State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFollowing the November 6, 2012 general election, with a 63,141 to 63,104 vote margin for the election for the office of State Senator for the 46th Senate District, candidates for political office sued the New York State Board of Elections challenging 216 affidavit ballots and 53 special ballots cast by Ulster County election inspectors more than two weeks before the election. The Supreme Court upheld objections to 209 affidavit ballots on the grounds that they contained inaccurate or incomplete information and allowed the other 7 to be canvassed, i.e., counted in the election. The Supreme Court held that the 53 special ballots would not count. On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court's decision regarding the 216 affidavit ballots but determined that the 53 special ballots cast by election inspectors would be canvassed since Election Law § 11-30 required only that the Election Board provide the ballots not more than two weeks before the election but did not explicitly say the earliest time voters had to return ballots. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied a motion for leave to appeal of the decision. Judge Graffeo dissented arguing that the court should review whether such an exception to statutory compliance should be made in the special ballot context.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs sought certification of a class of home health care aides for alleged violations of the Labor Law based on their respective employer’s failure to pay putative class members a required minimum wage for each hour of a 24- hour shift. Under a New York Department of Labor (DOL) wage order, plaintiffs’ employers were required to pay the minimum wage “for the time an employee is permitted to work, or is required to be available for work at a place prescribed by the employer.” DOL interpreted the wage order to require payment of the minimum wage for at least 13 hours of a 24-hour shift if the employee is allowed a sleep break of at least 8 hours — and actually receives five hours of uninterrupted sleep — and three hours of meal break time. The Court of Appeals held that DOL’s long-standing interpretation of its wage order was rational and therefore entitled to deference. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals noted that DOL’s interpretation was grounded in its specialized knowledge and experience of both round-the-clock work assignments and the home health care industry. While determining that plaintiffs were not entitled to payment of the minimum wage for each hour in a 24-hour shift if they received the requisite sleep and meal breaks, the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of additional grounds for class certification, including defendants’ alleged failure to adequately compensate home health care aides when they did not receive the minimum sleep and meal breaks.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Ardan, who suffered from “chronic neck, lower-back, and left-knee pain,” began working at a medical center as a nurse and her job duties required her to “walk substantial distances,” and to bend and lift, which aggravated her ailments. She resigned from her position at the medical center and accepted a desk job as a healthcare communicator to ease the strain on her body. After seven weeks at her new job, Ardan was terminated. Ardan applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. Ardan sought judicial review of the decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development that had denied her unemployment benefits. The appellate court held that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) required employees to notify their employers of medical conditions which were exacerbated by the work, request accommodations, and give the employers the “opportunity to address the matter to determine whether there was other suitable work available.” The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, stating that a claimant still needs to notify the employer of medical conditions and request accommodations before resigning, in order to meet the “burden to demonstrate the unavailability of alternative suitable work,” although it held that the statute does not contain such a "notice-and-inquiry" requirement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of public school students, primarily located in New York City, sued the state alleging that the state deprived students of their state constitutional right to a sound basic education by not complying with school funding requirements as defined by the Court of Appeals. The parents also claimed the students were denied constitutional rights based on the state's withholding of funds from districts that did not implement the state's annual performance review system. The New York Constitution mandates that the legislature provide a system of free education. In a series of cases known as the "Campaign for Fiscal Equity" litigation, the Court of Appeals set a floor for the standard of education required by the state constitution, holding that the state constitution requires education to include basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills for children to function productively as civic participants. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the plaintiffs adequately plead violations of the state constitutional right to education and held that (1) pleadings challenging the right to education must be school district-specific; (2) claims for constitutional violations could not be based on the argument that the state's funding was not as good as the proposed funding scheme deemed adequate in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation; and (3) claims for constitutional violations were adequate where they alleged a causal link between school funding and deficient inputs (e.g., lack of qualified teachers and materials) and deficient outputs (e.g., test scores).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, two former Starbucks baristas, brought a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Starbucks' policy of including shift supervisors in the tip pools was unlawful under Labor Law § 196-d. Plaintiffs claimed that shift supervisors should not be able to receive distributions from a store's tip pool because they are Starbucks "agents" who may not "demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee" (Labor Law § 196-d). In a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals was asked whether the tip-sharing policy established by Starbucks was legal under Labor Law § 196-d. Deferring in part to the interpretation of the New York Department of Labor (the agency charged with enforcing the statute) the Court of Appeals determined that (i) tip pools should be limited to those employees who customarily serve customers at Starbucks establishments, even if those employees sometimes perform supervisory duties, and (ii) employees who possess considerable authority and control over subordinates, such as the power to make hiring and firing determinations, are not eligible to participate in the tip pools.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, over thirty landowners, entered into separate oil and gas leases with Victory Energy Corporation under which Plaintiffs leased drilling rights to Victory. Victory shared its leasehold interests with Megaenergy Inc. Inflection Energy LLC then assumed from Megaenergy the operational rights and responsibilities under most of the leases. Each of these leases contained a force majeure clause which provided that nonperformance may be excused under certain circumstances. The leases also contained identical "habendum clauses," clauses which are typically found in standard oil and gas leases used to fix the lease duration, establishing the period during which the energy companies could exercise the drilling rights granted by the leases. Then-Governor of New York David Paterson ordered a formal public environmental review to address the impact of combined use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling. As a result, the state Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) informed the public that no permits for fracking would be issued until the DEC issued its required findings statement. After the primary term of the leases had expired, Plaintiffs commenced a declaratory judgment action against Inflection, Victory, and Megaenergy, seeking a declaration that the leases had expired by their own terms. The energy companies counterclaimed for a declaration that each lease was extended by operation of the force majeure clause, arguing the New York moratorium on the use of horizonal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracking triggered this clause. The Court of Appeals held that the force majeure clause did not modify the habendum clause, and therefore the leases terminated at the conclusion of their primary terms.