State Supreme Court Data Tracker
Use this data to spot trends, anticipate what’s next, and supercharge your advocacy.
| Case Name | State | Year | Topic | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Silver v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 821 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 2018)
|
North Carolina | 2018 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2018
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, parents from two school districts with a majority Black student population, stated that the Halifax County Board of Commissioners failed to ensure that their children had the right to a sound basic education. They alleged that the Halifax County Board of Commissioners underfunded the school districts in comparison to the district with a 65% White population. The Supreme Court found that while the State has a sole responsibility for guarding and preserving the right of every child in North Carolina to receive a sound basic education, this obligation does not also apply to County Commissioners. The General Assembly has the power to take away a local government's authority over education, which would leave them with a constitutional obligation to act without the capacity to do so. The Supreme Court also held that the word "may" in the North Carolina Constitution was not created to grant a party a claim of relief or guard rights. However, parents can still bring claims about education access directly against the state.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs, parents from two school districts with a majority Black student population, stated that the Halifax County Board of Commissioners failed to ensure that their children had the right to a sound basic education. They alleged that the Halifax County Board of Commissioners underfunded the school districts in comparison to the district with a 65% White population. The Supreme Court found that while the State has a sole responsibility for guarding and preserving the right of every child in North Carolina to receive a sound basic education, this obligation does not also apply to County Commissioners. The General Assembly has the power to take away a local government's authority over education, which would leave them with a constitutional obligation to act without the capacity to do so. The Supreme Court also held that the word "may" in the North Carolina Constitution was not created to grant a party a claim of relief or guard rights. However, parents can still bring claims about education access directly against the state.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co., 423 P.3d 348 (Ariz. 2018)
|
Arizona | 2018 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2018
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue in this case is whether the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) is required to consider unquantified federal reserved water rights when it determines whether a developer has an adequate supply of water for purposes of A.R.S. § 45-108 (Evaluation of subdivision water supply). The Court held that the statute does not require ADWR to do so. In 2013, the ADWR provided an adequate water supply designation approving Pueblo Del Sol Water Company’s (Pueblo) application to supply water to a proposed development in Cochise County. Castle & Cooke, Inc., which owns Pueblo, proposed a development approximately five miles from the San Pedro River and outside a statutory active management area, called “Tribute.” Pueblo planned to provide the Majority of Tribute’s water services and calculated that it would need to increase its annual groundwater pumping in order to do so. Pueblo applied to ADWR for an adequate water supply designation. Plaintiffs (two individuals and the U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM)) objected contending that the increase in Pueblo’s groundwater pumping would affect the flow of the San Pedro River and would therefore conflict with BLM's federal reserved water right. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Pueblo demonstrated that water would be continuously, legally, and physically available and ADWR issued an order affirming this opinion. After further appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed ADWR and the ALJ’s approval of Pueblo’s application, holding that ADWR is not required to consider unquantified federal reserved water rights under its physical availability or legal availability analysis. The Supreme Court stated that although surface water and groundwater are governed by different legal regimes in Arizona, both are subject to the federal reserved water rights doctrine. Under that doctrine, when the federal government creates a federal reservation of public land, it also reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. If a federal reserved water right is infringed by groundwater pumping, the federal government may obtain an injunction. But any injunction that issues must be appropriately tailored to the reservation's minimal need.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The issue in this case is whether the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) is required to consider unquantified federal reserved water rights when it determines whether a developer has an adequate supply of water for purposes of A.R.S. § 45-108 (Evaluation of subdivision water supply). The Court held that the statute does not require ADWR to do so. In 2013, the ADWR provided an adequate water supply designation approving Pueblo Del Sol Water Company’s (Pueblo) application to supply water to a proposed development in Cochise County. Castle & Cooke, Inc., which owns Pueblo, proposed a development approximately five miles from the San Pedro River and outside a statutory active management area, called “Tribute.” Pueblo planned to provide the Majority of Tribute’s water services and calculated that it would need to increase its annual groundwater pumping in order to do so. Pueblo applied to ADWR for an adequate water supply designation. Plaintiffs (two individuals and the U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM)) objected contending that the increase in Pueblo’s groundwater pumping would affect the flow of the San Pedro River and would therefore conflict with BLM's federal reserved water right. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Pueblo demonstrated that water would be continuously, legally, and physically available and ADWR issued an order affirming this opinion. After further appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed ADWR and the ALJ’s approval of Pueblo’s application, holding that ADWR is not required to consider unquantified federal reserved water rights under its physical availability or legal availability analysis. The Supreme Court stated that although surface water and groundwater are governed by different legal regimes in Arizona, both are subject to the federal reserved water rights doctrine. Under that doctrine, when the federal government creates a federal reservation of public land, it also reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. If a federal reserved water right is infringed by groundwater pumping, the federal government may obtain an injunction. But any injunction that issues must be appropriately tailored to the reservation's minimal need.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Simmons v. State, 788 S.E.2d 220 (S.C. 2016)
|
South Carolina | 2016 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty, Access to Justice |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2016
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner Kenneth Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death by a South Carolina trial court for the 1996 murder and criminal sexual assault of an 89-year-old woman. The State's case against Petitioner at the trial court level relied heavily on the argument that Petitioner's DNA matched DNA found at the crime scene. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR) on the grounds that (i) he was ineligible for the death penalty due to his mental incapacity; (ii) his trial court counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately challenge DNA evidence presented by the State; and (ii) the State had violated his due process rights by presenting false evidence to the jury and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. The PCR Court vacated Petitioner's death sentence and imposed life without parole, but denied Petitioner's remaining claims despite multiple hearings with the PCR Court where expert witnesses testified as to critical flaws in the DNA chart the State presented as evidence in support of its case against Petitioner. Petitioner then petitioned the Supreme Court to grant him a new trial on the basis that his original conviction was based on false and misleading evidence, but did not file a motion to preserve the issue challenging the PCR Court's findings (per Rule 59 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure). The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a new trial and remanded the case to the PCR court granting the PCR Court discretion to permit consideration of additional evidence. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that while the State was technically correct that Petitioner did not properly preserve the issue of false and misleading evidence in his appeal, that the Supreme Court was nonetheless empowered in extraordinary cases, to remand factual findings back to the PCR Court for reconsideration, citing the Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have corrected evidence presented by the prosecution and that Petitioner is entitled to relief under the S.C. Code where there are material facts, not previously presented or heard, that require a vacatur of a conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. See S.C. Code Ann. 17-27-20(A)(4)(2014)). The Supreme Court also noted that since it is reviewing the PCR Court's finding in an appellate capacity, it would not make new findings of fact related to Petitioner's evidence claims, and that remanding the matter to PCR court to reconsider would be the appropriate remedy to balance the interests of justice and the procedural rules of the court.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Petitioner Kenneth Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death by a South Carolina trial court for the 1996 murder and criminal sexual assault of an 89-year-old woman. The State's case against Petitioner at the trial court level relied heavily on the argument that Petitioner's DNA matched DNA found at the crime scene. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR) on the grounds that (i) he was ineligible for the death penalty due to his mental incapacity; (ii) his trial court counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately challenge DNA evidence presented by the State; and (ii) the State had violated his due process rights by presenting false evidence to the jury and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. The PCR Court vacated Petitioner's death sentence and imposed life without parole, but denied Petitioner's remaining claims despite multiple hearings with the PCR Court where expert witnesses testified as to critical flaws in the DNA chart the State presented as evidence in support of its case against Petitioner. Petitioner then petitioned the Supreme Court to grant him a new trial on the basis that his original conviction was based on false and misleading evidence, but did not file a motion to preserve the issue challenging the PCR Court's findings (per Rule 59 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure). The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a new trial and remanded the case to the PCR court granting the PCR Court discretion to permit consideration of additional evidence. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that while the State was technically correct that Petitioner did not properly preserve the issue of false and misleading evidence in his appeal, that the Supreme Court was nonetheless empowered in extraordinary cases, to remand factual findings back to the PCR Court for reconsideration, citing the Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have corrected evidence presented by the prosecution and that Petitioner is entitled to relief under the S.C. Code where there are material facts, not previously presented or heard, that require a vacatur of a conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. See S.C. Code Ann. 17-27-20(A)(4)(2014)). The Supreme Court also noted that since it is reviewing the PCR Court's finding in an appellate capacity, it would not make new findings of fact related to Petitioner's evidence claims, and that remanding the matter to PCR court to reconsider would be the appropriate remedy to balance the interests of justice and the procedural rules of the court.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017)
|
Arizona | 2017 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2017
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age 15 and, along with another defendant in a separate case, petitioned to be released on bail. The trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that Defendant committed sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15, rendering him ineligible for bail. Defendant challenged the facial constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(3), a statute that criminalizes sexual conduct with a minor, and the corresponding provision of the Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 22(A)(1), the section permitting revocation of right to bail in cases of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the provisions were unconstitutional because an individualized determination of dangerousness is necessary to withhold bail. As a matter of first impression, the Court evaluated the issue in light of competing public interests: protecting citizens from the danger of crime and the right to bail in non-capital cases rooted in American and Arizona law. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a three factor test allowing courts to restrict access to bail, which the Arizona Supreme Court rejected as a requirement in order to grant bail. The Court ultimately held that prohibitions on bail for persons charged with sexual conduct with a minor violate due process rights.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant was charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age 15 and, along with another defendant in a separate case, petitioned to be released on bail. The trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that Defendant committed sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15, rendering him ineligible for bail. Defendant challenged the facial constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(3), a statute that criminalizes sexual conduct with a minor, and the corresponding provision of the Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 22(A)(1), the section permitting revocation of right to bail in cases of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the provisions were unconstitutional because an individualized determination of dangerousness is necessary to withhold bail. As a matter of first impression, the Court evaluated the issue in light of competing public interests: protecting citizens from the danger of crime and the right to bail in non-capital cases rooted in American and Arizona law. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a three factor test allowing courts to restrict access to bail, which the Arizona Supreme Court rejected as a requirement in order to grant bail. The Court ultimately held that prohibitions on bail for persons charged with sexual conduct with a minor violate due process rights.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera Cnty. Canal & Reservoir Co., 328 P.3d 644 (Mont. 2014)
|
Montana | 2014 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2014
