State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, Betsy Baumgart, was appointed in 2002 by the then governor as administrator of the Montana Tourism and Promotion Division (Division), and consistently received satisfactory performance evaluations from 2002 until her termination in 2010. In 2010, the new governor appointed a different immediate supervisor to Plaintiff within the Department of Commerce (DOC), who terminated her citing multiple reasons, such as lack of management and budget understanding. Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance against the DOC, claiming her termination was politically motivated because she was a Republican and the new supervisor, as well as the new governor, were Democrats. The hearing examiner determined that Plaintiff was properly terminated for failure to adequately manage the Division's budget. Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of her fundamental rights under the Montana Human Rights Act (HRA), Mont. Code Ann. § 49-3-201, to be free from politically-motivated discrimination. Plaintiff also sued the DOC for violation of privacy and defamation. Relevant here, the district court sided with the DOC as to political affiliation discrimination. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly applied the four-part test of Ray v. Montana Tech of the University of Montana, 152 P.3d 122 (Mont. 2007), which requires proof that: (1) Defendant knew her political beliefs and affiliation; (2) Plaintiff was otherwise qualified for her position with DOC; (3) Plaintiff was terminated and replaced; and (4) Plaintiff was replaced by someone who did not hold the same political beliefs. The Supreme Court found that Plaintiff had failed to provide material and substantial evidence or specific facts to establish that her discharge was politically motivated. For instance, her supervisor had testified he did not know of her political affiliation, and Plaintiff had not submitted contrary evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was employed as a security guard through a security contract that was acquired by a successor who declined to hire the Plaintiff. The employee filed a lawsuit against the potential employer, alleging a claim for wrongful termination under NRS 50.070 and alleging a common law tort of wrongful refusal to hire. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the potential employer, finding that the Plaintiff was not an employee of the potential employer and therefore did not have a right to sue under NRS 50.070 as a prospective employee and that Nevada does not recognize a tort for wrongful refusal to hire. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant's son was killed while acting in the course of his employment with the City, and at the time of his death, he was not married, had no dependents, and his mother was his only heir at law. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son from his employer. Specifically, the mother asserted the Act as applied to her situation violates her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the U.S. Constitution by precluding her, as the decedent's non-dependent heir, from bringing a claim to recover for his death. Finding that the Act’s differing treatment of dependent and non-dependent heirs is not irrational and serves the legitimate government purpose of workers’ compensation, the Supreme Court held that the Act’s limitation on recovery by non-dependent heirs does not violate the due process or equal protection rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBarwick was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, armed burglary, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery. He was found guilty as charged and the jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation of a sentence of death for the murder and also sentenced Barwick to life for armed burglary with a battery, thirty years for attempted sexual battery, and life for armed robbery. Barwick filed a successive motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising, in relevant part, two claims: (1) newly discovered evidence (i.e., an August 2022 "resolution" from the American Psychological Association (APA)) which shows that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed) should be extended to individuals who are under the age of twenty-one at the time their capital offenses were committed; and (2) because there is no meaningful distinction between his reduced moral culpability on account of his severe neuropsychological disorder, immutable cognitive impairments, and low mental age at the time of the murder, and that of individuals with indistinguishable deficits due to intellectual disability, he is entitled to the same protection under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually disabled). Regarding the first claim, the applicable APA resolution states that "based upon the rationale of the Roper decision and currently available science, APA concludes the same prohibitions that have been applied to application of the penalty of death for persons who commit a serious crime at ages 17 and younger should apply to persons ages 18 through 20," because "there is no neuroscientific bright line regarding brain development that indicates the brains of 18- to 20-year-olds differ in any substantive way from those of 17-year-olds." The Supreme Court noted that it has routinely held that resolutions, consensus opinions, articles, research, and the like, do not constitute newly discovered evidence. Regarding the second claim, the Supreme Court held that the categorical bar of Atkins, shielding, under the Eighth Amendment, the intellectually disabled from execution, does not apply to individuals with other forms of psychiatric illness or brain damage. Moreover, the Supreme Court concluded that both of these claims were also without merit because the Florida Supreme Court lacks the authority to extend Roper given that the conformity clause of the Florida Constitution which indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in Florida, and the Florida Supreme Court cannot interpret Florida's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to provide protection that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided is not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff was prescribed and took medical marijuana on his own time, but was randomly drug tested and fired for cause for not notifying his employer of Plaintiff's condition, as required under the employee policy. The lower court granted summary judgment for the employer, agreeing with the employer that a violation of the employee policy constituted good cause for termination. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination that a violation of the employee policy was grounds for termination for cause, and therefore summary judgment was appropriate.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant appealed the district court's order directing him to comply with a treatment plan or be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs in an attempt to render him competent to stand trial for felony charges that arose out of the shooting death of a deputy sheriff. In its rulings determining that the State may involuntarily medicate the Defendant, the district court applied the Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) factors addressing forced medication of a defendant: (1) the court must find that important government interests are at stake; (2) the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those state interests and that the administration of the forced medication is (A) substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial, and (B) substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist his counsel in conducting his defense; (3) the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further the state's interests, and that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve the same results; and (4) the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e. in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition. The Court noted that the Sell factors do not represent a balancing test, but are independent requirements, each of which must be found to be true before the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs may be considered constitutionally permissible. The Court held that the district court did not err in determining that the State could involuntarily medicate the Defendant because it met its burden of establishing the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence. For the first factor, the Court found that while Defendant argued that he could face a life-long civil commitment, the district court did not err in deciding that such possible outcome was not likely enough to tip the balance against the governmental interest under the first factor. The Court noted that the first Sell factor is primarily a legal question and the remaining Sell factors involve questions that are factual in nature and require the trial court to resolve disputed issues by weighing expert testimony and evaluating other medical evidence. In examining the evidence in the case (which was previously presented over five days in the district court and which the district court "carefully weighed in making its findings"), the Court found defendant's arguments that the district court erred to be without merit and declined disturbing the district court's findings with respect to the other Sell factors because they were supported by substantial credible evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff, an auto detailer at Precision, disputed the placement of an evaporative cooler with his coworker, leading both to repeatedly move it between workstations. After complaining to his supervisor, who scolded both individuals without resolving the issue, Plaintiff, who had a medical condition requiring the cooler but did not disclose this, quit. Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), citing the supervisor’s "discriminatory" refusal to address his complaint, but did not mention his coworker or any medical condition. ADES denied his claim, determining he quit without good cause, specifically that the Plaintiff did not prove he was working in an intolerable situation. The Plaintiff appealed, and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who reversed the deputy's determination and ruled that the Plaintiff quit for good cause because he believed his supervisor was ignoring his complaints, resulting in an “inharmonious environment that created an intolerable working relationship.” Precision appealed to the Appeals Board, which disagreed with the ALJ's decision, interpreting the relevant regulation R6-3-50515(C)(2) as providing only two factors to determine whether an intolerable work situation existed: (1) continued employment would cause severe nervous strain or a physical altercation; or (2) the worker was subjected to extreme verbal abuse or profanity. The Appeals Board claimed that because the Plaintiff did not claim to have suffered verbal abuse, physical abuse, or severe nervous strain, the working conditions at Precision did not rise to the level of an intolerable work situation, disqualifying the Plaintiff from benefits. The Plaintiff appealed, arguing the factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) were non-exhaustive. The court of appeals agreed with the Plaintiff, vacating the Appeals Board's decision and remanding the case. Precision and ADES sought Arizona Supreme Court review. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that R6-3-50515(C)(2) does not "cover the entire universe of circumstances that could constitute an intolerable work situation" and that the factors enumerated in (C)(2) are not exhaustive and do not limit what factors may be considered when deciding whether a situation is intolerable, listing only two factors that "should be considered." The Supreme Court also agreed with the ADES deputy and the Appeals Board that the conflict between the Plaintiff and his coworker was not sufficiently egregious to establish an intolerable work situation. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the Appeals Board’s decision disqualifying the Plaintiff from benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe John A. Logan Community College Board of Trustees laid off multiple tenured faculty members and subsequently hired adjunct instructors to teach the courses that the laid-off faculty members previously taught. At issue was whether the Board was allowed to take such action under section 3B-5 of the Public Community College Act, which requires a community college to follow certain procedures after laying off members of their faculty. Under 3B-5, a dismissed faculty member is required to have a preferred right to reappointment for the 24 months following their dismissal, as long as they are "competent to render" the services entailed under the position at issue. Although some members of the faculty were later recalled, all dismissed faculty brought suit, seeking backpay and benefits for the recalled faculty, and reinstatement for those who had not been recalled. The trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's petition, but the appellate court and Supreme Court held that the Board acted in violation of section 3B-5. Reviewing 3B-5, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were discharged from their tenured roles because the Board decided to reduce the faculty, not because they were incompetent to teach the courses. The Court held that the legislature, in passing 3B-5, had sought to provide job safety for more experienced professors through the concept of tenure. The Court further held that the Board violated 3B-5 by hiring adjunct instructors to teach courses that the dismissed faculty members were competent to teach. Chief Justice Burke dissented, disagreeing with the majority's reading of the statute, and instead finding that the text of the statute suggested that employment of adjunct faculty in this way could not have violated 3B-5 as, based on the Chief Justice's reading, any position filled by an adjunct, who cannot accrue seniority under the law, could not be set aside for dismissed faculty purely on the basis of seniority.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA student was injured in the eye during a floor hockey game in a school physical education class. The student filed a personal injury complaint against the gym teacher and school district, alleging willful and wanton misconduct for failing to provide protective eyewear during the game. At the close of the evidence, the Defendant school district and teacher moved for a directed verdict, which was granted due to the Plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support a claim of willful and wanton conduct by the Defendants. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court, determining that a jury could view not requiring students to wear goggles as wanton and willful. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the teacher did not engage in willful and wanton conduct by failing to require students to wear safety goggles while playing floor hockey. The teacher had opted for floor hockey equipment that was softer and safer, and also had heightened rules to protect students from injury. School employees who exercised some precautions to protect students from injury, even if those precautions were insufficient, were not guilty of willful and wanton conduct. Further, the court held that the teacher's alleged awareness that the ball could hit players in the eye did not suggest there was willful and wanton conduct. Willful and wanton conduct is defined in part as the failure to take reasonable precautions after "knowledge of impending danger." In this case, there was no such knowledge or associated risk of serious injuries with modified floor hockey.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBarlow was convicted of the murders of his ex-girlfriend and her current partner. Following Barlow's penalty hearing, the jury sentenced Barlow to death. During the trial, the court did not permit Barlow's attorney to argue that if a single juror determines that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty is no longer an option. Barlow appealed the sentence arguing that the trial court erred in prohibiting this argument. The Court held that the trial court should have allowed Barlow to make the argument. The Court further clarified that a jury is hung in the penalty phase of a capital trial only when the jury cannot reach a unanimous decision as to the weighing of aggravated and mitigating circumstances. In other words, if the jury cannot agree that the aggravating circumstances presented for the death penalty outweigh the mitigating circumstances presented against the death penalty, they must impose a sentence other than the death penalty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Claimant sought temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from two different employers for two different injuries and was granted benefits for the first but denied benefits for the second claim. The Claimant argued that under Nevada's workers compensation statute he was not limited to a single TTD award. The Supreme Court held that the Nevada Legislature did not intend for a claimant to be entitled to concurrent TTD payments for the loss of earning capacity as a claimant has only one earning capacity and is therefore entitled to compensation only for that one total loss of earning capacity.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn the night of April 17, 2011, at then-eighteen-year-old Michael Shane Bargo's request, codefendant Amber Wright lured fifteen-year-old Seath Jackson to codefendant Charlie Ely's home, so that Bargo, codefendant Kyle Hooper, and codefendant Justin Soto could ambush and kill Jackson. Bargo ultimately killed the victim by shooting him in the face. Following the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced Bargo to death. In direct appeal of his death sentence, Bargo raised, among other claims, the issue of whether the 2016 amendment to Florida Statute Section 782.04(1)(b) (requiring the State to provide defendant with notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, as well as notice of the aggravating factors the State intended to prove), which was imposed prior to amendment’s effective date, retroactively precluded the State from seeking the death penalty at resentencing. The Supreme Court held that the amendment did not apply retroactively to Bargo’s resentencing for capital murder after his initial death sentence was vacated as nothing in the amendment evinced any intent to apply it to cases in which, as here, a defendant was arraigned, or waived arraignment, years before the amendment took effect.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, two former Starbucks baristas, brought a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Starbucks' policy of including shift supervisors in the tip pools was unlawful under Labor Law § 196-d. Plaintiffs claimed that shift supervisors should not be able to receive distributions from a store's tip pool because they are Starbucks "agents" who may not "demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee" (Labor Law § 196-d). In a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals was asked whether the tip-sharing policy established by Starbucks was legal under Labor Law § 196-d. Deferring in part to the interpretation of the New York Department of Labor (the agency charged with enforcing the statute) the Court of Appeals determined that (i) tip pools should be limited to those employees who customarily serve customers at Starbucks establishments, even if those employees sometimes perform supervisory duties; and (ii) employees who possess considerable authority and control over subordinates, such as the power to make hiring and firing determinations, are not eligible to participate in the tip pools.