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff sued Defendant Ciripompa, a tenured high school teacher, who allegedly had been using his school-issued laptop and iPad to send nude photographs of himself and to engage in inappropriate conversations with others. Further allegations arose accusing Defendant of inappropriate behavior towards other colleagues, often in the presence of students. The school board sought to terminate Defendant based, in relevant part, upon the evidence of inappropriate behavior. Because Defendant was a tenured teacher, the request for dismissal was submitted to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the school board's allegations of inappropriate behavior constituted a claim for sexual harassment requiring a showing that a reasonable woman would consider the behaviors of the aggressor to create a hostile work environment. The arbitrator found that the teacher's conduct did not meet this standard. The school board appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that an arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon the parties but remains subject to judicial review and enforcement, but also held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by converting the charge of unbecoming conduct into one of sexual harassment, and tasking the board with substantiating the charge of sexual harassment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital, alleging deviations from standards of medical care in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of her pelvic abscess due to a perforated appendix. The Superior Court determined that a report containing the hospital's self-critical analysis of patient's care included information on a Serious Preventable Adverse Event (SPAE) and ordered hospital to release to patient a redacted version of the report. The hospital sought leave to appeal. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed. Patient sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that: (1) although the trial court correctly determined that it could review in camera the facts underlying what the hospital concluded was not a SPAE, the trial court exceeded its authority in declaring that a SPAE had occurred; (2) the finding that an event is not reportable as a SPAE does not abrogate the self-critical-analysis privilege under the Patient Safety Act (PSA), which unconditionally protects the process of self-critical analysis, the analysis' results, and the resulting reports developed by a facility in its compliance with the PSA; but (3) patient was entitled, as a response to her discovery request, to have hospital provide a narrative to steer her to information contained in the approximately 4,500 pages of medical records that would lead her to the discrete yet interconnected notations of an apparent adverse incident, even though the hospital's self-critical analysis of a possible SPAE that happened to patient was privileged under the PSA; patient was unquestionably entitled to the raw data contained in her patient records.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient filed a medical malpractice suit against hospital, nurse, respiratory therapist, and physician, alleging that her infant was negligently deprived of oxygen at birth, resulting in brain damage. The Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County, denied patient's motion to compel production of investigative document relating to infant's birth because the hospital had substantially complied with the Patient Safety Act (Act) in its investigation, and thus the memorandum was subject to the Act's absolute privilege. Patient sought leave to appeal. After initially granting the appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, vacated its order and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court denied patient's motion to compel. Patient sought leave to appeal, which was granted. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendants filed motion for leave to appeal, which was granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the document was not discoverable under the Act, because it was developed in process of self-critical analysis conducted as part of a patient safety plan that met statutory criteria, and was thus privileged. Other material facts were that (1) the director of patient safety recorded in the document that it was created pursuant to the Act, (2) assured participants in a discussion that led to the creation of the document that their disclosures would be kept confidential, and (3) discussion was part of the investigation into whether the infant's birth was a serious, preventable, adverse event that should be reported under the Act.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA group of longtime heavy smokers brought a putative class action against Philip Morris USA alleging that cigarettes contained unnecessarily dangerous levels of carcinogens. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the smokers' claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on all but one claim, which it certified as a question to the Court of Appeals. That question, was whether New York law recognizes an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for smoking-related diseases by a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with smoking-related disease and who is not under investigation by a physician for such suspected disease. The Court of Appeals held that a threat of future harm is insufficient to impose liability against a defendant in a tort context, because it is a fundamental principle that a plaintiff must sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA healthcare provider, as the insured patient's assignee, brought an action against a no-fault automobile insurer to recover payment of a hospital bill from 2016 for treatment of complications arising from a 1977 automobile accident before the effective date of Medicare Secondary Payer Act in 1980 to expand the field of collateral sources bearing primary responsibility for the payment of medical expenses of a Medicare enrollee. The Superior Court entered summary judgment that the insurer was responsible for the entire medical bill minus the amount received from Medicare, placing on the insurer the primary obligation to pay medical expenses when billed, regardless of available collateral sources such as Medicare. The insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, holding that Medicare, rather than the insurer, had primary responsibility because the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the No Fault Act) provides that the insurer has the responsibility to make personal-injury-protection (PIP) payments first but ultimately the collateral source, which was Medicare at the time prior to the Medicate Secondary Payer Act in 1980, has primary responsibility for the payment of the medical bills. After December 5, 1980, Medicare became the secondary payer to a PIP carrier as the Secondary Payer Act, and in effect, preempted the No Fault Act's collateral source rule.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhile working on a building renovation project, plaintiff was tasked with moving sinks from one area of a bathroom to another. The work required plaintiff to cut and reroute pipes in the ceiling that were located near electrical wiring. To reach the pipes, plaintiff used an A-frame ladder; however, because of spatial limitations, he had to lean the ladder against the wall in the closed and unlocked position. While standing on the ladder and attempting to connect two pipes, plaintiff received an electric shock and fell to the ground. As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered electrical burns to his left hand and the left side of his torso from his chest to his hip, as well as injuries to his spine and shoulders. Plaintiff does not remember anything about his fall, including whether he lost consciousness, whether the ladder fell to the ground, or whether he was thrown from the ladder after being electrocuted. The question on appeal is whether plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was not entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim because he had failed to make a prima facie showing that his injuries were proximately caused by the inadequate ladder rather than the electric shock.