State Supreme Court Data Tracker
Use this data to spot trends, anticipate what’s next, and supercharge your advocacy.
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Daniels v. State, 87 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. 2022)
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Georgia | 2022 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2022
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes and when he was interviewed by the police, argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional Miranda rights before speaking with the police and that his statements should also have been excluded because the police failed to comply with provisions of the Juvenile Code relating to custody of juvenile arrestees. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the trial court did not err by not excluding the juvenile's statements at trial under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-502 because a period of six hours was not an obviously unreasonable time for interrogation, given that the police were questioning him about several incidents. The trial court also did not err by concluding that the 14-year-old juvenile made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights under the nine Riley factors. The nine Riley factors are: "(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date." Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Ga. 1976). Because he was advised of his rights two times (through use of an advice-of-rights form designed specifically for juveniles), although his interviews were lengthy nothing in the record suggested that he was coerced, intimidated, threatened, or held incommunicado by the police, he was permitted to speak with his mother and was given food and drink at the police station, and he never asked to speak with a lawyer or anyone else. The application of the exception set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-502 (b) was a matter of first impression for the Court. Subsection (b) plainly authorized the police to detain and interrogate Defendant for a reasonable period of time after his arrest.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant, who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes and when he was interviewed by the police, argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional Miranda rights before speaking with the police and that his statements should also have been excluded because the police failed to comply with provisions of the Juvenile Code relating to custody of juvenile arrestees. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the trial court did not err by not excluding the juvenile's statements at trial under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-502 because a period of six hours was not an obviously unreasonable time for interrogation, given that the police were questioning him about several incidents. The trial court also did not err by concluding that the 14-year-old juvenile made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights under the nine Riley factors. The nine Riley factors are: "(1) age of the accused; (2) education of the accused; (3) knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the charge . . . and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent; (4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogations; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date." Riley v. State, 226 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Ga. 1976). Because he was advised of his rights two times (through use of an advice-of-rights form designed specifically for juveniles), although his interviews were lengthy nothing in the record suggested that he was coerced, intimidated, threatened, or held incommunicado by the police, he was permitted to speak with his mother and was given food and drink at the police station, and he never asked to speak with a lawyer or anyone else. The application of the exception set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-11-502 (b) was a matter of first impression for the Court. Subsection (b) plainly authorized the police to detain and interrogate Defendant for a reasonable period of time after his arrest.
Link to Opinion
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Daniels v. Wiley, 314 So. 3d 1213 (Ala. 2020)
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Alabama | 2020 | Housing |
State:
Alabama
Year:
2020
Topics:
Housing
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a resident of an apartment complex owned and managed by Defendants, was walking on the sidewalk from her apartment to the mail kiosk for her building and slipped due to mud on the sidewalk. Plaintiff contended that the landlord may be liable for damages for a tenant's injury resulting from a danger where the landlord knew about the danger and should have anticipated the harm, even if the danger is "open and obvious." The Court rejected Plaintiff's argument and affirmed summary judgment for the Defendants, concluding that a landlord has no duty to the Plaintiff when the danger is “open and obvious.”
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, a resident of an apartment complex owned and managed by Defendants, was walking on the sidewalk from her apartment to the mail kiosk for her building and slipped due to mud on the sidewalk. Plaintiff contended that the landlord may be liable for damages for a tenant's injury resulting from a danger where the landlord knew about the danger and should have anticipated the harm, even if the danger is "open and obvious." The Court rejected Plaintiff's argument and affirmed summary judgment for the Defendants, concluding that a landlord has no duty to the Plaintiff when the danger is “open and obvious.”
Link to Opinion
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Danreuther Ranches v. Farmers Coop. Canal Co., 403 P.3d 332 (Mont. 2017)
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Montana | 2017 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2017
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Danreuther Ranches filed two claims for water rights from the Teton River based upon its predecessor's activities beginning in 1874. The land was first used for raising and watering stock, but evidence also showed that irrigation for crops began in 1880. Based upon aerial photographs as well as evidence that crops would not grow in the area without irrigation, the Water Court ruled that Danreuther had established irrigation water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that proof of precise facts as to a person's activities over 100 years ago is often not possible, even when written records are kept. Courts will presume facts in the record to be true, unless the objector can provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, claimants would be subject to an unjustifiably heavy burden to prove the existence of their claim. Here, the evidence that showed the predecessor was cropping a particular number of acres in 1880 and 1887, coupled with the unassailable fact that crops will not grow in the area without irrigation, was sufficient to establish water rights.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Danreuther Ranches filed two claims for water rights from the Teton River based upon its predecessor's activities beginning in 1874. The land was first used for raising and watering stock, but evidence also showed that irrigation for crops began in 1880. Based upon aerial photographs as well as evidence that crops would not grow in the area without irrigation, the Water Court ruled that Danreuther had established irrigation water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that proof of precise facts as to a person's activities over 100 years ago is often not possible, even when written records are kept. Courts will presume facts in the record to be true, unless the objector can provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, claimants would be subject to an unjustifiably heavy burden to prove the existence of their claim. Here, the evidence that showed the predecessor was cropping a particular number of acres in 1880 and 1887, coupled with the unassailable fact that crops will not grow in the area without irrigation, was sufficient to establish water rights.
Link to Opinion
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Davenport v. State, 846 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. 2020)
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Georgia | 2020 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2020
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and the trial court erred by admitting improper character evidence under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) and certain hearsay evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. However, the Supreme Court announced that it would end its practice of sua sponte review of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions in appeals of non-death penalty murder cases, beginning in December 2020.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and the trial court erred by admitting improper character evidence under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) and certain hearsay evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. However, the Supreme Court announced that it would end its practice of sua sponte review of the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions in appeals of non-death penalty murder cases, beginning in December 2020.
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Davis v. State, 332 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 2021)
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Florida | 2021 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Florida
Year:
2021
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury convicted Davis of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. According to trial testimony, a teenager was driving a car with Davis as a passenger. Officers stopped the car and found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a gun. The teenage driver testified that he did not know a gun was in the car until right before the traffic stop, when Davis pulled out the gun, wrapped it in an orange shirt, and stuffed it under the seat. The teen's testimony was essential, and the jury convicted. Davis moved for a new trial. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to sentencing. The presentence investigation report noted Davis's "extensive criminal history," which included "numerous violent offenses." It also concluded that Davis "appears to have a history of gang related activity" and "apparently continues to be a threat to the safety of the community." The presentence investigation report recommended the maximum sentence. At the sentencing hearing, Davis contended that he was innocent. He insisted that the gun was not his, that the jury convicted him without sufficient evidence, and that his counsel performed inadequately. After Davis spoke, the court pronounced the sentence. In doing so, the court recounted Davis's significant criminal history and told Davis "you still fail to take any responsibility for your actions." The court concluded that, "considering your history here, your failure to take any responsibility, the nature of the crime, the fact that it involves a firearm, the Court will sentence you to 15 years ..., which is the statutory maximum." The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code, in accordance with Davis's sentencing scoresheet, was 118.125 months (approximately nine years and ten months) and the statutory maximum sentence was fifteen years. Davis appealed to the First District. The First District affirmed his sentence. Receding from its own precedent, the First District concluded that the "lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the statutory range." The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's consideration of failure to take responsibility during a sentencing proceeding violates a defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative and approved the result in the decision on review, holding that when a defendant voluntarily chooses to allocute (formal statement by defendant) at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court is permitted to consider the defendant's freely offered statements, including those indicating a failure to accept responsibility.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A jury convicted Davis of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. According to trial testimony, a teenager was driving a car with Davis as a passenger. Officers stopped the car and found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a gun. The teenage driver testified that he did not know a gun was in the car until right before the traffic stop, when Davis pulled out the gun, wrapped it in an orange shirt, and stuffed it under the seat. The teen's testimony was essential, and the jury convicted. Davis moved for a new trial. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to sentencing. The presentence investigation report noted Davis's "extensive criminal history," which included "numerous violent offenses." It also concluded that Davis "appears to have a history of gang related activity" and "apparently continues to be a threat to the safety of the community." The presentence investigation report recommended the maximum sentence. At the sentencing hearing, Davis contended that he was innocent. He insisted that the gun was not his, that the jury convicted him without sufficient evidence, and that his counsel performed inadequately. After Davis spoke, the court pronounced the sentence. In doing so, the court recounted Davis's significant criminal history and told Davis "you still fail to take any responsibility for your actions." The court concluded that, "considering your history here, your failure to take any responsibility, the nature of the crime, the fact that it involves a firearm, the Court will sentence you to 15 years ..., which is the statutory maximum." The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code, in accordance with Davis's sentencing scoresheet, was 118.125 months (approximately nine years and ten months) and the statutory maximum sentence was fifteen years. Davis appealed to the First District. The First District affirmed his sentence. Receding from its own precedent, the First District concluded that the "lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the statutory range." The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's consideration of failure to take responsibility during a sentencing proceeding violates a defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative and approved the result in the decision on review, holding that when a defendant voluntarily chooses to allocute (formal statement by defendant) at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court is permitted to consider the defendant's freely offered statements, including those indicating a failure to accept responsibility.
Link to Opinion
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Delva v. Cont'l Grp., Inc., 137 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 2014)
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Florida | 2014 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination, Civil Rights, Sex |
State:
Florida
Year:
2014
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination, Civil Rights, Sex
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a pregnant employee, filed a lawsuit against her former employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) for allegedly discriminating against her for being pregnant. According to Plaintiff, her employer discriminated against her by applying heightened scrutiny to her work product and not allowing her to change shifts. The trial court dismissed the claim, reasoning that the statute did not prohibit pregnancy discrimination in employment practices. The appellate court affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court answered the question of whether being pregnant is protected under the FCRA on the basis of sex. The Court reasoned that FCRA makes it unlawful to discriminate against employees due to pregnancy, as this counts as discriminating on the basis of sex given that "pregnancy is a condition unique to women, and the ability to become pregnant is a primary characteristic of the female sex."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, a pregnant employee, filed a lawsuit against her former employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) for allegedly discriminating against her for being pregnant. According to Plaintiff, her employer discriminated against her by applying heightened scrutiny to her work product and not allowing her to change shifts. The trial court dismissed the claim, reasoning that the statute did not prohibit pregnancy discrimination in employment practices. The appellate court affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court answered the question of whether being pregnant is protected under the FCRA on the basis of sex. The Court reasoned that FCRA makes it unlawful to discriminate against employees due to pregnancy, as this counts as discriminating on the basis of sex given that "pregnancy is a condition unique to women, and the ability to become pregnant is a primary characteristic of the female sex."
Link to Opinion
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Delvecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 135 A.3d 954 (N.J. 2016)
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New Jersey | 2016 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Disability Rights, Employment Discrimination |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2016
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Disability Rights, Employment Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, who had been employed as a police dispatcher for the township's police department, filed a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) disability discrimination complaint against the township, alleging that her inflammatory bowel syndrome constituted a disability for purposes of LAD and that the township failed to provide reasonable accommodation for disability. Plaintiff's doctor, Ciambotti, had written to Plaintiff’s supervisors and stated that Plaintiff's symptoms would be exacerbated by an assignment to the midnight shift, and while the township initially provided Plaintiff with a steady afternoon shift, it later stated that it could not guarantee that she could entirely avoid midnight shifts. The superior court issued a limiting instruction, directing the jury to consider the physician's letter only as a request for a reasonable accommodation, and entered judgment in favor of township. The trial court denied employee's motion for new trial on the grounds that although treating physicians may be permitted to testify about the issue of causation, neither physician had been retained and designated as an expert witness and that neither witness had prepared a report. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that: (1) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating physician; (2) the error in barring testimony was not harmless; and (3) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating psychiatrist.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, who had been employed as a police dispatcher for the township's police department, filed a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) disability discrimination complaint against the township, alleging that her inflammatory bowel syndrome constituted a disability for purposes of LAD and that the township failed to provide reasonable accommodation for disability. Plaintiff's doctor, Ciambotti, had written to Plaintiff’s supervisors and stated that Plaintiff's symptoms would be exacerbated by an assignment to the midnight shift, and while the township initially provided Plaintiff with a steady afternoon shift, it later stated that it could not guarantee that she could entirely avoid midnight shifts. The superior court issued a limiting instruction, directing the jury to consider the physician's letter only as a request for a reasonable accommodation, and entered judgment in favor of township. The trial court denied employee's motion for new trial on the grounds that although treating physicians may be permitted to testify about the issue of causation, neither physician had been retained and designated as an expert witness and that neither witness had prepared a report. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that: (1) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating physician; (2) the error in barring testimony was not harmless; and (3) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating psychiatrist.