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury convicted Jaquez Dejuan Barber of burglary and grand larceny committed while Barber was 17 years old. Fingerprint evidence identified by crime scene investigators identified Barber as the suspect after he turned 18 and was already arrested and processed in the adult system for a different crime. The State commenced proceedings in juvenile court and, more than a year later, filed a petition to certify Barber for criminal trial as an adult. On appeal, Barber argued that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.330(1), because more than one year had passed without the juvenile court issuing a final disposition, the juvenile court lost subject matter jurisdiction over Barber such that the Court should vacate his convictions. The Court rejected Barber's argument. Although the statute states a juvenile court cannot extend the time for a final disposition beyond one year of the filing date of the delinquency petition, the statute did not provide a remedy for what happens when the juvenile court fails to dispose of a case within that one year time frame. Without such jurisdiction stripping language, the Court held that the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over Barber even after one year and thus had subject matter jurisdiction over Barber when it certified his case for trial in the adult criminal system. However, the Court went on to reverse Barber's conviction because insufficient evidence supported Barber's conviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee filed, on behalf of herself and other fellow employees, a constitutional minimum wage class action against her employer, alleging that the employer had misclassified exotic dancers as independent contractors, depriving them of their rights to minimum wage as employees under Nevada's Minimum Wage Act (MWA). The Supreme Court held that under the economic realities test, the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances and considers factors to determine whether a business relationship is one of employee-employer or principal-independent contractor and in this case, the employee did not have minimum shift hour requirements, did not need to request permission to depart early, could decline dance dollars, set their own prices, and received a discount on their access fee when they opted-in to stage rotations, rather than a fee for opting out. These facts supported the conclusion that the dancers were independent contractors as a matter of law pursuant to Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.3d 951 (Nev. 2014) and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and granted the employer's motion for summary judgment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingJP Morgan Chase (Chase) brought a foreclosure action against Respondents, the Glenvilles, seeking to foreclose on the first mortgage it had on the Glenvilles’ property. The property was sold at public auction and, thereafter, the court clerk issued a certificate of sale, title, and disbursements. Thereafter, Petitioner, Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), which held a second lien on the Glenvilles’ property, filed a claim to the surplus of funds remaining after the property was sold at the public auction and Chase was paid. The circuit court denied BNYM’s claim, asserting that the claim was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after the public sale. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Fla. Stat. § 45.031(7)(b), which required that any claims to the surplus from a judicial sale of a property be filed within “60 days after the sale” began to run as of the date of the clerk’s issuance of the certificate of disbursements and not as of the date of the public sale of the property. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court highlighted that Fla. Stat. § 45.031(1)(c) defined the term “surplus” to mean “the funds remaining after payment of all disbursements required by the final judgment of foreclosure and shown on the certificate of disbursements” and that Fla. Stat. § 45.032(3) expressly referenced a 60 day period “after the clerk issues a certificate of disbursements” as the relevant period in which claims for surplus funds may be filed. Accordingly, the Supreme court concluded that the “60 days after the sale” used in the context of claims to surplus funds, means 60 days after the clerk issues the certificate of disbursements following the sale, rather than 60 days after the public sale itself.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingSeveral voting rights groups, led by the League of Women Voters, filed a lawsuit in 2012 alleging that the Republican-dominated legislature had drawn a congressional map that favored incumbents. Republican political consultant Pat Bainter battled against the voting rights groups to keep 538 pages of relevant documents private by delaying production and then asserting qualified privilege. The requested documents included all emails Bainter had sent or received regarding the redistricting process (538 pages total). The trial court ordered the production of the subpoenaed documents, and Bainter sought review. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's ruling because, based on the totality of the circumstances: (1) Bainter failed to file a motion for a protective order or to raise any legal objection to producing the documents when served with the subpoena; (2) Bainter attended a deposition, where he affirmatively testified under oath that he had conducted "a thorough search" for documents in response to the subpoena and had produced what he found; and (3) Bainter did not claim that the documents were protected from disclosure under the First Amendment until the day after the trial court held him in contempt. The redistricting at issue in this case was addressed the following year in League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn this case, the Supreme Court held that existing South Carolina statutes allowing for absentee voting for "physically disabled persons" did not extend to those practicing social distancing due to COVID-19. Section 7-15-310(4) of the South Carolina Code (2019) defines "physically disabled person" as "a person who, because of injury or illness, cannot be present in person at his voting place on election day." Plaintiffs contended that these voters impacted by COVID-19 met the statuary test for "physically disabled persons." The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the Legislature and Governor's recent enactment of Act. No. 133 (2020), which provides that a "qualified elector must be permitted to vote by absentee ballot in an election if the qualified elector's place of residence or polling place is located in an area subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor and there are fewer than forty-six days remaining until the date of the election" specifically addressed Plaintiffs' question. The Court reasoned that the existing absentee-voting statutes relating to physically disabled persons necessarily could not be construed to include those practicing social distancing due to COVID-19, since the Legislature changed the law to specifically allow for that. The Court further held that because the Act had an expiration date of July 1, 2020, deciding whether voters practicing social distancing could vote absentee after that expiration date would be a political question that the judiciary could not rule on.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingLawsuit challenging the results of the 2020 election, alleging that the 2020 election was fraudulent due to the county’s use of Dominion tabulators and voting machines and claiming that he had an independent right to audit the election results. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s requested relief and dismissed the lawsuit, reasoning that the Supreme Court was not persuaded that it should review the questions presented.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBaiguen was a houseperson at Harrah's (the Defendant) when he arrived for work while suffering a stroke. While Baiguen was at work, in an employee's only area, coworkers and a manager noticed the signs of a stroke and concluded that he was "not good." Baiguen was then driven home by coworkers, where he was left alone for two days until he was discovered. The only FDA-approved treatment for the type of stroke suffered by Baiguen, while incurring certain risks, requires treatment within three hours of the stroke's onset to be effective. Baiguen sued his employer for failure to aid him during this three-hour window, which would have greatly assisted his ability to make a full recovery. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Plaintiff's exclusive remedy was workers' compensation, as the injury occurred at his workplace and in the course of his work. The court of appeals reversed, and the employer appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Baiguen's claims were allowable under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). Under the NIIA, an employee who sustains an injury within the course of and arising out of their employment may only seek compensation under the NIIA and not under any theory of negligence. The Supreme Court held that the employer's failure to respond to the stroke occurred in the course of employment, as Baiguen had arrived to work, parked in the employee's parking lot, and gone through the usual procedures of a work day, up to the point of clocking-in to work. Further, the Court held that any exacerbation of an injury by the absence of or failure to adhere to a workplace policy that would have prevented the exacerbation, implies that the workplace contributed to the injury and that it arose out of employment. As a result of its analysis, the Court concluded that the injuries caused by Baiguen's stroke occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment and, therefore, workers' compensation alone was the only proper remedy.