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingClaimants Gregory Duncan, Sherri Donovan, Terry Dougherty (collectively, Duncan) and Skelton Angus Ranch, Inc. (Skelton) filed statements of claim for existing water rights based on notices of appropriation (NOAs) filed between 1895 and 1913. Pondera County Canal and Reservoir Company (Pondera) filed a notice of intent to appear in the adjudication of Skelton and Duncan's claims. The water master (Master) quantified and assigned priority dates to the claimed water rights. The Montana water court (water court) amended and then adopted the Master's report (Report) as amended. Duncan and Skelton appealed the decision of the water court to the Supreme Court of Montana (Court). The Court addressed whether the water court correctly determined that portions of Duncan and Skelton's water rights had been abandoned or never perfected. Duncan and Skelton claimed additional water rights under 1895, 1902, and 1913 NOAs. The water court held that Duncan and Skelton never had rights to the 1895 claim and adopted the Master's finding that the Duncan and Skelton's predecessors had abandoned the 1902 and 1913 water rights. Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors perfected the 1895 right in the original ditch that washed out and that their predecessors lacked the requisite intent to abandon the other rights. Addressing the 1895 NOA, the Court concluded that the water court correctly held that neither Duncan nor Skelton had perfected the 1895 NOA. The Court noted that Skelton owned none of the lands mentioned in the 1895 NOA, and that the lands that Duncan owned that were subject to the 1895 NOA reflected a chain of title that did not reference the 1895 NOA. Accordingly, both Duncan and Skelton lacked the requisite contractual relationship with the original appropriator. The Court then addressed the 1902 and 1913 NOAs and held that the water court was correct in finding that Duncan and Skelton abandoned any water they claimed to have used that exceeded the capacity of the flume, which is a water channel built as a means of transport with elevated walls above the surrounding ground. The Court reasoned that the flume's capacity limited the amount of water available for beneficial use for 18-29 years, a period of time sufficient to raise a presumption of abandonment. Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors' continuous struggle to repair and expand the original flume demonstrated an intention to maintain the rights. The Court found this unpersuasive, holding that those efforts merely signaled an intention to continue to use the amount of water carried by the original 1912 flume. Accordingly, the Court held that the Master and water court did not err in finding the claimed water in excess of the flume's capacity abandoned.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Claimants Gregory Duncan, Sherri Donovan, Terry Dougherty (collectively, Duncan) and Skelton Angus Ranch, Inc. (Skelton) filed statements of claim for existing water rights based on notices of appropriation (NOAs) filed between 1895 and 1913. Pondera County Canal and Reservoir Company (Pondera) filed a notice of intent to appear in the adjudication of Skelton and Duncan's claims. The water master (Master) quantified and assigned priority dates to the claimed water rights. The Montana water court (water court) amended and then adopted the Master's report (Report) as amended. Duncan and Skelton appealed the decision of the water court to the Supreme Court of Montana (Court). The Court addressed whether the water court correctly determined that portions of Duncan and Skelton's water rights had been abandoned or never perfected. Duncan and Skelton claimed additional water rights under 1895, 1902, and 1913 NOAs. The water court held that Duncan and Skelton never had rights to the 1895 claim and adopted the Master's finding that the Duncan and Skelton's predecessors had abandoned the 1902 and 1913 water rights. Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors perfected the 1895 right in the original ditch that washed out and that their predecessors lacked the requisite intent to abandon the other rights. Addressing the 1895 NOA, the Court concluded that the water court correctly held that neither Duncan nor Skelton had perfected the 1895 NOA. The Court noted that Skelton owned none of the lands mentioned in the 1895 NOA, and that the lands that Duncan owned that were subject to the 1895 NOA reflected a chain of title that did not reference the 1895 NOA. Accordingly, both Duncan and Skelton lacked the requisite contractual relationship with the original appropriator. The Court then addressed the 1902 and 1913 NOAs and held that the water court was correct in finding that Duncan and Skelton abandoned any water they claimed to have used that exceeded the capacity of the flume, which is a water channel built as a means of transport with elevated walls above the surrounding ground. The Court reasoned that the flume's capacity limited the amount of water available for beneficial use for 18-29 years, a period of time sufficient to raise a presumption of abandonment. Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors' continuous struggle to repair and expand the original flume demonstrated an intention to maintain the rights. The Court found this unpersuasive, holding that those efforts merely signaled an intention to continue to use the amount of water carried by the original 1912 flume. Accordingly, the Court held that the Master and water court did not err in finding the claimed water in excess of the flume's capacity abandoned.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Slabey v. Dunn Cnty., 2023 WI 2 (Wis. 2023)
|
Wisconsin | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was sexually assaulted by a Dunn County correctional officer. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) action against Dunn County. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's Section 1983 action failed because Dunn County was not the causal moving force behind the sexual assault, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell created a requirement that in order for a municipality to be liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983, that municipality must be the "moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation. Instead, the constitutional violation was the action of an individual correctional officer who violated his training and Dunn County's policies.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a Dunn County correctional officer. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) action against Dunn County. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's Section 1983 action failed because Dunn County was not the causal moving force behind the sexual assault, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell created a requirement that in order for a municipality to be liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983, that municipality must be the "moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation. Instead, the constitutional violation was the action of an individual correctional officer who violated his training and Dunn County's policies.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 790 S.E.2d 1 (S. C. 2016)
|
South Carolina | 2016 | Housing, Tenant Rights |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2016
Topics:
Housing, Tenant Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingD.R. Horton, Inc. (Horton) specializes in residential construction. In March 2005, the Smiths entered into a home purchase agreement (the Agreement) with Horton for the design and construction of a new home in Summerville, South Carolina. Paragraph 14 of the Agreement titled “Warranties and Dispute Resolution,” contains provisions stating that the parties agree to arbitrate any claim arising out of Horton's construction of the home, as well as any disputes related to the warranties contained in the Agreement. In the majority of the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 14, Horton expressly disclaims all warranties for the home—including the implied warranty of habitability—except for a ten-year structural warranty. Further, subparagraph 14(i) stipulates that Horton “shall not be liable for monetary damages of any kind, including secondary, consequential, punitive, general, special or indirect damages." In 2010, the Smiths filed a defective construction lawsuit against Horton. Horton moved to compel arbitration consistent with the provisions in the Agreement. The circuit court denied Horton's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The circuit court based its determination on a number of oppressive and one-sided provisions, including Horton's attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability, as well as subparagraph 14(i)'s prohibition on awarding money damages of any kind against D.R. Horton. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Horton's attempts to disclaim the implied warranty claims and prohibit any monetary damages were clearly one-sided and oppressive. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision and held that the arbitration provision is unconscionable and unenforceable. The Court reasoned that in determining whether a party lacked a meaningful choice to arbitrate, courts should consider the relative disparity in the parties' bargaining power, the parties' relative sophistication, whether the parties were represented by independent counsel, and whether the plaintiff is a substantial business concern. Under the terms of paragraph 14, the only remedy provided for a defect in the home is repair or replacement—options left entirely to the discretion of Horton. This is accordingly no remedy because it leaves the relief to the whim of Horton while simultaneously allowing no monetary recuperation when the repairs were simply inadequate.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
D.R. Horton, Inc. (Horton) specializes in residential construction. In March 2005, the Smiths entered into a home purchase agreement (the Agreement) with Horton for the design and construction of a new home in Summerville, South Carolina. Paragraph 14 of the Agreement titled “Warranties and Dispute Resolution,” contains provisions stating that the parties agree to arbitrate any claim arising out of Horton's construction of the home, as well as any disputes related to the warranties contained in the Agreement. In the majority of the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 14, Horton expressly disclaims all warranties for the home—including the implied warranty of habitability—except for a ten-year structural warranty. Further, subparagraph 14(i) stipulates that Horton “shall not be liable for monetary damages of any kind, including secondary, consequential, punitive, general, special or indirect damages." In 2010, the Smiths filed a defective construction lawsuit against Horton. Horton moved to compel arbitration consistent with the provisions in the Agreement. The circuit court denied Horton's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The circuit court based its determination on a number of oppressive and one-sided provisions, including Horton's attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability, as well as subparagraph 14(i)'s prohibition on awarding money damages of any kind against D.R. Horton. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Horton's attempts to disclaim the implied warranty claims and prohibit any monetary damages were clearly one-sided and oppressive. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision and held that the arbitration provision is unconscionable and unenforceable. The Court reasoned that in determining whether a party lacked a meaningful choice to arbitrate, courts should consider the relative disparity in the parties' bargaining power, the parties' relative sophistication, whether the parties were represented by independent counsel, and whether the plaintiff is a substantial business concern. Under the terms of paragraph 14, the only remedy provided for a defect in the home is repair or replacement—options left entirely to the discretion of Horton. This is accordingly no remedy because it leaves the relief to the whim of Horton while simultaneously allowing no monetary recuperation when the repairs were simply inadequate.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 139 A.3d 1 (N.J. 2016)
|
New Jersey | 2106 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2106
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was working with the Millville Rescue Squad (MRS) and began an extramarital affair with an MRS volunteer and Plaintiff’s co-employee wife learned of the affair and reported it to Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. A year later, Plaintiff was terminated from his position, allegedly for “poor work performance” although he had never been subject to formal discipline during the term of his employment. Plaintiff brought action against MRS for violating the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging he was terminated because of his marital status after he revealed that he and his co-employee wife were separated after the affair led to irreconcilable discord between the Plaintiff and his wife. Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal, which the superior court granted on the ground that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements required to succeed on his gender and marital status LAD claims. Employee appealed. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the LAD’s prohibition against discrimination based on “marital status” extends to a person who has separated from their spouse and is in the process of obtaining a divorce. The Supreme Court held that: (1) “marital status” within the meaning of LAD included those who are single or married and those who are in transition from one "status" to another; and (2) evidence presented a jury question regarding whether the employee was terminated because of his marital status.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff was working with the Millville Rescue Squad (MRS) and began an extramarital affair with an MRS volunteer and Plaintiff’s co-employee wife learned of the affair and reported it to Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. A year later, Plaintiff was terminated from his position, allegedly for “poor work performance” although he had never been subject to formal discipline during the term of his employment. Plaintiff brought action against MRS for violating the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging he was terminated because of his marital status after he revealed that he and his co-employee wife were separated after the affair led to irreconcilable discord between the Plaintiff and his wife. Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal, which the superior court granted on the ground that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements required to succeed on his gender and marital status LAD claims. Employee appealed. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the LAD’s prohibition against discrimination based on “marital status” extends to a person who has separated from their spouse and is in the process of obtaining a divorce. The Supreme Court held that: (1) “marital status” within the meaning of LAD included those who are single or married and those who are in transition from one "status" to another; and (2) evidence presented a jury question regarding whether the employee was terminated because of his marital status.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 413 P.3d 678 (Ariz. 2018)
|
Arizona | 2018 | Environment, Actions against Government |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2018
Topics:
