State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBased on negative reviews from customers alleging fraudulent activity, Postmates (an on-demand delivery business that solicits employees and couriers using a website and smartphone application) blocked claimant from using the application. Thereafter, claimant filed for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor (DOL), based in part on a statement of the claimant, initially determined that claimant was an employee of Postmates, requiring that Postmates pay unemployment insurance contributions on the claimant's earnings, as well as on the earnings of "all other persons similarly employed." Postmates disputed the determination and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) who sustained Postmates' objection, concluding that claimant was an independent contractor and reasoning that Postmates did not exercise sufficient supervision, direction and control over claimant to establish an employer-employee relationship. The Commissioner appealed the ALJ's decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board), which reversed the ALJ, overruled Postmates' objection and sustained the DOL's initial determination. Postmates appealed to the Appellate Division - who reversed the Board's ruling. The Commissioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that couriers hired by Postmates Inc. are employees for whom Postmates is required to make unemployment insurance fund contributions, as opposed to independent contractors. Noting that the touchstone of the analysis is whether the employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve those results — and recognizing that the relevant indicia of control vary depending on the nature of the work — the Court concluded the Board’s finding was supported by record evidence that Postmates dominated significant aspects of its couriers’ work by dictating to whom they can deliver, where to deliver requested items, effectively limiting the time frame for delivery and controlling all aspects of pricing and payment. The fact that the couriers could choose their work schedules (by logging into the application) and specific delivery routes did not dictate a finding that they were independent contractors operating their own businesses.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involves the review of an arbitrator's award denying petitioner's funds pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Act), which creates a means by which the state can "provide monies for a swift and sure response to environmental contamination from the discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances." (cleaned up). In order to resolve disputes over denied fund monies, the Act uses arbitrators and flexible procedures to allow claimants the opportunity to demonstrate the denial was arbitrary and capricious action. The petitioner's claim was denied and he filed an appeal, but two years elapsed between the appeal request and the commencement of the appeal. In addition, on appeal, the arbitrator rejected the use of additional scientific material resulting in an allegedly flawed decision that petitioner contended is based on misconceptions by the arbitrator about the evidence on the record. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new arbitration proceeding due to concerns regarding the substantive reasoning of the arbitrator's decision and the procedural fairness considerations, which, the Supreme Court noted, undermined confidence in the outcome of the arbitration enough to persuade the Supreme Court, in the interest of fairness, to require a new arbitration be conducted.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Court of Appeals was whether New York education law permits a county to charge back to a town the amount the county paid on behalf of town residents for attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Court of Appeals held that the county can collect chargebacks. Under New York education law, funding for community colleges is derived from the state, the local sponsor, and individual students. For nonresident students, meaning students who live within New York but outside the region where the community college is located, the local sponsor can chargeback the operating costs to towns and cities in the student's county of residence. FIT, which originally only offered two-year associate degree programs, was authorized in 1975 to expand to bachelors and masters degree programs while still being financed and administered as a community college. Because the expansion of degree programs resulted in higher operating costs, in 1994 the state passed a law that obligated the state to reimburse counties for charges incurred for nonresident students attending FIT, but stopped appropriating finds for the reimbursement in 2001. In 2011 the county where FIT is located claimed chargebacks from a town for its nonresident students at FIT. the town argued that the county lacked authority to claim chargebacks because the 1994 statute made the state the sole source for reimbursement and that, even if the county could claim chargebacks that they should be limited to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals found that the county was entitled to claim the chargebacks because the 1994 statute did not expressly or impliedly repeal the law that gave the county the ability to seek chargebacks. Rather reimbursement can be obtained from either the state or the town. The Court of Appeals also found that chargebacks should not be limited to two-year degree programs because the 1975 law that expanded FIT's programs stated that the school should be financed and administered as a community college without limiting it to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals also held that the county had the authority to offset amounts from the towns share of sales tax revenue.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff reported alleged misconduct engaged in by the then-Commissioner and First Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation to his immediate supervisor and the agency's Inspector General. After plaintiff was retaliated against for his report, he commenced an action pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75-b (the statute governing retaliatory action by public employers). Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to comply with Civil Service Law § 75-b by not reporting the allegedly wrongful actions to the appointing authority (which under these facts were the defendants) before reporting to the Inspector General. The Court of Appeals held that because plaintiff's appointing authorities were defendants, and because he understandably did not report their alleged misconduct to them, strict compliance with the reporting requirements of Civil Service Law § 75-b would not serve the purpose of the statute - therefore, plaintiff's good faith effort to comply was sufficient under Civil Service Law § 75-b.