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingB.R.C.M., an unaccompanied minor who illegally entered the United States at age 13, filed for child dependency status under Fl. St. § 39.01(15). B.R.C.M. alleged that his parents abandoned him and did not provide him with basic necessities, and that he was placed with his godmother after arriving in the United States. The trial court denied his dependency application after no investigation and a cursory telephone hearing. The appeals court upheld the denial, ruling that he was not truly abandoned, abused, or neglected because he was being cared for by his godmother and that B.R.C.M.'s sole purpose for seeking dependency status was to facilitate a Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) application. B.R.C.M. appealed on the basis that the motivation for seeking child dependency status should not preclude a finding of child dependency. The Supreme Court held that "[a]n intent to obtain [SIJS] says nothing in and of itself regarding the facial sufficiency of the dependency allegations ... [t]therefore, a petition for dependency should not be rejected in Florida based on the mere motivation of the petitioner." The Court explained that the appellate court's ruling directly contradicted a different appellate court ruling in In re Interest of Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). The court in Y.V. reasoned that a child's motivation for obtaining dependency is irrelevant to the dependency determination. Further, if a child qualifies under the statute, a dependency finding is warranted. The Supreme Court resolved the appellate court split, ruling that, consistent with the holding in Y.V., if a child meets the statutory criteria for dependency, the case must be adjudicated regardless of the child's motivations. The Court explained that, in this case, the dependency petition alleged sufficient facts to trigger an investigation, therefore, the trial court must make individualized factual findings and apply the law to the facts. Further, the Court held that, although the state court can conduct a dependency analysis, the SIJS determination is reserved for federal immigration authorities, and the state dependency determination is merely a part of that formula. The Court remanded the case for individualized consideration rather than summary denial.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2017, Arizona passed 19-118.01(A), which bans per-signature compensation of gatherers for statewide initiative and referendum petitions. The State of Arizona filed 50 misdemeanor charges against Petition Partners, an organization hired by proponents of the Invest in Our Education Initiative. The charges alleged that Petition Partners' compensation scheme, which included bonuses which were informed by the number of signatures gathered, violated the statute. Petition Partners moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute prohibited more than just strictly per-signature compensation, and therefore facially violated the First Amendment. The court of appeals agreed, relying on the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Molera v. Hobbs, 474 P.3d 667 (Ariz. 2020), which clarified the standard for sufficiency of description as containing all of the "principal provisions" of the initiative and not using objectively false or misleading information, and ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Arizona Supreme Court clarified that 19-118.01(A) only prohibits per-signature compensation, which is an amount of payment that can be determined only by counting the number of signatures collected and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Court embraced a narrow interpretation of the statute to minimize any First Amendment infringement on core political speech and made clear that the statute forbids only per-signature compensation, leaving other productivity-based compensation intact, so as not to create any vagueness or overbreadth concerns. Finally, the Court declined to alleviate any constitutional concerns by reading a mens rea requirement into the statute since, as a matter of separation of powers, it cannot rewrite statutes.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case relates to the interpretation of the Charter Schools Act of 1998, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2060 et seq., regarding the authority of the Atlanta Independent School System (APS) and the Atlanta Board of Education to deduct a $38.6 million unfunded pension liability expense before calculating the amount of local revenue funds to be distributed to start-up schools within APS. The appellees in this case, the start-up charter schools, were all non-profit corporations that had been granted charters by APS to operate start-up charter schools. In May 2012, APS announced it was subtracting $38.6 million from local revenue before calculating the amount of local revenue to be distributed to the schools. This was due to APS's need to pay down a large, unfunded pension liability for current and former APS employees that was accruing since the 1980s. The start-up schools then filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel Appellants to distribute local revenue to the start ups charter schools without any deduction. The trial court granted the mandamus relief, finding the statutory funding formula set out in the Act does not authorize Appellants to subtract from its calculation. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The Act was enacted with the intent to "increase student achievement through academic and organizational innovation by encouraging local school systems to utilize the flexibility of a performance based contract called a charter." With regard to start-up charter schools, the Act prohibited Appellants from subtracting funding for APS's unfunded pension liability from their calculation of local revenue to be distributed to the start-up charter schools. The Supreme Court reviewed the statute under a plain language standard and determined that under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2068.1(c), Appellants are without authority or discretion to deduct the unfunded pension expense from their calculation. Appellants argued that because the Charter Schools Act of 1998 was silent on how system-wide expenses, like the school system's unfunded pension liability, may be assessed against charter schools, they were authorized to deduct the expense from local revenue prior to determining the amount of local revenue funds to be distributed. The Supreme Court felt this was asking for it to superimpose onto the statute an implicit authorization for local school boards to reduce the amount of available local revenue by first deducting expenses and it could not do that. Adopting the Appellants' argument would require the Supreme Court to ignore the funding formula within the Act. The Supreme Court limited its decision in the appeal to the proper interpretation and application of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2068.1(c) as enacted regarding the allocation of local revenue to start-up charter schools. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of mandamus relief to the start-up charter schools.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFor nearly a century, the Anaconda Copper Smelter in Butte, Montana contaminated an area of over 300 square miles with arsenic and lead. Over the past 35 years, the EPA has worked with the current owner of the now-closed smelter, Atlantic Richfield Company, to implement a cleanup plan for a remediation expected to continue through 2025. A group of 98 landowners sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, seeking restoration damages, which Montana law requires to be spent on property rehabilitation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the issue of whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (the Act) precluded their restoration damages claim and allowed the lawsuit to continue. After granting a writ of supervisory control, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Atlantic Richfield's argument that § 113 of the Act stripped the Montana courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim and concluding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties prohibited from taking remedial action without EPA approval under § 122(e)(6) of the Act. The Supreme Court of the United States thereafter granted certiorari. The two issues presented to the U.S. Supreme Court were (1) whether the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Montana Supreme Court; and (2) if so, whether the Montana courts have jurisdiction over the landowners' claim for restoration damages. After finding that the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the Montana Supreme Court's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that section 113 of the Act does not strip Montana courts of jurisdiction because landowners’ common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability claims arise under Montana law and not under the Act and "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” The Court noted that Atlantic Richfield's argument that section 113(h)—which states that “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal or remedial action” selected under the Act—implicitly broadens the scope of actions precluded from state court jurisdiction under section 113(b) is mistaken because § 113(h) speaks of “Federal court[s],” not state courts and therefore there is no textual argument to support that Congress precluded state courts from hearing cases under the Act. The Supreme Court of the United States then held that the Montana Supreme Court erred by holding that the landowners were not potentially responsible parties under the Act and thus did not need EPA approval to take remedial action. The Court noted that to determine who is a potentially responsible party, the Court looks to the list of “covered persons” in section 107, the Act's liability section, which includes any “owner” of “a facility.” “Facility” in turn is defined to include “any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B). Because arsenic and lead are hazardous substances that have “come to be located” on the landowners’ properties, the landowners are potentially responsible parties. Furthermore, the Court also noted that interpreting “potentially responsible parties” to include owners of polluted property reflects the Act's objective to develop a “Comprehensive Environmental Response” to hazardous waste pollution.