Environment, Actions against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingSolarCity is in the business of leasing solar panels to property owners, who generate power for their homes. Any excess energy generated can be transferred to power grids of utility companies and the utility companies often provide a credit for the extra energy generated. In 2015, the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) valued the panels and notified SolarCity that it would be taxed on the panels. Prior to this, no taxing authority attempted to tax such panels. A key issue was whether the panels constituted “renewable energy equipment” subject to taxation under applicable Arizona statutes. ADOR issued a memorandum in 2017 that concluded solar energy panels owned by solar power companies and leased on customer property constituted taxable renewable energy equipment under the relevant Arizona statutes. SolarCity and other energy companies sought a declaratory judgment in tax court. They argued the panels were not taxable because they were used for customers’ personal on-site consumption and, therefore, had no value for taxation purposes. The relevant Arizona statutes specifically state that “grid-tied” systems designed primarily for on-site consumption are "considered to add no value to the property,” A.R.S. § 42-11054(C)(2)-(3), and that “renewable energy equipment” includes equipment “not intended for self-consumption,” A.R.S. § 42–14155(A). The tax court granted the motion in part, agreeing with the solar companies that ADOR lacked a statutory basis to consider the panels renewable energy equipment, but denied summary judgment on the valuation disputes. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Like the tax court, the court of appeals agreed that ADOR erred in considering the panels “renewable energy equipment" used in "electric generation facility.” A.R.S. § 42-14151; A.R.S. §42-14155. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision that ADOR lacks statutory authority to value leased solar panels because the energy companies do not operate electric generation facilities. Instead, the Supreme Court noted that the solar energy companies lease panels to customers to enable those customers to generate electricity for self-use. Although utilities take excess electricity to transmit it to their customers, the energy companies have no part in these transmissions and receive no benefit from them and as a result, cannot be deemed "electric generation facilit[ies]." The Court remanded for the tax court to determine whether § 42-13054 [Taxable value of personal property] authorizes county assessors to value the solar panels and, if so, whether § 42-11054(C)(2) [“Solar energy devices, as defined in section 44-1761, grid-tied photovoltaic systems and any other device or system designed to produce solar energy primarily for on-site consumption are considered to add no value to the property on which such a device or system is installed.”] nevertheless requires a zero valuation. The Court further noted that if the tax court determines that § 42-11054(C)(2) applies, then it should also determine whether that provision violates the Arizona Constitution's Exemptions Clause or Uniformity Clause.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
SolarCity is in the business of leasing solar panels to property owners, who generate power for their homes. Any excess energy generated can be transferred to power grids of utility companies and the utility companies often provide a credit for the extra energy generated. In 2015, the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) valued the panels and notified SolarCity that it would be taxed on the panels. Prior to this, no taxing authority attempted to tax such panels. A key issue was whether the panels constituted “renewable energy equipment” subject to taxation under applicable Arizona statutes. ADOR issued a memorandum in 2017 that concluded solar energy panels owned by solar power companies and leased on customer property constituted taxable renewable energy equipment under the relevant Arizona statutes. SolarCity and other energy companies sought a declaratory judgment in tax court. They argued the panels were not taxable because they were used for customers’ personal on-site consumption and, therefore, had no value for taxation purposes. The relevant Arizona statutes specifically state that “grid-tied” systems designed primarily for on-site consumption are "considered to add no value to the property,” A.R.S. § 42-11054(C)(2)-(3), and that “renewable energy equipment” includes equipment “not intended for self-consumption,” A.R.S. § 42–14155(A). The tax court granted the motion in part, agreeing with the solar companies that ADOR lacked a statutory basis to consider the panels renewable energy equipment, but denied summary judgment on the valuation disputes. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Like the tax court, the court of appeals agreed that ADOR erred in considering the panels “renewable energy equipment" used in "electric generation facility.” A.R.S. § 42-14151; A.R.S. §42-14155. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision that ADOR lacks statutory authority to value leased solar panels because the energy companies do not operate electric generation facilities. Instead, the Supreme Court noted that the solar energy companies lease panels to customers to enable those customers to generate electricity for self-use. Although utilities take excess electricity to transmit it to their customers, the energy companies have no part in these transmissions and receive no benefit from them and as a result, cannot be deemed "electric generation facilit[ies]." The Court remanded for the tax court to determine whether § 42-13054 [Taxable value of personal property] authorizes county assessors to value the solar panels and, if so, whether § 42-11054(C)(2) [“Solar energy devices, as defined in section 44-1761, grid-tied photovoltaic systems and any other device or system designed to produce solar energy primarily for on-site consumption are considered to add no value to the property on which such a device or system is installed.”] nevertheless requires a zero valuation. The Court further noted that if the tax court determines that § 42-11054(C)(2) applies, then it should also determine whether that provision violates the Arizona Constitution's Exemptions Clause or Uniformity Clause.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887 (Fla. 2022)
|
Florida | 2022 | Criminal Justice |
State:
Florida
Year:
2022
Topics:
Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn January of 2013, Fred Somers was sentenced to 211 months after he plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of an unregistered firearm. In January of 2016, Somers filed a motion challenging his sentence. The district court denied his motion, but Somers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he was incorrectly sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) (which mandates harsher sentences for armed felons who have at least three prior convictions for either "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses") because his aggravated assault conviction did not meet ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021) (holding that the ACCA’s violent felony definition excludes reckless crimes), the Eleventh Circuit sent the case to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification of whether Florida’s assault statue covers reckless threats. The Supreme Court held that Florida Statute Section 784.011 (Florida's assault statute) requires a specific intent to direct a threat at another person and, therefore, cannot be violated by a reckless act. Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of Florida’s assault definition “prohibits an intentional expression of an intent to use physical force to harm another’s person” and that such expression “cannot be accomplished via a reckless act.”
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
In January of 2013, Fred Somers was sentenced to 211 months after he plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of an unregistered firearm. In January of 2016, Somers filed a motion challenging his sentence. The district court denied his motion, but Somers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he was incorrectly sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) (which mandates harsher sentences for armed felons who have at least three prior convictions for either "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses") because his aggravated assault conviction did not meet ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021) (holding that the ACCA’s violent felony definition excludes reckless crimes), the Eleventh Circuit sent the case to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification of whether Florida’s assault statue covers reckless threats. The Supreme Court held that Florida Statute Section 784.011 (Florida's assault statute) requires a specific intent to direct a threat at another person and, therefore, cannot be violated by a reckless act. Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of Florida’s assault definition “prohibits an intentional expression of an intent to use physical force to harm another’s person” and that such expression “cannot be accomplished via a reckless act.”
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 998 N.E.2d 1045 (N.Y. 2013)
|
New York | 2013 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
New York
Year:
2013
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company hired to provide janitorial services for a retail store, was injured when he fell from a four-foot-tall ladder while dusting a six-foot-high display shelf. He brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against J. Crew, the retail store, and The Mercer I LLC, the building owner. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. J. Crew moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that plaintiff was not engaged in a "cleaning" activity within the meaning of the statute. Outside the context of commercial window washing, the Court of Appeals determined that an activity cannot be characterized as "cleaning" under Labor Law § 240(1) if it is routine (in the sense that it occurs frequently); it requires neither specialized equipment or expertise, nor the unusual deployment of labor; it involves insignificant elevation related risks comparable to those inherent in typical domestic cleaning; and is unrelated to any ongoing construction, renovation, painting, alteration or repair project. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dusting of a six-foot-high display shelf could not be characterized as "cleaning" but was routine maintenance, falling outside the ambit of the statute.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company hired to provide janitorial services for a retail store, was injured when he fell from a four-foot-tall ladder while dusting a six-foot-high display shelf. He brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against J. Crew, the retail store, and The Mercer I LLC, the building owner. Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. J. Crew moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that plaintiff was not engaged in a "cleaning" activity within the meaning of the statute. Outside the context of commercial window washing, the Court of Appeals determined that an activity cannot be characterized as "cleaning" under Labor Law § 240(1) if it is routine (in the sense that it occurs frequently); it requires neither specialized equipment or expertise, nor the unusual deployment of labor; it involves insignificant elevation related risks comparable to those inherent in typical domestic cleaning; and is unrelated to any ongoing construction, renovation, painting, alteration or repair project. The Court of Appeals concluded that the dusting of a six-foot-high display shelf could not be characterized as "cleaning" but was routine maintenance, falling outside the ambit of the statute.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Southampton v. N.Y. State Dep't of Env't Conservation, 205 N.E.3d 426 (N.Y. 2023)
|
New York | 2023 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
New York
Year:
2023
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingRespondent owns and operates a sand and gravel mine on a 50-acre property in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County. In 2019, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved Respondent's permit to increase the depth of its mining operations, finding that the proposed sand mine deepening would not significantly impact groundwater quality, air quality, traffic or solid waste production. The Petitioners—the Town of Southampton, several neighboring landowners, and civic and environmental organizations—brought an action against Respondent and the DEC to annul the 2019 renewal permit. Petitioners argued that Respondent improperly sought to expand the mine's operations through a renewal permit to avoid the restrictions of the state's Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), which bars the DEC from processing all permits to mine in covered counties, including applications for renewal and modification permits when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined." While the Court of Appeals held the ECL contemplates that a mining applicant may have prior non-conforming use rights and requires DEC to defer to local town zoning laws when reviewing applications for mining permits, it rejected Respondent's claim that mine owners have a constitutional right to mine their parcels to an indefinite depth. As a result the Court of Appeals held that the permits must be annulled since the extent of Respondent's prior non-conforming use could not be determined. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court to remand to DEC for further proceedings.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Respondent owns and operates a sand and gravel mine on a 50-acre property in the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County. In 2019, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved Respondent's permit to increase the depth of its mining operations, finding that the proposed sand mine deepening would not significantly impact groundwater quality, air quality, traffic or solid waste production. The Petitioners—the Town of Southampton, several neighboring landowners, and civic and environmental organizations—brought an action against Respondent and the DEC to annul the 2019 renewal permit. Petitioners argued that Respondent improperly sought to expand the mine's operations through a renewal permit to avoid the restrictions of the state's Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), which bars the DEC from processing all permits to mine in covered counties, including applications for renewal and modification permits when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined." While the Court of Appeals held the ECL contemplates that a mining applicant may have prior non-conforming use rights and requires DEC to defer to local town zoning laws when reviewing applications for mining permits, it rejected Respondent's claim that mine owners have a constitutional right to mine their parcels to an indefinite depth. As a result the Court of Appeals held that the permits must be annulled since the extent of Respondent's prior non-conforming use could not be determined. The Court of Appeals remitted the matter to the lower court to remand to DEC for further proceedings.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson, 749 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 2013)
|
Georgia | 2013 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingSpectera is a vision care insurer that contracts with different providers. The appellees are licensed optometrists that contracted with Spectera. Under the contract, Spectera would reimburse appellees for materials. Spectera then decided to terminate that contract and replace it with one that required the providers to obtain materials from Spectera instead of reimbursing them for such materials. Appellees argued that the new agreement violated the Georgia Patient Access to Eye Care Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-59.12. The Act provides that an insurer “shall . . . [n]ot preclude a covered person who seeks eye care from obtaining such service directly from a provider” on the panel who is licensed to provide care. Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-59.12(c)(2). In practice, this contractual provision limited the providers’ ability to assemble lenses and frames for eyeglasses and prohibited providers from supplying patients with contacts that they had in their own inventory. Spectera customers were only permitted to obtain those services directly from Spectera. The Supreme Court held that the new agreement violated this portion of the Act because it limited independent providers from providing certain eye care directly to the insured.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Spectera is a vision care insurer that contracts with different providers. The appellees are licensed optometrists that contracted with Spectera. Under the contract, Spectera would reimburse appellees for materials. Spectera then decided to terminate that contract and replace it with one that required the providers to obtain materials from Spectera instead of reimbursing them for such materials. Appellees argued that the new agreement violated the Georgia Patient Access to Eye Care Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-59.12. The Act provides that an insurer “shall . . . [n]ot preclude a covered person who seeks eye care from obtaining such service directly from a provider” on the panel who is licensed to provide care. Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-59.12(c)(2). In practice, this contractual provision limited the providers’ ability to assemble lenses and frames for eyeglasses and prohibited providers from supplying patients with contacts that they had in their own inventory. Spectera customers were only permitted to obtain those services directly from Spectera. The Supreme Court held that the new agreement violated this portion of the Act because it limited independent providers from providing certain eye care directly to the insured.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027 (2013)