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, who had been employed as a police dispatcher for the township's police department, filed a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) disability discrimination complaint against the township, alleging that her inflammatory bowel syndrome constituted a disability for purposes of LAD and that the township failed to provide reasonable accommodation for disability. Plaintiff's doctor, Ciambotti, had written to Plaintiff’s supervisors and stated that Plaintiff's symptoms would be exacerbated by an assignment to the midnight shift, and while the township initially provided Plaintiff with a steady afternoon shift, it later stated that it could not guarantee that she could entirely avoid midnight shifts. The Superior Court issued a limiting instruction, directing the jury to consider the physician's letter only as a request for a reasonable accommodation, and entered judgment in favor of township. The trial court denied employee's motion for new trial on the grounds that although treating physicians may be permitted to testify about the issue of causation, neither physician had been retained and designated as an expert witness and that neither witness had prepared a report. Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that: (1) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating physician; (2) the error in barring testimony was not harmless; and (3) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating psychiatrist.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a podiatrist and his out-of-state medical malpractice insurer, and sought declaratory judgment requiring the insurer to provide indemnification coverage, notwithstanding the insurer's rescission of the policy due to material misrepresentations made concerning the state in which the podiatrist maintained his primary practice. The Superior Court entered judgment in patient's favor, requiring the insurer to indemnify the physician in patient's lawsuit. Insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Insurer sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the podiatrist stood without coverage to respond to patient claim that arose prior to rescission. The Supreme Court notes it is well established in New Jersey that a professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer. A professional in that position can also expect that claims that arose prior to discovery of the misrepresentation will be excluded from coverage. Once the policy has been rescinded, the professional responds to any claims from injured third parties without coverage.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of Bloomberg L.P., brought suit against Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor, and Michael Bloomberg, asserting several causes of action, including sex discrimination and hostile work environment under the New York City Human Rights Law (i.e., Administrative Code of City of NY, title 8 (City HRL)). Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were based on the vicarious liability provision in the City HRL, pursuant to his status as an owner and officer of the company. The City HRL, while providing for vicarious liability, does not define the term “employer” for the purposes of that provision. The Court of Appeals held that where an employer is a business entity, the shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees of that entity are not employers within the meaning of the City HRL. As a result, Bloomberg, an owner and officer of Bloomberg L.P., was not an employer within the meaning of the City HRL and could not be held vicariously liable for the supervisor’s offending conduct, and plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were dismissed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMembers and former members of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) may obtain health insurance through the New York State Health Insurance Plan, an optional health-benefit plan covering current and retired state employees and other public employees. CSEA and the State agreed to seven collective bargaining agreement (CBA or CBAs), spanning 1985 to 2011, each containing provisions continuing the contribution rates at 90% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage. Section 9.13(a) of the 2007-2011 CBA provided that "[t]he State agrees to pay 90 percent of the cost of individual coverage and 75 percent of the cost of dependent coverage toward the hospital/medical/mental health and substance abuse components provided under the Empire Plan." The section did not, however, expressly state the duration of the State's promise to contribute at those rates. The Court of Appeals held that health insurance benefits for retirees – specifically premium contributions – may be subject to modification by a public employer after a CBA expires, unless there is specific language expressly guaranteeing a lifetime benefit.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn this case, the Court was asked to consider the appropriate allocation of costs for environmental contamination property cleanup when one of two insurers on the risk became insolvent. Two residential homes were initially insured by an insurer, Newark Insurance Company (Newark) for up to $300K before being insured up to $500K by Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Farmers Mutual). Subsequently, in 2003, within the first year of coverage by Farmers Mutual, both properties were found to have soil and groundwater contamination caused by fuel oil leaks from underground storage tanks. In 2007, Newark was declared insolvent and the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (the Association) took over the administration of Newark's claims pursuant to the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act). Although it is undisputed that the environmental contamination on the properties began during periods insured by Newark, Farmers Mutual paid all remediation costs: $112,165.13 for the first property and $25,958.39 for the second and sought reimbursement from the Association for the remediation costs expended on the properties, claiming that, in accordance with the allocation scheme adopted in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (1994), the Association was responsible for Newark's share of liability. The Association moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act required the insureds to exhaust their claims through solvent insurance companies prior to applying for statutory benefits. The trial court rejected that argument, finding that the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11, provided Farmers Mutual with a right to contribution from the Guaranty Association. The Association appealed and the Appellate Division reversed finding that a 2004 amendment to the Act, N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5, requires exhaustion of benefits from solvent insurers before the Guaranty Association must pay statutory benefits and Farmers Mutual did not exhaust its policy limits in either case and, therefore, it could not seek contribution from the Association for the remediation costs it expended. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision and held that since the legislative enactments are never subservient to the common law, the 2004 amendments to the Act take precedence over the common-law proration scheme enunciated in Owens-Illinois, reasoning that the definition of "exhaust" in N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 as applied to N.J.S.A. 17:30A-12(b) is clearly intended to make the Association the insurer of last resort in continuous-trigger cases involving progressive injury and property damage arising from environmental contamination. Insureds must therefore exhaust the policy limits of solvent insurers prior to applying to the Association for statutory benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe plaintiffs are collective owners of real property in a remote area of the Adirondack Mountains, which is bounded on the north side by the William C. Whitney Wilderness Area (Wilderness Area) consisting of more than 20,000 acres of state forest preserve land. Shortly after the Wilderness Area entered public ownership, defendant New York State Department of Environmental Conservation constructed a .8 mile trail to permit canoe travelers to avoid the Mud Pond Waterway -- a two mile system of ponds and streams that crosses the plaintiffs' property -- and complete the waterway without entering the plaintiffs' property. The defendants claim that the Waterway is navigable-in-fact and therefore open to the public. The parties jointly requested a determination as a matter of law, but the Court of Appeals rejected this request. The Court held the record was inconclusive with regard to a number of material facts; for example, the Waterway's historical and prospective commercial utility, the Waterway's historical accessibility to the public, among other considerations.