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingManuel Ibanez, an undocumented Nevadan, worked as a carpenter for High Point Construction, a Nevada employer (High Point), and sustained severe injuries when a falling two-by-four struck him in the head, shoulder, and back. He was treated for these injuries over the next several years, which included multiple surgeries. Even after the surgeries, he continued to suffer both physical pain and mental trauma related to the accident. As a result, he applied for permanent total disability (PTD) status. High Point's insurance administrator denied the request, determining that Ibanez's disability was only temporary and that he would be able to return to light duty. Ibanez was granted PTD status pursuant to the "odd-lot doctrine," which permits a finding of PTD by the state when a worker, "while not altogether incapacitated for work, [is] so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market." The dispute related to Ibanez's eligibility for employment benefits as an undocumented worker. The Supreme Court held that an undocumented alien worker is not precluded from receiving disability benefits under Nevada's workers' compensation laws and that there is no conflict with the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring any alien who is unauthorized to work in the U.S.), which says nothing about paying an undocumented alien benefits that compensate them for an injury. Further, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 616C.440(1) (providing employee compensation for permanent total disability incurred during employment) benefits were available to any worker, lawfully or unlawfully employed, who was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe employee-Plaintiff developed software which he licensed to the employer-Defendant via a licensing agreement separate from his employment agreement. The employer-Defendant alleged ownership of the underlying software arising from terms within the employment agreement, which they argued superseded or preempted the licensing agreement. The Supreme Court found for the employee-Plaintiff, holding that Montana employment law allows for employers and employees to separately contract regarding matters related to but outside the scope of the employment contract. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-102, § 403–409. As a result, because there was an oral agreement and licensing agreement showing that the employee would retain a contractual interest in the software, the employee's rights to the software was not subsumed by the terms of his employment agreement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board determined that the state’s higher education system did not commit unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with an employee organization over a policy requiring faculty to submit to background checks and report to the university whether they’d previously been arrested or convicted for serious crimes or found to be a perpetrator of child abuse. The Supreme Court held that school system's policy was an inherent managerial policy over which school system was not required to bargain and upheld the Labor Relations Board’s order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAsma Masri, an unpaid intern at the Medical College of Wisconsin, alleged that she had been retaliated against for reporting an alleged medical ethics violation. Wisconsin's healthcare worker protection statute, Wis. Stat. § 146.997, states that "certain health care employers and their employees may not take “disciplinary action against ... any person who in good faith reports violations of state or federal laws, regulations, or standards." In this case, the Supreme Court held that the protections did not apply to non-employees, and interns were not employees under the statute because they received no tangible benefits or compensation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn October 2012, Arredondo placed her father, Whaley, in the Ashley River Plantation assisted-living facility in Charleston. Whaley, aged 84 with dementia, required daily assistance. Arredondo held two valid powers of attorney (a General Durable Power of Attorney (GDPOA) and a Health Care Power of Attorney (HCPOA)) and signed an arbitration agreement during admission. In February 2014, Whaley passed, and Arredondo, representing Whaley's estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action against Ashley River Tenant, LLC (Ashley), alleging negligence during Whaley's residency. Ashley moved to compel arbitration. Arredondo argued that (1) her powers of attorney did not authorize her to sign the arbitration agreement; and (2) the agreement was unconscionable. The court of appeals ruled that the GDPOA authorized the arbitration agreement. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and found the arbitration agreement unenforceable. As to the GDPOA, the Court reasoned that (1) the GDPOA did not authorize the arbitration agreement as it did not concern a cause of action or any property right Whaley possessed at signing; (2) Arredondo's authority under the GDPOA did not extend to signing the arbitration agreement, because the actions Arredondo took in signing the arbitration agreement were not "transfers" of any property, right, or things; and (3) although the GDPOA gave Arredonodo significant authority to make business and property decisions for Whaley, the GDPOA did not grant broad power to sign all documents to Whaley, including the arbitration agreement. As to the HCPOA, the Court reasoned that (1) the HCPOA did not authorize signing the arbitration agreement as a necessary action for Mr. Whaley's health care; (2) paragraph 11(d) of the HCPOA did not grant authority to sign the arbitration agreement, as it was not required by the facility; and (3) the HCPOA authorized legal action only to enforce Mr. Whaley's wishes, not for signing an arbitration agreement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff-employee was a trucking employee for Defendant-employer, and contends that the Defendant owed him wages pursuant to an oral agreement setting forth a minimum annual wage he would earn, as well as overtime worked. The lower court found for the employer, affirming a Department of Labor and Industry Hearing Officer's findings that there was no legally binding contract setting forth a minimum annual wage, and that the Plaintiff's claims of overtime hours were not credible as neither the employer nor the Plaintiff kept adequate records of those hours. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that there was no contract, but overturned its finding on the overtime wage claim, holding that when both employee and employer failed to keep records of hours worked, the duty was ultimately on the employer to keep records of hours worked under wage and hour laws. When the employer failed to do so, the employee's records may be used to determine the amount of time worked, and if the fact-finder finds that the employee's hours lack credibility, the remedy is to reduce the hours to the extent they lack credibility. These records need not be perfect, and here the employee prevailed with calendars listing worked days and hours, as well as testimony.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPolitical action committees (PACs) sought mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to accept and file initiative petitions using an online signature gathering system instead of the in-person procedure set forth in the state constitution, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court denied relief, holding that the Secretary could not accept the online signatures and that the in-person procedure set forth in the constitution was justified by the State's important regulatory interest in protecting the integrity of initiative elections. The Court further explained that enforcement of such procedures did not deprive citizens of the right to vote on valid initiatives, so therefore was not unconstitutional.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved an expedited election appeal concerning the "Arizona Abortion Access Act," a ballot initiative to adopt an amendment to the Arizona Constitution establishing a fundamental right to abortion in the Arizona Constitution and preventing the State from denying, restricting, or interfering with this right to abortion up until fetal viability. The superior court denied the request from Arizona Right to Life to enjoin the Secretary of State from including the Initiative on the 2024 general election ballot leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's analysis and conclusion that the 200-word description of the Act was acceptable to be included on the 2024 general election ballot. The Court held that the description accurately described the initiative of the Act to allow for a constitutional amendment to include the right to abortion access. The description used is not required to explain the impact on existing abortion laws or regulations. The Court used a reasonable person as their basis that the reasonable person would understand existing laws about abortion that are in conflict with the Act that would be invalid should the Act pass. The Court also believed that the "health care provider" tasked with determining fetal viability would be the pregnant woman's own medical physician. The ballot measure did not need to explicitly state this for it to be understood by the reasonable person voting on the initiative. The initiative would be included in the general election publicity pamphlet given to Arizonians in preparation of the general election so that should voters want to read it, they had a descriptor of the various people and laws up for a vote. The initiative would also be on the general election ballot. On November 5, 2024, Election Day, Arizonians passed the Arizona Abortion Access Act which enacted a right to abortion into the Constitution of Arizona.