State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMembers and former members of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) may obtain health insurance through the New York State Health Insurance Plan, an optional health-benefit plan covering current and retired state employees and other public employees. CSEA and the State agreed to seven collective bargaining agreement (CBA or CBAs), spanning 1985 to 2011, each containing provisions continuing the contribution rates at 90% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage. Section 9.13(a) of the 2007-2011 CBA provided that "[t]he State agrees to pay 90 percent of the cost of individual coverage and 75 percent of the cost of dependent coverage toward the hospital/medical/mental health and substance abuse components provided under the Empire Plan." The section did not, however, expressly state the duration of the State's promise to contribute at those rates. The Court of Appeals held that health insurance benefits for retirees – specifically premium contributions – may be subject to modification by a public employer after a CBA expires, unless there is specific language expressly guaranteeing a lifetime benefit.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of Bloomberg L.P., brought suit against Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor, and Michael Bloomberg, asserting several causes of action, including sex discrimination and hostile work environment under the New York City Human Rights Law (i.e., Administrative Code of City of NY, title 8 (City HRL)). Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were based on the vicarious liability provision in the City HRL, pursuant to his status as an owner and officer of the company. The City HRL, while providing for vicarious liability, does not define the term “employer” for the purposes of that provision. The Court of Appeals held that where an employer is a business entity, the shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees of that entity are not employers within the meaning of the City HRL. As a result, Bloomberg, an owner and officer of Bloomberg L.P., was not an employer within the meaning of the City HRL and could not be held vicariously liable for the supervisor’s offending conduct, and plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg were dismissed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a podiatrist and his out-of-state medical malpractice insurer, and sought declaratory judgment requiring the insurer to provide indemnification coverage, notwithstanding the insurer's rescission of the policy due to material misrepresentations made concerning the state in which the podiatrist maintained his primary practice. The Superior Court entered judgment in patient's favor, requiring the insurer to indemnify the physician in patient's lawsuit. Insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Insurer sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the podiatrist stood without coverage to respond to patient claim that arose prior to rescission. The Supreme Court notes it is well established in New Jersey that a professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer. A professional in that position can also expect that claims that arose prior to discovery of the misrepresentation will be excluded from coverage. Once the policy has been rescinded, the professional responds to any claims from injured third parties without coverage.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, who had been employed as a police dispatcher for the township's police department, filed a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) disability discrimination complaint against the township, alleging that her inflammatory bowel syndrome constituted a disability for purposes of LAD and that the township failed to provide reasonable accommodation for disability. Plaintiff's doctor, Ciambotti, had written to Plaintiff’s supervisors and stated that Plaintiff's symptoms would be exacerbated by an assignment to the midnight shift, and while the township initially provided Plaintiff with a steady afternoon shift, it later stated that it could not guarantee that she could entirely avoid midnight shifts. The Superior Court issued a limiting instruction, directing the jury to consider the physician's letter only as a request for a reasonable accommodation, and entered judgment in favor of township. The trial court denied employee's motion for new trial on the grounds that although treating physicians may be permitted to testify about the issue of causation, neither physician had been retained and designated as an expert witness and that neither witness had prepared a report. Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that: (1) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating physician; (2) the error in barring testimony was not harmless; and (3) the trial court improperly barred testimony from employee's treating psychiatrist.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhile working on a building renovation project, plaintiff was tasked with moving sinks from one area of a bathroom to another. The work required plaintiff to cut and reroute pipes in the ceiling that were located near electrical wiring. To reach the pipes, plaintiff used an A-frame ladder; however, because of spatial limitations, he had to lean the ladder against the wall in the closed and unlocked position. While standing on the ladder and attempting to connect two pipes, plaintiff received an electric shock and fell to the ground. As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered electrical burns to his left hand and the left side of his torso from his chest to his hip, as well as injuries to his spine and shoulders. Plaintiff does not remember anything about his fall, including whether he lost consciousness, whether the ladder fell to the ground, or whether he was thrown from the ladder after being electrocuted. The question on appeal is whether plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was not entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim because he had failed to make a prima facie showing that his injuries were proximately caused by the inadequate ladder rather than the electric shock.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA healthcare provider, as the insured patient's assignee, brought an action against a no-fault automobile insurer to recover payment of a hospital bill from 2016 for treatment of complications arising from a 1977 automobile accident before the effective date of Medicare Secondary Payer Act in 1980 to expand the field of collateral sources bearing primary responsibility for the payment of medical expenses of a Medicare enrollee. The Superior Court entered summary judgment that the insurer was responsible for the entire medical bill minus the amount received from Medicare, placing on the insurer the primary obligation to pay medical expenses when billed, regardless of available collateral sources such as Medicare. The insurer appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, holding that Medicare, rather than the insurer, had primary responsibility because the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (the No Fault Act) provides that the insurer has the responsibility to make personal-injury-protection (PIP) payments first but ultimately the collateral source, which was Medicare at the time prior to the Medicate Secondary Payer Act in 1980, has primary responsibility for the payment of the medical bills. After December 5, 1980, Medicare became the secondary payer to a PIP carrier as the Secondary Payer Act, and in effect, preempted the No Fault Act's collateral source rule.