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRespondent owns and operates a sand and gravel mine on a 50-acre property in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County. In 2019, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved Respondent's permit to increase the depth of its mining operations, finding that the proposed sand mine deepening would not significantly impact groundwater quality, air quality, traffic or solid waste production. The petitioners -- the Town of Southampton, several neighboring landowners, and civic and environmental organizations -- brought an action against Respondent and the DEC to annul the 2019 renewal permit. Petitioners argued that Respondent improperly sought to expand the mine's operations through a renewal permit to avoid the restrictions of the state's Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), which bars the DEC from processing all permits to mine in covered counties, including applications for renewal and modification permits when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined." While the Court of Appeals held the ECL contemplates that a mining applicant may have prior non-conforming use rights and requires DEC to defer to local town zoning laws when reviewing applications for mining permits, it rejected Respondent's claim that mine owners have a constitutional right to mine their parcels to an indefinite depth. As a result the Court of Appeals held that the permits must be annulled since the extent of Respondent's prior non-conforming use could not be determined. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court to remand to DEC for further proceedings.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company hired to provide janitorial services for a retail store, was injured when he fell from a four-foot-tall ladder while dusting a six-foot-high display shelf. He brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against J. Crew, the retail store, and The Mercer I LLC, the building owner. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. J. Crew moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that plaintiff was not engaged in a "cleaning" activity within the meaning of the statute. Outside the context of commercial window washing, the Court of Appeals determined that an activity cannot be characterized as "cleaning" under Labor Law § 240(1) if it is routine (in the sense that it occurs frequently); it requires neither specialized equipment or expertise, nor the unusual deployment of labor; it involves insignificant elevation related risks comparable to those inherent in typical domestic cleaning; and is unrelated to any ongoing construction, renovation, painting, alteration or repair project. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dusting of a six-foot-high display shelf could not be characterized as "cleaning" but was routine maintenance, falling outside the ambit of the statute.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was working with the Millville Rescue Squad (MRS) and began an extramarital affair with an MRS volunteer and Plaintiff’s co-employee wife learned of the affair and reported it to Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. A year later, Plaintiff was terminated from his position, allegedly for “poor work performance” although he had never been subject to formal discipline during the term of his employment. Plaintiff brought action against MRS for violating the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging he was terminated because of his marital status after he revealed that he and his co-employee wife were separated after the affair led to irreconcilable discord between the Plaintiff and his wife. Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal, which the Superior Court granted on the ground that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements required to succeed on his gender and marital status LAD claims. Employee appealed. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the LAD’s prohibition against discrimination based on “marital status” extends to a person who has separated from their spouse and is in the process of obtaining a divorce. The Supreme Court held that: (1) “marital status” within the meaning of LAD included those who are single or married and those who are in transition from one "status" to another, and (2) evidence presented a jury question regarding whether the employee was terminated because of his marital status.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a non-native English speaker from Argentina, was laid off as part of a company-wide reduction in force and brought action against the company, alleging retaliatory discharge. The employment application between the Plaintiff and the company included a provision requiring the Plaintiff to agree to bring any employment-related cause of action against the company within six months of the challenged employment action and waive any applicable statute of limitations. The Superior Court granted employer's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint as time-barred, as the Plaintiff filed his complaint nine months after his alleged wrongful termination. The employee appealed. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) a private agreement that frustrates the public-purpose imperative of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) by shortening the two-year limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced, and (2) provision of employment application shortening two-year limitations period for claims under LAD was unconscionable. In other words, the Supreme Court argued that the statute of limitations under the LAD cannot be shortened by private contract.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue in this appeal was whether plaintiff— who acknowledged he was lawfully terminated when convicted of a criminal offense while working for defendant— adequately alleged that defendant violated the antidiscrimination statutes when it denied plaintiff’s application for employment following the completion of a brief jail sentence. Correction Law article 23-A and Executive Law § 296(15) protect certain individuals convicted of criminal offenses from unlawful discrimination when applying for employment or licensing, preventing employers from denying an application for employment solely because the applicant was previously convicted of a criminal offense, subject to certain exceptions. After reviewing the statutory language, framework, and legislative history, the Court of Appeals determined that nothing indicated a legislative intent to exempt a previous employer from the statutes’ reach. Moreover, the undefined term “application,” read in context and given its ordinary meaning, is reasonably interpreted to refer to a request for employment, an event the Court of Appeals recognized may take various forms in different circumstances and which may trigger coverage under the statutes. The Court of Appeals held that the statutes’ application requirement is met when, viewed objectively and in light of the relevant circumstances, an employer would reasonably understand the communications from a prospective employee to be a request for employment. Under the liberal pleading standard for a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint adequately alleged facts supporting the inference that plaintiff applied for employment and was denied solely due to his conviction—and did not compel the conclusion that plaintiff merely protested a lawful termination decision.