|
Nevada | 2013 | LGBTQ+ Rights |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2013
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingMrs. St. Mary and Mrs. Damon had a child, where St. Mary gave birth to the child through in vitro fertilization using Mrs. Damon's egg and an anonymous sperm donor. In this process, the parties drafted a co-parenting agreement. Upon dissolution of their couple, the trial court refused to uphold the parties' co-parenting agreement and deemed that Damon was the child's legal mother, with Mrs. St. Mary being a surrogate with no legal custodial rights. Upon appeal by Mrs. St. Mary, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision stating that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.041(1)—which existed at the time of the trial court's decision—provides that a mother-child relationship may be established by "proof of [the mother] having given birth," such that a factual issue exists regarding whether Mrs. St. Mary is the legal mother to the child or a surrogate; (2) Nevada law does not preclude a child from having two legal mothers; and (3) the co-parenting agreement is not void as unlawful or against public policy on the ground that Mrs. St. Mary and Mrs. Damon are a same-sex couple, as the agreement was presumptively in the best interest of the child.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Mrs. St. Mary and Mrs. Damon had a child, where St. Mary gave birth to the child through in vitro fertilization using Mrs. Damon's egg and an anonymous sperm donor. In this process, the parties drafted a co-parenting agreement. Upon dissolution of their couple, the trial court refused to uphold the parties' co-parenting agreement and deemed that Damon was the child's legal mother, with Mrs. St. Mary being a surrogate with no legal custodial rights. Upon appeal by Mrs. St. Mary, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision stating that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.041(1)—which existed at the time of the trial court's decision—provides that a mother-child relationship may be established by "proof of [the mother] having given birth," such that a factual issue exists regarding whether Mrs. St. Mary is the legal mother to the child or a surrogate; (2) Nevada law does not preclude a child from having two legal mothers; and (3) the co-parenting agreement is not void as unlawful or against public policy on the ground that Mrs. St. Mary and Mrs. Damon are a same-sex couple, as the agreement was presumptively in the best interest of the child.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027 (Nev. 2013)
|
Nevada | 2013 | Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion, LGBTQ+ Rights |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion, LGBTQ+ Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingSt. Mary and Damon were two women engaged in a romantic relationship when they planned to have a child together. An egg from Damon, fertilized by an anonymous sperm donor, was implanted in St. Mary, who gave birth to the child. Concurrently, Damon drafted a co-parenting agreement, which both St. Mary and Damon signed. This agreement provided that in the event of their relationship ending, each would work to maintain a close relationship with the child, share duties as co-parents, and make a good-faith effort to make all major decisions affecting the child together. Following the child's birth, St. Mary stayed home to care for the child while Damon worked. One year following the child's birth, St. Mary and Damon ended their romantic relationship. After the two disagreed on the raising of the child, Damon sought and received an order from a district court stating that while St. Mary gave birth to the child, Damon was both the biological and legal mother of the child. St. Mary then, in a separate district court case, sought custody, visitation, and child support. Prior to an evidentiary hearing and following a motion limiting the scope of the hearing by Damon, the district court ruled that St. Mary was entitled to third-party visitation but not custody, as St. Mary was "simply a carrier for" the child. Further, the district court also ruled that the co-parenting agreement was null and void as a surrogate agreement, relying on a Nevada statute that was later repealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Nevada Parentage Act (NPA) did not preclude dual parentage by two mothers, finding no legal or policy reason that such a structure would be against the interests of the state or the intentions of the Nevada Legislature. As such, the case was remanded with instructions for the district court to hold a hearing on whether St. Mary could be considered the child's mother instead of only Damon. The Supreme Court also held that the district court erred in ruling that St. Mary was only a surrogate for the child, as the district court had specifically limited the scope of the hearing to exclude issues of parentage. Finally, the Supreme Court also held that the co-parenting agreement was not a surrogacy agreement and that it was consistent with Nevada public policy to allow for the enforcement of such an agreement.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
St. Mary and Damon were two women engaged in a romantic relationship when they planned to have a child together. An egg from Damon, fertilized by an anonymous sperm donor, was implanted in St. Mary, who gave birth to the child. Concurrently, Damon drafted a co-parenting agreement, which both St. Mary and Damon signed. This agreement provided that in the event of their relationship ending, each would work to maintain a close relationship with the child, share duties as co-parents, and make a good-faith effort to make all major decisions affecting the child together. Following the child's birth, St. Mary stayed home to care for the child while Damon worked. One year following the child's birth, St. Mary and Damon ended their romantic relationship. After the two disagreed on the raising of the child, Damon sought and received an order from a district court stating that while St. Mary gave birth to the child, Damon was both the biological and legal mother of the child. St. Mary then, in a separate district court case, sought custody, visitation, and child support. Prior to an evidentiary hearing and following a motion limiting the scope of the hearing by Damon, the district court ruled that St. Mary was entitled to third-party visitation but not custody, as St. Mary was "simply a carrier for" the child. Further, the district court also ruled that the co-parenting agreement was null and void as a surrogate agreement, relying on a Nevada statute that was later repealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Nevada Parentage Act (NPA) did not preclude dual parentage by two mothers, finding no legal or policy reason that such a structure would be against the interests of the state or the intentions of the Nevada Legislature. As such, the case was remanded with instructions for the district court to hold a hearing on whether St. Mary could be considered the child's mother instead of only Damon. The Supreme Court also held that the district court erred in ruling that St. Mary was only a surrogate for the child, as the district court had specifically limited the scope of the hearing to exclude issues of parentage. Finally, the Supreme Court also held that the co-parenting agreement was not a surrogacy agreement and that it was consistent with Nevada public policy to allow for the enforcement of such an agreement.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Stalowy v. Flathead Conservation Dist., 465 P.3d 1170 (Mont. 2020)
|
Montana | 2020 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2020
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingLandowners (the Stalowys) filed a petition for judicial review of the Conversation District's assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 (the Act), over dredging activities on their property. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, County of Flathead affirmed and the landowners appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Under the Act, any person planning a "project," which includes a physical alteration or modification that results in a change in the state of a natural, perennial-flowing stream or river, its bed, or its immediate banks, must notify the applicable local conservation district, which then reviews the proposal and may deny, approve, or approve with modifications. The landowners argued that the Act's grant of jurisdiction over "perennial-flowing stream," which is not defined in the Act, does not include subsurface flow. The district court determined that the subsurface parts of the creek at issue were due to manmade diversion and alterations, resulting in the loss of perennial surface flow. The District determined that the interconnected nature of the waterbodies on the Stalowy property, including surface and subsurface flows, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, comprised a natural, perennial-flowing stream that a project could impact because although the stream shifts channels, and during dry periods flows partially in subterranean form, it remains within the definition of a perennial stream because existing stream channels containing historical surface flows were documented in the review process. The district court found that the Stalowys' suggestion that the District did not have jurisdiction over subsurface flow when the evidence established that the flow was part of a natural, perennial flowing stream was an unreasonably narrow construction of the Act given the Act's intent. Thus, the District concluded the work done on the Stalowys' property was a project, subject to its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed, finding the District had sufficient evidence to reach its jurisdiction conclusion, and stated the landowners' argument was an unreasonably narrow construction of the Act given the Act's intent.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Landowners (the Stalowys) filed a petition for judicial review of the Conversation District's assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 (the Act), over dredging activities on their property. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, County of Flathead affirmed and the landowners appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Under the Act, any person planning a "project," which includes a physical alteration or modification that results in a change in the state of a natural, perennial-flowing stream or river, its bed, or its immediate banks, must notify the applicable local conservation district, which then reviews the proposal and may deny, approve, or approve with modifications. The landowners argued that the Act's grant of jurisdiction over "perennial-flowing stream," which is not defined in the Act, does not include subsurface flow. The district court determined that the subsurface parts of the creek at issue were due to manmade diversion and alterations, resulting in the loss of perennial surface flow. The District determined that the interconnected nature of the waterbodies on the Stalowy property, including surface and subsurface flows, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, comprised a natural, perennial-flowing stream that a project could impact because although the stream shifts channels, and during dry periods flows partially in subterranean form, it remains within the definition of a perennial stream because existing stream channels containing historical surface flows were documented in the review process. The district court found that the Stalowys' suggestion that the District did not have jurisdiction over subsurface flow when the evidence established that the flow was part of a natural, perennial flowing stream was an unreasonably narrow construction of the Act given the Act's intent. Thus, the District concluded the work done on the Stalowys' property was a project, subject to its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed, finding the District had sufficient evidence to reach its jurisdiction conclusion, and stated the landowners' argument was an unreasonably narrow construction of the Act given the Act's intent.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
Stand Up Mont. v. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Schs., 539 P.3d 1117 (2023)
|
Montana | 2023 | Health Care, Public Health, Education |
State:
Montana
Year:
2023
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Education
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of public school students brought an action against the school district's mandatory masking policies for students, staff, and visitors to school during the Covid-19 pandemic. The parents claimed the policies violated substantive due process. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted the school district's motions in limine and granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts finding the mask mandates implemented by the School District did not violate Appellants’ substantive due process rights. The parents appealed to the Supreme Court and the Justices held rational basis review and not strict scrutiny applied to the due process claim; mask policies do not violate due process; and expert testimony on physical effects of face mask usage on children was irrelevant to the due process analysis. The Court determined the policies did not violate due process because prior to the adoption of the policies it considered information and recommendations of reputable public and private health care providers and agencies like the CDC. The expert testimony was irrelevant because the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Parents of public school students brought an action against the school district's mandatory masking policies for students, staff, and visitors to school during the Covid-19 pandemic. The parents claimed the policies violated substantive due process. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted the school district's motions in limine and granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts finding the mask mandates implemented by the School District did not violate Appellants’ substantive due process rights. The parents appealed to the Supreme Court and the Justices held rational basis review and not strict scrutiny applied to the due process claim; mask policies do not violate due process; and expert testimony on physical effects of face mask usage on children was irrelevant to the due process analysis. The Court determined the policies did not violate due process because prior to the adoption of the policies it considered information and recommendations of reputable public and private health care providers and agencies like the CDC. The expert testimony was irrelevant because the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State Dep't of Bus. & Indus. v. Morgan, 523 P.3d 547 (Nev. 2023)
|
Nevada | 2023 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2023