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingApplicants for aged, blind, and disabled Medicaid benefits separately appealed decisions of the Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS), that denied their applications based upon conclusion that each applicant's income exceeded the federal poverty line for a single individual as calculated under state regulation (Regulation) for the New Jersey Medical Assistance and Health Services Act (Act). In a consolidated appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded on the ground that the Regulation violated the state statutory law enabling the New Jersey Medicaid program. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that: (1) the Regulation requiring an individual's income to be compared against the poverty income guideline for one person conflicted with the plain language and legislative intent of the Act, which explicitly made medical assistance available to aged, blind, and disabled applicants whose income does not exceed 100% of the poverty level, adjusted for family size; (2) the Regulation altered the language of legislation and frustrated plain import of the legislative direction to adjust the poverty level to family size when determining eligibility; and (3) the Regulation was not compelled by federal Medicaid statute to operate in a manner that was at odds with the Act.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of children enrolled in child care programs filed suit against the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and related agencies challenging amendments to city health code mandating that children who attend city-regulated child care or school-based programs receive annual flu vaccines. When determining whether agency rulemaking has exceeded legislative fiat, the circumstances to be considered are whether (1) the agency did more than balance the costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines, but instead made value judgments entailing difficult and complex choices between broad policy goals to resolve social problems; (2) the agency merely filled in details of a broad policy or if it wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance; (3) the legislature has unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement on the issue, which would indicate that the matter is a policy consideration for the elected body to resolve; and (4) the agency used special expertise or competence in the field to develop the challenged regulation. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (1987). The Court of Appeals held that the new rule was written without benefit of legislative guidance pursuant to significant delegated power, it was not a result of choice between competing public policies, it did not conflict with state law, and the state did not preempt field of mandatory school vaccinations. Accordingly, the rule was permissibly adopted pursuant to legislatively-delegated and long-exercised authority to regulate vaccinations.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, Golden State Equality along with six same-sex families, filed a lawsuit against the State of New Jersey in 2011, alleging that the New Jersey's civil union system failed to provide the same-sex couples with the same rights and protections as heterosexual couples and, therefore, violated the guarantees of equal protection contained in both the New Jersey and United States Constitutions. Plaintiff moved for summary judgement after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Windsor in 2013, which struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act and held that the federal government must extend federal marital benefits to same-sex couples who are lawfully married in states that have granted same-sex couples the right to civil marriage. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion, holding that civil-union partners are being denied equal access to federal benefits because of the label placed on their relationship, and therefore, it held that the state must extend the right to civil marriage to same-sex couples. The state moved for a stay of the order, which was denied, and then appealed. In the absence of the state showing a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that directed the state to permit same-sex couples to enter into civil marriage.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs who were landowners brought action against the township challenging the validity of an ordinance that rezoned a large tract of land, including most of plaintiffs' property, from residential and commercial use to an Environmental Conservation district (EC district), thereby restricting future development of their property. The Supreme Court held that the ordinances represented a legitimate exercise of the municipality's power to zone property and that plaintiff did not overcome the ordinance's presumption of validity. The Supreme Court reasoned that the inclusion of the plaintiffs' property in the EC district rationally related to the municipality's comprehensive smart growth development plan, which concentrated development in a town center surrounded by a green-zone buffer, which plan had the additional benefit of protecting a sensitive coastal ecosystem through preservation of undisturbed, contiguous, forested uplands of which plaintiffs' property is an integral and connected part.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, each having a prior criminal conviction for sexual offenses against young children, were hired as laborers for Astro Moving and Storage Company. Astro entered into a contract with Allied Van Lines, a subsidiary of Sirva, to perform moving services for Allied. The contract required Astro to adhere to Allied's Certified Labor Program guidelines, which required that employees who "conduct the business of Allied at customer's home or place of business ... must have successfully passed a criminal background screen ... as specifically approved by Allied." Under these guidelines, employees automatically failed the criminal background screen if they had ever been convicted of a sexual offense. Plaintiffs consented to have Sirva investigate their criminal records, which identified their convictions for sexual offenses against young children. Soon thereafter, Astro fired plaintiffs. In response to three questions certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding who may be liable under the New York State Human Rights Law for employment discrimination on the basis of a prior criminal conviction, the Court of Appeals held that (i) Executive Law § 296(15) (which prohibits such discrimination) limits liability to an aggrieved party’s employer; (ii) common-law principles govern who is deemed an employer under the Human Rights Law, with emphasis placed on the employer’s power to order and control the employee in the performance of work; and (iii) Executive Law § 296(6) (which provides for aiding and abetting liability under the Human Rights Law) extends liability to an out-of-state non-employer who aids or abets employment discrimination against individuals based on a prior criminal conviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2014, New York voters voted to amend the state constitution, establishing a bipartisan Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) which was tasked with drawing new legislative and congressional districts. The IRC was instructed to follow a mandatory process in drawing new maps, which included submitting them to the state legislature for approval. In 2022, following the 2020 census, the IRC submitted a set of maps, which the legislature rejected, and then reached a stalemate in redrawing its second set of maps. The Democratic party created and enacted maps when the IRC failed to submit a second set of maps. However, the constitution permitted the legislature to offer amendments to the IRC's map only after rejecting two sets of IRC maps. The Court of Appeals held that the IRC's failure to follow its constitutional mandate warranted invalidation of the legislature’s congressional and state senate maps, and declared the maps void and remitted the matter to the New York Supreme Court to oversee the adoption of new, constitutional maps. Since this decision, the New York Supreme Court has ordered that the IRC reconvene and start drafting new maps for the 2024 elections.