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a teacher who alleged misconduct by her school's principal. Plaintiff alleged that she was fired as a result of discrimination and/or retaliation in the form of homophobic remarks and falsified reports to the Department of Education. The case was dismissed by the New York Supreme Court, because the court found insufficient evidence to show that the homophobic comments made by the employer were related to the firing. The court stated there was no proof that the Principal would not have made the same decision had the Plaintiff's sexuality been unknown or unconsidered. However, the Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence related to the homophobic remarks and other actions taken against the Plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, and the trial court should determine as a matter of triable fact how much the Plaintiff's sexuality weighed into the firing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff's work (i.e., removing an old advertisement from a billboard that was raised 59 feet from the ground, attaching extensions using angle irons, nuts, bolts, and nails that would change the dimensions of the billboard to accommodate a new advertisement with different measurements, and then attaching the new advertisement itself) was included in the activities protected under Labor Law § 240(1). Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals found the plaintiff's work to be "altering," under the definition adopted in Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457 (1998), as the work was "a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” that was not “routine maintenance” or “decorative modification."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA retired member of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) sought review of PFRS Board of Trustees' (Board) decision to uphold the Division of Pension and Benefits' denial of the member's request to reassign survivors' benefits from his disabled son as an individual to special needs trust (SNT) in his son's name, due to the Board's strict view of how to implement the word “child” in the survivors' benefits statute. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that SNT was permitted to stand in the son's place as beneficiary to whom survivors' benefits were due as both the federal government's Supplemental Security Income and related medical assistance programs and New Jersey's SNT statutes permit the use of self-settled SNTs. The Supreme Court noted that the Board's action requires a disabled child of a PFRS retiree to choose between abandoning the survivors' benefits earned by his parent or forgoing public assistance programs for his medical needs, such choice is unnecessary and unwarranted, and that the Board advances no legitimate public policy through its rigid interpretation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a state trooper, filed suit against his employer New Jersey State Police (NJSP) for racial and disability discrimination. Plaintiff asserted that the NJSP failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disabling medical condition -- ulcerative colitis -- in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In addition, plaintiff complained of retaliatory conduct in violation of the LAD, ADA, and New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). The Superior Court granted a directed verdict for NJSP in part, and, after the trial, entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the remaining claims based on the ADA and CEPA. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) NJSP did not waive its sovereign immunity defense by raising it after the jury's verdict; (2) NJSP was not equitably estopped from raising sovereign immunity defense; (3) CEPA waiver provision did not bar trooper's LAD claim because waiver exception does not apply to those causes of action that are substantially independent of the CEPA claim; (4) the issue of whether NJSP failed to accommodate trooper under the LAD was for a jury to decide; and (5) interests of justice required reinstatement of improperly dismissed LAD claim.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn consolidated actions, patient's estate and patient's husband brought an action against defendants including physician, hospital's chief executive officer (CEO), and hospital's director of risk management, asserting claims including for malpractice, lack of informed consent, products liability, and punitive damages arising from patient's death from leiomyosarcoma following a laparoscopic hysterectomy performed at the hospital with the use of a power morcellation device. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, which the Superior Court denied. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) the alleged acts or omissions of physician were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages, and (2) the alleged acts or omissions of hospital executives also were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages. Under the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, punitive damages are available only in exceptional cases.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a middle school teacher who had Type 1 diabetes and was injured in school during a hypoglycemic event, sued the Board of Education, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) for failure to accommodate her diabetes. The Superior Court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, and denied the teacher's motion for reconsideration on the ground that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not fired or reassigned, and thus did not have a prima facie claim. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants stating that the LAD's broad remedial purpose may permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who failed to reasonably accommodate disabilities. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that an adverse employment action is not a required element for a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD and concluded that plaintiff’s LAD claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition is not barred by the state's Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). This decision clarified the required elements of a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability under the LAD and also held that the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude LAD claims because it would purportedly result in a “double recovery” to successful plaintiffs.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Puglia filed an action against a former employer under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), claiming that his employment was terminated after he complained about his employer's failure to pay him in accord with the Prevailing Wage Act. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that such state-law claim is preempted by federal labor law on multiple grounds and the appellate court agreed. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that a collective bargaining agreement cannot be used by an employer as a defense to a CEPA claim. Also, the Supreme Court found that whether the Plaintiff was terminated because of his complaints was a question of fact and therefore summary judgment should have been denied.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2006, the state's Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation prepared a plan to create a 27-mile system of snowmobile trails between communities in the Adirondack Park Forest Preserve. This plan would require the cutting and removal of thousands of trees, grading and leveling, and the removal of rocks and other natural components from the Forest Preserve to create such snowmobile paths. Plaintiff brought an action alleging the construction of the trails was in violation of the "forever wild" provision (article XIV) of the New York Constitution. This constitutional provision mandated that protected Forest Preserve lands "shall be forever kept as wild forest lands" with the intent of ending commercial destruction and despoliation of the soil and trees and protecting the state's watershed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the level of tree cutting needed to construct these trails exceeded the level of tree cutting permitted by prior Court decisions regarding compliance with article XIV. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the planned snowmobile trails violated the State Constitution's "forever wild" provision and that construction of these trails could only be accomplished with a constitutional amendment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2016, the New York City Water Board -- which collects revenues to keep the City's water and sewer systems financially self-sustaining -- approved a 2.1% rate increase, a one-time bill credit of $183 for the fiscal year to all account holders belonging in a particular tax class, as well as assistance programs for multi-unit apartments, seniors and low-income households and a low-consumption rate freeze. The City of New York also announced it would temporarily forbear collecting rents from the Water Board and provided that the savings from the rent forbearance would be passed on to all account holders. Petitioners, which included various landlords not eligible for the bill credit and not-for-profit assistance, commenced an action against the Water Board and New York Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), arguing the Water Board's determinations were irrational, arbitrary, and capricious and exceeded the Board's authority. The Court of Appeals held that the governing statutes provide that water and sewer rates may be determined in accordance with public policy goals, not just economic ones. Specifically, the Court found the respondents' decision to allocate the relatively modest gain from the rent forbearance so as to be meaningful to a very large category of ratepayer, without requiring a complex application process, was not irrational. Thus, the Court of Appeals could not say the respondents' actions were utterly arbitrary or unsupported by rational goals.

Summary of Case Context & Holding16-year old defendant was charged with second degree murder for shooting a teenaged bystander during an argument, and spent six years in prison before pleading guilty. During this time, the prosecution sought cooperation against the defendant by his co-defendant through various means, then faced administrative delays in beginning the trial. The Court of Appeals held that, despite the absence of bad faith for these delays on behalf of the government, the defendant's imprisonment for such a long time violated his right to a speedy trial, and dismissed his indictment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2014, defendant, was charged with committing various crimes against a 10-year-old child and pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. Defendant was initially placed on interim probation. Due to defendant's subsequent arrest on other charges stemming from conduct occurring after his plea, defendant's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment. This Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division had authority to reverse a county court order that designated defendant a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act, based on a risk factor point assessment. In the absence of an erroneous ruling or any applicable statutory or other jurisdictional limitation on the Appellate Division’s authority, the Court of Appeals declined to restrain the Appellate Division from remitting the country order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter defendant struck and killed a pedestrian, her family contacted a lawyer who instructed law enforcement not to question or test his client. Defendant consented to a breathalyzer test at the same time, without being informed of the attorney's communication. Based on prior case law, the Court of Appeals reaffirms that suspected drunk drivers have time-limited rights to seek legal assistance before chemical testing, and this right cannot be waived prior to the police making the accused aware that a lawyer has made contact on the accused's behalf, regardless of whether the accused requested this lawyer.