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Arizona Republican Party sued the Maricopa County Recorder and Board of Supervisors and the Arizona Secretary of State, seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus regarding hand counting of votes in the 2020 election. Plaintiffs argued that the Arizona Election Procedures Manual (EPM), which allowed for counties such as Maricopa County to conduct statutorily required hand counts at voting centers, violated the statute's express requirement for hand counting of ballots at "precincts." Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the EPM violated the state statute and a writ of mandamus directing the county to conduct the hand count by precinct instead of at voting centers. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims on procedural grounds, expressly not reaching the merits but describing them as "barely colorable." Upon dismissal the Secretary of State moved for attorneys' fees. The trial court also awarded attorney's fees against Plaintiffs, finding that the claims were both groundless and made in bad faith. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings in all respects. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review of the award of attorney's fees and reversed. The Court found, without reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, that the claims were not "groundless" since there was a plain language dispute between the statute and the EPM and this statutory construction argument was more than "barely colorable." Because election disputes are inherently political, the Court found that the trial court's reliance upon political motive to find bad faith was also misplaced and ran the risk of chilling judicial advocacy in connection with electoral disputes.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn the March 2020 Presidential Preference and August 2020 Primary Elections, the Maricopa County Recorder included a ballot instruction regarding overvoting, which is when a person votes for more than the allowable number of candidates for a specific election. The Recorder's instruction (New Instruction) differed from the instruction required by the 2019 Election Procedures Manual (EPM Instruction). The EPM Instruction stated that overvotes would not be counted and instructs the voter to contact the Recorder's office for a new ballot. The New Instruction told voters to correct their overvote by crossing out the candidate's name and bubble. The Recorder claimed that updates to Arizona law and the EPM Instruction mandated the inclusion of the New Instruction to protect the rights of voters. The Arizona Supreme Court, on appeal from the Superior Court and transfer from the court of appeals, found that the Recorder had exceeded his authority in including the New Instruction. The Supreme Court ruled that only the Secretary of State, pursuant to the statutory authority and procedures granted by the legislature, could promulgate new instructions and that the Recorder had acted with neither the authority nor the proper procedure to promulgate new instructions and the inclusion of the New Instruction threatened the uniformity and integrity provided by the state's election laws. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the EPM Instruction was to be included with November 2020 general election ballots.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe attorney general sought a ruling that allowing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) recipients to qualify for in-state tuition violated Arizona law, A.R.S. § 15–1803(B), which bars in-state tuition for students not lawfully present in the United States. Two DACA recipients asserted constitutional defenses based on preemption and equal protection. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the students without even considering the constitutional issues, as it found the students to be "lawfully present" under both federal and Arizona law. On appeal, the Court reviewed the case de novo as an issue of statutory interpretation. Looking to the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) ("Limitation of eligibility for preferential treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher education benefits"), the Court found that the term "lawfully present" was also used in 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), with respect to eligibility to other public benefits aside from postsecondary education public benefits. Because DACA recipients are not eligible for benefits under § 1621(a), the Court held that they were similarly not eligible for in-state tuition under § 1623(a). Furthermore, although Arizona could make in-state tuition available to DACA recipients under certain conditions, and subject to the Supremacy Clause, the Court found that Arizona had not done so and that the enactment of A.R.S. § 15–1803(B) reflected voter intent to the contrary.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFreeport Minerals Corporation (Freeport) filed applications with the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) to sever and transfer water rights appurtenant to land located in Mohave County. Mohave County objected, alleging that approving Freeport’s application might negatively affect the County’s water supply and County residents’ tax burdens. Mohave County also alleged that the severance and transfer would generally go against the public interest. ADWR determined that it was not authorized to deny the application on those grounds. In Arizona, a water right “may be severed from the land to which it is appurtenant” and transferred for other uses (A.R.S. § 45-172(A)). A party’s ability to sever and transfer a water right is subject to statutory limitations and conditions, including the approval of ADWR. The Arizona Supreme Court unanimously determined that the severance and transfer of a water right is a “licensing decision” that cannot be based “on a licensing requirement or condition that is not specifically authorized by statute.” Because Mohave County did not allege that Freeport’s application violated any of the limitations or conditions defined in the applicable statutes, the Court affirmed ADWR’s conclusion that it lacked authority to deny the application on the grounds that the County alleged. The Arizona Supreme Court also held that the County was not an “interested person” entitled to file objections to the application because, read in context, the phrase “interested person” is most reasonably interpreted as identifying individuals with an interest that is protected by the water transfer statute.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Arizona electorate approved Proposition 206, “The Fair Wages and Healthy Families Act,” in the November 2016 election, which: (a) increased the minimum wage incrementally over a three-year period, with further increases tied to the consumer price index; and (2) established earned paid sick leave of one hour for every thirty hours worked. Petitioners sought a court declaration that Proposition 206 violated the Arizona Constitution’s Revenue Source Rule, the Separate Amendment Rule, and the Single Subject Rule. After the superior court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, Petitioners sought special action relief from the Arizona Supreme Court. As to the Revenue Source Rule, the Court determined that “propos[ing] a mandatory expenditure of state revenues,” as used in the Revenue Source Rule, occurs when an initiative or referendum explicitly requires either an expenditure of state funds or actions that inherently require such expenditures. The Court then clarified that a mandatory expenditure of state revenues does not arise from initiatives that only indirectly cause state spending. The Court then analyzed different expenditures raised by petitioners as violating the Revenue Source Rule. As to Proposition 206’s requirements for the Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) to issue guidelines and create model notices, the Court ruled that it constituted a “mandatory expenditure of state revenues” under the Revenue Source Rule. The Court held that Proposition 206 complied with this rule by providing a revenue source to fund the ICA’s mandate for implementing and enforcing the paid sick leave provisions. The Court further ruled that the minimum wage increase and paid sick leave for non-state workers did not trigger a “mandatory expenditure of state revenues” because Proposition 206 did not require the state to increase rates for Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System providers or reimburse labor costs for other state contractors. As to the Separate Amendment Rule, which requires that constitutional amendments be voted on separately from one another, the Court concluded that it applies only to constitutional amendments, not to statutory initiatives like Proposition 206. And as to the Single Subject Rule, which requires legislative acts to cover only one subject, the Court concluded that it does not apply to voter initiatives.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of public school students, primarily located in New York City, sued the state alleging that the state deprived students of their state constitutional right to a sound basic education by not complying with school funding requirements as defined by the court of appeals. The parents also claimed the students were denied constitutional rights based on the state's withholding of funds from districts that did not implement the state's annual performance review system. The New York Constitution mandates that the legislature provide a system of free education. In a series of cases known as the "Campaign for Fiscal Equity" litigation, the Court of Appeals set a floor for the standard of education required by the state constitution, holding that the state constitution requires education to include basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills for children to function productively as civic participants. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Plaintiffs adequately plead violations of the state constitutional right to education and held that (1) pleadings challenging the right to education must be school district-specific; (2) claims for constitutional violations could not be based on the argument that the state's funding was not as good as the proposed funding scheme deemed adequate in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation; and (3) claims for constitutional violations were adequate where they alleged a causal link between school funding and deficient inputs (e.g., lack of qualified teachers and materials) and deficient outputs (e.g., test scores).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Ardan, who suffered from “chronic neck, lower-back, and left-knee pain,” began working at a medical center as a nurse and her job duties required her to “walk substantial distances,” and to bend and lift, which aggravated her ailments. She resigned from her position at the medical center and accepted a desk job as a healthcare communicator to ease the strain on her body. After seven weeks at her new job, Ardan was terminated. Ardan applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. Ardan sought judicial review of the decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development that had denied her unemployment benefits. The appellate court held that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) required employees to notify their employers of medical conditions which were exacerbated by the work, request accommodations, and give the employers the “opportunity to address the matter to determine whether there was other suitable work available.” The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, stating that a claimant still needs to notify the employer of medical conditions and request accommodations before resigning, in order to meet the “burden to demonstrate the unavailability of alternative suitable work,” although it held that the statute does not contain such a "notice-and-inquiry" requirement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff claimed entitlement to uncoordinated workers' compensation benefits after Defendant, facing bankruptcy, coordinated Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits with his disability pension benefits. Under a coordinated worker's compensation benefits scheme, employers reduce workers’ benefits by offsetting the employer's obligation with disability pension benefits received via other programs (for example, Social Security Disability Insurance benefits). Under Michigan law, coordination is mandatory by default, but an employer may agree to uncoordinated benefits during employment negotiations. Here, the Defendant had agreed to uncoordinated benefits in the Plaintiff's 1990 collective bargaining agreement; however, when the agreement was renegotiated in 2007, the uncoordinated compensation agreement was dropped. Finding that Plaintiff's claim was preempted by federal law under the Labor Management Relations Act, the Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff did not have a vested right to uncoordinated benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingSeveral large anti-gay activist organizations sought to challenge Wisconsin's domestic partnership law/civil unions under the state anti-gay marriage amendment, also known as Wisconsin Question 1, passed by popular referendum in 2006. The referendum (later nullified by Obergefell v. Hodges, 574 U.S. 1118 (2015)) created a state constitutional amendment that validated only marriage between one man and one woman. Further, the amendment stated that "[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state." The Supreme Court held that domestic partnership law did not create a legal status identical to or substantially similar to that of marriage, and thus, the law did not violate marriage amendment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant Applied Building Sciences, Inc. (ABS) was a tenant in a building condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways (Public Railways). Besides the just compensation for its leasehold interest, ABS was entitled to two types of reimbursements from Public Railways. First, under South Carolina Code Section 28-11-10, a relocating business can apply for reimbursement of reasonable expenses for moving tangible personal property, which Public Railways paid. Second, under South Carolina Code Section 28-11-30(4), a relocating business can seek reimbursement for other reestablishment expenses up to $50,000. ABS renovated the replacement site and sought reimbursement from Public Railways for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000. ABS argued that the $50,000 cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution. The South Caroline Supreme Court held that (1) reestablishment expenses are separate from constitutional just compensation in an eminent domain action; and (2) the statutory cap of $50,000 on reestablishment expenses is constitutional. Specifically, the court explained that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality. The Court considered three precedents: (1) United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); (2) United States v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 339 U.S. 261 (1950); and (3) Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923). Petty Motor Co. established that the cost of removal or relocation should not be included in valuing the property taken because these costs “are apart from the value of the thing taken” and are “personal to the lessee.” Westinghouse Electric clarified that when the government takes a tenant's entire leasehold interest, the expenses of removal or relocation are not to be included in valuing what is taken. Joslin Manufacturing held that the cost of removing personal property from land taken is recoverable only if provided for by statute. Applying these precedents, the Court concluded that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. The Court further held that the General Assembly acts within constitutional confines and has plenary power to make policy decisions, including setting the $50,000 cap. Accordingly, the Court concluded that ABS had not met its burden of establishing that the $50,000 cap on reestablishment expenses in Section 28-11-30(4) is unconstitutional.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDevelopers purchased land from the operator of a neighboring golf course for development as a residential community and hired a contractor to construct erosion control structures and devices. A dam that the contractors built ruptured, causing mud, water and other debris to repeatedly flood the neighboring golf course. The local county natural resources department issued several notices of non-compliance to the developers for having taken insufficient measures to control erosion and sedimentation in violation of North Carolina law. The golf course operator subsequently brought suit against the developers and contractors, alleging, among other claims, violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973 (SPCA). The Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff did not have standing to bring the SPCA claim because the Defendants had only received notices of non-compliance but had not been cited for violation of a relevant law, rule, order or erosion and sedimentation control plan. The Supreme Court held that a violation of, rather than mere noncompliance with, an erosion and sedimentation control plan must have occurred to give rise to a private cause of action under the statute.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingProperty owner Applegate-Bader Farm operated an 11,000 acre farm in southern Wisconsin; approximately 2,000 of those acres were enrolled in a federal Wetland Reserve Easement through the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program. The easement is permanent, so Applegate is unable to use the land for agricultural purposes. This case is over a 2015 revision to the Wisconsin Administrative Tax Code and the effect that that revision had on landowners with conservation easements. Applegate alleged that the Wisconsin Department of Revenue failed to consider environmental effects of the rule, and failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement of the rule. The rule changed the tax treatment of wetland easements on agricultural parcels of land, effectively removing the lowered tax assessment value for wetland easements on agricultural land. Applegate alleged that these changes would cause farmers to attempt to farm previously protected land. The Supreme Court conducted a two-step inquiry into the Department of Revenue's decision: (1) whether the Department developed a reviewable record that sufficiently considered the potential environmental concerns; and (2) whether the Department's determination that the action does not significantly impact the quality of the environment logically flow from the Department's investigation. Upon review of the Department's record, the Supreme Court found that the Department failed to take a "hard look" at the potential environmental effects of the rule noting that there was no "discussion, memoranda, e-mail, transcript or other documentation" on the Department's rationale to not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement of the rule. Therefore, it fails the first step of the inquiry. To remedy Applegate's case, the Supreme Court stayed the enforcement of the revision to the tax code and remanded the claim to the circuit court with instructions to remand the matter to the Department of Revenue for further investigation on its environmental effects.