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DeMarco v. Stoddad, 125 A.3d 367 (N.J. 2015)
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New Jersey | 2015 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2015
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a podiatrist and his out-of-state medical malpractice insurer, and sought declaratory judgment requiring the insurer to provide indemnification coverage, notwithstanding the insurer's rescission of the policy due to material misrepresentations made concerning the state in which the podiatrist maintained his primary practice. The superior court entered judgment in patient's favor, requiring the insurer to indemnify the physician in patient's lawsuit. Insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Insurer sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the podiatrist stood without coverage to respond to patient claim that arose prior to rescission. The Supreme Court notes it is well established in New Jersey that a professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer. A professional in that position can also expect that claims that arose prior to discovery of the misrepresentation will be excluded from coverage. Once the policy has been rescinded, the professional responds to any claims from injured third parties without coverage.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Patient brought a medical malpractice action against a podiatrist and his out-of-state medical malpractice insurer, and sought declaratory judgment requiring the insurer to provide indemnification coverage, notwithstanding the insurer's rescission of the policy due to material misrepresentations made concerning the state in which the podiatrist maintained his primary practice. The superior court entered judgment in patient's favor, requiring the insurer to indemnify the physician in patient's lawsuit. Insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Insurer sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the podiatrist stood without coverage to respond to patient claim that arose prior to rescission. The Supreme Court notes it is well established in New Jersey that a professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer. A professional in that position can also expect that claims that arose prior to discovery of the misrepresentation will be excluded from coverage. Once the policy has been rescinded, the professional responds to any claims from injured third parties without coverage.
Link to Opinion
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Deminski v. State Bd. of Educ., 858 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. 2021)
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North Carolina | 2021 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2021
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe mother of a child who was frequently bullied and sexually harassed at school alleged that the school failed to act despite her repeatedly reporting the behavior, and as such denied the child's right to education as guaranteed under the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiff argued that the behavior constituted harassment, and the school expressed deliberate indifference in enforcing her child's education. The Supreme Court decided that schools are not immune from liability, and students can raise claims about barriers to education. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals' decision to grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss should be reversed because the Plaintiff was able to adequately assert a claim of relief. There has not yet been a subsequent decision on the merits.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The mother of a child who was frequently bullied and sexually harassed at school alleged that the school failed to act despite her repeatedly reporting the behavior, and as such denied the child's right to education as guaranteed under the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiff argued that the behavior constituted harassment, and the school expressed deliberate indifference in enforcing her child's education. The Supreme Court decided that schools are not immune from liability, and students can raise claims about barriers to education. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals' decision to grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss should be reversed because the Plaintiff was able to adequately assert a claim of relief. There has not yet been a subsequent decision on the merits.
Link to Opinion
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Democratic Party of Ga. Inc., DSCC, and Warnock for Ga. v. State, No. S23M0376 (Ga. 2022)
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Georgia | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn November 14, 2022, the Democratic Party of Georgia, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and Warnock for Georgia sued the State of Georgia seeking emergency declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the Secretary of State's instruction to counties that they could not open the polls on Saturday November 26 before the December 6 Senate runoff election. The Secretary and his office initially said they expected that some counties would have Saturday voting after Thanksgiving but then, three days later, reversed course and instructed the counties that they could not hold early voting on November 26. https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/georgia-secretary-of-state-guidance-prohibits-early-voting-on-the-saturday-after-thanksgiving/ Arguing that the Secretary's reading of O.C.G.A § 21-2-385(d)(1) was wrong because the provisions restricting Saturday voting were limited to primary and general elections (not runoffs), the Democratic Party et al. immediate relief in the state trial court that the Secretary not be permitted to "prevent or interfere with counties holding advance voting on [November 26]." https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2022-11-14-Complaint-.pdf Four days later, the Trial Court judge ruled that counties could hold early voting on November 26. The state subsequently filed a motion for an emergency stay with the court of appeals, arguing that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was correct and that permitting counties to hold early voting on November 26 would lead to "chaos" and lack of uniformity. On November 21, the court of appeals denied the appeal. On November 22, the Republican committees subsequently filed an emergency petition for writ of certiorari (on similar grounds) with the state Supreme Court, which was denied on November 23.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
On November 14, 2022, the Democratic Party of Georgia, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and Warnock for Georgia sued the State of Georgia seeking emergency declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the Secretary of State's instruction to counties that they could not open the polls on Saturday November 26 before the December 6 Senate runoff election. The Secretary and his office initially said they expected that some counties would have Saturday voting after Thanksgiving but then, three days later, reversed course and instructed the counties that they could not hold early voting on November 26. https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/georgia-secretary-of-state-guidance-prohibits-early-voting-on-the-saturday-after-thanksgiving/ Arguing that the Secretary's reading of O.C.G.A § 21-2-385(d)(1) was wrong because the provisions restricting Saturday voting were limited to primary and general elections (not runoffs), the Democratic Party et al. immediate relief in the state trial court that the Secretary not be permitted to "prevent or interfere with counties holding advance voting on [November 26]." https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2022-11-14-Complaint-.pdf Four days later, the Trial Court judge ruled that counties could hold early voting on November 26. The state subsequently filed a motion for an emergency stay with the court of appeals, arguing that the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was correct and that permitting counties to hold early voting on November 26 would lead to "chaos" and lack of uniformity. On November 21, the court of appeals denied the appeal. On November 22, the Republican committees subsequently filed an emergency petition for writ of certiorari (on similar grounds) with the state Supreme Court, which was denied on November 23.
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Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 102 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2014)
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Pennsylvania | 2014 | Environment, Actions Against Government |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2014
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe case involved a question of whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had the authority to issue administrative orders related to accident reporting and the requiring of fire extinguishers under the state's Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act. The Supreme Court found that the DEP had authority to issue orders regarding the failure to report accidents but acted outside the scope of its authority when it issued orders requiring fire extinguishers on certain machinery.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The case involved a question of whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had the authority to issue administrative orders related to accident reporting and the requiring of fire extinguishers under the state's Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act. The Supreme Court found that the DEP had authority to issue orders regarding the failure to report accidents but acted outside the scope of its authority when it issued orders requiring fire extinguishers on certain machinery.
Link to Opinion
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DeRuiter v. Twp. of Byron, 949 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. 2020)
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Michigan | 2020 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2020
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a licensed qualifying medical marijuana patient and registered primary caregiver under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA), began growing marijuana on rented, commercially-zoned property because she did not want to grow it at her residence. Plaintiff argued that the property counted under the MMMA requirement to cultivate medical marijuana in any "enclosed, locked facility." Byron Township's zoning ordinance allowed primary caregivers to cultivate marijuana, but only as "a home occupation." The township sent Plaintiff's landlord a letter, directing the landlord to cease and desist Plaintiff's cultivation of medical marijuana and remove all related equipment or be subject to enforcement action. Plaintiff brought an action against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance which allowed the township to sanction a caregiver's use when in a commercially zoned location directly conflicted with, and therefore was preempted by, the MMMA. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not preempted because it did not conflict with the immunity provision of the MMMA which provides immunity to primary caregivers for assisting patients on the condition that cultivation of marijuana in an "enclosed, locked facility." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, a licensed qualifying medical marijuana patient and registered primary caregiver under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA), began growing marijuana on rented, commercially-zoned property because she did not want to grow it at her residence. Plaintiff argued that the property counted under the MMMA requirement to cultivate medical marijuana in any "enclosed, locked facility." Byron Township's zoning ordinance allowed primary caregivers to cultivate marijuana, but only as "a home occupation." The township sent Plaintiff's landlord a letter, directing the landlord to cease and desist Plaintiff's cultivation of medical marijuana and remove all related equipment or be subject to enforcement action. Plaintiff brought an action against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance which allowed the township to sanction a caregiver's use when in a commercially zoned location directly conflicted with, and therefore was preempted by, the MMMA. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not preempted because it did not conflict with the immunity provision of the MMMA which provides immunity to primary caregivers for assisting patients on the condition that cultivation of marijuana in an "enclosed, locked facility." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.
Link to Opinion
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Detroit Caucus v. Indep. Citizens Redistricting Comm'n, 969 N.W.2d 331 (Mich. 2022)
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Michigan | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiffs challenged the plans adopted by the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the Commission) on December 28, 2021 for Michigan's congressional and legislative districts, alleging that the absence of an equivalent number of race-based majority-minority districts in the adopted plans as compared to Michigan's existing congressional and state legislative districts will result in unlawful vote dilution. The Supreme Court denied the relief requested, reasoning that the plaintiffs did not identify grounds or legal authority that would allow them to question the Commission's decision not to draw race-based, majority-minority districts, there was no strong basis in evidence providing good reason for the Commission to believe that the three threshold preconditions provided in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) were satisfied so as to potentially require race-based district lines in order to avoid liability for vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, and the Supreme Court had the responsibility to resolve the case at this juncture consistent with its charge under the Michigan Constitution. (In Gingles, the U.S. Supreme Court identified three threshold conditions for proving vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: (1) a "minority group" must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district; (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive; and (3) a district's white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate.)
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Plaintiffs challenged the plans adopted by the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the Commission) on December 28, 2021 for Michigan's congressional and legislative districts, alleging that the absence of an equivalent number of race-based majority-minority districts in the adopted plans as compared to Michigan's existing congressional and state legislative districts will result in unlawful vote dilution. The Supreme Court denied the relief requested, reasoning that the plaintiffs did not identify grounds or legal authority that would allow them to question the Commission's decision not to draw race-based, majority-minority districts, there was no strong basis in evidence providing good reason for the Commission to believe that the three threshold preconditions provided in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) were satisfied so as to potentially require race-based district lines in order to avoid liability for vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, and the Supreme Court had the responsibility to resolve the case at this juncture consistent with its charge under the Michigan Constitution. (In Gingles, the U.S. Supreme Court identified three threshold conditions for proving vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: (1) a "minority group" must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district; (2) the minority group must be politically cohesive; and (3) a district's white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate.)
Link to Opinion
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Detroit News, Inc. v. Indep. Citizens Redistricting Comm'n, 976 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 2021)
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Michigan | 2021 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2021
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2018, the voters of Michigan chose to vest responsibility for redistricting in an independent body, being the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the Commission), which consists of 13 commissioners selected on a random basis from a pool of applicants. The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others brought an original action in the Supreme Court against the Commission, alleging that the Commission violated Const. 1963, art 4, § 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. The Supreme Court ordered production of recording of October 27 meeting and seven memoranda because the Commission's October 27 closed-session meeting violated the requirement in Constitution 1963, art 4, § 6(10) that the Commission conduct all of its business at open meetings. The discussion that occurred at that meeting involved the content and development of the maps and thus constituted the "business" of the Commission.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2018, the voters of Michigan chose to vest responsibility for redistricting in an independent body, being the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (the Commission), which consists of 13 commissioners selected on a random basis from a pool of applicants. The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others brought an original action in the Supreme Court against the Commission, alleging that the Commission violated Const. 1963, art 4, § 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. The Supreme Court ordered production of recording of October 27 meeting and seven memoranda because the Commission's October 27 closed-session meeting violated the requirement in Constitution 1963, art 4, § 6(10) that the Commission conduct all of its business at open meetings. The discussion that occurred at that meeting involved the content and development of the maps and thus constituted the "business" of the Commission.
Link to Opinion
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Detzner v. League of Women Voters of Fla., 256 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam)
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Florida | 2018 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Florida
Year:
2018
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court affirmed the decision of the lower court preventing the Florida Secretary of State from placing Revision 8 on the ballot for the November 2018 general election, holding that the ballot language was defective. The revision at issue sought to reallocate the power to authorize new charter schools to a variety of potential public or private entities rather than district school boards. The Court held that "[w]hile the ballot summary informs voters that district school boards will no longer have the authority to operate, control, and supervise public schools that they do not establish," the ballot summary "fails to explain who or what, other than district school boards, currently has the authority to establish public schools, which categories of public schools will be affected, and who or what will have the authority to establish future public schools if voters approve the revision." Therefore, the ballot language was clearly and conclusively defective.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court preventing the Florida Secretary of State from placing Revision 8 on the ballot for the November 2018 general election, holding that the ballot language was defective. The revision at issue sought to reallocate the power to authorize new charter schools to a variety of potential public or private entities rather than district school boards. The Court held that "[w]hile the ballot summary informs voters that district school boards will no longer have the authority to operate, control, and supervise public schools that they do not establish," the ballot summary "fails to explain who or what, other than district school boards, currently has the authority to establish public schools, which categories of public schools will be affected, and who or what will have the authority to establish future public schools if voters approve the revision." Therefore, the ballot language was clearly and conclusively defective.