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a caregiver to a physically disabled ten-year old girl, pled guilty to a charge of reckless endangerment arising out a severe skin injury requiring skin grafts that the girl received while in the defendant's care. Following a civil jury unanimously concluding that the defendant was not at fault, as well as further evidence coming to light indicating the same, the defendant moved to vacate the judgement on a claim of "actual innocence." Focusing on matters of law rather than matters of fact, the Court of Appeals refused to allow her to vacate her guilty plea, finding that the relevant statute does not entitle a defendant who has entered in a guilty plea to move to vacate a conviction, regardless of actual innocence, unless the claim is based on DNA evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder of his infant son based on both the video tape of a 9.5 hour investigation during which police falsely represented that his wife had accused him of the murder, that she would be the target of the investigation if he did not take responsibility, and that his confession would help to save his son's life, who had already died in the hospital. Defendant moved to suppress this interrogation and was denied. The Court of Appeals overturned this denial, reversed the conviction, and directed a new trial, finding that the defendant's statements were not demonstrably voluntary, as any parent would confess to a crime if they believed it would save their child's life.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingSeventeen-year-old defendant Storm Lang was charged with four felony counts of sexual abuse, and two misdemeanor counts of sexual abuse stemming from his sexual assault of three children ages 5, 7 and 12 years old. During the sentencing proceeding, the Court of Appeals decided the Youthful Offender adjudication was inappropriate and reminded Lang that he had waived his right to appeal when he had accepted his plea bargain. Lang challenged both the waiver and the denial of Youthful Offender status arguing that both were invalid and unenforceable. This Court of Appeals decided that Lang was entitled to relief because the trial court mischaracterized the appellate rights waived as encompassing not only an absolute bar to the taking of a direct appeal but also all post-conviction relief separate from the direct appeal and thus, it could not be said that their appeal waivers were knowingly and voluntarily made. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the remainder of the waiver was valid and enforceable, foreclosing review of the Youthful Offender determination.

Summary of Case Context & Holding17-year old defendant pled guilty to a designated class E felony sex offense, was designated a Youthful Offender, and sentenced to 10 years' probation. Class E felonies are subject to the same sentences for Youthful Offenders as others convicted of such felonies. At the time of enactment of the relevant Youthful Offenders statute, all class E felonies were subject to only 5 years probation. The statute was later updated so that designated class E felonies were subject to 10 years probation. The Defendant argued that, since the legislature did not specifically update the Youthful Offenders statute to also reflect a maximum 10 years' probation for designated class E felonies, the legislature intended for the Youthful Offenders maximum for such felonies to remain 5 years' probation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that since this claim is unproven, they must rely only on text of the Youthful Offenders statute, which refers back to the amended statute, by which 10 years' probation is allowable.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a noncitizen, faced several charges after attacking the mother of his children. The defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment entitled him to a jury trial given that these offenses carried the risk of deportation. The lower appeals court denied this motion and he was convicted for said deportable offenses. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, in the first case of its kind under its jurisdiction, finding that the Sixth Amendment does indeed entitle a defendant to the right to a jury trial if indicted under deportable offenses.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn trial court, defendants in three cases were not allowed to cross-examine police officers regarding allegations of prior misconduct by these officers in unrelated federal lawsuits. The Court of Appeals held that there is no categorical prohibition against such cross-examination, and determination as to whether to permit such inquiries for impeachment purposes lies at the discretion of the trial court judge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a 17 year old, pled guilty to one count of criminal drug possession and was sentenced to five years of prison and two years of post-release supervision. Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court failed to address whether he could be considered a "Youthful Offender," a determination for 16- to 19-year old in New York which carries benefits such as a vacated conviction and lesser jailtime. The Court of Appeals found that, despite the fact that defendant did not ask for a Youthful Offender determination, all there must be a Youthful Offender determination in every case where a defendant may be eligible, and that such defendant cannot waive this right via a plea deal.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA defendant's driving, appearance, and responses to questions gave an officer probable cause to arrest him on a Driving While Intoxicated. The officer asked the defendant to step out of the car and searched him, discovering a switchblade, after which the defendant was arrested. In court, the officer said he did not intend to arrest defendant until he found the switchblade. The Court of Appeals held that, although the officer hypothetically had the authority to search defendant as a search "incident to a lawful arrest," since the officer said there would not have been an arrest but for the fruits of his search, the search was not "incident" to the arrest and therefore The Court of Appeals suppressed the knife as evidence and dismissed the indictment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals held that defendant was properly assessed points under Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment instrument risk factor 9, which concerns the “Number and Nature of Prior Crimes,” for his prior New Jersey conviction for lewdness. The Court of Appeals determined that reliance on the underlying conduct of a prior foreign conviction is appropriate as a matter of law for purposes of assessing points under risk factor 9 and that the New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders and courts should apply the “essential elements” test set forth in Matter of North v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y., 8 NY3d 745 [2007] when considering whether to assess points for the prior foreign conviction. Under that test, defendant’s New Jersey conviction was comparable to the New York offense of endangering the welfare of a child. It was therefore proper to assess him 30 points for his prior criminal history. The Court of Appeals also held that the New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders may rely on youthful offender adjudications and juvenile delinquency findings as "reliable indicators of wrongdoing" in connection with assessing "an offender's likelihood of re-offense and danger to public safety," even though they are not technically criminal convictions.