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a senior paralegal in the legal department of a large corporation, complained to her department supervisor after being passed over for a promotion and after newly implemented corporate policies reduced the flexibility of her schedule and her ability to work overtime. After further requests that Plaintiff adopt a more standard work schedule, and after Plaintiff continued to work unauthorized overtime, she was reprimanded by her supervisor. Plaintiff then submitted a formal email to upper management in her department, alleging that she was being discriminated against on the basis of both her gender and her age (Plaintiff was 59 at the time). The only discrimination-specific allegation submitted by Plaintiff was that she had “observed and experienced the Company’s pervasive negative attitude toward advancing or recognizing the contributions or accomplishments of its female employees.” Following an internal investigation of her claims, the company found no wrongdoing. Reflecting numerous discussions among management regarding Plaintiff’s insubordination and disagreements with her supervisor, Plaintiff was ultimately terminated. Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission through the Texas Workforce Commission, asserting age discrimination. Following receipt of a “right-to-sue” letter, Plaintiff sued the corporation, alleging claims of age discrimination as well as retaliation for complaining about age and gender discrimination. Following trial, a jury found that while age was not a motivating factor in Plaintiff’s termination, her email constituted a complaint of discrimination that resulted in her termination. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the ruling. The Supreme Court then granted the corporation’s petition for review, restricting its review to the preliminary question of whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find that, but for Plaintiff’s email, the corporation would not have terminated her. The Court emphasized that this “but-for” standard prevents employees who suspect they may be terminated from making unfounded discrimination claims in order to remain employed. After reviewing the totality of the evidence presented to support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the Court held that no evidence suggested Plaintiff would not have been terminated but for her email alleging discrimination. The Court especially considered Plaintiff’s refusal to conform her schedule to the corporation’s standard working hours, her repeated unauthorized overtime, and her statement that she no longer wanted to work for her supervisor. As a result, the Court concluded that this evidence, taken together with various statements indicating the corporation had already intended to terminate Plaintiff prior to the discrimination-alleging email, demonstrated that the but-for standard was not met.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs sought certification of a class of home health care aides for alleged violations of the Labor Law based on their respective employer’s failure to pay putative class members a required minimum wage for each hour of a 24- hour shift. Under a New York Department of Labor (DOL) wage order, Plaintiffs’ employers were required to pay the minimum wage “for the time an employee is permitted to work, or is required to be available for work at a place prescribed by the employer.” DOL interpreted the wage order to require payment of the minimum wage for at least 13 hours of a 24-hour shift if the employee is allowed a sleep break of at least 8 hours—and actually receives five hours of uninterrupted sleep—and three hours of meal break time. The Court of Appeals held that DOL’s long-standing interpretation of its wage order was rational and therefore entitled to deference. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals noted that DOL’s interpretation was grounded in its specialized knowledge and experience of both round-the-clock work assignments and the home health care industry. While determining that Plaintiffs were not entitled to payment of the minimum wage for each hour in a 24-hour shift if they received the requisite sleep and meal breaks, the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of additional grounds for class certification, including defendants’ alleged failure to adequately compensate home health care aides when they did not receive the minimum sleep and meal breaks.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2004, Ricky Anderson injured his vertebrae at work. The injury was debilitating, and Anderson received workers' compensation benefits for temporary total disability (TTD). Following surgery, Anderson returned to work as a construction company foreman for over two years until October 2008. However, Anderson's back problems recurred, and he again received TTD benefits, from November 2008 until June 2010. After more surgery, Anderson was medically released to return to work. But Anderson could not find a job, so he filed for unemployment compensation. The Employment Security Division (ESD) denied Anderson's claim. It determined that he did not qualify for unemployment compensation, calculated conventionally, because he had not earned wages in the first four of the last five calendar quarters preceding his application. Deferring to the ESD's finding of fact that the 2004 injury led to both disability leaves, the Court focused on the legal question of whether, by working full time from 2006 to 2008, Anderson restored his eligibility to elect the optional base period under NRS 612.344. NRS 612.344 allows an individual who cannot find work after a period of temporary disability the option of using their work history for the 15 months preceding their disability leave to determine their unemployment compensation instead of the 15 months preceding their application for unemployment compensation. To qualify for this option, the application must be filed "within 3 years after the initial period of disability begins and not later than the fourth calendar week of unemployment after . . . [t]he end of the period of [TTD] or temporary partial disability [or the] date the person ceases to receive money for rehabilitative services, whichever occurs later." NRS 612.344(2). The Supreme Court held that the phrase "within 3 years after the initial period of disability begins" refers to the first in the series of potentially available benefits enumerated in NRS 612.344(2)—temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, and/or vocational rehabilitation—for each episode of compensated disability leave and, therefore, the alternative-calculation option in NRS 612.344 renews when a temporarily disabled worker recovers and returns to work long enough to reestablish himself in the unemployment compensation system. The Court reversed the district court's denial of the petition for judicial review and remanded for further proceedings.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFormer employees of two in-home personal care companies sued their former employers, asserting that they had not been paid the minimum wage to which they are entitled under the Georgia Minimum Wage Law (GMWL). Specifically, the Supreme Court considered two certified questions: (i) whether an employee that falls under a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exemption is effectively “covered” by the FLSA for purposes of Ga. Code Ann. § 34-4-3(c) analysis, thereby prohibiting said employee from receiving minimum wage compensation under the GMWL; and (ii) whether an individual whose employment consists of providing in-home personal support services is prohibited from receiving minimum wage compensation under the GMWL pursuant to the “domestic employees” exception articulated in Ga. Code Ann. § 34-4-3(b(3). With respect to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the text of Ga. Code Ann. § 34-4-3(c) does not speak in terms of employees’ coverage by the FLSA (or other acts of Congress) in general—rather, it removes from the GMWL’s protection employees who are “covered” by the minimum wage provisions of a federal statute like the FLSA if such act provides for a minimum wage greater than the GMWL’s minimum wage. As to the second question, the Supreme Court held that “domestic employees” as that term is used in Ga. Code Ann. § 34-4-3(b) must work in or about the homes of their employers, and the employers in the instant case are therefore not exempt from the GMWL under that provision.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFollowing the November 6, 2012 general election, with a 63,141 to 63,104 vote margin for the election for the office of State Senator for the 46th Senate District, candidates for political office sued the New York State Board of Elections challenging 216 affidavit ballots and 53 special ballots cast by Ulster County election inspectors more than two weeks before the election. The Supreme Court upheld objections to 209 affidavit ballots on the grounds that they contained inaccurate or incomplete information and allowed the other 7 to be canvassed, i.e., counted in the election. The Supreme Court held that the 53 special ballots would not count. On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court's decision regarding the 216 affidavit ballots but determined that the 53 special ballots cast by election inspectors would be canvassed since Election Law § 11-30 required only that the Election Board provide the ballots not more than two weeks before the election but did not explicitly say the earliest time voters had to return ballots. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied a motion for leave to appeal of the decision. Judge Graffeo dissented arguing that the Court should review whether such an exception to statutory compliance should be made in the special ballot context.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe County employees' union petitioned the commonwealth court for review of an order of the Labor Relations Board, which ruled that the County did not engage in unfair labor practice when a multi-county Workforce Investment Board contracted out employment development services and youth programs to private entities, which services had been previously provided by County employees, without first bargaining with the union. The commonwealth court affirmed the order, and the union appealed. Because the Workforce Investment Board, and not the County, made the decision to award contracts to non-union private entities, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and held that the County did not engage in unfair labor practice.