Link to Opinion
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DeVisser v. Sec'y of State, 981 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 2022)
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Michigan | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Republican National Committee, Michigan Republican Party and a voter filed suit challenging a set of 2022 rules pertaining to the appointment, rights and duties of partisan elections challengers, which they argued are a “significant departure” from prior iterations of the rules regulating election challengers and “contain express self-descriptors that are typically associated with documents meant to have the effect of law,” as opposed to being merely “guidance.” They assert that the following rule changes violate Michigan law: a requirement that the “written authority necessary to serve as a challenger now ‘must be on a form promulgated by the Secretary of State;’” a stipulation that political parties may only appoint challengers before Election Day (but not on Election Day); a mandate that “every polling place or Absent Voter Counting Board have an election inspector designated as the challenger liaison, among others. The Plaintiffs ask the court to invalidate the challenged rules for violating Michigan law and to prohibit the defendants from enforcing them. This case was consolidated with O'Halloran v. Sec'y of State & Dir. of the Bureau of Elections, 981 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 2022).
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Republican National Committee, Michigan Republican Party and a voter filed suit challenging a set of 2022 rules pertaining to the appointment, rights and duties of partisan elections challengers, which they argued are a “significant departure” from prior iterations of the rules regulating election challengers and “contain express self-descriptors that are typically associated with documents meant to have the effect of law,” as opposed to being merely “guidance.” They assert that the following rule changes violate Michigan law: a requirement that the “written authority necessary to serve as a challenger now ‘must be on a form promulgated by the Secretary of State;’” a stipulation that political parties may only appoint challengers before Election Day (but not on Election Day); a mandate that “every polling place or Absent Voter Counting Board have an election inspector designated as the challenger liaison, among others. The Plaintiffs ask the court to invalidate the challenged rules for violating Michigan law and to prohibit the defendants from enforcing them. This case was consolidated with O'Halloran v. Sec'y of State & Dir. of the Bureau of Elections, 981 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 2022).
Link to Opinion
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Diamond Nat. Res. Prot. & Conservation Ass'n v. Diamond Valley Ranch, LLC, 511 P.3d 1003 (Nev. 2022)
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Nevada | 2022 | Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2022
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhen a water basin in Nevada is over-appropriated and over-pumped, the State Engineer may designate a basin a Critical Management Area (CMA). After Diamond Valley was designated a CMA, the State Engineer approved a Groundwater Management Plan (GMP) for the basin to remove it from being designated as a CMA. The GMP that was approved deviated from Nevada's doctrine of prior appropriation for water rights (priority is assigned based on first in time, first in right). The district court invalidated the State Engineer's order after finding the plan forced senior water holders to reduce their use. The Supreme Court reversed the holding, finding that the Legislature gave the State Engineer unambiguous authority to deviate from the doctrine of prior appropriation in the case of a GMP.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
When a water basin in Nevada is over-appropriated and over-pumped, the State Engineer may designate a basin a Critical Management Area (CMA). After Diamond Valley was designated a CMA, the State Engineer approved a Groundwater Management Plan (GMP) for the basin to remove it from being designated as a CMA. The GMP that was approved deviated from Nevada's doctrine of prior appropriation for water rights (priority is assigned based on first in time, first in right). The district court invalidated the State Engineer's order after finding the plan forced senior water holders to reduce their use. The Supreme Court reversed the holding, finding that the Legislature gave the State Engineer unambiguous authority to deviate from the doctrine of prior appropriation in the case of a GMP.
Link to Opinion
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Diaz v. Bernini, 435 P.3d 457 (Ariz. 2019)
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Arizona | 2019 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2019
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, charged with a DUI, moved to suppress breath evidence obtained after her arrest. The trial court granted the motion and the State appealed. On appeal, the Court reviewed whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1321 requires voluntary consent to the blood alcohol content test admonition. Defendant argued that because the search by nature penalizes no consent, the statute is inherently not voluntary and thus violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court compared the present case to Carillo v. Houser, 232 P.3d 1245 (Ariz. 2010), where "this Court held that § 28-1321 'generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer the test without a warrant unless the arrestee expressly agrees to the test.'" The Court quickly dismissed the analogy by stating that at issue in Carillo was not the constitutionality of the statute, but was solely ruled on as a matter of statutory interpretation. The reverse was true in State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (Ariz. 2013), where the Court solely addressed whether § 28-1321 was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, absent any statutory requirement for consent. Finally, the Court explained that because both Butler and Carillo involved blood tests, which are inherently more invasive as compared to breath tests, those cases could not be analogized to the present case. Ultimately, the Court held that the statutory requirement under the implied consent statute of express agreement to breath testing of a DUI arrestee does not require that the arrestee’s agreement be voluntary.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant, charged with a DUI, moved to suppress breath evidence obtained after her arrest. The trial court granted the motion and the State appealed. On appeal, the Court reviewed whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1321 requires voluntary consent to the blood alcohol content test admonition. Defendant argued that because the search by nature penalizes no consent, the statute is inherently not voluntary and thus violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court compared the present case to Carillo v. Houser, 232 P.3d 1245 (Ariz. 2010), where "this Court held that § 28-1321 'generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer the test without a warrant unless the arrestee expressly agrees to the test.'" The Court quickly dismissed the analogy by stating that at issue in Carillo was not the constitutionality of the statute, but was solely ruled on as a matter of statutory interpretation. The reverse was true in State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (Ariz. 2013), where the Court solely addressed whether § 28-1321 was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, absent any statutory requirement for consent. Finally, the Court explained that because both Butler and Carillo involved blood tests, which are inherently more invasive as compared to breath tests, those cases could not be analogized to the present case. Ultimately, the Court held that the statutory requirement under the implied consent statute of express agreement to breath testing of a DUI arrestee does not require that the arrestee’s agreement be voluntary.
Link to Opinion
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Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013)
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Minnesota | 2013 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn action for medical malpractice was brought by the parents of a newborn infant against a pediatrician and the medical center based on the pediatrician's alleged failure to diagnose the infant's rare form of cancer within one year from birth. The parents claim that if the cancer had been timely diagnosed, it would have been curable rather than fatal. The district court entered summary judgment and dismissed the parents' complaint concluding that the claim for infant's “reduced life expectancy and increased risk of recurrence” was essentially “a claim for loss of chance of life” that was foreclosed by the court's prior case law, and also dismissed the parents' claim for medical expenses based on the cancer's recurrence, citing failure to present sufficient expert testimony. The parents appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the parents' claim was not foreclosed under Minnesota law and affidavits supported parents' claim of the pediatrician and medical center's negligence. The pediatrician and medical center appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal, holding that: (1) a pediatrician that harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or survival should be liable for the value of that lost chance; (2) loss of chance damages are measured as percentage probability by which the Defendant's tortious conduct diminished likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome; (3) proportional-recovery approach, in which damages for the patient's injury or death are discounted by the value of the chance that the pediatrician's negligence destroyed, is used to measure damages in loss of chance case; (4) the appropriate baseline to determine loss of chance damages for injury to a newborn, who was still alive, was not the total amount of damages allowable for death, but, instead, the value of the reduction of the newborn's life expectancy from her pre-negligence life expectancy; and (5) whether the pediatrician's failure to timely diagnose a newborn's cancer caused substantial increase in the likelihood that her cancer would recur and decreased her chances of survival precluded a grant of summary judgment to the pediatrician and the medical center on parents' loss of chance claim.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
An action for medical malpractice was brought by the parents of a newborn infant against a pediatrician and the medical center based on the pediatrician's alleged failure to diagnose the infant's rare form of cancer within one year from birth. The parents claim that if the cancer had been timely diagnosed, it would have been curable rather than fatal. The district court entered summary judgment and dismissed the parents' complaint concluding that the claim for infant's “reduced life expectancy and increased risk of recurrence” was essentially “a claim for loss of chance of life” that was foreclosed by the court's prior case law, and also dismissed the parents' claim for medical expenses based on the cancer's recurrence, citing failure to present sufficient expert testimony. The parents appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the parents' claim was not foreclosed under Minnesota law and affidavits supported parents' claim of the pediatrician and medical center's negligence. The pediatrician and medical center appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal, holding that: (1) a pediatrician that harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or survival should be liable for the value of that lost chance; (2) loss of chance damages are measured as percentage probability by which the Defendant's tortious conduct diminished likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome; (3) proportional-recovery approach, in which damages for the patient's injury or death are discounted by the value of the chance that the pediatrician's negligence destroyed, is used to measure damages in loss of chance case; (4) the appropriate baseline to determine loss of chance damages for injury to a newborn, who was still alive, was not the total amount of damages allowable for death, but, instead, the value of the reduction of the newborn's life expectancy from her pre-negligence life expectancy; and (5) whether the pediatrician's failure to timely diagnose a newborn's cancer caused substantial increase in the likelihood that her cancer would recur and decreased her chances of survival precluded a grant of summary judgment to the pediatrician and the medical center on parents' loss of chance claim.
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Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014), aff'd, Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015), vacated, Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017)
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North Carolina | 2014 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2014
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & Holding[Vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017)] The North Carolina General Assembly developed redistricting plans following the 2010 decennial census. Registered individual voters (including Margaret Dickinson), North Carolina divisions of the NAACP, and a few other organizations challenged the North Carolina Senate's redistricting plans (Robert Rucho being the chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee). The Plaintiffs argued the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and violated the state's constitution by constituting impermissible racial gerrymandering. Plaintiffs claimed that 26 districts were mapped to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act which necessarily required drafters to classify residents by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs also claimed that 4 other districts, though not re-mapped due to the Voting Rights Act, were nevertheless mapped according to racial gerrymandering. In affirming the redistricting plans, the Supreme Court held that(1) compliance with the Voting Rights Act does not necessarily mean race was a motivating factor that requires strict scrutiny; (2) complying with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling state interest and plans were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) race was not a predominant factor in districts not subject to the Voting Rights Act. Therefore, the plans did not violate the U.S. or North Carolina Constitutions.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
[Vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017)] The North Carolina General Assembly developed redistricting plans following the 2010 decennial census. Registered individual voters (including Margaret Dickinson), North Carolina divisions of the NAACP, and a few other organizations challenged the North Carolina Senate's redistricting plans (Robert Rucho being the chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee). The Plaintiffs argued the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and violated the state's constitution by constituting impermissible racial gerrymandering. Plaintiffs claimed that 26 districts were mapped to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act which necessarily required drafters to classify residents by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs also claimed that 4 other districts, though not re-mapped due to the Voting Rights Act, were nevertheless mapped according to racial gerrymandering. In affirming the redistricting plans, the Supreme Court held that(1) compliance with the Voting Rights Act does not necessarily mean race was a motivating factor that requires strict scrutiny; (2) complying with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling state interest and plans were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) race was not a predominant factor in districts not subject to the Voting Rights Act. Therefore, the plans did not violate the U.S. or North Carolina Constitutions.
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Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015), vacated, Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017) (vacated to comply with U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017) which found North Carolina redistricting plans to be unconstitutional); on remand, trial court found controversy to be moot and case dismissed in Dickson v. Rucho, 11 CVS 16896 (N.C. Wake Cnty., March 14, 2018)
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North Carolina | 2015 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2015
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & Holding[Vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017)] After the Supreme Court found the redistricting plans were constitutional (see Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014)), the Plaintiffs (registered voters of North Carolina and other organizations) appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court's 2014 decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015). In Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Alabama Senate prioritized redistricting to maintain existing minority percentages which the court found is not a requirement of the Voting Rights Act and so remanded the case to reconsider given the Senate operated on a false assumption and may have engaged in racial gerrymandering. Reviewing the Alabama decision while re-reviewing this Dickson case, the Supreme Court found that its prior decision in Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014) complied with Alabama. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Alabama because it found the North Carolina Senate did not prioritize redistricting to maintain minority percentages and so did not engage in racial gerrymandering.
