State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant fatally shot three men outside a club. Defendant claimed diminished capacity due to alcohol and marijuana intoxication. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. The death penalty sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court noting that it independently reviews the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support convictions in all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed. The Supreme Court noted that deviations from the norms established by the American Bar Association guidelines for the appointment and performance of defense counsel in death penalty cases do not establish that a capital defendant's constitutional rights were violated. The Supreme Court also determined that in a capital prosecution, a misdemeanor offense cannot support the aggravating factor of killing while in the perpetration of a felony. However, the Supreme Court explained that evidence in penalty phase of capital murder prosecution was sufficient to support aggravating factor that the killing was committed while in the perpetration of a felony, where Defendant stipulated that he committed the killings while being an illegal alien in possession and/or use of a firearm and stipulated to that being a felony firearm charge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner appealed his murder conviction on numerous grounds, including the fact that the jury was permitted to hear him utter racial epithets in an otherwise relevant statement. The Supreme Court held that any error in the trial court's permitting the jury to hear excerpts of the Defendant's 911 call during which he uttered the epithets while making other highly relevant statements was harmless. The Supreme Court said that the overwhelming evidence of both guilt and the aggravating circumstances on which the jury based its decision was sufficient to convict and that the epithets were not factored in the jury's decision in the Defendant's guilt or sentencing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingProsecutor's comparison of Defendant to a dog during opening argument in penalty phase of first degree murder trial was highly irregular and improper, but given the overwhelming aggravating circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the comment did not so infect the jury that it could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a fair sentence. Future dangerousness is not an enumerated aggravating circumstance, and, unlike the statutory aggravating circumstances, it may not be used by a jury as the sole reason for imposing a death sentence. Thus, it is not a per se error for a prosecutor to argue a defendant's future dangerousness during penalty phase, so long as the court grants the capital defendant's request to instruct the jury that his first-degree murder conviction precludes his eligibility for parole.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with third-degree murder and other crimes after shooting and killing a person while working as a police officer. Prosecutor filed a motion in limine, which requested that the court prevent the defense from using a standard peace officer justification defense instruction for Pennsylvania Statute section 508. Prosecutor argued that this instruction, which closely follows the language of the statute, violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court denied Prosecutor's motion. The superior court quashed appeal as unauthorized interlocutory appeal. The superior court quashed appeal as unauthorized interlocutory appeal as of right. The Supreme Court affirmed superior court's ruling and held: (1) the denial of the motion in limine did not substantially hinder the prosecution, as required for interlocutory appeal from denial of motion as of right; (2) the issue of whether the peace officer justification defense instruction violated the Fourth Amendment could not be separated from the overall merits of the case, and hence precluded Prosecutor's interlocutory appeal as of right; and (3) the challenge to the justification defense could not be separated from the merits of the charges, precluding an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court's majority opinion did not discuss the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Statute section 508, which on its face permits the use of deadly force if the person to be arrested simply is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly weapon. Likewise, the concurring opinion reserved final judgment on this issue. The dissenting opinion argued that Section 508(a)(1) is, at least in part, constitutionally defective, because the forcible felony and deadly weapon justifications permit an officer to kill a fleeing suspect without any facts demonstrating that the suspect poses an actual threat of death or grave bodily injury to the officer of others.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed arguing that new facts warranted reconsideration of his case. Defendant's claim that the Supreme Court judge's failure to recuse himself from hearing Defendant's appeal from denial of initial petition for postconviction relief violated due process, due to fact that judge, while serving as district attorney at time of defendant's capital murder case, had approved prosecutor's request to seek death penalty, and thus had significant, personal involvement in critical decision regarding defendant's case that gave rise to risk of actual bias. The Supreme Court held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016) was not “fact,” within meaning of “newly discovered fact” exception to one-year limitations period governing petition for postconviction relief in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court reasoned that the fact upon which claim was predicated (justice was a former district attorney) was publicly available to Defendant more than two decades before he filed petition, and thus, Defendant could not show that he could not have ascertained fact through exercise of due diligence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed arguing that his attorney should have provided mitigation testimony of psychiatrists regarding Defendant's mental health even though Defendant decided not to provide the information. The Defendant argued that the trial court erroneously believed that a doctor-patient privilege existed. The Pennsylvania Sentencing Code permits the introduction of two types of victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial: (1) evidence about the victim; and (2) evidence regarding the impact that the death of the victim has had on the victim's family. The Supreme Court held that the trial counsel was not ineffective at penalty phase of capital murder trial for not objecting to the manner in which the trial court handled Defendant's decision not to allow counsel to present mitigation testimony. The Supreme Court reasoned that whether he wanted counsel to pursue it, Defendant failed to cite any evidence to support his argument that, had he been provided with accurate information concerning the mental health mitigation evidence and the alleged privilege, he would have permitted counsel to allow the psychiatrists to testify on his behalf.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner filed post-conviction request based on a number of grounds, including the alleged discriminatory intent in the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes in the Defendant's case failed to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding while a defendant is not entitled to have a jury completely or partially composed of people of his own race, the state is not permitted to use its peremptory challenges to automatically exclude potential members of the jury because of their race) when the prosecutor struck more African Americans than Caucasians but the totality of the circumstances, including petitioner's failure to identify racial composition of the jury, was inadequate to evaluate Batson claims.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed arguing that the court impermissibly permitted two prospective jurors from serving on the jury because they indicated uncertainty about ability to impose death penalty were properly excluded, even though they never stated they would be unable to follow the law or conduct themselves in an impartial manner. The Supreme Court held that the jurors were properly excluded because they expressed an uncertainty about their ability to impose the death penalty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA petitioner asked for relief following revelations that justices sent offensive e-mails and possibly had ex parte communications with members of the District Attorney's office. Unlike in Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 193 A.3d 350 (Pa. 2018), the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision affirming the lower court's decision to deny the appeal. Justice Donohue supported reversal because there was no way for the Defendant to exercise due diligence to obtain the information prior to the revelations. Justice Donohue also argued that the District Attorney had a conflict of interest.