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner worked as a compliance investigator with the Nevada Department of Business and Industry Division of Taxicab Authority (NDBI). While working for NDBI, petitioner also had an approved second job. Petitioner was dismissed from his position with NDBI, but was reinstated with pay about two and a half years later pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 284.390, under which an employee who has been dismissed may request in writing a hearing before the hearing officer of the Commission to determine the reasonableness of the dismissal within 10 days of the dismissal. During the period between Petitioner's dismissal and subsequent reinstatement, Petitioner continued working at his second job. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that NDBI failed to award him his full reinstatement pay since NDBI had offset petitioner's earnings received from his second job. NDBI argued that the offset of wages earned from outside employment between dismissal and reinstatement was required under NRS 284.390. The Supreme Court held, without determining whether NRS 284.390 requires an offset of interim mitigating earnings, that an offset would be inappropriate here since the purpose of an offset was to ensure that employees are not made "more than whole," and the facts in this case showed that rejecting an offset would not generate a financial windfall for Petitioner, since Petitioner had maintained the same amount of work in his approved secondary employment both before and after dismissal from NDBI.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Petitioner worked as a compliance investigator with the Nevada Department of Business and Industry Division of Taxicab Authority (NDBI). While working for NDBI, petitioner also had an approved second job. Petitioner was dismissed from his position with NDBI, but was reinstated with pay about two and a half years later pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 284.390, under which an employee who has been dismissed may request in writing a hearing before the hearing officer of the Commission to determine the reasonableness of the dismissal within 10 days of the dismissal. During the period between Petitioner's dismissal and subsequent reinstatement, Petitioner continued working at his second job. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that NDBI failed to award him his full reinstatement pay since NDBI had offset petitioner's earnings received from his second job. NDBI argued that the offset of wages earned from outside employment between dismissal and reinstatement was required under NRS 284.390. The Supreme Court held, without determining whether NRS 284.390 requires an offset of interim mitigating earnings, that an offset would be inappropriate here since the purpose of an offset was to ensure that employees are not made "more than whole," and the facts in this case showed that rejecting an offset would not generate a financial windfall for Petitioner, since Petitioner had maintained the same amount of work in his approved secondary employment both before and after dismissal from NDBI.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Div. of Pub. & Behav. Health v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 534 P.3d 706 (Nev. 2023)
|
Nevada | 2023 | Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination, Criminal Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2023
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination, Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Nevada Supreme Court upheld a district court’s decision to impose fines against the state agency responsible for delays in providing treatment to criminal defendants found mentally unfit to stand trial. The case centered around contempt orders involving 11 criminal defendants who were deemed incompetent to stand trial and set to be transported to psychiatric facilities for treatment. After significant delays in accepting the defendants for treatment, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss their criminal cases, or alternatively, for the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health (DPBH) to show cause as to why the DPBH should not be held in contempt by the district court. The district court denied the motions to dismiss but found DPBH in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not lack jurisdiction to find DPBH in contempt, which was established as the contempt requirements were satisfied by each criminal Defendant's motion containing a declaration from counsel under penalty of perjury along with a detailed history of the DPBH's failings (even though an affidavit identifying the material facts of the contempt is typically required) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court denied DPBH's arguments that the district court imposed an arbitrary deadline for compliance, instead agreeing that the district court correctly interpreted NRS 178.425(1) and the competency orders' use of the term "forthwith" as requiring transport within seven days based on past consent decrees in effect for many years. The Court further noted that the DPBH "struggles to honor its constitutional obligation to promptly treat incompetent inmates when the agency is not under the supervision of a court order or settlement agreement."
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld a district court’s decision to impose fines against the state agency responsible for delays in providing treatment to criminal defendants found mentally unfit to stand trial. The case centered around contempt orders involving 11 criminal defendants who were deemed incompetent to stand trial and set to be transported to psychiatric facilities for treatment. After significant delays in accepting the defendants for treatment, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss their criminal cases, or alternatively, for the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health (DPBH) to show cause as to why the DPBH should not be held in contempt by the district court. The district court denied the motions to dismiss but found DPBH in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not lack jurisdiction to find DPBH in contempt, which was established as the contempt requirements were satisfied by each criminal Defendant's motion containing a declaration from counsel under penalty of perjury along with a detailed history of the DPBH's failings (even though an affidavit identifying the material facts of the contempt is typically required) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court denied DPBH's arguments that the district court imposed an arbitrary deadline for compliance, instead agreeing that the district court correctly interpreted NRS 178.425(1) and the competency orders' use of the term "forthwith" as requiring transport within seven days based on past consent decrees in effect for many years. The Court further noted that the DPBH "struggles to honor its constitutional obligation to promptly treat incompetent inmates when the agency is not under the supervision of a court order or settlement agreement."
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Allison v. Farris, 194 So.3d 214 (Ala. 2015) (modified Nov. 12, 2015; corrected Oct. 10, 2016)
|
Alabama | 2015 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Alabama
Year:
2015
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Alabama Supreme Court addressed a conflict between Walker County Probate Judge Rick Allison and County Administrator Jill Farris regarding the authority to contract for the publication of voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison, as the county's chief election officer, was required by state law to publish certain election notices. To reduce costs, he sought bids from two local newspapers and selected the newspaper that submitted the lower bid. The Walker County Commission refused to pay the newspaper contract, asserting that the County Commission - not the probate judge - had the authority to select the newspaper and approve the cost based in part on its budgetary control and a discretionary clause in the Alabama code regarding advertising supplements. The circuit court agreed with the Commission, determining that the funding body had decision-making power. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probate judge's statutory duty to publish included the authority to choose the publisher and contract for the services. The Court reasoned that divorcing the authority to publish from the means to carry it out would defeat the legislative purpose of timely voter notification. The Court also rejected the Commission's interpretation of the statute, finding it inconsistent with the judge's express legal obligations. However, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Judge Allison complied with Alabama's competitive-bid law when awarding the contract and whether he could recover attorney's fees.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Alabama Supreme Court addressed a conflict between Walker County Probate Judge Rick Allison and County Administrator Jill Farris regarding the authority to contract for the publication of voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison, as the county's chief election officer, was required by state law to publish certain election notices. To reduce costs, he sought bids from two local newspapers and selected the newspaper that submitted the lower bid. The Walker County Commission refused to pay the newspaper contract, asserting that the County Commission - not the probate judge - had the authority to select the newspaper and approve the cost based in part on its budgetary control and a discretionary clause in the Alabama code regarding advertising supplements. The circuit court agreed with the Commission, determining that the funding body had decision-making power. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probate judge's statutory duty to publish included the authority to choose the publisher and contract for the services. The Court reasoned that divorcing the authority to publish from the means to carry it out would defeat the legislative purpose of timely voter notification. The Court also rejected the Commission's interpretation of the statute, finding it inconsistent with the judge's express legal obligations. However, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Judge Allison complied with Alabama's competitive-bid law when awarding the contract and whether he could recover attorney's fees.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 476 P.3d 307 (Ariz. 2020)
|
Arizona | 2020 | Immigration, Discrimination |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2020
Topics:
Immigration, Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis action relates to the Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa County Community College District Board, 416 P.3d 803 (Ariz. 2018) lawsuit brought by the state's Attorney General alleging that allowing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) students to receive in-state tuition rates violated Arizona law because those students are not "lawfully present" to be eligible for that benefit. The Attorney General’s lawsuit against Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) consisted of six counts. Counts I-V alleged that ABOR’s policies violated the constitutional guarantee that instruction provided by Arizona postsecondary institutions "shall be as nearly free as possible.” Count VI alleged that by subsidizing in-state tuition for students who are not “lawfully present,” ABOR violated A.R.S. §§ 15-1803(B) and -1825(A), failed to collect monies as required by ARS §35-143, and caused illegal payment of public monies in violation of ARS § 35-212. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the Attorney General lacked constitutional or statutory authority to litigate it, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court partially affirmed determining that the Attorney General was not authorized to proceed with the first set of claims, relying on Arizona State Land Department v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960), which provides that the Attorney General only possesses authority that is specifically granted by statute, and that ARS §41-193 did not provide authority to bring Counts I-V. However, the Court remanded for the Attorney General to proceed with Count VI, after finding that § 35-212, on which Count VI is based, is one of the statutes that expressly authorizes action by the Attorney General against state officers and agencies. In alleging Count VI, the Attorney General argued that “[s]tudents who attend any of the Universities and pay only in-state tuition are receiving a subsidy in the form of expenditure of public monies toward their education.” The Attorney General subsequently argued that because the amount of in-state tuition is less than the cost of education, ABOR necessarily illegally expended public funds when it extended in-state tuition to students who were unlawfully present.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
This action relates to the Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa County Community College District Board, 416 P.3d 803 (Ariz. 2018) lawsuit brought by the state's Attorney General alleging that allowing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) students to receive in-state tuition rates violated Arizona law because those students are not "lawfully present" to be eligible for that benefit. The Attorney General’s lawsuit against Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) consisted of six counts. Counts I-V alleged that ABOR’s policies violated the constitutional guarantee that instruction provided by Arizona postsecondary institutions "shall be as nearly free as possible.” Count VI alleged that by subsidizing in-state tuition for students who are not “lawfully present,” ABOR violated A.R.S. §§ 15-1803(B) and -1825(A), failed to collect monies as required by ARS §35-143, and caused illegal payment of public monies in violation of ARS § 35-212. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the Attorney General lacked constitutional or statutory authority to litigate it, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court partially affirmed determining that the Attorney General was not authorized to proceed with the first set of claims, relying on Arizona State Land Department v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960), which provides that the Attorney General only possesses authority that is specifically granted by statute, and that ARS §41-193 did not provide authority to bring Counts I-V. However, the Court remanded for the Attorney General to proceed with Count VI, after finding that § 35-212, on which Count VI is based, is one of the statutes that expressly authorizes action by the Attorney General against state officers and agencies. In alleging Count VI, the Attorney General argued that “[s]tudents who attend any of the Universities and pay only in-state tuition are receiving a subsidy in the form of expenditure of public monies toward their education.” The Attorney General subsequently argued that because the amount of in-state tuition is less than the cost of education, ABOR necessarily illegally expended public funds when it extended in-state tuition to students who were unlawfully present.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663 (Ariz. 2017)
|
Arizona | 2017 | Civil Rights |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2017
Topics:
Civil Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Attorney General initiated a special action against Tucson, claiming that a city ordinance that required Tucson to destroy forfeited or unclaimed firearms violated a state law requiring law enforcement to sell such firearms to stores. The Court concluded that the state law preempted Tucson's ordinance because firearm and police department regulation was a matter of statewide concern and therefore not entrusted to local determination under the state constitution.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Attorney General initiated a special action against Tucson, claiming that a city ordinance that required Tucson to destroy forfeited or unclaimed firearms violated a state law requiring law enforcement to sell such firearms to stores. The Court concluded that the state law preempted Tucson's ordinance because firearm and police department regulation was a matter of statewide concern and therefore not entrusted to local determination under the state constitution.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2021)
|
Arizona | 2021 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2021