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA group of longtime heavy smokers brought a putative class action against Philip Morris USA alleging that cigarettes contained unnecessarily dangerous levels of carcinogens. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the smokers' claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on all but one claim, which it certified as a question to the Court of Appeals. That question, was whether New York law recognizes an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for smoking-related diseases by a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with smoking-related disease and who is not under investigation by a physician for such suspected disease. The Court of Appeals held that a threat of future harm is insufficient to impose liability against a defendant in a tort context, because it is a fundamental principle that a plaintiff must sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient filed a medical malpractice suit against hospital, nurse, respiratory therapist, and physician, alleging that her infant was negligently deprived of oxygen at birth, resulting in brain damage. The Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County, denied patient's motion to compel production of investigative document relating to infant's birth because the hospital had substantially complied with the Patient Safety Act (Act) in its investigation, and thus the memorandum was subject to the Act's absolute privilege. Patient sought leave to appeal. After initially granting the appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, vacated its order and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court denied patient's motion to compel. Patient sought leave to appeal, which was granted. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendants filed motion for leave to appeal, which was granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the document was not discoverable under the Act, because it was developed in process of self-critical analysis conducted as part of a patient safety plan that met statutory criteria, and was thus privileged. Other material facts were that (1) the director of patient safety recorded in the document that it was created pursuant to the Act, (2) assured participants in a discussion that led to the creation of the document that their disclosures would be kept confidential, and (3) discussion was part of the investigation into whether the infant's birth was a serious, preventable, adverse event that should be reported under the Act.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital, alleging deviations from standards of medical care in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of her pelvic abscess due to a perforated appendix. The Superior Court determined that a report containing the hospital's self-critical analysis of patient's care included information on a Serious Preventable Adverse Event (SPAE) and ordered hospital to release to patient a redacted version of the report. The hospital sought leave to appeal. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed. Patient sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that: (1) although the trial court correctly determined that it could review in camera the facts underlying what the hospital concluded was not a SPAE, the trial court exceeded its authority in declaring that a SPAE had occurred; (2) the finding that an event is not reportable as a SPAE does not abrogate the self-critical-analysis privilege under the Patient Safety Act (PSA), which unconditionally protects the process of self-critical analysis, the analysis' results, and the resulting reports developed by a facility in its compliance with the PSA; but (3) patient was entitled, as a response to her discovery request, to have hospital provide a narrative to steer her to information contained in the approximately 4,500 pages of medical records that would lead her to the discrete yet interconnected notations of an apparent adverse incident, even though the hospital's self-critical analysis of a possible SPAE that happened to patient was privileged under the PSA; patient was unquestionably entitled to the raw data contained in her patient records.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff sued Defendant Ciripompa, a tenured high school teacher, who allegedly had been using his school-issued laptop and iPad to send nude photographs of himself and to engage in inappropriate conversations with others. Further allegations arose accusing Defendant of inappropriate behavior towards other colleagues, often in the presence of students. The school board sought to terminate Defendant based, in relevant part, upon the evidence of inappropriate behavior. Because Defendant was a tenured teacher, the request for dismissal was submitted to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the school board's allegations of inappropriate behavior constituted a claim for sexual harassment requiring a showing that a reasonable woman would consider the behaviors of the aggressor to create a hostile work environment. The arbitrator found that the teacher's conduct did not meet this standard. The school board appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that an arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon the parties but remains subject to judicial review and enforcement, but also held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by converting the charge of unbecoming conduct into one of sexual harassment, and tasking the board with substantiating the charge of sexual harassment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, over thirty landowners, entered into separate oil and gas leases with Victory Energy Corporation under which Plaintiffs leased drilling rights to Victory. Victory shared its leasehold interests with Megaenergy Inc. Inflection Energy LLC then assumed from Megaenergy the operational rights and responsibilities under most of the leases. Each of these leases contained a force majeure clause which provided that nonperformance may be excused under certain circumstances. The leases also contained identical "habendum clauses," clauses which are typically found in standard oil and gas leases used to fix the lease duration, establishing the period during which the energy companies could exercise the drilling rights granted by the leases. Then-Governor of New York David Paterson ordered a formal public environmental review to address the impact of combined use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling. As a result, the state Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) informed the public that no permits for fracking would be issued until the DEC issued its required findings statement. After the primary term of the leases had expired, Plaintiffs commenced a declaratory judgment action against Inflection, Victory, and Megaenergy, seeking a declaration that the leases had expired by their own terms. The energy companies counterclaimed for a declaration that each lease was extended by operation of the force majeure clause, arguing the New York moratorium on the use of horizonal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracking triggered this clause. The Court of Appeals held that the force majeure clause did not modify the habendum clause, and therefore the leases terminated at the conclusion of their primary terms.