where FIT is located claimed chargebacks from a town for its nonresident students at FIT. the town argued that the county lacked authority to claim chargebacks because the 1994 statute made the state the sole source for reimbursement and that, even if the county could claim chargebacks that they should be limited to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals found that the county was entitled to claim the chargebacks because the 1994 statute did not expressly or impliedly repeal the law that gave the county the ability to seek chargebacks. Rather reimbursement can be obtained from either the state or the town. The Court of Appeals also found that chargebacks should not be limited to two-year degree programs because the 1975 law that expanded FIT's programs stated that the school should be financed and administered as a community college without limiting it to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals also held that the county had the authority to offset amounts from the towns share of sales tax revenue.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involves the review of an arbitrator's award denying petitioner's funds pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Act), which creates a means by which the state can "provide monies for a swift and sure response to environmental contamination from the discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances." (cleaned up). In order to resolve disputes over denied fund monies, the Act uses arbitrators and flexible procedures to allow claimants the opportunity to demonstrate the denial was arbitrary and capricious action. The petitioner's claim was denied and he filed an appeal, but two years elapsed between the appeal request and the commencement of the appeal. In addition, on appeal, the arbitrator rejected the use of additional scientific material resulting in an allegedly flawed decision that petitioner contended is based on misconceptions by the arbitrator about the evidence on the record. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new arbitration proceeding due to concerns regarding the substantive reasoning of the arbitrator's decision and the procedural fairness considerations, which, the Supreme Court noted, undermined confidence in the outcome of the arbitration enough to persuade the Supreme Court, in the interest of fairness, to require a new arbitration be conducted.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBased on negative reviews from customers alleging fraudulent activity, Postmates (an on-demand delivery business that solicits employees and couriers using a website and smartphone application) blocked claimant from using the application. Thereafter, claimant filed for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor (DOL), based in part on a statement of the claimant, initially determined that claimant was an employee of Postmates, requiring that Postmates pay unemployment insurance contributions on the claimant's earnings, as well as on the earnings of "all other persons similarly employed." Postmates disputed the determination and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) who sustained Postmates' objection, concluding that claimant was an independent contractor and reasoning that Postmates did not exercise sufficient supervision, direction and control over claimant to establish an employer-employee relationship. The Commissioner appealed the ALJ's decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board), which reversed the ALJ, overruled Postmates' objection and sustained the DOL's initial determination. Postmates appealed to the Appellate Division - who reversed the Board's ruling. The Commissioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that couriers hired by Postmates Inc. are employees for whom Postmates is required to make unemployment insurance fund contributions, as opposed to independent contractors. Noting that the touchstone of the analysis is whether the employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve those results — and recognizing that the relevant indicia of control vary depending on the nature of the work — the Court concluded the Board’s finding was supported by record evidence that Postmates dominated significant aspects of its couriers’ work by dictating to whom they can deliver, where to deliver requested items, effectively limiting the time frame for delivery and controlling all aspects of pricing and payment. The fact that the couriers could choose their work schedules (by logging into the application) and specific delivery routes did not dictate a finding that they were independent contractors operating their own businesses.