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Arizona Attorney General sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01, which required consolidation of local elections with state elections if certain voter participation criteria were not met, could be applied to a city whose charter specified otherwise. The Supreme Court ruled that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 cannot apply to require a city to consolidate its local elections with statewide elections if its charter provides otherwise. The state constitution's "home rule charter" provision, gives charter cities autonomy over matters of "purely municipal concern." The Supreme Court ruled that the timing and administration of local elections are matters of purely municipal concern and thus not subject to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 when the city's charter authorizes the city to make the determination of whether to hold municipal elections on cycle or off cycle.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Arizona Attorney General sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01, which required consolidation of local elections with state elections if certain voter participation criteria were not met, could be applied to a city whose charter specified otherwise. The Supreme Court ruled that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 cannot apply to require a city to consolidate its local elections with statewide elections if its charter provides otherwise. The state constitution's "home rule charter" provision, gives charter cities autonomy over matters of "purely municipal concern." The Supreme Court ruled that the timing and administration of local elections are matters of purely municipal concern and thus not subject to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-204.01 when the city's charter authorizes the city to make the determination of whether to hold municipal elections on cycle or off cycle.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Loc. Schs., 170 N.E.3d 748 (Ohio 2020)
|
Ohio | 2020 | Education |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2020
Topics:
Education
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that the Ohio Student Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of public school records pertaining to a student, even where the student is a former student, an adult, and is deceased, without written consent of the former student. Media organizations submitted public records requests to a school district for records of its former student who committed a mass shooting and was killed by police at the scene of the incident, and the school denied the requests stating the records were exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court agreed that the school did not have to disclose the records reasoning that the statute unambiguously covers former students as well as current students, and that the plain language of the statute does not provide an exception for a deceased individual.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio Student Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of public school records pertaining to a student, even where the student is a former student, an adult, and is deceased, without written consent of the former student. Media organizations submitted public records requests to a school district for records of its former student who committed a mass shooting and was killed by police at the scene of the incident, and the school denied the requests stating the records were exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court agreed that the school did not have to disclose the records reasoning that the statute unambiguously covers former students as well as current students, and that the plain language of the statute does not provide an exception for a deceased individual.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Med. Exam'rs Off., 94 N.E.3d 498 (Ohio 2017)
|
Ohio | 2017 | Criminal Justice |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2017
Topics:
Criminal Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA father who had been convicted of murdering his infant daughter sought to have records pertaining to his daughter released. This case involved the interpretation of the applicable Ohio statute that governs access to records held by the coroner's office. The Supreme Court held that the father was entitled to full and complete records of the coroner related to his daughter's autopsy and that except for death certificate, records requested by father were within the “full and complete records” of the coroner and thus must be turned over.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
A father who had been convicted of murdering his infant daughter sought to have records pertaining to his daughter released. This case involved the interpretation of the applicable Ohio statute that governs access to records held by the coroner's office. The Supreme Court held that the father was entitled to full and complete records of the coroner related to his daughter's autopsy and that except for death certificate, records requested by father were within the “full and complete records” of the coroner and thus must be turned over.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Cunnane et al. v. LaRose, 202 N.E.3d 679 (Ohio 2022)
|
Ohio | 2022 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Cunnanes filed a joint nominating petition to appear on Ohio's 2022 general-election ballot as independent candidates for the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Ohio Secretary of State rejected their nominating petition because the Cunnanes had both cast partisan ballots in the May 2022 primary election, and therefore he claimed they were not unaffiliated from a political party. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary reasonably concluded that prospective candidates' declarations of independence were made in bad faith or were no longer true.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Cunnanes filed a joint nominating petition to appear on Ohio's 2022 general-election ballot as independent candidates for the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Ohio Secretary of State rejected their nominating petition because the Cunnanes had both cast partisan ballots in the May 2022 primary election, and therefore he claimed they were not unaffiliated from a political party. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary reasonably concluded that prospective candidates' declarations of independence were made in bad faith or were no longer true.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Davis v. Summit Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 998 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio 2013)
|
Ohio | 2013 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2013
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA prospective independent candidate filed an expedited election action seeking a writ from the Supreme Court to require the County Board of Elections to place her name on the ballot for the City Council general election. The Board of Elections suspected bad faith and lack of disaffiliation from Democratic Party because Davis had voted in a Presidential partisan primary in March 2012. However, the Supreme Court held that a candidate's prior voting history alone is not a sufficient basis for disqualifying them as an independent candidate. Further, the Court explained that the requirement imposed by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.257, which outlines the procedure for independent candidate statements of candidacy, is that a candidate to a non-governor or non-presidential primary election must declare their lack of affiliation to a party in good faith, not that they take affirmative action to disaffiliate in order to prove their good faith. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the requested writ to allow Davis's name on the ballot as an independent candidate.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
A prospective independent candidate filed an expedited election action seeking a writ from the Supreme Court to require the County Board of Elections to place her name on the ballot for the City Council general election. The Board of Elections suspected bad faith and lack of disaffiliation from Democratic Party because Davis had voted in a Presidential partisan primary in March 2012. However, the Supreme Court held that a candidate's prior voting history alone is not a sufficient basis for disqualifying them as an independent candidate. Further, the Court explained that the requirement imposed by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.257, which outlines the procedure for independent candidate statements of candidacy, is that a candidate to a non-governor or non-presidential primary election must declare their lack of affiliation to a party in good faith, not that they take affirmative action to disaffiliate in order to prove their good faith. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the requested writ to allow Davis's name on the ballot as an independent candidate.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 205 N.E.3d 558 (Ohio 2023)
|
Ohio | 2023 | Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2023
Topics:
Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court upheld the Ohio Ballot Board's denial of a petition seeking to add a constitutional amendment titled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety" to the ballot. The amendment aimed to safeguard an individual's right to make reproductive decisions, including those related to abortion. However, the Ballot Board objected to the petition, asserting that abortion should not be treated as part of reproductive rights, citing distinctions between abortion as a medical procedure and other "intimate, personal decisions." Subsequently, the voters pursued a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to prompt the Ballot Board to reconsider their petition. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court for adjudication. This decision was grounded in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 3505.062, which confers discretionary authority to the Ballot Board in determining the inclusion of proposed amendments on the ballot. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the imperfections in the Ballot Board's reasoning, it concluded that the Ballot Board acted within the bounds of its authorized discretion, as outlined in RC 3505.062. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by the voters who filed the petition, upholding the Ballot Board's decision.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the Ohio Ballot Board's denial of a petition seeking to add a constitutional amendment titled "The Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety" to the ballot. The amendment aimed to safeguard an individual's right to make reproductive decisions, including those related to abortion. However, the Ballot Board objected to the petition, asserting that abortion should not be treated as part of reproductive rights, citing distinctions between abortion as a medical procedure and other "intimate, personal decisions." Subsequently, the voters pursued a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to prompt the Ballot Board to reconsider their petition. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court for adjudication. This decision was grounded in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 3505.062, which confers discretionary authority to the Ballot Board in determining the inclusion of proposed amendments on the ballot. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the imperfections in the Ballot Board's reasoning, it concluded that the Ballot Board acted within the bounds of its authorized discretion, as outlined in RC 3505.062. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by the voters who filed the petition, upholding the Ballot Board's decision.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Espen v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.E.3d 1222 (Ohio 2017)
|
Ohio | 2017 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2017
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA protester sought a writ from the Supreme Court to compel the County Board of Elections to remove a proposed City-charter amendment from the general election ballot. The amendment provided that the people of the City possessed the right to a healthy environment and livable climate, and therefore there should be no new infrastructure for fossil fuel transportation within the city except for infrastructure to transport fuel to end-users within the County. The protestor challenged the constitutionality of the amendment by alleging that it was a regulation of commerce that occurs outside the City's municipal boundaries and was beyond the city's authority to enact. The Board of Elections reviewed the petition and decided that the amendment was constitutional and permitted. However, the Supreme Court held that the Board of Elections does not have authority to review the legality or constitutionality of a ballot measure's substantive terms. Such review belongs in the judicial branch. Therefore, the Board did not have the authority to dismiss the constitutional challenge; rather, the judicial branch could review the constitutionality of the amendment if and when the amendment is adopted.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
A protester sought a writ from the Supreme Court to compel the County Board of Elections to remove a proposed City-charter amendment from the general election ballot. The amendment provided that the people of the City possessed the right to a healthy environment and livable climate, and therefore there should be no new infrastructure for fossil fuel transportation within the city except for infrastructure to transport fuel to end-users within the County. The protestor challenged the constitutionality of the amendment by alleging that it was a regulation of commerce that occurs outside the City's municipal boundaries and was beyond the city's authority to enact. The Board of Elections reviewed the petition and decided that the amendment was constitutional and permitted. However, the Supreme Court held that the Board of Elections does not have authority to review the legality or constitutionality of a ballot measure's substantive terms. Such review belongs in the judicial branch. Therefore, the Board did not have the authority to dismiss the constitutional challenge; rather, the judicial branch could review the constitutionality of the amendment if and when the amendment is adopted.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp., 852 N.W.2d 103 (Mich. 2014)
|
Michigan | 2014 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
Michigan
Year:
2014
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved two consolidated class actions (one brought by Plaintiffs the City of Lansing and Dickinson Press Inc. and the other brought by Plaintiff consumer of prescription medication). Plaintiffs alleged that multiple pharmacies in Michigan systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Plaintiffs further contended that violations of § 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) because pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. The Supreme Court held that (1) the section of Public Health Code that required pharmacist to pass on savings to purchaser when a generic drug was substituted for a brand-name drug only applied when pharmacist was engaged in a substitution transaction; and (2) plaintiffs failed to allege fraud with the required specificity. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
This case involved two consolidated class actions (one brought by Plaintiffs the City of Lansing and Dickinson Press Inc. and the other brought by Plaintiff consumer of prescription medication). Plaintiffs alleged that multiple pharmacies in Michigan systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Plaintiffs further contended that violations of § 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) because pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. The Supreme Court held that (1) the section of Public Health Code that required pharmacist to pass on savings to purchaser when a generic drug was substituted for a brand-name drug only applied when pharmacist was engaged in a substitution transaction; and (2) plaintiffs failed to allege fraud with the required specificity. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Keith v. Adult Parole Auth., 24 N.E.3d 1132 (Ohio 2014)
|
Ohio | 2018 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2018