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner sought post-conviction relief after murder conviction. Petitioner sought relief, in part, due to a recording that demonstrated a prosecuting attorney advocated a racially discriminatory approach to voir dire under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding while a defendant is not entitled to have a jury completely or partially composed of people of his own race, the state is not permitted to use its peremptory challenges to automatically exclude potential members of the jury because of their race). The Supreme Court held that the tape, which recommended several pretexts to mask the use of racially discriminatory peremptory strikes was inadequate to demonstrate actual, purposeful discrimination in the Defendant's murder trial when the trial occurred more than 10 years after the recording and the speaker was not the prosecutor in the case.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant challenged a death sentence claiming the passage of time was a violation of the Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court held that murder Defendant's due process rights were not violated by delay of more than 17 years between conviction and imposition of sentence of death, because the prior testimony was preserved, absences and lapses in memory had not been shown to involve identifiable exculpatory, mitigating, or even helpful information and in the end, Defendant did not demonstrate legal prejudice.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAt trial, evidence was presented that Defendant inflicted considerable amount of pain upon victim that was unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, and cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity, including cutting victim's hair against her will and stripping off her clothes, binding her wrists and ankles, forcing victim to write false suicide note, and slitting victim's wrists. In addition, Defendant directed the co-perpetrator to proceed with killing the victim, after which co-perpetrator stabbed victim 24 times, and that Defendant possessed specific intent to torture, and the 24 stab wounds inflicted by co-perpetrator upon Defendant's direction connected torture with killing itself. When a criminal defendant is vicariously liable for a first-degree murder and himself possesses both the intention to kill and to torture the “offense” can have been “committed by means of torture,” and thus the torture aggravator can apply, so as to support the imposition of the death penalty, although the defendant was not the actual instrumentality of the death. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8). The Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that offense was committed by means of torture, as required for torture aggravator supporting imposition of death penalty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed claiming ineffective counsel of his trial lawyer. He claimed his counsel's lack of experience demonstrated ineffectiveness. He also claimed his trial lawyer did not adequately present mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court restated its previous holding that lack of experience, by itself, does not amount to ineffectiveness of counsel. The Supreme Court also held defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in penalty phase of capital murder trial by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding defendant's traumatic, abusive childhood and its neuropsychological impact on him since that evidence could have affected the analysis during the penalty phase.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant convicted at trial court of killing his girlfriend and sentenced to death. On appeal before the Supreme Court, Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial attorney did not satisfy capital case qualifications set forth in Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 801 (e.g., continuing legal education requirements specific to capital cases). The Supreme Court held that such fact alone would not establish ineffectiveness at trial. Rather, all the prongs of the Strickland/Pierce ineffectiveness standard (the Strickland test to demonstrate ineffective counsel, defendant must show (1) that the trial lawyer's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)) must be demonstrated, and they were not demonstrated here. Separately, during the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) phase, Defendant violently attacked his attorney, who then withdrew. PCRA hearing found Defendant had forfeited his right to an attorney and it was not an error for PCRA phase to be adjudicated pro se.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant was prosecuted before his 18th birthday for rape of a child and related offenses. The juvenile court transferred the Appellant to adult court in part because he did not admit to the acts alleged, which is the first step of sex offender treatment, and so he was not amenable to treatment within the juvenile system. The Supreme Court held that juvenile's use of his refusal to admit guilt to transfer him to a court with more severe penalties violated the Appellants 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court distinguished the Commonwealth's comments on Defendant's silence in this case and the comments made in United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988). In Robinson, the defendant's silence was commented on by the prosecution in response to the defense's implication that the government denied the defendant an opportunity to explain his side of the story. Here, the Commonwealth made adverse comments on Defendant's refusal to admit guilt, implying that it invited a Fifth Amendment violation. The Supreme Court held that the Juvenile Act did not allow drawing an adverse inference from a juvenile's refusal to admit guilt. When deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court, the court cannot base its ruling on the minor's assertions of innocence or invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Doing so would infringe upon the juvenile's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of murder for intentionally starving her child to death and appealed claiming ineffective counsel. Counsel has an obligation under the 6th Amendment to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation for mitigating evidence or to make reasonable decisions that make further investigation unnecessary, encompassing pursuit of all statutory mitigators he is or reasonably should be aware of, unless there is some reasonable ground not to pursue the circumstance, such as when it might open the door to harmful evidence. In evaluating an ineffectiveness claim alleging counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence in a capital case, appellate court considers a number of factors, including the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, and the additional or different mitigation evidence that could have been presented; none of the aforementioned factors is, by itself, dispositive, because even if counsel's investigation is deemed unreasonable, the defendant is not entitled to relief unless the defendant demonstrates that prejudice resulted from counsel's conduct. In this case, capital counsel was aware of Defendant's claims that she suffered from child abuse and was a victim of domestic violence and aware of pretrial competency report detailing Defendant's mental health problems. The Supreme Court found counsel was deficient in his investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence at sentencing phase after counsel failed to (1) identify a single person that he interviewed or a single document that he obtained to corroborate Defendant's disclosures of abuse at trial; (2) ask Defendant's family about upbringing or domestic abuse; (3) present any witnesses during penalty phase; and (4) provide any strategic reason for failing to present available mental health evidence. The Supreme Court held that counsel's investigation of mitigation evidence at penalty phase was deficient and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded for new penalty phase proceeding.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn appeal, the Supreme Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner (in this case the Commonwealth) in order to determine whether the jury could have found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. To convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed another human being, the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill, and the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570 (2005). The specific intent to kill supporting a conviction for first-degree murder may be inferred from the defendant's use of a weapon on a vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114 (2017). Failure of Pennsylvania death penalty statute to require the jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). Defendant appealed the his conviction, claiming insufficient evidence. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain first-degree murder conviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that a prospective juror's statement that she preferred to impose a life sentence rather than the death penalty warranted excusal of juror for cause in capital murder prosecution, where, although juror never expressly indicated that she was incapable of imposing a death sentence, juror repeatedly expressed opposition to the death penalty, and juror stated that she would sentence Defendant to life, even if the law required imposition of the death penalty. The Defendant also appealed arguing that the prosecutor improperly excluded a different juror based on her race and sex. The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth provided sufficient race and gender-neutral explanation for peremptory strike of a prospective juror in capital murder prosecution in response to Defendant's Batson challenge (objecting to the validity of a peremptory challenge on grounds that the other party used the challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race, ethnicity, or sex), Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where Commonwealth gave its non-discriminatory reasons, including: (1) juror indicated on her written jury questionnaire that she would have been less likely to believe the testimony of a police officer; (2) responded equivocally during voir dire as to whether she would acquit defendant to avoid issuing him the death penalty; (3) commented on how defendant had to fight the case; and (4) expressed affinity toward defense counsel and smiled at defendant.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant's counsel presented testimony from five lay witnesses and submitted four mitigating circumstances to the jury, counsel attempted to submit evidence of defendant's brain injury and cognitive impairments through testimony of his mother, and experts presented at Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceedings were not found credible. Defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court previously held that to establish prejudice, Defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence in death penalty case must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's failure to present the mitigation evidence he currently proffers, Defendant would have been able to prove at least one more mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence and that at least one jury member would have concluded that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel's alleged failure to sufficiently investigate and present evidence of Defendant's psychological and sociological problems as mitigation evidence in penalty phase of death penalty case.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed sentence based on ineffective counsel because the attorney failed to present the Defendant's intellectual disability. Evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that Defendant suffered from significant adaptive limitations in areas of conceptual, practical, and social skills. Specifically, evidence presented supported finding that murder Defendant had significant adaptive limitations and was thus intellectually disabled and was ineligible for death penalty, even though he was able to pass oral examination to obtain commercial driver's license. The Supreme Court held that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in penalty phase of capital murder trial by failing to present mitigating evidence that Defendant had significant adaptive limitations and was thus intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court reasoned that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to present such evidence in light of information from members of Defendant's family regarding Defendant's limitations, his work history, and ways in which family members had assisted Defendant.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's decision to excuse nine potential jurors based on their general views of the death penalty without any attempt to rehabilitate them through further questioning was reasonable trial strategy. Eight of the nine potential jurors made unequivocal statements that his or her personal views, opinions, and/or religious convictions would substantially impair his or her ability to vote to impose the death penalty. The ninth potential juror gave a more equivocal statement that he “probably” could set aside his personal views and return a verdict of death if warranted by the facts and the law. Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent makes clear that any person may be excluded from a jury who holds views on capital punishment that prevents or substantially impairs that person from adhering to the trial court's instructions on the law. Commonwealth v. Lark, 698 A.2d 43, 48 (1997). A trial court acts within its discretion when it excludes venire persons who express reservations about imposing the death penalty in a capital case. Commonwealth v. Chimel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1176 (2011). "[C]apital trial counsel has no constitutional obligation to attempt to change the views of venire persons by further questioning." Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not find error in the Post-Conviction Relief Act court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the dismissal of the challenged jurors for cause.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that in a capital murder prosecution, trial court acted within its discretion in excusing for cause prospective juror whose equivocal responses during voir dire demonstrated that his moral beliefs would substantially impair his ability to discharge his duty as a juror if law called for imposition of death penalty. In addition, the Defendant appealed death penalty sentence claiming improper jury instruction based on his age and the potential for future issues. The Supreme Court held that in the penalty phase of the capital murder trial, the trial court did not improperly instruct jury regarding aggravating circumstance of “future dangerousness” by instructing jury that Defendant's age was a factor that could be considered in terms of whether he posed future danger to society. The Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court explicitly instructed jury as to only the aggravating circumstances at issue, and entirety of court's instruction made clear that “future dangerousness” was not an aggravating circumstance to be considered by jury. The Supreme Court also held that during the penalty phase of Defendant's capital murder prosecution, Defendant was not entitled to instruction on possibility of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, where Defendant's future dangerousness was not an issue.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTo establish that a murder was committed by means of torture, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally inflicted a considerable amount of pain and suffering that was unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 1279 (1996). The factors to consider in determining whether the torture aggravator applies include, but are not limited to: (1) the manner in which the murder was accomplished, including the number and type of wounds inflicted; (2) whether the wounds were inflicted on a vital or non-vital area of the body; (3) whether the victim was conscious when the wounds were received; and (4) the duration of the episode. The Supreme Court held that Application of torture aggravating circumstance was warranted in capital first-degree murder prosecution, where two-year-old victim died as a result of lacerated liver that was (1) allegedly the result of being beaten by defendant; (2) there was expert medical testimony that victim would have been in severe pain each time he took a breath for several hours before he died; and (3) there was expert medical testimony that there were 20 to 30 impacts on victim's body.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTwo former employees filed a complaint against their employer, a provider of massage therapy, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy under state and federal law. The district court found that the employer violated the employees' rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex" with the term "sex" not limited to gender but including on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. The employer argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain such a finding. The Supreme Court held that Nevada's anti-discrimination statute was almost identical to Title VII and therefore the district court was correct in looking at the federal courts for guidance and finding discrimination under Nevada law as well. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that substantial evidence (district court heard testimony from multiple witnesses and the Supreme Court deferred to the district court's assessment of the witnesses) supported the district court's ultimate finding of liability. In an en banc reconsideration of its 2020 opinion in this case, the Nevada Supreme Court considered the limited issue of mitigation of damages. In its 2020 decision, the Court affirmed the district court’s award of substantial back pay, reasoning that a trial court’s award of back pay is reversible only for an abuse of discretion and there was no abuse of discretion. When the case was before the trial court, Complete Care raised the employees’ duty to mitigate their damages as an affirmative defense arguing that the employees voluntarily withdrew from the workforce, which would support a deduction of backpay for the time each employee chose to voluntarily withdraw. The district court did not address mitigation in its oral ruling or written order. On reconsideration, the Supreme Court explained that, while back pay awards would normally be subject to deference, the “manifestly deficient order [of the trial court] amounts to legal error.” Therefore, the Court vacated the district court’s back pay award and remanded for further proceedings to address mitigation and recalculate damages.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn the underlying federal case, Michael Conage was convicted of a gun possession crime and then sentenced to a mandatory prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). To impose that sentence, the trial court first had to conclude that Conage had three previous convictions for a "serious drug offense" as defined by the ACCA. One of the three convictions that the trial court counted against Conage was a 2006 conviction for trafficking in cocaine in violation of Florida Statute Section 893.135(1)(b)1. Conage appealed his sentence, arguing that it was error to deem the 2006 conviction an ACCA predicate offense. The question addressed by the Supreme Court was how does Florida law define the term "purchase" for purposes of Florida Statute § 893.135(1)? More specifically, does a completed purchase for purposes of conviction under § 893.135(1) require some form of possession—either actual or constructive—of the drug being purchased? As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court held that it does, and in doing so rejected the argument that a purchase is necessarily complete as soon as the would-be purchaser pays for the drugs. The Supreme Court concluded that a completed purchase requires proof that the Defendant both gave consideration for, and obtained control of, trafficking quantity of illegal drugs.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Charles Reese Conner admitted that he hit the victim in the head with a hammer in a blind rage and then sexually assaulted her. Conner was convicted of first-degree murder and sexual assault. On appeal, the Court primarily considered whether the district court clearly erred by overruling Connor's challenge to the State's peremptory strike under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The State argued that it struck an African-American prospective juror because he switched answers during voir dire regarding whether or not he could impose the death penalty. However, no evidence existed that the prospective juror ever switched his answer and the juror stated he could impose the death penalty if necessary. On Conner's Batson challenge, the State offered race-neutral explanations for striking the juror, but Conner was not allowed to respond. Here, the Court found that the State's race-neutral reasons for striking the prospective juror were pretextual. Accordingly, the Court reversed Conner's conviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThree-year old Amaya Gullatte went into cardiac arrest while being administered anesthetics by Defendants anesthesiologist Doctor James Doyle and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA) Gus VanSoestbergen, along with two additional physicians who treated her. The Plaintiff, Amaya's guardian, sued for medical malpractice due to the onset of permanent brain damage and developmental delay Amaya suffered after the incident. At trial, the court excluded evidence offered by the Plaintiff showing CRNA VanSoestbergen breached the professional duty of care and the jury failed to reach a verdict on the claims against Dr. Doyle and CRNA VanSoestbergen. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's exclusion of Plaintiff's expert testimony against the nurse anesthetist on grounds that the medical profession has increasingly recognized the specialization and independence of nurses in the treatment of patients. The decision therefore overruled Byrd v. Marion General Hospital, 162 S.E. 738 (N.C. 1932), which established that nurses categorically do not owe a duty of care in the diagnosis and treatment of patients while working under the supervision of a licensed physician, as applied to the facts of the case. The case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn a lawsuit filed by individual voters requesting that the Supreme Court enjoin the Wayne County Canvassers' certification of the November 2020 election results on the basis that an audit needs to occur prior to the election results being certified, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal the court of appeals' denial of the motion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant did not file a timely appeal, but more than six years later, filed a motion for out-of-time appeal in the trial court, contending that she was deprived of her right to appeal because of her plea counsel's ineffective assistance. When a convicted criminal defendant is unconstitutionally deprived of an appeal of right, typically because her counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely appeal, she is entitled to an untimely or “out-of-time” appeal. The Supreme Court examined the question of whether to overrule its precedent allowing a defendant a right to file a motion for out-of-time appeal in the trial court, as opposed to seeking a writ of habeas corpus as an exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court held that there was no legal authority for motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts. The Supreme Court also held that the out-of-time appeal procedure was not a legally cognizable vehicle for a convicted defendant to seek relief from alleged constitutional violations. The Supreme Court overruled Rowland v. State, 452 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. 1995), and its handful of progeny and disapproved King v. State, 212 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. 1975), Furgerson v. State, 216 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 1975), and other decisions that allowed out-of-time appeal claims to be litigated in trial courts without addressing the propriety of that procedure. The Court found that by judicially creating this trial court out-of-time appeal procedure (a procedure that is neither authorized by common law nor established by statute) the Supreme Court acted not as a body of judges, but as a body of lawmakers, thus overstepping their limited constitutional role.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that, in violation of the Election Code, Committee for Frank J. Mautino (Committee), a candidate political committee, had filed inadequate expenditure reports and made expenditures that did not comply with Section 9-8.10, an election code prohibiting political committees from making expenditures clearly in excess of fair market value. Specifically, the complaint alleged discrepancies with respect to how expenditures were recorded, including expenses listed in whole dollar amounts without sufficient detail to verify the nature and purpose of those expenditures. The Illinois State Board of Elections issued an order and assessed a $5,000 fine to the Committee after it failed to timely amend the expenditure reports, and denied Plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Plaintiff appealed because the Board did not reach the merits of its complaint. In 2019, the appellate court reversed the State Board of Election's findings that Plaintiff had not met its burden in establishing violations of Sections 9-8.10(a)(2) and 9-8.10(a)(9). Based on insufficient evidence, the appellate court remanded the case to the Board to “address whether the violations were knowingly committed in considering the matter of fines under section 9-8.10(b)." The Supreme Court granted the Committee's petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that: (i) committee could not make expenditures for vehicles not owned or leased by election committee beyond actual mileage reimbursement; (2) committee violated election code by making payments to third-party vendor for gas and repairs to vehicles not owned or leased by committee; (3) section of election code prohibiting political committee from making expenditures clearly in excess of fair market value was concerned only with amount or price of expenditure; (4) citizen did not show that election committee violated that section of election code with regard to payment for gas; and (5) Board was without requisite information to determine whether it was probably true that election committee violated section of election code prohibiting political committee from making expenditures clearly in excess of fair market value. The Court concluded that because the Committee made expenditures for gas and repairs for vehicles it neither owned nor leased, the Committee violated Section 9-8.10(a)(9). However, the Court concluded that Section 9-8.10(a)(2) regulates only the amount or price of expenditures and Plaintiff did not demonstrate that the Committee violated that section.