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was employed as a maintenance worker for First Amherst, a property management and maintenance company. The plaintiff responded to a work order alleging that a bird had burrowed into the gutter through a hole, about six inches by six inches, and there was an excess of bird excrement soiling the entryway to the tenant's shop. Plaintiff had an eight-foot stepladder and a work truck and responded to the area of affected gutter. He intended to remove the bird's nest from the gutter, and then repair the hole in the gutter with sheet metal. The plaintiff set up his ladder on the concrete dock flooring outside of the affected tenant's shop below the affected gutter. Plaintiff testified he used this particular ladder, because it was the proper elevation for the job. After tapping the gutter several times in an effort to dislodge the bird, the plaintiff reached his hand into the gutter and the bird flew out causing the plaintiff to fall from the ladder. To recover under Labor Law § 240(1) for an injury caused by a failure to provide such safety devices, plaintiffs must first show that they were engaged in one of that section's enumerated activities including, among others, "cleaning." To determine whether an activity is "cleaning" within the meaning of the statute, courts apply a four-factor analysis (see Soto v J. Crew Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 562, 568 (2013)). The first factor considers whether the work is "routine, in the sense that it is the type of job that occurs on a daily, weekly or other relatively-frequent and recurring basis as part of the ordinary maintenance and care of commercial premises." The Court of Appeals held that a determination of whether the work was "routine" does not involve a fact-specific assessment of a plaintiff's regular tasks - it instead asks whether the type of work would be expected to recur with relative frequency as part of the ordinary maintenance and care of a commercial property. Consistent with this interpretation, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's work was "routine" within the meaning of the first factor, which weighs against concluding that he was "cleaning." Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim was granted.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn connection with a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency, the Village of Herkimer sought a judgment through a counterclaim declaring the plaintiff personally liable to the Village for certain unpaid water rents. These bills were incurred by the plaintiff through a bond financing sale-and-leaseback transaction. The Court of Appeals held the law applicable to the subject property provided for a lien upon the real property, and not personal liability of the owner and accordingly concluded that the plaintiff is not liable for unpaid water rents.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingEnvironmental group petitioners brought suit against the state Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for permitting seasonal snowmobile use on an existing roadway on property recently acquired by the state and added to the Adirondack Forest Preserve. Petitioners argued the DEC exceeded its authority and contravened the controlling motor use restrictions in the Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan and Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers System Act. The lower courts held the DEC did not exceed its authority, and the Court of Appeals affirmed these lower court decisions, ruling that the challenged portion of the DEC's decision was not irrational, arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. The Court of Appeals held it was rational for DEC to conclude the contemplated use of the disputed one-mile portion of the road during the winter and hunting season to public snowmobile use would not necessarily alter or expand the prior use within meaning of New York State law.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTwo unions (FOP Lodge 34 representing full-time "correction officers" and PBA Local 77, representing "sergeants, detective I and detectives") filed charges against Atlantic County, appealing the decisions of the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) dismissing unfair practice charges in connection with the counties' failure to continue scheduled salary increases set forth in expired collective negotiation agreements (CNAs) during the negotiation of successor CNAs. The Supreme Court held that counties violated the Employer–Employee Relations Act (EERA) by unilaterally ceasing payment of salary increases. Of note, the Supreme Court did not determine whether, as a general rule, an employer must maintain the status quo while negotiating a successor agreement. In these cases, the governing contract language required that the terms and conditions of the respective agreements, including the salary step increases, remain in place until a new CNA is reached. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision on other grounds.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe CNA between the Robbinsville Township Board of Education and the Washington Township Education Association (Association) had stated that teachers’ salaries would be based on 188 days for new teachers and 185 days for all other teachers. In 2010, a series of events caused a significant reduction in the Board’s funding and the Board requested the Association to reopen negotiations. However, the Association declined each time. In May 2010, the Board imposed a three day furlough on the remaining teachers, reducing their work year from 185 to 182 days. The Association filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), which found in favor of the Board reasoning that the furlough was a non-negotiable managerial prerogative. The Association appealed, and the Appellate Division upheld the PERC’s decision. The Supreme Court disagreed with the PERC and reversed the Appellate Division and ruled that even during times of economic crisis, boards of education must negotiate employees’ work hours and cannot unilaterally alter those hours.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff employee, who was a health facilities planner, developed a serious lung disease as a result of exposure to asbestos or other dust particles and, as a result, requested certain workplace accommodations (i.e., a respirator and a transfer). Plaintiff was placed on involuntary medical leave and was terminated at the conclusion of the leave period. Plaintiff sued the employer for unlawful employment discrimination based on disability. Employer moved for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals found that the employer's failure to consider the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation for a generally qualified employee's disability via a good faith interactive process precluded the employer from obtaining summary judgment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a former employee of New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). During his employment, plaintiff developed lung conditions that limited his ability to perform certain aspects of his job. He asked for accommodations, which were not provided. Two days after filing a disability discrimination complaint against HHC, plaintiff was placed on unpaid medical leave until his condition approved. His condition did not improve and HHC terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff sued alleging disability discrimination and the trial court granted summary judgement for HHC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that where an employee seeks a specific accommodation for his or her disability, the employer must give individualized consideration to that request and may not arbitrarily reject the employee's proposal without further inquiry. The Court of Appeals also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff could have reasonably performed his essential job duties with accommodation and whether employee's proposed disability accommodations were reasonable. The Court of Appeals reinstated causes related to the same.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA patient brought a medical negligence action against a physician for a surgical procedure and failure to maintain malpractice liability insurance or post a letter of credit as statutorily mandated, and against the hospital for negligent hiring. After all claims except the medical negligence claim were dismissed, a jury trial was held on the negligence claim, and the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the patient holding that the physician negligently performed the surgery and his negligence proximately caused injury. The physician appealed and the patient cross-appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that: (1) the statute setting out mandatory medical malpractice liability insurance coverage for physicians does not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for an injured patient to sue a physician who does not obtain or maintain statutorily-required medical malpractice insurance; (2) any failure of a physician to comply with such statute did not vitiate the patient's informed consent to surgical procedure; but (3) a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the physician complied with statutory letter of credit requirement precluded summary judgment in favor of the hospital as to the patient's negligent hiring claim against the hospital.