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn inmate filed an action seeking a writ of mandamus alleging that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (OAPA) and the chair of the Ohio Parole Board denied him meaningful parole consideration because they relied on information in his parole record that he alleged to be incorrect. The Supreme Court ruled (1) that inmate could not invoke due process to challenge his allegedly inaccurate parole record because he has no constitutional or statutory right to parole; (2) that in any parole determination involving indeterminate sentencing, the Adult Parole Authority may not rely on information that it knows or has reason to know is inaccurate; and (3) Authority was required to investigate inmate's allegations of substantive errors and correct them. The Supreme Court therefore reversed on the basis that having established a parole system, and having put in place statutory and regulatory language requiring the OAPA to consider relevant information regarding a prisoner it is considering for parole, the state created a minimal due-process expectation that the information will actually and accurately pertain to the prisoner whose parole is being considered.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
An inmate filed an action seeking a writ of mandamus alleging that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (OAPA) and the chair of the Ohio Parole Board denied him meaningful parole consideration because they relied on information in his parole record that he alleged to be incorrect. The Supreme Court ruled (1) that inmate could not invoke due process to challenge his allegedly inaccurate parole record because he has no constitutional or statutory right to parole; (2) that in any parole determination involving indeterminate sentencing, the Adult Parole Authority may not rely on information that it knows or has reason to know is inaccurate; and (3) Authority was required to investigate inmate's allegations of substantive errors and correct them. The Supreme Court therefore reversed on the basis that having established a parole system, and having put in place statutory and regulatory language requiring the OAPA to consider relevant information regarding a prisoner it is considering for parole, the state created a minimal due-process expectation that the information will actually and accurately pertain to the prisoner whose parole is being considered.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Khumprakob v. Mahoning Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 109 N.E. 3d 1184 (Ohio 2018)
|
Ohio | 2018 | Environment, Water Rights, Actions Against Government |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2018
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court held that four electors had a clear legal right to have their proposal placed on the May 2018 election ballot and that the Mahoning County Board of Elections had a duty to provide that relief. The electors' proposal was an amendment to the Youngstown city charter that would (1) recognize the rights of Youngstown residents to “clean water, air, and soil” and to be free from fossil-fuel drilling and extraction activities; (2) require the city to prosecute violations of the amendment; (3) impose strict liability on any government or corporation that violates the rights; (4) restrict the use of funds allocated to the city's water and sewer infrastructure; and (5) give the people of Youngstown the right “to compel their governments to protect their rights, health, and safety.”
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Supreme Court held that four electors had a clear legal right to have their proposal placed on the May 2018 election ballot and that the Mahoning County Board of Elections had a duty to provide that relief. The electors' proposal was an amendment to the Youngstown city charter that would (1) recognize the rights of Youngstown residents to “clean water, air, and soil” and to be free from fossil-fuel drilling and extraction activities; (2) require the city to prosecute violations of the amendment; (3) impose strict liability on any government or corporation that violates the rights; (4) restrict the use of funds allocated to the city's water and sewer infrastructure; and (5) give the people of Youngstown the right “to compel their governments to protect their rights, health, and safety.”
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Kreuger v. Appleton Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 898 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. 2017)
|
Wisconsin | 2017 | Education, Censorship |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2017
Topics:
Education, Censorship
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA parent of a student attending a public school asked the school district to establish an alternative ninth-grade Communications Arts 1 curriculum that did not include "profanities, obscenities, or sexualized content." The school district's officials began a curriculum review process through a curriculum review committee, but denied the parent access to the curriculum review committee meetings. The parent brought suit against the school district, claiming that the denial violated Wisconsin's open meetings law. The Supreme Court held that the curriculum review committee was subject to the open meetings law because the committee constituted a "governmental body" as defined by the state open meetings law. Specifically, the Supreme Court first found that the curriculum review committee constituted a "committee" as defined by the open meetings law because it had the "essential elements" of defined membership and collective responsibilities/authority. Second, the Supreme Court found that the committee was "created by . . . rule" because it was formed pursuant to the school board-approved Assessment, Curriculum, & Instruction Handbook (ACI Handbook) and Rule 361—which states that the school board is "legally responsible for all educational materials utilized" and that curriculum revision shall be conducted pursuant to the ACI Handbook. The Supreme Court reasoned that the ACI Handbook and Rule 361 together constituted a "rule" because they were adopted to "prescribe the procedures for District employees to follow in reviewing educational materials and presenting them to the Board for approval." Therefore, the curriculum review committee was a committee "created by . . . rule" and subject to the open meetings law.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
A parent of a student attending a public school asked the school district to establish an alternative ninth-grade Communications Arts 1 curriculum that did not include "profanities, obscenities, or sexualized content." The school district's officials began a curriculum review process through a curriculum review committee, but denied the parent access to the curriculum review committee meetings. The parent brought suit against the school district, claiming that the denial violated Wisconsin's open meetings law. The Supreme Court held that the curriculum review committee was subject to the open meetings law because the committee constituted a "governmental body" as defined by the state open meetings law. Specifically, the Supreme Court first found that the curriculum review committee constituted a "committee" as defined by the open meetings law because it had the "essential elements" of defined membership and collective responsibilities/authority. Second, the Supreme Court found that the committee was "created by . . . rule" because it was formed pursuant to the school board-approved Assessment, Curriculum, & Instruction Handbook (ACI Handbook) and Rule 361—which states that the school board is "legally responsible for all educational materials utilized" and that curriculum revision shall be conducted pursuant to the ACI Handbook. The Supreme Court reasoned that the ACI Handbook and Rule 361 together constituted a "rule" because they were adopted to "prescribe the procedures for District employees to follow in reviewing educational materials and presenting them to the Board for approval." Therefore, the curriculum review committee was a committee "created by . . . rule" and subject to the open meetings law.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Lusane v. Kent Police Dep't, 213 N.E.3d 681 (Ohio 2023)
|
Ohio | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff delivered a public-records request to the police department, requesting “ANY and ALL officer body camera and cruiser dash camera video, but request was denied on the basis that the records fall within the public-records-disclosure exception: confidential law-enforcement investigatory records (CLEIR). Plaintiff thereafter filed an action requesting (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the police department to release the dash- and body-camera videos; and (2) an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court held that dash- and body-cam recordings are public records and subject to disclosure after a public record request under O.R.C. 149.43 unless the arrest footage meets the CLEIR exception, but, in this case, such recordings did not meet the CLEIR exception as the police department failed to even argue why redaction at the point of arrest would be proper. The Plaintiff was also awarded statutory damages of $1,000.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Plaintiff delivered a public-records request to the police department, requesting “ANY and ALL officer body camera and cruiser dash camera video, but request was denied on the basis that the records fall within the public-records-disclosure exception: confidential law-enforcement investigatory records (CLEIR). Plaintiff thereafter filed an action requesting (1) a writ of mandamus ordering the police department to release the dash- and body-camera videos; and (2) an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court held that dash- and body-cam recordings are public records and subject to disclosure after a public record request under O.R.C. 149.43 unless the arrest footage meets the CLEIR exception, but, in this case, such recordings did not meet the CLEIR exception as the police department failed to even argue why redaction at the point of arrest would be proper. The Plaintiff was also awarded statutory damages of $1,000.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose, 189 N.E.3d 777 (Ohio 2022)
|
Ohio | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingTersehore P. Maras was an independent candidate for Ohio Secretary of State and was on the November 8, 2022, general-election ballot. Maras sought a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court compelling the Ohio Secretary of State, Frank LaRose, to (1) allow Maras to appoint election observers to inspect the counting of votes; and (2) to compel LaRose to provide election observers with copies of all software, source codes, and hardware that is installed on any automatic vote-tabulating machine, on the grounds that not doing so would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions because it prevents certified independent candidates from appointing election observers to the same extent as political parties. The Supreme Court ruled that, under a rational-basis review, the statute in question serves a legitimate government interest by obviating the potential for Boards of Elections to become overwhelmed with too many election observers and the statute in question does not provide election observers with permission to inspect the software, source codes, or hardware installed on automatic vote-tabulating machines, nor does it require poll workers to tabulate votes by hand.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Tersehore P. Maras was an independent candidate for Ohio Secretary of State and was on the November 8, 2022, general-election ballot. Maras sought a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court compelling the Ohio Secretary of State, Frank LaRose, to (1) allow Maras to appoint election observers to inspect the counting of votes; and (2) to compel LaRose to provide election observers with copies of all software, source codes, and hardware that is installed on any automatic vote-tabulating machine, on the grounds that not doing so would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions because it prevents certified independent candidates from appointing election observers to the same extent as political parties. The Supreme Court ruled that, under a rational-basis review, the statute in question serves a legitimate government interest by obviating the potential for Boards of Elections to become overwhelmed with too many election observers and the statute in question does not provide election observers with permission to inspect the software, source codes, or hardware installed on automatic vote-tabulating machines, nor does it require poll workers to tabulate votes by hand.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 535 P.3d 3 (Ariz. 2023)
|
Arizona | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe case involved Lonnie Allen Bassett, who was 16 years old when he committed two murders and was sentenced to natural life for one count and life with the possibility of parole after 25 years for the other. Bassett filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held lifetime incarceration without parole for children without consideration of age violates the Eighth Amendment and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which held that Miller is retroactive. The PCR court found a colorable claim and ordered an evidentiary hearing. However, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bassett’s natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller. Unlike in Miller, which mandated a sentence of life without parole, the applicable Arizona statute required the trial court to consider age and qualities of youth as mitigating factors in sentencing. The Court concluded that there had been no significant change in the law that would likely overturn his sentence, and dismissed the PCR petition.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The case involved Lonnie Allen Bassett, who was 16 years old when he committed two murders and was sentenced to natural life for one count and life with the possibility of parole after 25 years for the other. Bassett filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held lifetime incarceration without parole for children without consideration of age violates the Eighth Amendment and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which held that Miller is retroactive. The PCR court found a colorable claim and ordered an evidentiary hearing. However, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bassett’s natural life sentence was not mandatory within the meaning of Miller. Unlike in Miller, which mandated a sentence of life without parole, the applicable Arizona statute required the trial court to consider age and qualities of youth as mitigating factors in sentencing. The Court concluded that there had been no significant change in the law that would likely overturn his sentence, and dismissed the PCR petition.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Murray v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 123 N.E.3d 941 (Ohio 2018)
|
Ohio | 2018 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2018
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter being fired from his job as a Columbus police officer, David Murray attempted to regain his job through arbitration involving his union. According to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Columbus, only the union could initiate arbitration of grievances; nearly two years after his dismissal, the union had failed to initiate formal arbitration proceedings. Shortly before the 2-year mark, Murray suit in federal court alleging that the city and its public safety director had violated his rights by terminating him without due process and by depriving him of his right to be heard on his termination. Several months later and with little concrete progress on commencing arbitration, Murray filed before SERB unfair labor practice charges against both the city and the union, alleging they “collaborated to delay the timely arbitration of the grievance," and subsequently “collaborated to falsify evidence of a settlement agreement and deprive [Murray] of his arbitration.”