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA healthcare provider, as the insured patient's assignee, brought an action against a no-fault automobile insurer to recover payment of a hospital bill from 2016 for treatment of complications arising from a 1977 automobile accident before the effective date of Medicare Secondary Payer Act in 1980 to expand the field of collateral sources bearing primary responsibility for the payment of medical expenses of a Medicare enrollee. The superior court entered summary judgment that the insurer was responsible for the entire medical bill minus the amount received from Medicare, placing on the insurer the primary obligation to pay medical expenses when billed, regardless of available collateral sources such as Medicare. The insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, holding that Medicare, rather than the insurer, had primary responsibility because the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the No Fault Act) provides that the insurer has the responsibility to make personal-injury-protection (PIP) payments first but ultimately the collateral source, which was Medicare at the time prior to the Medicate Secondary Payer Act in 1980, has primary responsibility for the payment of the medical bills. After December 5, 1980, Medicare became the secondary payer to a PIP carrier as the Secondary Payer Act, and in effect, preempted the No Fault Act's collateral source rule.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn December 2020, Jackson and Pope each filed a statement as an independent candidate for village president. Jackson's petition had 50 voter signatures and Pope's petition had 32 signatures. An objection alleged that the number of signatures for both candidates was insufficient under 10 ILCS 5/10-3, a code which requires independent candidates to obtain a number of signatures that is between 5-8% of the total number of voters in the preceding election. Plaintiff alleged that the candidates were required, under the code, to collect 118-188 signatures. Both candidates testified that they relied on Schmidt, the Glendale Heights clerk and election official, who stated that she had read the State Board of Elections 2021 Candidate’s Guide, and, relying on the numbers “for non-partisan” elections, concluded that 24 signatures were required. In addition, Schmidt admitted that she did not understand the distinction between independent and nonpartisan, and acknowledged that she was never notified that the statutorily required number of signatures had been reduced because of the pandemic, though she mistakenly believed it had. The Glendale Heights Municipal Officers Electoral Board found that both candidates justifiably relied on Schmidt’s statements and excused their statutory violations. The trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed holding that a statute governing signature requirements for nominating petitions for candidates for village president is mandatory and requires strict compliance, regardless of whether candidates may have relied on representations of the village clerk to the contrary.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn this case, Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, et al. (PPCR), challenged the constitutionality and sought to enjoin the enforcement of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.123 (RC 2919.123), which it contended restricted physicians from providing individualized care for medically induced abortions using the drug Mifepristone. The statute required physicians to adhere to the guidelines outlined in the Federal Drug Administration's (FDA) drug approval letter for Mifepristone, which restricted the timing and dosage of prescriptions to those approved in the drug’s FDA trial. PPCR argued that RC 2919.123 violated patient bodily autonomy and lacked an exception for safeguarding patient health. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, but the state, via Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray, appealed. The Sixth Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which ruled that compliance with the 49-day gestational limitation and FDA-approved treatment protocols and dosage indications was required under RC 2919.123. The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision clarified the mandate for physicians to adhere to the FDA's guidelines in using Mifepristone for abortions, thereby upholding the state statute. The Supreme Court based their decision on the plain language of the statute, which explicitly included the drug's approval letter as part of the definition of "federal law."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents, schools, and school districts filed petition for review, challenging a mask mandate issued by the Acting Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health, which required individuals to wear facial coverings while inside schools as a means of controlling the spread of COVID-19, alleging that the Secretary failed to adhere to statutory rulemaking requirements before issuing the mandate. The commonwealth court granted petitioners' application for summary relief and denied the Secretary's application for summary relief. The Secretary appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) disease control measures available to the Department of Health pursuant to its non-emergency powers are limited to those adopted by formal rule or regulation; (2) a mask mandate was not “modified quarantine,” for purposes of regulation directing the Department of Health or local health authority to impose disease control measures, including modified quarantine, when necessary to protect public from spread of infectious diseases; (3) the mask mandate could not be justified under a catchall provision in regulation governing disease control measures; and (4) the mask mandate was void ab initio.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMichigan passed a law that permitted reimbursement of costs incurred by nonpublic schools to comply with state health, safety, and welfare mandates. Plaintiffs argued that this violated the Michigan Constitution's prohibition on aid to nonpublic schools. The Supreme Court held that the law was in accordance with the state constitution and the religions clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Michigan Constitution has a clause that prohibits public money from being paid to aid or maintain nonpublic schools. The Supreme Court reasoned that the intent of the clause was to prohibit the purchase of educational services from a nonpublic school, not to prohibit all forms of funding because denying all funding would include denying the schools fundamental services. The statutory reimbursements for health, safety, and welfare were only incidental to the educational services at the schools and therefore were permissible under the Michigan Constitution. Further, the Supreme Court reasoned that, if the state constitution were to deny all funding including public benefits to nonpublic schools, it would raise concerns under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it could pose an affirmative burden on the free exercise of religion where the nonpublic schools were religious institutions. Therefore, the law allows for some funding to nonpublic schools.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDanny Crane sought workers' compensation benefits for injuries, including severe hearing loss and brain injuries, allegedly sustained during a workplace incident at Raber's Discount Tire Rack. Crane claimed he suffered these injuries after an air hose suddenly separated from its fitting on a tire changer, causing an explosion-like noise. Medical examinations shortly after the incident confirmed that Crane had severe bilateral hearing loss and ruptured eardrums, diagnosed by multiple medical specialists through objective medical tests. The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission denied Crane's claims for temporary total disability, permanent impairment, and future medical care, primarily based on the Commissioner's determination that Crane was not a credible witness at his hearing. Crane appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals partially reversed the Commission’s decision, awarding temporary total disability but affirming the denial of permanent impairment and future medical care. On further review, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s denial of permanent impairment and future medical care. The Court found that the Commission erred by relying excessively and improperly on Crane's perceived lack of credibility while ignoring objective medical evidence conducted by two different ear, nose, and throat specialists, showing severe to profound hearing loss. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that although credibility assessments are typically within the Commission's discretion, such assessments must have a reasonable and meaningful relationship to the factual issues at hand. Here, the Court determined that Crane’s credibility issues were not logically related to the objective medical evidence of his hearing loss. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new hearing before a different Commissioner, requiring reconsideration of Crane's claims for temporary total disability, permanent impairment, and future medical care.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDerrick Palmer was convicted of domestic violence. During his incarceration, he gained technical skills that led him to be offered a lighting-systems design position at Cree, Inc. However, after learning of his domestic violence convictions, Cree, Inc. rescinded the offer. Palmer complained to the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (DWD), alleging that Cree, Inc. violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his prior convictions. The DWD held that Cree, Inc. did not discriminate, and Palmer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission, which reversed. Cree, Inc. then appealed to the courts. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 111.335(3)(a)(1), Wisconsin law makes it unlawful to discriminate against a job applicant on the basis of their conviction record unless that conviction is substantially related to the job. In this case, the Supreme Court held that Palmer's domestic violence conviction was substantially related to a lightning-systems design, stating that "Palmer's willingness to use violence to exert power and control over others substantially relates to the independent and interpersonal circumstances of the position, the layout of the facility—which provides sufficient opportunities to isolate a victim—and the opportunities created by unsupervised travel." As such, Cree, Inc.'s recission of an offer of employment on that basis was lawful.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWilliam Crenshaw, a tenured professor at Erskine College in South Carolina, was fired following claims that he had acted improperly during a medical emergency with a student and that he had failed to comply with the resulting faculty investigation. Crenshaw filed suit claiming damages for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, all charges outside of breach of contract were dropped. The jury found in favor of Crenshaw and awarded him $600,000 in damages, however, the trial court granted the college's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court of appeals reinstated the verdict on appeal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the prior courts had given too much weight to Crenshaw's tenured status. After reviewing the purposes of tenure, the job security it is meant to provide, and South Carolina precedent framing the requisite process for a tenured professor to be removed from their position, the Court held that the college had crafted their contractual protections and tenure policies in accordance with adequate reflection of the nature of tenure. However, the Court emphasized that because Erskine is a private college, the typical due process protections that apply to tenured positions at public institutions were not applicable. In considering the employment contract between the college and Crenshaw, the Court held that because Crenshaw failed to bring the issue of his dismissal to the Board of Trustees of the college, he had not properly exhausted the administrative remedies available to him and not followed the procedures laid out in the contract. Further, the Court held that no evidence presented in the case suggested that the college had deviated from the required procedures to dismiss a member of the faculty. As a result, the Court held that the trial court properly determined as a matter of law that the college did not breach its contract with Crenshaw and that the trial court was correct in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Justice Hearn wrote a dissent framing the key issue of whether Crenshaw acted properly to maintain a claim for breach of contract not as a question of law but rather one that was meant to be decided by a jury.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2021, the South Carolina legislature enacted the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act, which contained provisions restricting certain public institutions from enforcing face mask requirements. Importantly included was Proviso 117.190, prohibiting any public institution of higher education from using funds to enforce a mandate requiring students to either receive a COVID-19 vaccination or wear a face mask to be present in a higher education facility. On July 30, 2021, the Interim President of the University of South Carolina announced that all students, faculty, and staff would be required to wear face coverings while in university facilities. The South Carolina Attorney General sent a letter to the Interim President opining that the proposed mask mandate violated 117.190. The university administration reversed course and announced it would only require face coverings in health care facilities and public transportation. A university professor sought declaratory relief in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to find that 117.190 permitted a universal mask mandate. In reviewing the wording of 117.190 against other provisos contained in the Act, the Supreme Court held that nothing in 117.190 prohibited an institution of higher education from instituting a universal mask mandate. Instead, the Court read 117.190's language as prohibiting public institutions of higher education from discriminating against unvaccinated students in their application of a mask mandate.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff worked as a sanitarian charged with issuing septic permits to contractors, and she was allegedly terminated due to complaints from contractors regarding her work performance. The Plaintiff was given a written warning to improve her performance, after which she resigned, alleging that she was being retaliated against for bringing up her concerns with her work environment. The lower court affirmed a Department of Labor and Industry finding that the Plaintiff had resigned without good cause, thus becoming ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits to the Plaintiff, on the basis that the Plaintiff's voluntary resignation from her role did not constitute good cause to leave. The Supreme Court was unconvinced by the Plaintiff's argument that impending termination as a result of a written warning and complaints from clients rose to the level of a hostile work environment that would have supported a finding of good cause, as there were job-related reasons that supported the issuance of the written warning.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Thomas Wayne Crump was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon in connection with the robbing and strangling a victim. The district court sentenced Crump to death and the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Crump petitioned for postconviction relief, which was procedurally barred. To overcome the bar, Crump argued his prior counsel was ineffective and that intervening changes in the law warranted relief. The Court rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, given his unexcused thirty-year delay in seeking relief. In any event, Crump had no right to effective assistance of counsel in his second postconviction challenge. As to changes in the law, the Court first rejected Crump's argument regarding jury instructions as untimely, and even if not untimely, Crump would likely have been convicted under a correct jury instruction given the time he took in strangling his victim (establishing premeditation). Second, the Court rejected Crump's argument that Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 435 (Nev. 2007) provided a basis for challenging robbery as an aggravating circumstance. Nay held that "[r]robbery does not support felony murder where the evidence shows that the accused kills a person and only later forms the intent to rob that person." Id. Nay is inapt here as Crump was convicted of first-degree murder, not felony murder, and, regardless, evidence supported the fact that Crump intended to rob the victim before he murdered her. Finally, the Court held that Crump was not actually innocent or ineligible for the death penalty. Crump introduced evidence of his "low-average intellectual functioning" and being "extremely impulsive in the expression of anger" together with a diagnosis of "organic personality syndrome." However, in light of significant premeditation evidence and Crump's statement that "I just wanted to kill her . . . . I premeditated," the Court concluded that Crump failed to