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA police officer stopped defendant's car because of a nonfunctioning center brake light. Defendant, who exhibited signs of intoxication, was given—and failed—a portable breathalyzer test. Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192) and two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause to justify the seizure. The sole issue on appeal is whether the officer's belief that defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by operating a vehicle with a nonfunctioning center stop light was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeals concluded that the officer's interpretation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was objectively reasonable because the law mandates that motor vehicles must be equipped with at least two functioning stop lamps. Therefore, the courts below erred as a matter of law in granting defendant's suppression motion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingUsing the emergency lights on his unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe, a federal marine interdiction agent with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) stopped the driver of a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger for driving dangerously on a public highway. After pulling the driver over, the agent waited in his truck for police officers who, upon arriving at the scene, searched the vehicle and arrested defendant for criminal possession of a weapon. The question on this appeal is whether the courts below properly relied on this Court's decision in People v. Williams, 797 N.Y.S.2d 35, 829 N.E.2d 1203 (2005), in granting defendant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered. The trial court concluded that suppression was warranted under Williams because, by activating his emergency lights to pull the driver of the vehicle over and approaching the car with the Buffalo police officer, the agent "acted under the color of law with all the accouterments of official authority and could not effect a citizen's arrest." The Court of Appeals decided that Williams is inapposite because the CBP agent who stopped defendant was not considered a federal law enforcement officer with peace officer powers pursuant to CPL §2.10 and CPL §2.15, he could not have improperly circumvented the jurisdictional limitations on the powers reserved for those members of law enforcement under CPL § 140.25. Therefore, the trial court should have denied defendant’s motion to suppress the gun found as a result of a traffic stop, called in by the agent, and the appellate court erred by affirming suppression of the evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, charged with murder based on confessions during an interrogation, was assessed by psychiatric experts to have issues of concentration, memory, intelligence and auditory hallucinations. His counsel at trial decided not to execute subpoenas for or otherwise review these assessments as evidence of defendant's mental weakness, which could have rebutted the voluntariness of his admissions, due both to poor strategy and a misunderstanding of criminal discovery law. After sentencing, defendant obtained new counsel which moved to vacate the conviction, arguing trial counsel's failures represented ineffective representation. The Court of Appeals held that defendants' right to representation was violated by his counsel's failure to secure and review crucial documents to defendant's case. A strategy involving "a total failure to investigate the facts of a case, or review pertinent records," does not constitute meaningful representation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant moved to dismiss charges of driving while his ability were impaired in front of a judge in City Court, who denied the motion. This same judge then proceeded over both the bench trial in which the defendant was ultimately convicted, and the County Court trial in which the defendant appealed this conviction. The Court of Appeals decided that a judge who presided at a trial may not act as the appellate judge in the same case, as they would likely not be or appear to be an impartial jurist. This ban does not apply to judges who proceed over different stages of a trial, since at this stage there is still the availability of further appellate review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, at age 18, plead guilty to several assault and attempted murder charges and was denied Youth Offender status based in part from a confidential document that was not shared with nor disclosed to the defendant. Defendant argued that he was entitled to an explanation of the reasoning for denying him this status as well as to disclosure of the confidential document. In looking at CPL § 720.20, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant is not entitled to the reasoning behind the denial of Youth Offender status. However, in this particular case, defendant's due process rights were violated by the sentencing court refusing to disclose the confidential document.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTwo defendants pled and were found guilty, respectively, for armed robberies committed when they were 18 years old. Many crimes committed by 16- to 19- year old are categorically eligible for determination of Youth Offender status, which comes with more favorable sentencing, based on the case People v. Rudolph, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 (2013). Defendants argued that their status as "eligible youth" requires that they should have received a Youth Offender determination, however, armed robberies are only eligible for this more favorable sentencing in the presence of mitigating factors. The Court of Appeals found that such mitigating factors were not present, and as a result, neither defendant received Youth Offender determinations.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was driving when she swerved into an adjacent lane and struck another vehicle. Two people in the other vehicle were killed and defendant was taken to the hospital. At the time, defendant was 34 weeks' pregnant and the hospital found signs of fetal distress so she agreed to an emergency cesarean section. The baby died six days later. The autopsy confirmed the cause of death was due to injuries sustained during the accident. The defendant was indicted on three counts of manslaughter, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, and one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence. Defendant was traveling in excess of 50 mph in a 30 mph zone, while under the influence of a prescription drugs and alcohol, and was not wearing a seat belt. Defendant was only convicted on manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her child. The Court of Appeals reversed holding the legislature did not intend to hold pregnant women criminally responsible for engaging in reckless conduct against themselves and their unborn fetuses, such that they should be subject to criminal liability for prenatal conduct resulting in postnatal death.