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner Bethany Kosmider submitted a Freedom of Information Law request for copies of electronic voting ballot images recorded by voting machines used by Essex County in the general election. The Essex County Board of Elections denied the request on the basis that these were “voted ballots,” which under Election Law § 3-222(2) may not be examined a period of two years following an election absent a court order or direction from a legislative committee. The Court of Appeals upheld the County Board’s decision, holding that electronic voting ballots are “voted ballots” protected from disclosure by the Election Law in order to safeguard ballot secrecy and the integrity of official results.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue on appeal was whether a property owner's claims for contribution under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) must be deferred under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction until after the conclusion of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) mediation enforcement actions or whether a property owner may proceed against responsible parties to recover sums expended to remediate the site before the DEP concludes its involvement in the site. This case involved two separate legal actions. First, the DEP sued Magic Petroleum (Magic) for expenses incurred during the cleanup of hazardous material whereby Magic bore the entire cost pursuant to the DEP's determination that Magic was the discharger. Magic then sought contribution from Exxon Mobil Corporation, the owner of the neighboring land, to contribute to the cost of the cleanup. The trial court dismissed Magic's case because it reasoned that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the contribution claim could only be filed following complete remediation of the site. In holding that remediation need not conclude to seek contribution under the Spill Act, the court reasoned that (1) the legislature established a private right of action in contribution and focused on the courts as the venue to allocate liability percentages for such recourse while the DEP continued to apply its expertise in the remediation; and (2) the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply because DEP and the courts share concurrent jurisdiction over recovery of cleanup costs because private parties are required to turn to the courts to seek contribution from other entities that caused the contamination on the land in the form of percentage liability (which final determination of costs would be dictated by the remediation process overseen by DEP).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioners Town of Riverhead and Town of Riverhead Community Development Agency (Riverhead) sought to challenge 2010 amendments to the regulations of respondent Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The Division of Fish, Wildlife, and Marine Resources of the DEC adopted amendments to a state law pertaining to the protection of endangered or threatened species. Although DEC had the preexisting authority to prohibit the intentional taking of endangered or threatened species, these amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of such species. Riverhead brought the action after promulgation of these amendments, alleging procedural violations concerning the DEC's failure to comply with certain provisions of the Environmental Conservation Law and State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA). Specifically this included the failure to refer the proposed amendments to the Environmental Board, failure to hold public hearings, failure to properly evaluate and analyze the potential regulatory impact, and failure to take a necessary look under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The Court of Appeals held that petitioners could proceed with the first three of their procedural claims, but lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action. The Court of Appeals held that until petitioner submits a permit application and DEC imposes requirements of the amended regulations to their detriment, allegations that petitioners are affected by such regulations is too speculative as there is no actual injury caused by the substantive provisions of the amended regulations.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA nonprofit charter school in New York City responded to a request for proposals from the local school district to receive funding for providing a pre-k program under the state's Universal Pre-K Law. The funding was granted, contingent on the charter school executing a contract with the school district that included provisions regulating curriculum and operations of the charter school and giving the school district authority to monitor the charter school. The charter school formally objected to the contract and was denied payment. The charter school initiated an action against the district seeking the funds and a declaration that the contract was unlawful. The Commissioner of Education ruled in favor of the school district. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the Commissioner's decision and ruled that the Universal Pre-K Law did not give the school district control over curriculum and operations of the charter school. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court, finding that it did not need to defer to the decision of the Commissioner and holding that the statutory scheme governing charter school pre-k programs does not allow for shared oversight between charters and local school districts. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of the Universal Pre-K Law provides that charter school pre-k programs are the exclusive responsibility of the charter entity.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2007, Entergy applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a 20-year renewal of its operating licenses for nuclear reactors at Indian Point, taking the position with the NRC that its application was subject to the New York Department of State's (Department) consistency review under the state's Coastal Management Program (CMP). This CMP sets forth 44 enforceable statewide policies relating to coastal activities against which federal license renewals and other actions affecting coastal areas must be assessed, including the objectives of protecting fishing and wildlife, meeting public energy needs, and controlling air and water pollution. Certain projects are exempt from consistency with these coastal policies set forth in the CMP. In 2012, Entergy changed its position and sought a ruling that its re-licensing was not subject to the Department's review for consistency with the CMP. Entergy sought a declaratory ruling from the Department, arguing its license renewals fell within two exemptions to CMP's consistency requirement. Entergy argued that one exemption was grandfathered in under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and that the second exemption was because the facilities' final environmental impact statements were adopted before the effective date of the Department's relevant regulations. The Court of Appeals noted that Entergy's new application for a license to operate the Indian Point nuclear reactions for an additional 20 years is a new federal action, with different impacts and concerns than what appeared in the initial environmental impact statements issued 40 years earlier. The Court of Appeals held that the Department's interpretation of the exemptions in the CMP and its conclusion that Entergy's application to re-license the nuclear reactors at Indian Point was subject to a consistency review was rational, reversed the lower court's orders, and judgment was granted in favor of the Department of State.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFMC Corp owns and operates a 103-acre pesticide production facility in Niagara County, and has released significant quantities of hazardous waste including arsenic, lead, cyanide and more onto adjacent properties including school, recreational watercourses, croplands, and residences. Under the state Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), applicants are required to undertake corrective actions for all releases of hazardous waste as part of the permitting approval process. To adhere to these requirements, FMC entered into a consent order with the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and in 2013, the DEC adopted a final corrective measure for FMC. FMC then proposed eight different options for remediation, but DEC found none of them sufficiently alleviated the threat posed by FMC's release of hazardous waste and announced it would seek to undertake the corrective measures itself. FMC alleged the DEC's decision to implement such measures unilaterally was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held the lower court erred in foreclosing the possibility that the DEC's unilateral remediation action was authorized, and that the interpretation of the ECL adopted by both parties authorized DEC's action.