show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him and likewise affirmed his eligibility for the death penalty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingCarlos Tercero Cruz, charged with child abuse, kidnapping, and first-degree felony murder in connection with the death of his daughter, sought to introduce certain testimony to argue that his intellectual disability rendered him physically incapable of committing the alleged acts. The trial court precluded the evidence, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly excluded the proposed testimony. However, the Court clarified that Cruz could introduce admissible “behavioral-tendency” or “observation evidence" through expert and lay witnesses, consistent with prior precedent. The Court also upheld the trial court’s decision to limit Cruz’s lay witness list from eleven to two, finding no abuse of discretion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2013, Christian Cruz and codefendant Justen Charles were indicted for the first-degree murder of Christopher Jemery, as well as burglary while armed, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping. Cruz and Charles were tried separately but before the same trial court. Charles' trial occurred after Cruz's trial but before Cruz's sentencing. Cruz and Charles were convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and kidnapping. Cruz was sentenced to death, and Charles was sentenced to life in prison. Cruz's sole challenge to his death sentence is that this Court's relative culpability review requires that the sentence be reduced to life imprisonment because his equally culpable codefendant, Charles, was convicted of the same offenses and to whom the same aggravating factors were proven applicable, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the same judge. The State takes the position that when this Court in Lawrence v. State, 308 So.3d 544 (Fla. 2020) receded from its obligation to conduct a comparative proportionality review, it also receded from its obligation to conduct a relative culpability analysis, therefore, Charles's sentence is irrelevant to Cruz's sentence. The question addressed by the Supreme Court is whether relative culpability review survives Lawrence. Abandoning the doctrine of relative culpability, the Supreme Court held that relative culpability cannot provide a basis for vacating Cruz's death sentence because as an integrated part of comparative proportionality review, relative culpability review is rendered obsolete by the Lawrence decision.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of children enrolled in Minneapolis and Saint Paul public schools filed an action against the state (and other state entities and officials) alleging that the state's education practices resulted in racial and socioeconomic segregation and inadequate academic outcomes for students enrolled in segregated schools and, therefore, violated the Education, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution. The state moved to dismiss the claims and while the district court granted the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, it otherwise denied the state's motion. On review, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the Plaintiffs' claims presented a political question (one reserved for the legislature), rather than a judicial question. The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the alleged violations of the Education, Equal Protection, and Due Process clauses of the Minnesota Constitution presented a controversy appropriate for judicial determination. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that "although specific determinations of education policy are matters for the Legislature, it does not follow that the judiciary cannot adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional duty under the Education Clause." Because the Plaintiffs' Education Clause claims asked the Supreme Court to determine whether the Legislature had violated its constitutional duty under the Education clause, "to provide a general and uniform system of public schools that is thorough and efficient," rather than to prescribe what the policy remedy for such a violation should be, the Supreme Court found that such claims were justiciable. The Supreme Court further concluded that the Plaintiffs' equal-protection claims were justiciable based on the fundamental right to an adequate education.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingCurry, a private landowner, filed an action against Pondera, a water supply company which supplied water to Pondera County residents primarily for irrigation purposes. Both Curry and Pondera owned rights to divert waters from Birch Creek, some of which were secured by Pondera’s predecessors through the Carey Land Act (Carey Act). After Pondera locked the gate controlling water flow to Curry, Curry filed a complaint alleging interference with his water rights by Pondera and requested a determination as to the parties’ water rights. In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court found that Pondera had put the water to beneficial use—which was the basis of water rights in Montana—by providing the water for sale and issuing shares of stock up to its allowed acreage maximum as determined by the Montana Carey Land Board (MCLB) (which was established to ensure that procedures for passage of rights to federal lands pursuant to the federal Carey Act were followed). As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s decision finding Pondera’s water rights were not limited by the actual acreage irrigated by its shareholders. The Supreme Court determined that it was appropriate to grant Pondera a “service area”—with respect to its right to water—rather than a place of use based on historically irrigated lands by shareholders. However, the Supreme Court excluded from the “service area” an area where the water was determined not to be beneficially used because such was not included in Pondera’s original distribution construction project and Pondera had not issued stock related to use of water to individuals in that area.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhile working on a building renovation project, Plaintiff was tasked with moving sinks from one area of a bathroom to another. The work required Plaintiff to cut and reroute pipes in the ceiling that were located near electrical wiring. To reach the pipes, Plaintiff used an A-frame ladder; however, because of spatial limitations, he had to lean the ladder against the wall in the closed and unlocked position. While standing on the ladder and attempting to connect two pipes, Plaintiff received an electric shock and fell to the ground. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered electrical burns to his left hand and the left side of his torso from his chest to his hip, as well as injuries to his spine and shoulders. Plaintiff does not remember anything about his fall, including whether he lost consciousness, whether the ladder fell to the ground, or whether he was thrown from the ladder after being electrocuted. The question on appeal is whether Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff was not entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim because he had failed to make a prima facie showing that his injuries were proximately caused by the inadequate ladder rather than the electric shock.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingJack R. Ouellette was employed by Allied Nevada Gold Corporation (Allied) to perform tire service work. Ouellette was injured while he and an independent contractor working for Purcell Tire & Rubber Company (Purcell) and hired by Allied, were repairing a truck. Oullette filed a personal injury claim against Purcell. At trial, Purcell moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the employee was a statutory employee of Allied and was thus immune from liability under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). The district court denied Purcell's motion. Employers and coemployees of a person injured in the course of employment are immune from liability under the NIIA. However, a subcontractor or independent contractor is not a statutory employee if such contractor is not considered to be in the same trade, business, profession, or occupation as the employer of the injured employee, which is determined by looking at the "normal work" test (reviewing whether indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather than independent contractors). The Supreme Court held that there was evidence demonstrating that the independent contractor was present at the mine for the purpose of a specialized repair and acting in furtherance of the specialized repair when he caused Ouellette's injury, and, therefore, Purcell was not immune from liability for Ouellette's injury under NRS 616B.612.