After the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of its 2010 redistricting plans, the registered voter Plaintiffs again petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the case in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's, at time, recent decision in Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017). In Cooper, which was brought by registered voters at the federal level (not the state level, like in Dickson) to challenge North Carolina redistricting plans, the U.S. Supreme Court found the North Carolina redistricting plans to be unconstitutional because they were the product of impermissible racial gerrymandering. So, when the U.S. Supreme Court received Dickson on appeal, it remanded this case to the Supreme Court to reconsider and the Supreme Court remanded to the North Carolina trial courts to determine whether (1) in light of Cooper, a controversy exists or if this matter is moot in whole or in part; (2) there are other remaining collateral state and/or federal issues that require resolution; and (3) other relief may be proper. In 2018, the Wake County Superior Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs, finding that the challenged districts were unconstitutional, but given that the General Assembly had already enacted new congressional plans in 2016, and new legislative plans, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs' remaining claims as moot.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
[Vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickson v. Rucho, 581 U.S. 1004 (2017)] After the Supreme Court found the redistricting plans were constitutional (see Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014)), the Plaintiffs (registered voters of North Carolina and other organizations) appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court's 2014 decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015). In Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Alabama Senate prioritized redistricting to maintain existing minority percentages which the court found is not a requirement of the Voting Rights Act and so remanded the case to reconsider given the Senate operated on a false assumption and may have engaged in racial gerrymandering. Reviewing the Alabama decision while re-reviewing this Dickson case, the Supreme Court found that its prior decision in Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014) complied with Alabama. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Alabama because it found the North Carolina Senate did not prioritize redistricting to maintain minority percentages and so did not engage in racial gerrymandering.
After the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of its 2010 redistricting plans, the registered voter Plaintiffs again petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the case in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's, at time, recent decision in Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017). In Cooper, which was brought by registered voters at the federal level (not the state level, like in Dickson) to challenge North Carolina redistricting plans, the U.S. Supreme Court found the North Carolina redistricting plans to be unconstitutional because they were the product of impermissible racial gerrymandering. So, when the U.S. Supreme Court received Dickson on appeal, it remanded this case to the Supreme Court to reconsider and the Supreme Court remanded to the North Carolina trial courts to determine whether (1) in light of Cooper, a controversy exists or if this matter is moot in whole or in part; (2) there are other remaining collateral state and/or federal issues that require resolution; and (3) other relief may be proper. In 2018, the Wake County Superior Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs, finding that the challenged districts were unconstitutional, but given that the General Assembly had already enacted new congressional plans in 2016, and new legislative plans, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs' remaining claims as moot.
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Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 492 P.3d 313 (Ariz. 2021)
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Arizona | 2021 | Education, Gun Control in Schools/School Safety |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2021
Topics:
Education, Gun Control in Schools/School Safety
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA student shot and killed his girlfriend and then himself at his house after sending threatening text messages to his ex-girlfriend. School personnel knew that he had been violent with his ex-girlfriend in the past and planned to meet with his girlfriend off campus, but the school did not take any action to protect the girlfriend who was shot and killed. The girlfriend's mother sued the school. The trial court granted the school's motion for summary judgment because the school did not owe the girlfriend a duty of care. Because the threatening text messages were sent to the ex-girlfriend, not the girlfriend who was ultimately killed, and because the girlfriend reassured the school faculty on the day she was killed that she was in no danger and planned to see the boyfriend, there was no sufficiently known and tangible risk of harm arising within the scope of the school-student relationship, and the school did not owe a duty to protect the girlfriend from the student. Assuming the student's text messages to his girlfriend threatened harm, that threat was aimed only at his ex-girlfriend (not the girlfriend) and the girlfriend herself told the vice principal and school safety officer that the student did not pose a threat to her. The Court declined to draw a bright-line rule barring recognition of the school-student duty whenever a student suffers harm while outside the school's supervision and control. The key consideration is whether a known and tangible risk of harm arose that endangered the student while under the school's custody and control. The Court concluded that the facts here do not rise to that threshold given that the student left the school and assured school officials that she was in no danger.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A student shot and killed his girlfriend and then himself at his house after sending threatening text messages to his ex-girlfriend. School personnel knew that he had been violent with his ex-girlfriend in the past and planned to meet with his girlfriend off campus, but the school did not take any action to protect the girlfriend who was shot and killed. The girlfriend's mother sued the school. The trial court granted the school's motion for summary judgment because the school did not owe the girlfriend a duty of care. Because the threatening text messages were sent to the ex-girlfriend, not the girlfriend who was ultimately killed, and because the girlfriend reassured the school faculty on the day she was killed that she was in no danger and planned to see the boyfriend, there was no sufficiently known and tangible risk of harm arising within the scope of the school-student relationship, and the school did not owe a duty to protect the girlfriend from the student. Assuming the student's text messages to his girlfriend threatened harm, that threat was aimed only at his ex-girlfriend (not the girlfriend) and the girlfriend herself told the vice principal and school safety officer that the student did not pose a threat to her. The Court declined to draw a bright-line rule barring recognition of the school-student duty whenever a student suffers harm while outside the school's supervision and control. The key consideration is whether a known and tangible risk of harm arose that endangered the student while under the school's custody and control. The Court concluded that the facts here do not rise to that threshold given that the student left the school and assured school officials that she was in no danger.
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. Bloomberg L.P., 167 N.E.3d 454 (N.Y. 2021)
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New York | 2021 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
New York
Year:
2021
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of Bloomberg L.P., brought suit against Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor, and Michael Bloomberg, asserting several causes of action, including sex discrimination and hostile work environment under the New York City Human Rights Law (i.e., Administrative Code of City of NY, title 8 (City HRL)). Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were based on the vicarious liability provision in the City HRL, pursuant to his status as an owner and officer of the company. The City HRL, while providing for vicarious liability, does not define the term “employer” for the purposes of that provision. The Court of Appeals held that where an employer is a business entity, the shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees of that entity are not employers within the meaning of the City HRL. As a result, Bloomberg, an owner and officer of Bloomberg L.P., was not an employer within the meaning of the City HRL and could not be held vicariously liable for the supervisor’s offending conduct, and Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were dismissed.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, an employee of Bloomberg L.P., brought suit against Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor, and Michael Bloomberg, asserting several causes of action, including sex discrimination and hostile work environment under the New York City Human Rights Law (i.e., Administrative Code of City of NY, title 8 (City HRL)). Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were based on the vicarious liability provision in the City HRL, pursuant to his status as an owner and officer of the company. The City HRL, while providing for vicarious liability, does not define the term “employer” for the purposes of that provision. The Court of Appeals held that where an employer is a business entity, the shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees of that entity are not employers within the meaning of the City HRL. As a result, Bloomberg, an owner and officer of Bloomberg L.P., was not an employer within the meaning of the City HRL and could not be held vicariously liable for the supervisor’s offending conduct, and Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were dismissed.
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. La Fuente, Inc., 481 P.3d 860 (Nev. 2021)
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Nevada | 2021 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2021
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingExotic dancers had performed at Cheetahs Lounge, a men's club owned by Respondent La Fuente, Inc. (Cheetahs). Cheetahs permitted the exotic dancers to dance there based on certain shared qualifications, including a valid sheriffs card, state ID, work license, costume, that they were not "trashed," and that they were "standing up." Cheetahs did not require any exotic dancer to have prior dance training nor did it check any exotic dancer's references or employment history or require an audition prior to a first shift. However, once a shift began, Cheetahs imposed controls on the exotic dancers, requiring that they pay a "house fee" at entry as well as an "off stage fee," or else check-in with the D.J. for on-stage rotation. Cheetahs also imposed limitations on the costumes and performances inside the club, setting "a minimum heel height of two-inches, grip strips, mandatory; prohibiting clog type shoes, street clothes, cotton material, tears in [their] stockings or outfits, glitter and body oil; requiring graceful stage exits; . . . defining appropriate body placement during performances and while interacting with customers;" and enforcing a long list of rules addressing dancer manners (citation modified). Each exotic dancer was required to sign a "Dancer Performer's Lease" agreement with Cheetahs, under which any employment relation was disavowed. Despite their having contractually "disavowed" any employment relationship with Cheetahs in the Lease agreement, the exotic dancers claimed they were, in fact, employees and entitled to minimum wages from the club. Cheetahs refused to pay, arguing that the dancers were independent contractors. The Supreme Court held that the exotic dancers were employees rather than independent contractors, as a matter of law, and entitled to minimum wages under both Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 608 and the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA), finding that that the weight of the economic realities test factors supported that the exotic dancers were employees because Cheetahs reserved an extensive right to control its dancers, the dancers' opportunities for profit or loss were not meaningfully tethered to their managerial skills, and the dancers did not make significant investments in equipment or materials. The Court further held that Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 608 could not remove constitutional protections of employer-employee relationships from the MWA.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Exotic dancers had performed at Cheetahs Lounge, a men's club owned by Respondent La Fuente, Inc. (Cheetahs). Cheetahs permitted the exotic dancers to dance there based on certain shared qualifications, including a valid sheriffs card, state ID, work license, costume, that they were not "trashed," and that they were "standing up." Cheetahs did not require any exotic dancer to have prior dance training nor did it check any exotic dancer's references or employment history or require an audition prior to a first shift. However, once a shift began, Cheetahs imposed controls on the exotic dancers, requiring that they pay a "house fee" at entry as well as an "off stage fee," or else check-in with the D.J. for on-stage rotation. Cheetahs also imposed limitations on the costumes and performances inside the club, setting "a minimum heel height of two-inches, grip strips, mandatory; prohibiting clog type shoes, street clothes, cotton material, tears in [their] stockings or outfits, glitter and body oil; requiring graceful stage exits; . . . defining appropriate body placement during performances and while interacting with customers;" and enforcing a long list of rules addressing dancer manners (citation modified). Each exotic dancer was required to sign a "Dancer Performer's Lease" agreement with Cheetahs, under which any employment relation was disavowed. Despite their having contractually "disavowed" any employment relationship with Cheetahs in the Lease agreement, the exotic dancers claimed they were, in fact, employees and entitled to minimum wages from the club. Cheetahs refused to pay, arguing that the dancers were independent contractors. The Supreme Court held that the exotic dancers were employees rather than independent contractors, as a matter of law, and entitled to minimum wages under both Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 608 and the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA), finding that that the weight of the economic realities test factors supported that the exotic dancers were employees because Cheetahs reserved an extensive right to control its dancers, the dancers' opportunities for profit or loss were not meaningfully tethered to their managerial skills, and the dancers did not make significant investments in equipment or materials. The Court further held that Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 608 could not remove constitutional protections of employer-employee relationships from the MWA.
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 976 N.W.2d 584
(Wis. 2022)
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Wisconsin | 2022 | LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Youth, Education |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2022
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Youth, Education
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingSeveral parents (Plaintiffs) anonymously sued the Madison Metropolitan School District in Wisconsin state court. The parents claimed that the school district’s guidance that seeks to provide support for transgender, non-binary, and gender-expansive students violates parental rights by allowing students to use names and pronouns at school different from those they were assigned at birth, without providing parental notification absent a student’s consent. The Supreme Court received this case on interlocutory appeal to consider whether Plaintiffs could advance in the litigation under pseudonyms for fear of retaliation and harassment by the school district. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that while the Plaintiffs could proceed under pseudonyms with respect to publicly available documents, they must reveal their identities to the court and defense counsel under confidential seal.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Several parents (Plaintiffs) anonymously sued the Madison Metropolitan School District in Wisconsin state court. The parents claimed that the school district’s guidance that seeks to provide support for transgender, non-binary, and gender-expansive students violates parental rights by allowing students to use names and pronouns at school different from those they were assigned at birth, without providing parental notification absent a student’s consent. The Supreme Court received this case on interlocutory appeal to consider whether Plaintiffs could advance in the litigation under pseudonyms for fear of retaliation and harassment by the school district. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that while the Plaintiffs could proceed under pseudonyms with respect to publicly available documents, they must reveal their identities to the court and defense counsel under confidential seal.
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys. - Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 681 (Wis. 2016)
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Wisconsin | 2016 | Health Care |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2016
Topics:
Health Care
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA family physician's examination resulted in inappropriate touching of several young patients, Plaintiffs. The examinations occurred from 2003-2009. Not until 2012, when the state brought criminal charges against the doctor did the former patients realize that the touching was inappropriate. Plaintiffs appealed from the court of appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court's dismissal based on the statute of limitations. Specifically, the circuit court had indicated that Plaintiffs were "not arguing that the news reports caused them to discover that they had been injured during the genital examinations; rather, they are asserting that no injury had occurred, and therefore, their claims did not accrue, until they learned that [the doctor's] conduct during the genital examinations might have involved a criminal sexual assault." Plaintiffs argued that it was the knowledge that "caused them to suffer extreme emotional distress and other psychological injuries," which therefore started the statute clock anew. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that medical malpractice claims accrue on the last date of the alleged malpractice (i.e., the last date of the "physical injurious change") and, thus, Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Any additional emotional distress is considered a separate "additional injury."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A family physician's examination resulted in inappropriate touching of several young patients, Plaintiffs. The examinations occurred from 2003-2009. Not until 2012, when the state brought criminal charges against the doctor did the former patients realize that the touching was inappropriate. Plaintiffs appealed from the court of appeals, which had affirmed the circuit court's dismissal based on the statute of limitations. Specifically, the circuit court had indicated that Plaintiffs were "not arguing that the news reports caused them to discover that they had been injured during the genital examinations; rather, they are asserting that no injury had occurred, and therefore, their claims did not accrue, until they learned that [the doctor's] conduct during the genital examinations might have involved a criminal sexual assault." Plaintiffs argued that it was the knowledge that "caused them to suffer extreme emotional distress and other psychological injuries," which therefore started the statute clock anew. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that medical malpractice claims accrue on the last date of the alleged malpractice (i.e., the last date of the "physical injurious change") and, thus, Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. Any additional emotional distress is considered a separate "additional injury."