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2014, following an investigative process, the Public Service Commission (PSC) issued an order finding energy service companies (ESCOs) were charging their residential or small-scale customers higher prices than those charged by utilities. Two years later, the PSC issued a Reset Order to address these pricing concerns. Specifically, the Reset Order conditioned access to public utility infrastructure by energy service companies upon them caping their prices such that, on an annual basis, they charge no more for electricity than is charged by public utilities, unless 30% of energy is derived from renewable resources. The ESCOs and their respective trade associations challenged the Order, alleging it should be annulled as arbitrary and capricious and in excess of the PSC's authority. The Court of Appeals ruled that ESCOs do not fall within the definition of "gas corporation" and "electric corporation" and thus are not subject to the PSC's direct rate-making authority under Public Service Law article 4. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that under the PSC's authority to regulate utilities' transportation of ESCOs' gas and electricity, the PSC may condition access to utility infrastructure upon ESCO's compliance with a price cap on gas or electricity. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court should have issued a declaration to the effect that the PSC did not exceed its authority under the state's Public Service Law or violate the petitioners' constitutional rights in issuing the Order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingNational Fuel Gas Supply brought an Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) vesting proceeding to acquire temporary construction easements and a fifty-foot-wide permanent easement over respondent landowners' property to build a 99-mile gas pipeline from Pennsylvania to Western New York. The New York Supreme Court granted the EDPL petition, concluding that National Fuel made a prima facie showing of entitlement to the easements based on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) certificate of public convenience and necessity. The New York Appellate Division reversed this lower court decision, holding that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation's intervening denial of National Fuel's application for a water quality certification meant that National Fuel no longer held a qualifying federal certificate for purposes of the EDPL exemption. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the federal certificate was still valid because the FERC-issued certificate of public convenience and necessity did not condition National Fuel's eminent domain authority on receipt of a water qualify certification. The Court of Appeals further held that while a FERC certificate of public convenience and necessity contains numerous "conditions," including receiving a water quality certificate, these conditions cannot be reasonably understood as rendering the certificate provisional for purposes of eminent domain, since they are not conditions addressing the validity of the certificate itself.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner Ranco Sand and Stone Corp owns two parcels of contiguous property in an area zoned for residential use in Suffolk County and leased a parcel to a private school bus company which was used as a bus yard and trucking station. Although this use was unapproved and nonconforming, the Town had not enforced the residential zoning requirement against Ranco. Ranco applied to rezone the parcel from residential to heavy industrial use. Following a public hearing, the Town's Planning Board adopted a resolution issuing a positive declaration that rezoning the parcel may have a significant effect on the environment and required Ranco to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS). Ranco challenged the Board's decision pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and sought to annul it on the grounds that the declaration was "arbitrary, capricious, and unauthorized." The Court of Appeals held that Ranco does not claim the declaration is unauthorized, or that the property is not subject to SEQRA, nor does it present any other basis to conclude the Town acted outside the scope of its authority. Therefore the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's order and ruled the matter was not ripe for judicial review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Village of Painted Post (Village) is located at the confluence of three different rivers, and underlying this confluence is the Corning aquifer, which is the principal drinking water supply of several New York State municipalities. The Village adopted a resolution to enter into a surplus water sale agreement with respondent SWEPI LP, a subsidiary of Shell Oil Company, which operates gas wells in Pennsylvania. The Village determined that under New York law, its water sales were exempt from review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). Petitioners, which included environmental groups as well as individual residents of the Village, brought an action against the Village challenging this water sale agreement. The petitioners argued the Village failed to comply with the procedural mandates of SEQRA on grounds that it failed to consider significant adverse environmental impacts of the water withdrawals, including noise and air contamination associated with the proposed rail loading facility site. The Court of Appeals ruled, contrary to the decision of the lower court, that petitioner John Marvin had standing. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court's standing analysis -- which reasoned that because other Village residents lived along the train line, the petitioner did not suffer noise impacts that were different from his neighbors even though train noise fell under the purview of the SEQRA -- applied an overly restrictive analysis of the requirement to show harm different from that of the public at large.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRespondent Town of Dryden is a rural community in Tompkins County, in which land use is governed by a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. Petitioner Norse Energy Corp. (Norse) through its predecessors started acquiring oil and gas leases from landowners in Dryden to explore and develop natural gas resources. The Town Board took the view that gas extraction activities were prohibited in Dryden because the operations fell within the catch-all provision of its zoning ordinance, which precludes any uses not specifically allowed. The Town Board unanimously voted to amend its zoning ordinance to specify that all oil and gas exploration, extraction and storage activities were not permitted in Dryden. The amendment also purported to invalidate any oil and gas permits issued by a state or federal agency. Norse challenged the validity of the zoning amendment, asserting that Dryden lacked the authority to prohibit natural gas exploration and activities because the state Environmental Conservation Law demonstrated the state legislature intended to preempt local zoning laws that curtailed energy production. The Court of Appeals held that the state legislature did not eliminate the home rule capacity of municipalities -- an authority derived from article IX of the New York State constitution and Municipal Home Rule Law, which empowers local governments to pass laws for both the "protection and enhancement of [their] physical and visual environments" and for the "government, protection, order, conduct, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community" -- to pass zoning laws that exclude oil, gas, and hydrofracking activities to preserve the character of their communities. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled the municipal zoning laws were valid.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a negligence action against an orthodontist, alleging that the orthodontist failed to inform him that a dental appliance he was given to treat sleep apnea may dislocate his teeth. The Superior Court dismissed the action after determining that plaintiff was required to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM) from an orthodontist rather than an AOM from a board-certified prosthodontist who had specialized in the treatment of sleep apnea for twenty years. Patient appealed. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed. Patient petitioned for certification, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) enhanced credential requirements under the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (Patients First Act) of Section 41 for those submitting AOMs applied only to physicians in medical malpractice actions; in all other actions against a licensed professional, including a dentist, section 27 prescribes the qualifications of the person who may submit an AOM against a licensed professional who is alleged to have acted negligently; (2) a licensed dentist could submit an AOM provided that he had particular expertise in the general area involved in the action; (3) dentist, who devoted significant portion of his practice to the diagnosis and treatment of sleep apnea for over 20 years, had particular expertise necessary to prepare AOM; and (4) trial court failed to hold an effective Ferreira hearing, which requires participants to identify at the conference the general area or specialty involved in the action and whether the defendant was providing professional services within that profession or specialty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Supreme Court is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14–1's six-year statute of limitations applies to the contribution claims authorized under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act). Plaintiff, the owner of a shopping center, brought an action under the Spill Act against heating oil companies and former owners of dry cleaning business at the shopping center for costs of remediating contamination allegedly caused by leaks of heating oil located under the dry cleaning business. In focusing on the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitation does not apply. It reasoned that while the Spill Act is silent as to the applicability of a statute of limitations to contribution claims, language of the statute expressly restricting the defenses available under the Spill Act provides significant support for a conclusion that no statute of limitations applies. In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that the construction they adopted is also supported by the "longstanding view . . . that the Spill Act is remedial legislation designed to cast a wide net over those responsible for hazardous substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this state." Notably, six groups of organizations and individuals were granted leave to appear as amici in this case and all but one argued that the six-year statute of limitation does not apply to Spill Act claims.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief to permit "aid-in-dying," whereby a mentally competent, terminally ill patient may obtain a prescription from a physician to cause death. The plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment that physicians who provide aid-in-dying in this manner are not criminally liable under the State's assisted suicide statutes and injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecution of physicians who issue such prescriptions to terminally ill, mentally competent patients. The plaintiffs argued the prohibition on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Penal Law provisions prohibiting assisted suicide do not exclude physician assisted suicide. The Court of Appeals found that the prohibition of physician assisted suicide does not violate the equal protection clause and is supported by a rational basis for due process purposes.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingNew Jersey passed the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (FWPA) as a means of protecting its freshwater wetlands from random and unnecessary alterations and disturbances. Pursuant to the FWPA, a single penalty and restoration remedy was imposed on Robert and Michelle Huber (the Petitioners) as a result of FWPA violations committed on their land, which had been developed subject to FWPA permit conditions. On appeal from the final administrative action of the New Jersey Department of Environment Protection (DEP), the Hubers raised for the first time a constitutional argument contesting the right of a DEP inspector to have entered their land without securing a warrant in advance in violation of Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court held that based on the FWPA's integrated scheme governing freshwater wetlands in New Jersey, land subject to FWPA restrictions so important as to be required by law to be filed of record, is subject to the statutory, reasonable right of entry and inspection, but that in exercising that right, the DEP must comply with its processes, which require presentation of credentials before seeking consent to entry at reasonable times. If entry is denied, the DEP Commissioner may order that entry be provided and the DEP shall be entitled, pursuant to the rules of court, to judicial process to compel access to the property subject to the FWPA permit. The Supreme Court reasoned that although the FWPA expects permittee consent, and will penalize the permittee who denies a DEP representative reasonable entry onto property to inspect for compliance with the FWPA, the inspection scheme taken as a whole does not purport to authorize forcible, nonconsensual entry into the backyard of a residential property owner -- it only provides a means for the DEP to obtain judicial access to secure a court-issued injunction order authorizing the search to which the DEP is entitled.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Natural Resources Defense Council and seven other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought an action to challenge certain provisions in a the state's 2010 General Permit which requires municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) to develop, document, and implement a Storm Water Management Program (SWMP) in compliance with detailed specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). These specifications seek to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater to the maximum extent practicable. In order to obtain initial coverage under the terms of the General Permit, small MS4s are required to submit and complete an accurate notice of intent (NOI) to the DEC. NRDC claims that by allowing small MS4s to gain coverage under the General Permit based upon an NOI reviewed only for completeness rather than provide an opportunity for public hearing, the DEC has created an impermissible self-regulatory system that fails to force local governments to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable and thus violates federal and state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's rejection of NRDC's federal and state law challenges to the General Permit on grounds that DEC has determined that examining NOIs for completeness constitutes a sufficient level of technical regulatory review to qualify a small MS4 for initial coverage under the General Permit, and that these are reasonable judgments that the DEC possesses the discretion and expertise to make in furtherance of its responsibilities under the Environmental Conservation Law.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe New York State Civil Rights Law Section 50-a requires that the personnel records of police officers be kept confidential. The New York Civil Liberties Union sought certain disciplinary records from the NYPD pursuant to the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), contending that compliance with this statute is unnecessary where officer's identifying information is adequately redacted (the NYPD was also amenable to disclosing redacted records). The Court of Appeals prevented the disclosure of these redacted documents, arguing that FOIL's exemption from disclosure of records deemed confidential by state or federal statute, save for vis a vis in specific manners and for specific purposes, is mandatory and does not permit government agencies to exercise discretion in whether and how to disclose such confidential records.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA coalition of interest groups filed suit against the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) and the New York City Board of Health challenging the constitutionality of an amendment to the New York City Health Code, which prohibited New York City restaurants, movie theaters, and other food service establishments from serving sugary drinks in sizes larger than 16 ounces. The Court of Appeals held that the New York Board of Health did not have inherent legislative powers separate and apart from the City Council; therefore, the Board lacked legislative authority to promulgate the amendment to the City Health Code. The amendment was declared invalid and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to enjoin its implementation.