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, while held in Rikers Island on robbery charges, made several incriminating statements during phone calls to friends and family, which, per Department of Correction's policy, were recorded and handed over to the prosecution. At trial, the defendant argued that the Department's practice of recording and disseminating to District Attorneys' offices all non-privileged and non-exempted phone calls from inmates violated inmates' right to counsel. The Court of Appeals sides with the prosecution, holding that no agent of the government deliberately elicited incriminating statements from inmates on these phone calls and notes that defendant had several notices that his calls were being recorded, while also stating this ruling should not be viewed as the Court of Appeals approving of this policy.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe circumstances (as described below) did not warrant a level three De Bour stop and frisk (which requires reasonable suspicion determination by the officer), and the evidence seized as a result of the frisk had to be suppressed where the officer's observations of defendant moving from the driver's seat to the passenger seat of his parked car, moving his upper torso back toward the driver's seat, pulling up his pants and attempting to buckle his belt, and appearing nervous while being questioned did not support a reasonable view that defendant was armed, had committed a crime, or was about to commit a crime. Thus, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk after defendant exited a parked car and walked down the street.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was questioned for 28 hours across three days about the death of a former partner and her brother, during which he confessed to their murders, along with related crimes. The Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police, saying they were coerced and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to his limited English proficiency. The Court of Appeals held that, while the delays by the police were unnecessary, the totality of circumstances--e.g., the defendant was supplied with food, water, and cigarettes, the interrogation was not continuous and allowed defendant breaks to sleep and consider his situation, and conversed multiple times with officers in English--showed that defendant's statements were voluntary.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals considered whether, defendant, a youthful offender, was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary possession of a weapon. Defendant testified that, while sitting in an apartment where he had rented a room for the evening, he was shot by someone outside of the apartment. He further testified that, after running into the bedroom he had rented to search for a towel to stop the bleeding from his gunshot wound, he saw what appeared to be a gun in an open drawer. Police arrived shortly thereafter and transported defendant to the hospital. Police also searched the apartment and found a number of weapons and marihuana. Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of marihuana. With respect to the gun found in the drawer, defendant argued that the jury should be instructed that possession had to be voluntary, meaning that he “was aware of his . . . physical possession or control . . . for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate the possession” (CJI2d [NY] Possession — Voluntary Possession § 15.00 [2]). The Court of Appeals held that, when the evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, there was a reasonable view that he had constructively possessed the weapon but that his awareness was so fleeting that any possession was not voluntary. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the evidence supported the requested jury charge and the error warranted a new trial on the voluntary possession count.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPolice officers, having observed defendant exit and reenter a building in a public housing development several times, possessed the requisite objective credible reason to approach him and ask briefly about his identity, destination, or reason for being in the area. However, after defendant explained that he was visiting a friend who lived in the building, and provided his identification, the encounter rose beyond a level-one request for information, which, according to the Court of Appeals, the State failed to justify as lawful. An officer took defendant's identification to the eleventh floor of the building to verify whether the occupant of the apartment defendant identified knew him, while another officer instructed defendant to "stand right there" under the watch of two officers, and when the first officer returned, having determined that the occupant of the apartment did not know defendant, defendant was arrested for trespassing. The State justified the officers' interaction with defendant purely on the ground that it was a level-one inquiry supported by an objective credible reason. The Court of Appeals found that the record demonstrated that the encounter thereafter rose beyond a level-one request for information, which the State failed to justify as lawful. Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress drugs recovered from his person during a search incident to his arrest was granted.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhile being processed for an arrest at the Franklin County Jail, defendant was directed to remove his footwear, a command given to all those in custody at jail, but defendant refused to do so despite multiple orders regarding this. A police sergeant called for backup and specifically warned defendant that he would pepper spray defendant if he refused to remove his footwear. Defendant continued to refuse, was pepper sprayed in the face, and punched the sergeant in the head. Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree. The Appellate Division concluded that there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the use of the pepper spray constituted excessive force. The Court of Appeals, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, decided that defendant's contention that the force exerted was unlawful is without merit, and no reasonable factfinder could conclude on this record that defendant reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary to defend himself from the use of unlawful physical force. Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division.