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. State ex rel. Legislature of 77th Session, 406 P.3d 482 (Nev. 2017)
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Nevada | 2017 | Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn November 2000, the Nevada Constitution was amended to allow the possession and use of marijuana for the treatment or alleviation of various medical conditions, resulting in the enactment of Assembly Bill 453 (allowing registry identification cardholders to use medical marijuana without fear of state prosecution for certain marijuana-related offenses). An application fee and a processing fee were required to defray the costs of administering the registration program. In 2015, John Doe's doctor recommended that he try medical marijuana to treat his migraine headaches. Doe subsequently applied for, and received, a registry identification card. Doe then sued the Nevada Legislature, the Governor, and the Department of Health, arguing that the medical marijuana registry and associated fees violated his due process rights, equal protection rights, and his right against self-incrimination. The district court held that Doe failed to sue the proper state official (the Administrator of the Division of Public and Behavioral Health), denied Doe's request to amend his complaint as such amendment would be futile as Doe's claims lacked constitutional merit, and held that any state law tort claims were barred as a matter of law due to the State's sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, and further held that the Nevada medical marijuana registry does not violate any constitutional protections against due process or equal protection because: (i) the registry does not impinge upon a fundamental right (noting that no court had then recognized a fundamental right to use medical marijuana, and it was still prohibited under federal law and the laws of 22 states) and (ii) it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest (deterring potential violators or assisting in detecting and investigating specific instances of apparent abuse). Finally, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination are not implicated by an individual applying to participate in the medical marijuana program, as Nevada law does not compel anyone to seek a registry identification card, and if an individual does apply, no criminal or civil penalties are imposed if they do not complete the application.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In November 2000, the Nevada Constitution was amended to allow the possession and use of marijuana for the treatment or alleviation of various medical conditions, resulting in the enactment of Assembly Bill 453 (allowing registry identification cardholders to use medical marijuana without fear of state prosecution for certain marijuana-related offenses). An application fee and a processing fee were required to defray the costs of administering the registration program. In 2015, John Doe's doctor recommended that he try medical marijuana to treat his migraine headaches. Doe subsequently applied for, and received, a registry identification card. Doe then sued the Nevada Legislature, the Governor, and the Department of Health, arguing that the medical marijuana registry and associated fees violated his due process rights, equal protection rights, and his right against self-incrimination. The district court held that Doe failed to sue the proper state official (the Administrator of the Division of Public and Behavioral Health), denied Doe's request to amend his complaint as such amendment would be futile as Doe's claims lacked constitutional merit, and held that any state law tort claims were barred as a matter of law due to the State's sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, and further held that the Nevada medical marijuana registry does not violate any constitutional protections against due process or equal protection because: (i) the registry does not impinge upon a fundamental right (noting that no court had then recognized a fundamental right to use medical marijuana, and it was still prohibited under federal law and the laws of 22 states) and (ii) it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest (deterring potential violators or assisting in detecting and investigating specific instances of apparent abuse). Finally, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination are not implicated by an individual applying to participate in the medical marijuana program, as Nevada law does not compel anyone to seek a registry identification card, and if an individual does apply, no criminal or civil penalties are imposed if they do not complete the application.
Link to Opinion
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Doe v. State, 808 S.E.2d 807 (S.C. 2017)
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South Carolina | 2017 | LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Discrimination, Criminal Justice |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2017
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Discrimination, Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA same-sex couple had cohabitated, claiming to be fiancés, between 2010 and 2015. Eventually, the relationship dissolved, and Doe moved out of the shared residence. In 2015, Doe contacted the police claiming that her ex-fiancé assaulted her, even though there was no physical confrontation. On August 12, 2015, Doe sought an Order of Protection from the Richland County Family Court. The judge denied the request citing lack of jurisdiction because Doe was not a "household member" as defined by Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) of the South Carolina Domestic Abuse Act. On August 14, 2015, Doe filed an action for a declaratory judgment requesting that the Court declare the statutory definition of "household member" as unconstitutional because it leaves unmarried, same-sex victims without the benefit of the same remedy afforded to heterosexual counterparts. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition under original jurisdiction. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the definition of “household member” under Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) was unconstitutional as applied to Doe and other same-sex couples. In particular, the Court found that the definition of “household member” violated the Equal Protection clauses of South Carolina and United States constitutions. The Court reasoned that there was no reasonable basis to support a definition of “household member” that results in disparate treatment of same-sex couples who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited. To do so would treat unmarried, same-sex couples who live together differently than all other couples. In particular, the Court determined that the statute as applied does not pass the “rational basis test,” which is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause. To remedy the unconstitutionality of the South Carolina Domestic Abuse Act, the Court rejected the suggestion to sever the sections of the Act and render it void as that would contravene the intent of the South Carolina General Assembly, which is to protect persons in a relationship and grant them the ability to obtain an Order of Protection. However, it found that Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) are unconstitutional as applied to Doe. The family court cannot use the statutory provisions to prevent same-sex relationships from seeking an Order of Protection.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A same-sex couple had cohabitated, claiming to be fiancés, between 2010 and 2015. Eventually, the relationship dissolved, and Doe moved out of the shared residence. In 2015, Doe contacted the police claiming that her ex-fiancé assaulted her, even though there was no physical confrontation. On August 12, 2015, Doe sought an Order of Protection from the Richland County Family Court. The judge denied the request citing lack of jurisdiction because Doe was not a "household member" as defined by Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) of the South Carolina Domestic Abuse Act. On August 14, 2015, Doe filed an action for a declaratory judgment requesting that the Court declare the statutory definition of "household member" as unconstitutional because it leaves unmarried, same-sex victims without the benefit of the same remedy afforded to heterosexual counterparts. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition under original jurisdiction. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the definition of “household member” under Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) was unconstitutional as applied to Doe and other same-sex couples. In particular, the Court found that the definition of “household member” violated the Equal Protection clauses of South Carolina and United States constitutions. The Court reasoned that there was no reasonable basis to support a definition of “household member” that results in disparate treatment of same-sex couples who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited. To do so would treat unmarried, same-sex couples who live together differently than all other couples. In particular, the Court determined that the statute as applied does not pass the “rational basis test,” which is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause. To remedy the unconstitutionality of the South Carolina Domestic Abuse Act, the Court rejected the suggestion to sever the sections of the Act and render it void as that would contravene the intent of the South Carolina General Assembly, which is to protect persons in a relationship and grant them the ability to obtain an Order of Protection. However, it found that Sections 16-25-10(3) and 20-4-20(b) are unconstitutional as applied to Doe. The family court cannot use the statutory provisions to prevent same-sex relationships from seeking an Order of Protection.
Link to Opinion
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Dolorfino v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 427 P.3d 1039 (Nev. 2018) (unpublished disposition), vacated and superseded on reconsideration by 450 P.3d 391 (Nev. 2019)
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Nevada | 2018 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2018
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDuring an emergency hysterectomy performed at the Defendant hospital, Dolorfino sustained an injury to her tooth. While under general anesthesia, she had been intubated, during which she had been injured when an anesthesiologist dropped a medical instrument onto her mouth during a power outage. Dolorfino sued the hospital and the anesthesiologist under claims of medical malpractice and negligence. Under Nevada law, medical malpractice claims generally require a supporting medical expert affidavit. The district court dismissed Dolorfino's suit for failure to include the requisite affidavit, ruling that the affidavit requirement applied to all claims brought, including any negligence claims. On appeal, a Supreme Court panel held that because the tooth injury sustained was not directly involved or proximate to the hysterectomy, a statutory exemption removing the affidavit requirement applied, and dismissal was improper. Following Defendants' petition for en banc reconsideration, the Supreme Court vacated the original panel ruling and held that the district court was correct to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim regarding medical malpractice under the affidavit requirement, holding that the mouth (and therefore the tooth) was directly involved in the intubation procedure undertaken by the anesthesiologist. However, the Court also held that the district court should have severed the deficient claim, instead of dismissing all claims in their entirety.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
During an emergency hysterectomy performed at the Defendant hospital, Dolorfino sustained an injury to her tooth. While under general anesthesia, she had been intubated, during which she had been injured when an anesthesiologist dropped a medical instrument onto her mouth during a power outage. Dolorfino sued the hospital and the anesthesiologist under claims of medical malpractice and negligence. Under Nevada law, medical malpractice claims generally require a supporting medical expert affidavit. The district court dismissed Dolorfino's suit for failure to include the requisite affidavit, ruling that the affidavit requirement applied to all claims brought, including any negligence claims. On appeal, a Supreme Court panel held that because the tooth injury sustained was not directly involved or proximate to the hysterectomy, a statutory exemption removing the affidavit requirement applied, and dismissal was improper. Following Defendants' petition for en banc reconsideration, the Supreme Court vacated the original panel ruling and held that the district court was correct to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim regarding medical malpractice under the affidavit requirement, holding that the mouth (and therefore the tooth) was directly involved in the intubation procedure undertaken by the anesthesiologist. However, the Court also held that the district court should have severed the deficient claim, instead of dismissing all claims in their entirety.
Link to Opinion
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Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364 (Mont. 2012)
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Montana | 2012 | LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Discrimination |
State:
Montana
Year:
2012
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights, LGBTQ+ Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingSix same-sex couples sought a ruling that they are entitled to the same protections, rights and benefits as different-sex couples who are married under Montana law. Because Montana had at that time adopted a constitutional amendment defining "marriage" as between a "man and a woman," Plaintiffs sought a finding under the state's other constitutional protections, such as its guarantee of equal protection and privacy. The district court found against Plaintiffs, stating that Plaintiffs' requested relief exceeded the bounds of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's determination, indicating that Plaintiffs sought a general declaration of their rights, which, if granted, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy underlying their case. The Supreme Court, however, permitted Plaintiffs to amend their complaint if they chose to do so. Three dissenting justices indicated, however, that they would have granted the requested relief and would have entered a declaratory judgment that Montana law imposes a discriminatory statutory structure that prohibits Plaintiffs from enjoying significant relationship and family protections and obligations automatically provided to similarly-situated different-sex couples who marry.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Six same-sex couples sought a ruling that they are entitled to the same protections, rights and benefits as different-sex couples who are married under Montana law. Because Montana had at that time adopted a constitutional amendment defining "marriage" as between a "man and a woman," Plaintiffs sought a finding under the state's other constitutional protections, such as its guarantee of equal protection and privacy. The district court found against Plaintiffs, stating that Plaintiffs' requested relief exceeded the bounds of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's determination, indicating that Plaintiffs sought a general declaration of their rights, which, if granted, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy underlying their case. The Supreme Court, however, permitted Plaintiffs to amend their complaint if they chose to do so. Three dissenting justices indicated, however, that they would have granted the requested relief and would have entered a declaratory judgment that Montana law imposes a discriminatory statutory structure that prohibits Plaintiffs from enjoying significant relationship and family protections and obligations automatically provided to similarly-situated different-sex couples who marry.