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Florida Supreme Court determined that same-sex couples who use assisted reproductive technology are the parents of the resulting child and have the same constitutional parental rights and responsibilities as opposite-sex couples. In this case, two women, D.M.T. and T.M.H., were in a long-term romantic relationship and became parents when they jointly conceived and raised a child together. The women used assisted reproductive technology where T.M.H. provided the biological egg and D.M.T. bore the child. Both partners participated in raising the child together until their relationship ceased. T.M.H. initially provided child support but ended support payments after D.M.T. and T.M.H agreed to divide the child's time evenly between them. Eventually, however, the relationship between the women soured and D.M.T. absconded to an undisclosed location with the child, severing T.M.H's contact with the child. After T.M.H. learned of the location of D.M.T. and the child in Australia, she initiated custody proceedings to establish parental rights, including an adjudication of parentage pursuant to Chapter 742, Florida Statutes (2008), and sought to a declaration of statutory invalidity with respect to Section 742.14, the assisted reproductive technology statute. D.M.T. moved for summary judgment, alleging that T.M.H., as the biological parent and not the parent that bore their child, lacked parental rights as a matter of law regardless of the couple's original intent to jointly raise the child. While the trial court granted D.M.T. summary judgment, the judge noted disagreement with the current state of law because under Section 742.13(2), a "[s]ame-sex partner[ ][does] not meet the definition . . . of commissioning couple" resulting in "no protection for [the biological mother] under Florida law." T.M.H. appealed the trial court's decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeals where, on a case of first impression, the Fifth District reversed the trial court's decision and held that the trial court's interpretation and application of the statute violated the biological mother's constitutional rights. The issues before the Supreme Court were (1) whether Section 742.14 (the assisted reproductive technology statute) applied under these circumstances; (2) if it does, whether Sections 742.13(2) defining "commissioning couple" and 742.14 violated constitutional due process, privacy, and equal protection; and (3) whether T.M.H. waived any interest she may have in the child by signing a standard informed consent form as part of the couple's use of a reproductive service. The Florida Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed in part and affirmed in part the Fifth District's decision. First, it held that Section 742.13 applied to T.M.H because T.M.H., as the provider of an egg for the couple, was a donor, which falls within the defined term for "commissioning couple." Second, the Supreme Court held that the statute excluding same-sex partners from "commissioning couples" violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause both under the U.S. Constitution and the Florida Constitution. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that because T.M.H. established parental rights by assuming parental responsibilities (in addition to being the biological mother), "the state does not have a compelling interest in depriving T.M.H. of her right to be a parent in this situation." The Supreme Court then applied a rational basis analysis and concluded that because "the state would be hard pressed to find a reason why a child would not be better off having two loving parents in her life, regardless of whether those parents are of the same sex, than she would by having only one parent[,]" the statute's exclusion of same-sex couples from qualifying as a "commissioning couple" lacks a rational basis and is, therefore, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the Supreme Court held that T.M.H. did not relinquish her parental rights by signing the consent form as part of the couple's use of reproductive services because the consent form "ha[d] nothing to do with a release of parental rights where [T.M.H.] was not an anonymous donor, but rather, was a full-fledged partner in the conception and raising of the child."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMultiple homeowners brought an action against their homebuilder and general contractor, Lennar Carolinas, LLC (Lennar), claiming that there was a construction defect in the homes Lennar built. Lennar moved to compel arbitration of the claims, citing arbitration provisions within the series of contracts that the homeowners signed when they purchased their homes. In response, the homeowners claimed that multiple provisions, including the arbitration provisions, were unconscionable citing a number of oppressive terms. The circuit court denied Lennar's motion to compel finding that the contracts were "grossly one-sided" and unconscionable, therefore making the arbitration provisions unenforceable. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision citing the United States Supreme Court's "Prima Paint" doctrine, which forbids consideration of unconscionable terms that are outside of an arbitration provision in determining whether the arbitration provision is unconscionable. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision because it reviewed terms outside of the arbitration provisions themselves to determine whether the agreements in whole were unconscionable. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that the circuit court violated the Prima Paint doctrine. However, the Court found that the arbitration provisions, when considered alone, contain several oppressive and one-sided terms that render them unconscionable and unenforceable under South Carolina law. Specifically, paragraph 4 states: “Seller may, at its sole election, include Seller's contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers, as well as any warranty company and insurer as parties in the mediation and arbitration; and . . . the mediation and arbitration will be limited to the parties specified herein." The Court reasoned that it is a fundamental principle of law that the plaintiff is the master of their own complaint and has the sole right to decide whom to sue for their injuries. Granting Lennar the “sole election” to include or exclude subcontractors from arbitration proceedings strips Petitioners of this right and undermines a firmly established legal principle. Furthermore, paragraph 5 stipulates that no factual or legal findings made in the arbitration are binding in any other arbitral or judicial proceedings “unless there is mutuality of parties.” However, Lennar can ensure there is never “mutuality of parties” by exercising its “sole election” in paragraph 4 to control the parties involved in arbitration. The Court also declined to sever the unconscionable terms from the remainder of the arbitration provisions because (1) the Court would have to remove unenforceable parts of a contract while enforcing the remaining, fragmented agreement, which is disfavored in contract disputes; and (2) as a policy matter, severing terms from an unconscionable contract discourages fair, arms-length transactions.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Daniel was a City of Minneapolis firefighter who injured his ankle while performing rescue duties. Treatment of injury included physician-prescribed tennis shoes, but the city contended the tennis shoes did not comply with the department’s uniform policy, and conditioned Daniel’s return on his agreeing to wear policy-compliant shoes. Upon disagreement, Daniel sued the city under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Daniel alleged his ankle injury was compensable under the MHRA and that the city discriminated against him by failing to make the reasonable accommodation of allowing him to wear the physician-prescribed shoes, thus triggering liability under the MHRA. The district court denied the city's motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded, in favor of the Defendant, citing Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1989), the 30-year old Minnesota Supreme Court case which held that a claim of disability discrimination was not “separate and distinct” from the employee’s claim for benefits owed under the MHRA. The Supreme Court reversed again (overruling its own 30-year old precedent) and ruled that Daniel could pursue his discrimination claims. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that: (i) an employee can pursue claims under both the MWCA and the MHRA because each act provides a distinct cause of action; overruling Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co.; (ii) the fact that the firefighter's disability resulted from an earlier workplace injury was immaterial to his disability discrimination claim under the MHRA; (iii) the firefighter could seek compensation under the MHRA for conduct by the city that allegedly injured his civil rights, even though he also sought compensation under the MWCA; (iv) the firefighter's claims under the MHRA were not barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the MWCA; and (v) the exclusivity provision of the MWCA does not bar claims for disability discrimination brought under the MHRA.