Summary of Case Context & Holding"[W]hen a defendant has been convicted of an armed felony and the only barrier to his or her youthful offender eligibility is that conviction, the court is required to determine on the record whether the defendant is an eligible youth by considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL §720.10 (3)" (People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 527-528 [2015]; accord People v Lofton, 29 NY3d 1097, 1098 [2017]). Here, the State conceded that the sentencing court failed to make any appropriate on-the-record determination. The Court of Appeals accepted the State's concession and, accordingly, the case should be remitted for consideration of youthful offender treatment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with three assaults on three separate deputy sheriffs based on a fight at a correctional facility. The defendant claimed a deputy initiated this fight. The deputies denied this and alleged to have watched a video recorded by the facility that proved their case, a video that was destroyed before trial. At trial, a request for an "adverse inference charge" to the jury, instructing them to question the validity of the testimony by the deputy about the existence and contents of the video, was denied. The Court of Appeals held that such a charge should be given where a defendant has requested evidence likely to be important to the case, and where this evidence has been destroyed by the State.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was stopped by an officer after driving past an unregistered and therefore legally unauthorized stop sign. After this stop, the defendant was arrested and charged with both failing to stop at a stop sign and driving while intoxicated. The defendant argued that the lack of legal authorization for the stop sign created a lack of probable cause for the officer's stop, so no evidence from the stop should be admitted. The Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that when an officer has an "objectively reasonable" belief that they have probable cause for a stop, the evidence from the stop is admissible as evidence, even if the officer is mistaken that they have such probable cause due to either a mistake in fact or law.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of second degree murder, in part based on a 49.5 hour interrogation during which he did not sleep and only received one meal. On appeal, defendant argued that statements made during interrogation, as well as subsequent inculpatory statements 10 hours later, should be suppressed as evidence. The Court of Appeals ruled that statements made in both of these interrogations should have been suppressed and that both were tainted by the police misconduct in the initial interrogation

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, at trial for attempted armed robbery, was represented by a lawyer from the Legal Aid Society. This lawyer informed the trial court that he was leaving the Legal Aid, after which the trial court rejected a request for adjournment so that a new Legal Aid attorney could have time to prepare themselves for trial. The trial court also relieved the Legal Aid Society over its objections and appointed the defendant new counsel, at a hearing in which defendant was present but not consulted. Defendant plead guilty, then sought to withdraw his plea and have new counsel assigned. The Court of Appeals held that relieving Legal Aid as defendant's counsel without consulting the defendant deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that such a claim was not barred by defendant's guilty plea.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant swore at officers and claimed they were harassing him in a subway station in Manhattan, after which the officers followed the defendant to another level of the station, prevented him from leaving, searched him and found an illegal knife. The defendant moved to suppress the knife on the grounds the police stop was illegal. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed the indictment, holding that shouting obscenities at officers does not constitute disorderly conduct.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288 (1982), this Court set forth a three-prong standard for seizure of corporeal evidence from an uncharged suspect that requires bodily intrusion: the State must demonstrate probable cause to commitment of the crime, a "clear indication" that material and relevant evidence will be found, and that the means used for the seizure is "safe and reliable." Generally, when the corporeal evidence sought is not subject to alteration or destruction, there is no exigency and the search warrant application must be brought on notice to the suspect. In this case, the police sought a search warrant authorizing them to obtain corporeal evidence — in the form of DNA evidence by use of a buccal swab — from defendant, a suspect in a murder investigation who was in custody on an unrelated matter. The Court of Appeals held that there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights where he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the warrant on the nature and extent of the bodily intrusion. The Court of Appeals further develops the rule by deciding that Abe and the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures do not require that a defendant be given access to search warrant materials and an adversarial hearing as a matter of constitutional law, as the probable cause determination is one that is made by the neutral magistrate as a matter of course because a buccal swab was undeniably safe, consisted of a minimal intrusion and involved no discomfort, and the method and procedures employed in taking the saliva undoubtedly respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.