Link to Opinion
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Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach, 811 S.E.2d 744 (S.C. 2018)
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South Carolina | 2018 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2018
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Donevant, the former "building official" (a position that each South Carolina municipality is required to fill) and at-will employee for the town of Surfside Beach brought a wrongful termination action against the town, asserting that she was fired in retaliation for issuing a stop-work order after discovering unpermitted construction work in violation of the building code. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Donevant, and the town moved for a directed verdict which the circuit court denied. The town appealed. The Supreme Court found in favor of Donevant affirming the jury verdict stating that it found Donevant's "cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine." Specifically, the Court explained that the firing of Donevant because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the building code would violate a public policy established by the legislature in Subsection 6-9-5(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017). Specifically, the "public policy of South Carolina is to maintain reasonable standards of construction in buildings and other structures in the State consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens." This case is significant because the Court had previously held in Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 768 S.E.2d 385 (S.C. 2015), that its deference to the legislature in matters of public policy meant that a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine had to be based in legislative expression (and found no such legislative expression in that case with regard to a public policy in favor of reporting a crime on an employer's property). Here, however, the Court explicitly identified the legislative language that can serve as an example of legislative language necessary to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff Donevant, the former "building official" (a position that each South Carolina municipality is required to fill) and at-will employee for the town of Surfside Beach brought a wrongful termination action against the town, asserting that she was fired in retaliation for issuing a stop-work order after discovering unpermitted construction work in violation of the building code. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Donevant, and the town moved for a directed verdict which the circuit court denied. The town appealed. The Supreme Court found in favor of Donevant affirming the jury verdict stating that it found Donevant's "cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine." Specifically, the Court explained that the firing of Donevant because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the building code would violate a public policy established by the legislature in Subsection 6-9-5(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017). Specifically, the "public policy of South Carolina is to maintain reasonable standards of construction in buildings and other structures in the State consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens." This case is significant because the Court had previously held in Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 768 S.E.2d 385 (S.C. 2015), that its deference to the legislature in matters of public policy meant that a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine had to be based in legislative expression (and found no such legislative expression in that case with regard to a public policy in favor of reporting a crime on an employer's property). Here, however, the Court explicitly identified the legislative language that can serve as an example of legislative language necessary to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
Link to Opinion
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Donohue v. Cuomo, 184 N.E.3d 860 (N.Y. 2022)
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New York | 2022 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
New York
Year:
2022
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingMembers and former members of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) may obtain health insurance through the New York State Health Insurance Plan, an optional health-benefit plan covering current and retired state employees and other public employees. CSEA and the State agreed to seven collective bargaining agreement (CBA or CBAs), spanning 1985 to 2011, each containing provisions continuing the contribution rates at 90% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage. Section 9.13(a) of the 2007-2011 CBA provided that "[t]he State agrees to pay 90 percent of the cost of individual coverage and 75 percent of the cost of dependent coverage toward the hospital/medical/mental health and substance abuse components provided under the Empire Plan." The section did not, however, expressly state the duration of the State's promise to contribute at those rates. The Court of Appeals held that health insurance benefits for retirees—specifically premium contributions—may be subject to modification by a public employer after a CBA expires, unless there is specific language expressly guaranteeing a lifetime benefit.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Members and former members of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) may obtain health insurance through the New York State Health Insurance Plan, an optional health-benefit plan covering current and retired state employees and other public employees. CSEA and the State agreed to seven collective bargaining agreement (CBA or CBAs), spanning 1985 to 2011, each containing provisions continuing the contribution rates at 90% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage. Section 9.13(a) of the 2007-2011 CBA provided that "[t]he State agrees to pay 90 percent of the cost of individual coverage and 75 percent of the cost of dependent coverage toward the hospital/medical/mental health and substance abuse components provided under the Empire Plan." The section did not, however, expressly state the duration of the State's promise to contribute at those rates. The Court of Appeals held that health insurance benefits for retirees—specifically premium contributions—may be subject to modification by a public employer after a CBA expires, unless there is specific language expressly guaranteeing a lifetime benefit.
Link to Opinion
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Draper v. Gentry, 532 P.3d 1153 (Ariz. 2023)
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Arizona | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with the second-degree murder. The brother of the murder victim (who was also a possible killer of the victim) became a victim by virtue of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4401(12), a statute that implements the Arizona Constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights. Using the same standard this Court applied in R.S. v. Thompson, 485 P.3d 1068 (Ariz. 2021), the trial court rejected the request for direct disclosure of the GPS data but allowed the data to be extracted for in camera review. This data ultimately identified the victim's brother as the possible killer, and was used by the Defendant in cross examination of the victim's brother to argue the Defendant was asleep when the murder was committed. The victim's brother filed a petition for special action, arguing that accessing his GPS information was a warrantless search and seizure, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. On review, the Court compared the facts of Thompson, where the Court held that to be entitled to discovery of otherwise-confidential records for in camera inspection by the trial court, the defendant must establish that "(1) the defendant seeks evidence whose materiality is of constitutional dimension, as distinguished by evidence merely relevant to the defense; and (2) there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information actually includes such evidence." The Court held that Defendant satisfied both prongs because his third party defense was more than a "fishing expedition," it was necessary for his defense.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant was charged with the second-degree murder. The brother of the murder victim (who was also a possible killer of the victim) became a victim by virtue of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4401(12), a statute that implements the Arizona Constitution's Victims' Bill of Rights. Using the same standard this Court applied in R.S. v. Thompson, 485 P.3d 1068 (Ariz. 2021), the trial court rejected the request for direct disclosure of the GPS data but allowed the data to be extracted for in camera review. This data ultimately identified the victim's brother as the possible killer, and was used by the Defendant in cross examination of the victim's brother to argue the Defendant was asleep when the murder was committed. The victim's brother filed a petition for special action, arguing that accessing his GPS information was a warrantless search and seizure, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. On review, the Court compared the facts of Thompson, where the Court held that to be entitled to discovery of otherwise-confidential records for in camera inspection by the trial court, the defendant must establish that "(1) the defendant seeks evidence whose materiality is of constitutional dimension, as distinguished by evidence merely relevant to the defense; and (2) there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information actually includes such evidence." The Court held that Defendant satisfied both prongs because his third party defense was more than a "fishing expedition," it was necessary for his defense.
Link to Opinion
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Drs. Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 788 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 2016)
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Georgia | 2016 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2016
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingHealth care providers provided life-saving care contrary to the patient’s advanced directive. The patient’s health care agent sued and the providers argued that the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act provided them immunity from liability. The Supreme Court held that, in order to qualify for immunity, health care providers had to have acted in good faith reliance on the health care agent’s directions not to provide life-saving treatment. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined there was still an issue of material fact over whether the providers acted in good faith so the Supreme Court remanded the case.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Health care providers provided life-saving care contrary to the patient’s advanced directive. The patient’s health care agent sued and the providers argued that the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act provided them immunity from liability. The Supreme Court held that, in order to qualify for immunity, health care providers had to have acted in good faith reliance on the health care agent’s directions not to provide life-saving treatment. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined there was still an issue of material fact over whether the providers acted in good faith so the Supreme Court remanded the case.
Link to Opinion
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DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 2020)
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Minnesota | 2020 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2020
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe National Democratic committees sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of Minnesota’s statutory limits on the number of voters that could be assisted by a single individual in marking a ballot and the number of completed ballots that could be collected by a particular third party for delivery on several grounds, including that such restrictions were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. The Democratic committees also asserted that these limits burden the right to vote, in violation of the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 2 and Article VII, Section 1, and burden political speech and associational rights, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution. The district court granted a temporary injunction, finding that all of Plaintiffs' claims were likely to succeed on the merits. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision on the preemption claim as to the limit on the number of voters that may be assisted in marking a ballot but reversed on all arguments concerning the number of completed ballots that could be delivered by a third party, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. The Court found that the restriction on the number of ballots that could be collected by a third party for delivery did not conflict with the Voting Rights Act and Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their claims that the restriction was unconstitutional because it concerns conduct that is administrative rather than expressive in nature and imposes only a modest, nondiscriminatory burden on the right of individuals to vote.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The National Democratic committees sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of Minnesota’s statutory limits on the number of voters that could be assisted by a single individual in marking a ballot and the number of completed ballots that could be collected by a particular third party for delivery on several grounds, including that such restrictions were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. The Democratic committees also asserted that these limits burden the right to vote, in violation of the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 2 and Article VII, Section 1, and burden political speech and associational rights, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution. The district court granted a temporary injunction, finding that all of Plaintiffs' claims were likely to succeed on the merits. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision on the preemption claim as to the limit on the number of voters that may be assisted in marking a ballot but reversed on all arguments concerning the number of completed ballots that could be delivered by a third party, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. The Court found that the restriction on the number of ballots that could be collected by a third party for delivery did not conflict with the Voting Rights Act and Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their claims that the restriction was unconstitutional because it concerns conduct that is administrative rather than expressive in nature and imposes only a modest, nondiscriminatory burden on the right of individuals to vote.
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DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 841 S.E.2d 251 (N.C. 2020)
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North Carolina | 2020 | Education, Gun Control in Schools/School Safety |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2020
Topics:
Education, Gun Control in Schools/School Safety
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingNews organizations brought legal action against the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill (UNC-CH). The News Organizations argued that the school violated the Public Records Act by refusing to release records from sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court found that releasing the information would not violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) as UNC-CH argued. FERPA, which governs information access for publicly funded educational institutions, mandates that the university share the name of any student over 18, the violation, and the sanctions imposed. FERPA does not require institutions to release the dates of offenses. The statute does not provide discretion to a public university to decide if they will release the records.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
News organizations brought legal action against the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill (UNC-CH). The News Organizations argued that the school violated the Public Records Act by refusing to release records from sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court found that releasing the information would not violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) as UNC-CH argued. FERPA, which governs information access for publicly funded educational institutions, mandates that the university share the name of any student over 18, the violation, and the sanctions imposed. FERPA does not require institutions to release the dates of offenses. The statute does not provide discretion to a public university to decide if they will release the records.
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Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Kiser, 886 S.E.2d 99 (N.C. 2023)
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North Carolina | 2023 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2023
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDuke Power Company (Duke) purchased an easement from the Kiser family that allowed it to create Lake Norman, an artificial lake. For decades, Duke issued permits to third-party homeowners to build lake access structures. In 2017, Duke brought an action against the Kisers for trespass and wrongful interference with an easement after the Kisers extended the shoreline of their lot into Lake Norman without seeking Duke's permission. The Kisers challenged the action, contending that Duke lacked the authority under the easement to allow third parties to use Lake Norman without the Kisers' consent. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the plain and unambiguous language of the easement, which granted Duke "absolute water rights" and the right to "treat [the land] in any manner deemed necessary or desirable by Duke Power Company," Duke acted within the scope of its authority when it granted permits to third-party homeowners to build lake access structures and to use the lake for recreational purposes.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Duke Power Company (Duke) purchased an easement from the Kiser family that allowed it to create Lake Norman, an artificial lake. For decades, Duke issued permits to third-party homeowners to build lake access structures. In 2017, Duke brought an action against the Kisers for trespass and wrongful interference with an easement after the Kisers extended the shoreline of their lot into Lake Norman without seeking Duke's permission. The Kisers challenged the action, contending that Duke lacked the authority under the easement to allow third parties to use Lake Norman without the Kisers' consent. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the plain and unambiguous language of the easement, which granted Duke "absolute water rights" and the right to "treat [the land] in any manner deemed necessary or desirable by Duke Power Company," Duke acted within the scope of its authority when it granted permits to third-party homeowners to build lake access structures and to use the lake for recreational purposes.
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Dundas v. Winter Sports, Inc., 410 P.3d 177 (Mont. 2017)
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Montana | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Montana
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff was a seasonal employee who was re-hired each winter season. He sued for retaliation after his employer terminated him due to some emails that the employee sent that were critical of the employer, and what the employer alleged were insubordinate and inappropriate statements. The lower court held for the employer, agreeing that the employee was a seasonal probational employee who could be terminated for any reason during the probationary period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, which provides for employees to pursue wrongful termination claims, only applied to full-time employees after their probationary period. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902. Here, the employee's probationary period restarted after each seasonal rehire according to the plain language of the employee handbook, and during that period, the employee could be fired for any reason.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Plaintiff was a seasonal employee who was re-hired each winter season. He sued for retaliation after his employer terminated him due to some emails that the employee sent that were critical of the employer, and what the employer alleged were insubordinate and inappropriate statements. The lower court held for the employer, agreeing that the employee was a seasonal probational employee who could be terminated for any reason during the probationary period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, which provides for employees to pursue wrongful termination claims, only applied to full-time employees after their probationary period. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902. Here, the employee's probationary period restarted after each seasonal rehire according to the plain language of the employee handbook, and during that period, the employee could be fired for any reason.