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, two former Starbucks baristas, brought a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Starbucks' policy of including shift supervisors in the tip pools was unlawful under Labor Law § 196-d. Plaintiffs claimed that shift supervisors should not be able to receive distributions from a store's tip pool because they are Starbucks "agents" who may not "demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee" (Labor Law § 196-d). In a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals was asked whether the tip-sharing policy established by Starbucks was legal under Labor Law § 196-d. Deferring in part to the interpretation of the New York Department of Labor (the agency charged with enforcing the statute) the Court of Appeals determined that (i) tip pools should be limited to those employees who customarily serve customers at Starbucks establishments, even if those employees sometimes perform supervisory duties, and (ii) employees who possess considerable authority and control over subordinates, such as the power to make hiring and firing determinations, are not eligible to participate in the tip pools.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of public school students, primarily located in New York City, sued the state alleging that the state deprived students of their state constitutional right to a sound basic education by not complying with school funding requirements as defined by the Court of Appeals. The parents also claimed the students were denied constitutional rights based on the state's withholding of funds from districts that did not implement the state's annual performance review system. The New York Constitution mandates that the legislature provide a system of free education. In a series of cases known as the "Campaign for Fiscal Equity" litigation, the Court of Appeals set a floor for the standard of education required by the state constitution, holding that the state constitution requires education to include basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills for children to function productively as civic participants. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the plaintiffs adequately plead violations of the state constitutional right to education and held that (1) pleadings challenging the right to education must be school district-specific; (2) claims for constitutional violations could not be based on the argument that the state's funding was not as good as the proposed funding scheme deemed adequate in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation; and (3) claims for constitutional violations were adequate where they alleged a causal link between school funding and deficient inputs (e.g., lack of qualified teachers and materials) and deficient outputs (e.g., test scores).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Ardan, who suffered from “chronic neck, lower-back, and left-knee pain,” began working at a medical center as a nurse and her job duties required her to “walk substantial distances,” and to bend and lift, which aggravated her ailments. She resigned from her position at the medical center and accepted a desk job as a healthcare communicator to ease the strain on her body. After seven weeks at her new job, Ardan was terminated. Ardan applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. Ardan sought judicial review of the decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development that had denied her unemployment benefits. The appellate court held that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) required employees to notify their employers of medical conditions which were exacerbated by the work, request accommodations, and give the employers the “opportunity to address the matter to determine whether there was other suitable work available.” The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, stating that a claimant still needs to notify the employer of medical conditions and request accommodations before resigning, in order to meet the “burden to demonstrate the unavailability of alternative suitable work,” although it held that the statute does not contain such a "notice-and-inquiry" requirement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs sought certification of a class of home health care aides for alleged violations of the Labor Law based on their respective employer’s failure to pay putative class members a required minimum wage for each hour of a 24- hour shift. Under a New York Department of Labor (DOL) wage order, plaintiffs’ employers were required to pay the minimum wage “for the time an employee is permitted to work, or is required to be available for work at a place prescribed by the employer.” DOL interpreted the wage order to require payment of the minimum wage for at least 13 hours of a 24-hour shift if the employee is allowed a sleep break of at least 8 hours — and actually receives five hours of uninterrupted sleep — and three hours of meal break time. The Court of Appeals held that DOL’s long-standing interpretation of its wage order was rational and therefore entitled to deference. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals noted that DOL’s interpretation was grounded in its specialized knowledge and experience of both round-the-clock work assignments and the home health care industry. While determining that plaintiffs were not entitled to payment of the minimum wage for each hour in a 24-hour shift if they received the requisite sleep and meal breaks, the Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of additional grounds for class certification, including defendants’ alleged failure to adequately compensate home health care aides when they did not receive the minimum sleep and meal breaks.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFollowing the November 6, 2012 general election, with a 63,141 to 63,104 vote margin for the election for the office of State Senator for the 46th Senate District, candidates for political office sued the New York State Board of Elections challenging 216 affidavit ballots and 53 special ballots cast by Ulster County election inspectors more than two weeks before the election. The Supreme Court upheld objections to 209 affidavit ballots on the grounds that they contained inaccurate or incomplete information and allowed the other 7 to be canvassed, i.e., counted in the election. The Supreme Court held that the 53 special ballots would not count. On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court's decision regarding the 216 affidavit ballots but determined that the 53 special ballots cast by election inspectors would be canvassed since Election Law § 11-30 required only that the Election Board provide the ballots not more than two weeks before the election but did not explicitly say the earliest time voters had to return ballots. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied a motion for leave to appeal of the decision. Judge Graffeo dissented arguing that the court should review whether such an exception to statutory compliance should be made in the special ballot context.