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Dynak v. Bd. of Educ. of Wood Dale Sch. Dist. 7, 164 N.E.3d 1226 (Ill. 2020)
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Illinois | 2020 | Education, Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2020
Topics:
Education, Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a full time teacher who gave birth at the end of the school year. In advance of her planned birth, Plaintiff notified her employing School District of her intention to take time off at the end of the school year and to then rely on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 to take an additional twelve weeks off at the beginning of the following school year. Further, Plaintiff informed the District that she intended to use 28.5 days of her accumulated sick leave to make the first 28.5 days of her leave under the FMLA paid leave, and that the balance should be considered unpaid. While the District allowed Plaintiff to take off 1.5 days at the end of the school year, the District denied her request to use her sick days to ensure that the first 28.5 days of her leave the following year was paid. The District informed the teacher that she would need to demonstrate some additional circumstances to allow for the delayed use of paid sick leave. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint claiming that she was permitted to carry over paid sick leave across school years according to section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code. The trial court ruled in favor of the District, ruling that allowing sick leave to carry over across school years would lead to inconsistent implementations. On appeal, a divided appellate panel affirmed the trial court, determining that sick leave for child birth must be treated the same as sick leave for other events delineated under Section 24-6 (e.g. personal illness). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that teachers may only use paid sick leave for birth during the six-week period immediately following the birth. When teachers give birth just prior to or during a summer break, the teacher has no need to use her accumulated sick days because she is not required to be at work during that time. The bank of sick days has not been reduced or harmed, and those sick days can be saved for future qualifying events or credited at the time of retirement. The teacher in this case was not harmed or unfairly deprived of any earned benefits; therefore, the School District's denial of sick paid leave in the next school year was appropriate.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff was a full time teacher who gave birth at the end of the school year. In advance of her planned birth, Plaintiff notified her employing School District of her intention to take time off at the end of the school year and to then rely on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 to take an additional twelve weeks off at the beginning of the following school year. Further, Plaintiff informed the District that she intended to use 28.5 days of her accumulated sick leave to make the first 28.5 days of her leave under the FMLA paid leave, and that the balance should be considered unpaid. While the District allowed Plaintiff to take off 1.5 days at the end of the school year, the District denied her request to use her sick days to ensure that the first 28.5 days of her leave the following year was paid. The District informed the teacher that she would need to demonstrate some additional circumstances to allow for the delayed use of paid sick leave. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint claiming that she was permitted to carry over paid sick leave across school years according to section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code. The trial court ruled in favor of the District, ruling that allowing sick leave to carry over across school years would lead to inconsistent implementations. On appeal, a divided appellate panel affirmed the trial court, determining that sick leave for child birth must be treated the same as sick leave for other events delineated under Section 24-6 (e.g. personal illness). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that teachers may only use paid sick leave for birth during the six-week period immediately following the birth. When teachers give birth just prior to or during a summer break, the teacher has no need to use her accumulated sick days because she is not required to be at work during that time. The bank of sick days has not been reduced or harmed, and those sick days can be saved for future qualifying events or credited at the time of retirement. The teacher in this case was not harmed or unfairly deprived of any earned benefits; therefore, the School District's denial of sick paid leave in the next school year was appropriate.
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Edwards v. Thomas, 229 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff brought suit for medical malpractice and negligent hiring after the physician who performed her gallbladder removal procedure cut her common bile duct and failed to notice. Plaintiff was given corrective surgery at another hospital after presenting with abdominal pain at the emergency room. In her suit, Plaintiff served production requests upon Defendant pursuant to the Florida Constitution which allows discovery of records relating to adverse medical incidents kept in the course of business. Defendants objected to the request arguing that the requested records "did not relate to 'adverse medical incidents', were not 'made or received in the course of business,' and were protected by attorney client privilege, and protected as opinion work product." Defendant was ultimately ordered to produce the documents and appealed. The Second District Appeals Court overturned the trial court decision, emphasizing that documents created and retained for the purposes of litigation are not "made or received in the [ordinary] course of business" and do not "relate to an 'adverse medical incident.'" The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, noting that the plain language of the provision entitling patients to "any records made or received in the course of business" relating to "any adverse medical incident" contains no explicit limitations. The Court additionally found the definition of "adverse medical incident," which included but was not limited to "those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be reported to any governmental agency or body," to be probative of the broad reach of the statute. The Court was unreceptive to Defendant's argument that the requested reports were related to adverse medical incidents, but were not the type of documents contemplated by the Florida Constitution, again citing the broadness of the statutory language. The Court, relying on Charles v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017), found the requested records to be made in the "ordinary course of business" because Defendant had an independent statutory obligation to create and store them. Finally, the Court determined without deciding the issue, that the amendment to the Florida Constitution likely preempted work product protections. The dissent argued that the requested documents could not have been made in "the course of business" because they were made in anticipation of litigation and explicitly requested by Defendant's counsel. The dissent also argued that the Florida Constitution was not intended to and does not abrogate the work-product protections.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff brought suit for medical malpractice and negligent hiring after the physician who performed her gallbladder removal procedure cut her common bile duct and failed to notice. Plaintiff was given corrective surgery at another hospital after presenting with abdominal pain at the emergency room. In her suit, Plaintiff served production requests upon Defendant pursuant to the Florida Constitution which allows discovery of records relating to adverse medical incidents kept in the course of business. Defendants objected to the request arguing that the requested records "did not relate to 'adverse medical incidents', were not 'made or received in the course of business,' and were protected by attorney client privilege, and protected as opinion work product." Defendant was ultimately ordered to produce the documents and appealed. The Second District Appeals Court overturned the trial court decision, emphasizing that documents created and retained for the purposes of litigation are not "made or received in the [ordinary] course of business" and do not "relate to an 'adverse medical incident.'" The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, noting that the plain language of the provision entitling patients to "any records made or received in the course of business" relating to "any adverse medical incident" contains no explicit limitations. The Court additionally found the definition of "adverse medical incident," which included but was not limited to "those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be reported to any governmental agency or body," to be probative of the broad reach of the statute. The Court was unreceptive to Defendant's argument that the requested reports were related to adverse medical incidents, but were not the type of documents contemplated by the Florida Constitution, again citing the broadness of the statutory language. The Court, relying on Charles v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017), found the requested records to be made in the "ordinary course of business" because Defendant had an independent statutory obligation to create and store them. Finally, the Court determined without deciding the issue, that the amendment to the Florida Constitution likely preempted work product protections. The dissent argued that the requested documents could not have been made in "the course of business" because they were made in anticipation of litigation and explicitly requested by Defendant's counsel. The dissent also argued that the Florida Constitution was not intended to and does not abrogate the work-product protections.
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El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 934 N.W.2d 665 (Mich. 2019)
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Michigan | 2019 | Health Care, Health Care Discrimination |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2019
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA physician who held staff privileges at various hospitals brought action against the hospitals for breach of contract and unlawful retaliation under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) arising from the nonrenewal of his staff privileges following his prior ELCRA lawsuit alleging racial discrimination based on his Arabic ethnicity. The Wayne Circuit Court granted hospitals' motion for summary disposition. The physician appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, after which the Supreme Court remanded. The court of appeals affirmed and the physician appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the physician stated a valid retaliation claim under ELCRA and for breach of contract.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A physician who held staff privileges at various hospitals brought action against the hospitals for breach of contract and unlawful retaliation under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) arising from the nonrenewal of his staff privileges following his prior ELCRA lawsuit alleging racial discrimination based on his Arabic ethnicity. The Wayne Circuit Court granted hospitals' motion for summary disposition. The physician appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, after which the Supreme Court remanded. The court of appeals affirmed and the physician appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the physician stated a valid retaliation claim under ELCRA and for breach of contract.
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Elam v. Mun. Officers Electoral Bd. for Vill. of Riverdale, 182 N.E.3d 746 (Ill. 2021)
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Illinois | 2021 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2021
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn December 2020, Elam filed nomination papers to be included on the ballot for office of village trustee of the Village of Riverdale consolidated general election taking place on April 6, 2021. Attached to Elam's nomination papers were 26 pages of signatures. Jones and Dean (objectors) raised circulator-based objections, arguing that three individuals who circulated Elam's nomination papers for signatures as an independent candidate violated statutory law by previously circulating nomination papers on behalf of a Democratic candidate in the primary election. This act violated Section 10-4 of the Election Code which provides "[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election." The Electoral Board held that multiple signatures on Elam's nomination petitions were invalid because three circulators improperly violated Section 10-4 of the Election Code. In January 2021, the Electoral Board issued a unanimous written decision that Elam's name shall be stricken from the ballot at the April 2021 consolidated general election. On judicial review of the Electoral Board's decision, the circuit and appellate courts affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Electoral Board's decision concluding that circulators violated section 10-4 when they circulated nominated petitions on behalf of an established political party and independent candidate in the same election cycle.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In December 2020, Elam filed nomination papers to be included on the ballot for office of village trustee of the Village of Riverdale consolidated general election taking place on April 6, 2021. Attached to Elam's nomination papers were 26 pages of signatures. Jones and Dean (objectors) raised circulator-based objections, arguing that three individuals who circulated Elam's nomination papers for signatures as an independent candidate violated statutory law by previously circulating nomination papers on behalf of a Democratic candidate in the primary election. This act violated Section 10-4 of the Election Code which provides "[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election." The Electoral Board held that multiple signatures on Elam's nomination petitions were invalid because three circulators improperly violated Section 10-4 of the Election Code. In January 2021, the Electoral Board issued a unanimous written decision that Elam's name shall be stricken from the ballot at the April 2021 consolidated general election. On judicial review of the Electoral Board's decision, the circuit and appellate courts affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Electoral Board's decision concluding that circulators violated section 10-4 when they circulated nominated petitions on behalf of an established political party and independent candidate in the same election cycle.
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Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Lower Teton Joint Objectors, 369 P.3d 1034 (Mont. 2016)
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Montana | 2016 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2016
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court upheld the water court's imposition of a volume limit on Eldorado Coop Canal Company's (Eldorado) water rights to Montana's Bateman Ditch based on the statement of claim Eldorado filed for its four decreed water rights, as required by the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA). The MWUA required any party claiming an existing water right as of the effective date of the MWUA to file a statement of claim to assert that right. After that, other parties impacted are permitted to challenge the extent of the claimed right, and either the water court or, if assigned by the water court, a water master, will review and come to conclusions about the extent of the claimed right. Eldorado filed a statement of claim as to four water rights. Lower Teton Joint Objectors and Teton Coop Reservoir Co. objected. A water master, assigned by the water court reviewed Eldorado's claim and the related objections and issued a report regarding each of Eldorado's claimed water rights, which were based in part on witness testimony regarding the historic volume used with respect to each water right. The water court thereafter reviewed the water master's determination. The water court agreed that a volume limitation, with respect to Eldorado's claimed water rights was necessary to administer the water rights, but disagreed with respect to the applicable limitation. The water court found that none of the parties were able to meet their burden of proof to establish a historic volume quantification for the four water rights claimed by Eldorado that was either greater or less than the amount reflected on Eldorado's statement of claim and, thus, it was the statement of claim amount that should hold. The Supreme Court agreed. Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that the water court did not err by applying a combined volume limitation for Eldorado's four named water rights, rather than parsing them out. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the water court did not err when it limited the flow rate of one of Eldorado's claimed water rights to 300 miner's inches, instead of 225 miner's inches, given that Eldorado had claimed the full 300 miner's inches on its statement of claim and the water commissioner's records demonstrated Eldorado's full use of that right.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the water court's imposition of a volume limit on Eldorado Coop Canal Company's (Eldorado) water rights to Montana's Bateman Ditch based on the statement of claim Eldorado filed for its four decreed water rights, as required by the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA). The MWUA required any party claiming an existing water right as of the effective date of the MWUA to file a statement of claim to assert that right. After that, other parties impacted are permitted to challenge the extent of the claimed right, and either the water court or, if assigned by the water court, a water master, will review and come to conclusions about the extent of the claimed right. Eldorado filed a statement of claim as to four water rights. Lower Teton Joint Objectors and Teton Coop Reservoir Co. objected. A water master, assigned by the water court reviewed Eldorado's claim and the related objections and issued a report regarding each of Eldorado's claimed water rights, which were based in part on witness testimony regarding the historic volume used with respect to each water right. The water court thereafter reviewed the water master's determination. The water court agreed that a volume limitation, with respect to Eldorado's claimed water rights was necessary to administer the water rights, but disagreed with respect to the applicable limitation. The water court found that none of the parties were able to meet their burden of proof to establish a historic volume quantification for the four water rights claimed by Eldorado that was either greater or less than the amount reflected on Eldorado's statement of claim and, thus, it was the statement of claim amount that should hold. The Supreme Court agreed. Moreover, the Supreme Court determined that the water court did not err by applying a combined volume limitation for Eldorado's four named water rights, rather than parsing them out. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the water court did not err when it limited the flow rate of one of Eldorado's claimed water rights to 300 miner's inches, instead of 225 miner's inches, given that Eldorado had claimed the full 300 miner's inches on its statement of claim and the water commissioner's records demonstrated Eldorado's full use of that right.
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Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 118 N.E.3d 907 (Ohio 2018)
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Ohio | 2018 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2018
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, an online charter school operating in Ohio, sought for funding to be based on enrollment rather than how long students were logged in. The statute states that funding must be determined on a full-time equivalency basis for each student enrolled. The Supreme Court held that the school funding statute prescribes duration of student participation, rather than enrollment, as the applicable measure for funding in online schools. The Supreme Court reasoned that, because there is a maximum number of hours an online school can count in a day, the calculation can only be made by referring to the duration of a student's participation.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, an online charter school operating in Ohio, sought for funding to be based on enrollment rather than how long students were logged in. The statute states that funding must be determined on a full-time equivalency basis for each student enrolled. The Supreme Court held that the school funding statute prescribes duration of student participation, rather than enrollment, as the applicable measure for funding in online schools. The Supreme Court reasoned that, because there is a maximum number of hours an online school can count in a day, the calculation can only be made by referring to the duration of a student's participation.
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Election Integrity Project, LCC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 473 P.3d 1021 (Nev. 2020)
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Nevada | 2020 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2020
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn September 1, 2020 the Election Integrity Project of Nevada (EIPN) and Nevada citizen Sharron Angle sued the state and Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske over Assembly Bill (AB) 4, an election law that had been recently enacted on August 3 and permitted statewide vote-by-mail in the event of an emergency or disaster. EIPN and Angle argued that "AB4 enacts many unconstitutional and illegal provisions" including an unfunded mandates which Plaintiffs argued violated NRS 354.699, which "prohibit[s] unfunded mandates from the State of Nevada to local governments." EPIN and Angle argued that AB 4 violated the state constitution because the proposed ballot counting "standardless" and lacked adequate safeguards. Regarding its constitutional equal protection claims, EIPN and Angle argued that the certain sections of AB4 violated the Equal Protection Clause, such as a section of the statute requiring counties to establish vote centers consistent with its population (Plaintiffs argued that this violates the rights of rural voters since they have less voting centers than voters in large counties and thus it is harder to vote in rural counties). On October 7, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order denying the emergency petition for writ of mandamus and explained that, because Petitioners had waited nearly a month to file their complaint and a number of counties planned to send mail ballots the day before Petitioners filed their writ with the Supreme Court, "to grant the petition at this late date would inject a significant measure of confusion into an election process that is already underway." The Supreme Court said it was "reluctant" to inject confusion into the election process "absent a clear and compelling demonstration that the district court had a legal duty to enjoin AB 4 [and t]hat showing ha[d] not been made here."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
On September 1, 2020 the Election Integrity Project of Nevada (EIPN) and Nevada citizen Sharron Angle sued the state and Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske over Assembly Bill (AB) 4, an election law that had been recently enacted on August 3 and permitted statewide vote-by-mail in the event of an emergency or disaster. EIPN and Angle argued that "AB4 enacts many unconstitutional and illegal provisions" including an unfunded mandates which Plaintiffs argued violated NRS 354.699, which "prohibit[s] unfunded mandates from the State of Nevada to local governments." EPIN and Angle argued that AB 4 violated the state constitution because the proposed ballot counting "standardless" and lacked adequate safeguards. Regarding its constitutional equal protection claims, EIPN and Angle argued that the certain sections of AB4 violated the Equal Protection Clause, such as a section of the statute requiring counties to establish vote centers consistent with its population (Plaintiffs argued that this violates the rights of rural voters since they have less voting centers than voters in large counties and thus it is harder to vote in rural counties). On October 7, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order denying the emergency petition for writ of mandamus and explained that, because Petitioners had waited nearly a month to file their complaint and a number of counties planned to send mail ballots the day before Petitioners filed their writ with the Supreme Court, "to grant the petition at this late date would inject a significant measure of confusion into an election process that is already underway." The Supreme Court said it was "reluctant" to inject confusion into the election process "absent a clear and compelling demonstration that the district court had a legal duty to enjoin AB 4 [and t]hat showing ha[d] not been made here."
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Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 312 P.3d 479 (Nev. 2013)
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Nevada | 2013 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding, Labor, Employment, and Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding, Labor, Employment, and Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2000, Elizondo was an employee of Hood Machine, Inc. (the Defendant) when he sustained an abdominal injury while working. Elizondo filed an industrial injury claim, which was accepted by the Defendant's insurer. However, further evaluation and treatment found no evidence of the injury, and the insurer closed the claim. Elizondo sought to have the claim reopened on three separate occasions with support from physicians, yet the insurer denied his request each time. In 2011, Elizondo submitted a fourth request to reopen the claim, which was also denied, despite the inclusion of a physician's letter that found the injury to be easily identifiable, and explicitly related back to the original 2000 injury. Elizondo once again appealed this decision, but an appeals officer summarily dismissed the petition in a two-sentence judgment, relying on an argument of res judicata put forward by the insurer. The district court, in denying Elizondo's petition for judicial review, ruled that he had not stated any claim that could withstand res judicata. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the appeals officer had met Nevada statutory requirements in issuing the denial. First, the Supreme Court held that the appeal's officer had failed to state any findings of fact or conclusions of law and, therefore, had submitted a deficient denial. Further, the Court reviewed precedent and determined that the Nevada legislature had intended for Nevada's workers' compensation statutes to alone control the review of industrial injury claims, therefore preventing the application of the common law defenses of issue and claim preclusion.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2000, Elizondo was an employee of Hood Machine, Inc. (the Defendant) when he sustained an abdominal injury while working. Elizondo filed an industrial injury claim, which was accepted by the Defendant's insurer. However, further evaluation and treatment found no evidence of the injury, and the insurer closed the claim. Elizondo sought to have the claim reopened on three separate occasions with support from physicians, yet the insurer denied his request each time. In 2011, Elizondo submitted a fourth request to reopen the claim, which was also denied, despite the inclusion of a physician's letter that found the injury to be easily identifiable, and explicitly related back to the original 2000 injury. Elizondo once again appealed this decision, but an appeals officer summarily dismissed the petition in a two-sentence judgment, relying on an argument of res judicata put forward by the insurer. The district court, in denying Elizondo's petition for judicial review, ruled that he had not stated any claim that could withstand res judicata. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the appeals officer had met Nevada statutory requirements in issuing the denial. First, the Supreme Court held that the appeal's officer had failed to state any findings of fact or conclusions of law and, therefore, had submitted a deficient denial. Further, the Court reviewed precedent and determined that the Nevada legislature had intended for Nevada's workers' compensation statutes to alone control the review of industrial injury claims, therefore preventing the application of the common law defenses of issue and claim preclusion.
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Elk Grove Dev. Co. v. Four Corners Cnty. Water and Sewer Dist., 469 P.3d 153 (Mont. 2020)
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Montana | 2020 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2020
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA subdivision developer brought an action for injunctive relief against the county water and sewer district (District), seeking to preclude the District from using the subdivision's water for property outside the subdivision. The district court granted summary judgement to the developer. The District appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the subdivision covenant providing that specified water rights and related infrastructure were to be possessed and used exclusively for diversion and distribution of water supply for the benefited property was not a reasonable restraint on alienation. The Supreme Court stated Montana's constitutionally based water rights system cannot be thwarted by a privately entered property covenant. Here the covenant at issue precluded any attempt by the water right holder to apply to change or potentially expand the right and therefore placed restrictions on the right that impermissibly conflicted with state water law.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A subdivision developer brought an action for injunctive relief against the county water and sewer district (District), seeking to preclude the District from using the subdivision's water for property outside the subdivision. The district court granted summary judgement to the developer. The District appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the subdivision covenant providing that specified water rights and related infrastructure were to be possessed and used exclusively for diversion and distribution of water supply for the benefited property was not a reasonable restraint on alienation. The Supreme Court stated Montana's constitutionally based water rights system cannot be thwarted by a privately entered property covenant. Here the covenant at issue precluded any attempt by the water right holder to apply to change or potentially expand the right and therefore placed restrictions on the right that impermissibly conflicted with state water law.
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Elkins v. State, 830 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 2019)
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Georgia | 2019 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2019
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was 17 years old when he committed and was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in the shooting death of a 13-month-old child and the shooting of his mother, as well as the shooting ten days earlier of a pastor behind his church. Defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence when the jury heard that he had a juvenile criminal record during questioning by a trial attorney. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness did not confirm or deny the existence of a criminal juvenile report and the trial court struck the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. The trial court noted among other things that questions by attorneys are not evidence, that Defendant objected before the witness had a chance to respond, and that the word used was “report,” not “record,” which did not necessarily mean anything bad about Defendant. The court offered to instruct the jury that “any reference . . . to a juvenile proceeding refers to [defendant's mother] and her involvement and not [defendant]” but Defendant objected. The court denied Defendant's mistrial motion but asked Defendant to craft a curative instruction. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that statements of counsel are not evidence and the witness did not confirm or deny the existence of a “criminal juvenile report.” Moreover, the trial court struck the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant was 17 years old when he committed and was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in the shooting death of a 13-month-old child and the shooting of his mother, as well as the shooting ten days earlier of a pastor behind his church. Defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence when the jury heard that he had a juvenile criminal record during questioning by a trial attorney. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness did not confirm or deny the existence of a criminal juvenile report and the trial court struck the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. The trial court noted among other things that questions by attorneys are not evidence, that Defendant objected before the witness had a chance to respond, and that the word used was “report,” not “record,” which did not necessarily mean anything bad about Defendant. The court offered to instruct the jury that “any reference . . . to a juvenile proceeding refers to [defendant's mother] and her involvement and not [defendant]” but Defendant objected. The court denied Defendant's mistrial motion but asked Defendant to craft a curative instruction. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that statements of counsel are not evidence and the witness did not confirm or deny the existence of a “criminal juvenile report.” Moreover, the trial court struck the question and instructed the jury to disregard it. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.
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Elliott v. State, 824 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 2019)
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Georgia | 2019 | Criminal Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2019
Topics:
Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was prosecuted for driving under the influence of alcohol. When Defendant was arrested, she refused to submit to a breath test. Georgia statutes allow the State to use her refusal against her in her criminal trial, which the State attempted to do. Defendant, however, contended that the protection against compelled self-incrimination provided by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution does afford the right to refuse such a test. Defendant argued that Paragraph XVI gives her the protection that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not, and thus renders invalid the portions of the statutes allowing her refusal to be admitted against her. The Supreme Court agreed and the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was reversed. The Supreme Court held that Georgia Constitution's Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI precluded admission of evidence that a suspect refused to consent to a breath test, and thus statutes O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-67.1(b) and 40-6-392(d), were unconstitutional to the extent that they allow a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test to be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial. After extensive review of the historical record and case law, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia's state constitutional right does prohibit admission of evidence that Defendant refused a breath test.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant was prosecuted for driving under the influence of alcohol. When Defendant was arrested, she refused to submit to a breath test. Georgia statutes allow the State to use her refusal against her in her criminal trial, which the State attempted to do. Defendant, however, contended that the protection against compelled self-incrimination provided by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution does afford the right to refuse such a test. Defendant argued that Paragraph XVI gives her the protection that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not, and thus renders invalid the portions of the statutes allowing her refusal to be admitted against her. The Supreme Court agreed and the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was reversed. The Supreme Court held that Georgia Constitution's Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI precluded admission of evidence that a suspect refused to consent to a breath test, and thus statutes O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-67.1(b) and 40-6-392(d), were unconstitutional to the extent that they allow a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test to be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial. After extensive review of the historical record and case law, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia's state constitutional right does prohibit admission of evidence that Defendant refused a breath test.
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Emps. Ins. Co. v. Sunada, No. 63167, 2015 WL 1855173 (Nev. Apr. 17, 2015) (unpublished disposition)
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Nevada | 2015 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2015
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant Employers Insurance Company of Nevada terminated the temporary total disability (TTD) benefits of Respondent Guy Sunada after his treating physician opined that he could return to modified duty work with certain restrictions. The appeals officer reversed Appellant's decision, however, finding Respondent temporarily and totally disabled and, thus, entitled to ongoing TTD benefits. The appeals officer based his decision on Dr. Derek Duke's independent medical evaluation that opined as to the severity of Respondent's condition and his need for surgery and further treatment, in addition to Respondent's "significant reliance" on pain medication. The district court denied judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying judicial review and held that since Respondent's treating physician determined that Respondent could return to modified duty, and because there is no other medical opinion in the record to the contrary, substantial evidence did not support the appeals officer's determination that Respondent was entitled to ongoing TTD benefits.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Appellant Employers Insurance Company of Nevada terminated the temporary total disability (TTD) benefits of Respondent Guy Sunada after his treating physician opined that he could return to modified duty work with certain restrictions. The appeals officer reversed Appellant's decision, however, finding Respondent temporarily and totally disabled and, thus, entitled to ongoing TTD benefits. The appeals officer based his decision on Dr. Derek Duke's independent medical evaluation that opined as to the severity of Respondent's condition and his need for surgery and further treatment, in addition to Respondent's "significant reliance" on pain medication. The district court denied judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying judicial review and held that since Respondent's treating physician determined that Respondent could return to modified duty, and because there is no other medical opinion in the record to the contrary, substantial evidence did not support the appeals officer's determination that Respondent was entitled to ongoing TTD benefits.
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