SERB dismissed all the unfair-labor-practice charges, concluding that they had been filed outside the 90-day statute of limitations applicable to each charge. Murray filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to set the charges for hearing. The Supreme Court held that SERB did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Murray's charges as untimely, upholding a lower court's denial of writ. Specifically, the Supreme Court agreed with SERB's determination that Muray's alleged damages occurred on June 23, when the city and union reportedly conspired to represent the grievance had been resolved, rather than on September 29, when the settlement was signed.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
After being fired from his job as a Columbus police officer, David Murray attempted to regain his job through arbitration involving his union. According to the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Columbus, only the union could initiate arbitration of grievances; nearly two years after his dismissal, the union had failed to initiate formal arbitration proceedings. Shortly before the 2-year mark, Murray suit in federal court alleging that the city and its public safety director had violated his rights by terminating him without due process and by depriving him of his right to be heard on his termination. Several months later and with little concrete progress on commencing arbitration, Murray filed before SERB unfair labor practice charges against both the city and the union, alleging they “collaborated to delay the timely arbitration of the grievance," and subsequently “collaborated to falsify evidence of a settlement agreement and deprive [Murray] of his arbitration.”
SERB dismissed all the unfair-labor-practice charges, concluding that they had been filed outside the 90-day statute of limitations applicable to each charge. Murray filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to set the charges for hearing. The Supreme Court held that SERB did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Murray's charges as untimely, upholding a lower court's denial of writ. Specifically, the Supreme Court agreed with SERB's determination that Muray's alleged damages occurred on June 23, when the city and union reportedly conspired to represent the grievance had been resolved, rather than on September 29, when the settlement was signed.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. O'Neill v. Athens Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 154 N.E.3d 44 (Ohio 2020)
|
Ohio | 2020 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2020
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingO'Neill was running for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District, which encompassed Athens County. For a few years, O'Neill had been attending law school in Vermont, but began to look for employment and a place to live in Athens County in October 2019. On October 14, 2019, she started living with a friend while seeking a permanent home. She then met with an apartment management company at the end of October, and on November 1, they agreed to a nine-month lease starting on that date. However, at the request of the company representative, O'Neill did not make the rent payment or receive her keys until November 4th. Upon submitting her candidacy for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District, a voter filed a protest alleging that O'Neill had not resided in the district for one year preceding the November 3, 2020 general election. The Athens County Board of Elections subsequently voted that O'Neill was not an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination because she had not resided in the district for one year preceding the general election. However, the Supreme Court held that O'Neill satisfied the residency requirement because she had been working and living in the district for over a year. The standard for residency according to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.02 is that the residence of a person is the place in which the person's habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning to. The Supreme Court emphasized that the person's intent to make a place a fixed or permanent place of abode is a key consideration. Since O'Neill started living in the County on October 14th, 2019 with a friend, with the intention of making the County her permanent home, the Board abused its discretion by upholding the protest to O'Neill's candidacy.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
O'Neill was running for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District, which encompassed Athens County. For a few years, O'Neill had been attending law school in Vermont, but began to look for employment and a place to live in Athens County in October 2019. On October 14, 2019, she started living with a friend while seeking a permanent home. She then met with an apartment management company at the end of October, and on November 1, they agreed to a nine-month lease starting on that date. However, at the request of the company representative, O'Neill did not make the rent payment or receive her keys until November 4th. Upon submitting her candidacy for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th Ohio House District, a voter filed a protest alleging that O'Neill had not resided in the district for one year preceding the November 3, 2020 general election. The Athens County Board of Elections subsequently voted that O'Neill was not an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination because she had not resided in the district for one year preceding the general election. However, the Supreme Court held that O'Neill satisfied the residency requirement because she had been working and living in the district for over a year. The standard for residency according to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.02 is that the residence of a person is the place in which the person's habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning to. The Supreme Court emphasized that the person's intent to make a place a fixed or permanent place of abode is a key consideration. Since O'Neill started living in the County on October 14th, 2019 with a friend, with the intention of making the County her permanent home, the Board abused its discretion by upholding the protest to O'Neill's candidacy.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Pool v. Sheffield Lake, 224 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio 2023)
|
Ohio | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff was a police officer in Sheffield Lake and the only black police officer when he was hired by Sheffield Lake. The police chief Sheffield Lake was blatantly racist towards the Plaintiff, including placing a paper sign that read KKK on hi back to taunt the Plaintiff and was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into the incident. The Plaintiff submitted a public records request, but the Sheffield Lake only provided partial responses and he subsequently filed an action for writ of mandamus for the records related to the incident not provided by the Sheffield Lake. The Supreme Court ruled that Sheffield Lake made reasonable efforts to locate and share offensive images from former police chief’s computer in response to a former subordinate's allegations of racism and city cannot be compelled to produce documents that it does not have or could not find after a reasonable effort.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Plaintiff was a police officer in Sheffield Lake and the only black police officer when he was hired by Sheffield Lake. The police chief Sheffield Lake was blatantly racist towards the Plaintiff, including placing a paper sign that read KKK on hi back to taunt the Plaintiff and was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation into the incident. The Plaintiff submitted a public records request, but the Sheffield Lake only provided partial responses and he subsequently filed an action for writ of mandamus for the records related to the incident not provided by the Sheffield Lake. The Supreme Court ruled that Sheffield Lake made reasonable efforts to locate and share offensive images from former police chief’s computer in response to a former subordinate's allegations of racism and city cannot be compelled to produce documents that it does not have or could not find after a reasonable effort.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 238 N.E.3d 1085 (Ill. 2024)
|
Illinois | 2024 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2024
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Attorney General filed suit against Elite Staffing Inc., Metro Staff, Inc., and Midway Staffing Inc., for violating the Illinois Antitrust Act by conspiring to fix employee wages. The agencies all supplied temporary workers to a company, Colony Display (Colony). Colony and the agencies agreed to fix wages for the staffing company employees at below-market rates and agreed not to hire each others’ employees. The agencies argued that the Antitrust Act did not apply to the charged conduct because the employees were only working for Colony on a temporary basis. In the agencies’ view, they could only be liable for holding down the wages of their own full-time employees, and not temporary workers. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the Illinois Antitrust Act applies when competitors conspire to hold down wages and limit employment opportunities for each others’ employees—even temporary employees—unless the fixed wage is reached through the employee collective bargaining process and the employees have bargained with the employer for the set wage and opportunities.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Attorney General filed suit against Elite Staffing Inc., Metro Staff, Inc., and Midway Staffing Inc., for violating the Illinois Antitrust Act by conspiring to fix employee wages. The agencies all supplied temporary workers to a company, Colony Display (Colony). Colony and the agencies agreed to fix wages for the staffing company employees at below-market rates and agreed not to hire each others’ employees. The agencies argued that the Antitrust Act did not apply to the charged conduct because the employees were only working for Colony on a temporary basis. In the agencies’ view, they could only be liable for holding down the wages of their own full-time employees, and not temporary workers. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the Illinois Antitrust Act applies when competitors conspire to hold down wages and limit employment opportunities for each others’ employees—even temporary employees—unless the fixed wage is reached through the employee collective bargaining process and the employees have bargained with the employer for the set wage and opportunities.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Stark Cnty. Bd. of Elections v. Stark Cnty. Bd. Of Comm'rs, 177 N.E.3d 232 (Ohio 2021)
|
Ohio | 2021 | Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2021
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Voting Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Stark County Board of Elections adopted new voting machines under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3506.02. However, the Stark County Board of Commissioners viewed the Elections Board decision as a recommendation and refused to acquire and install the updated equipment. The Commissioners instead demanded that the Board of Elections provide them with more information about their decision-making process. The Commissioners ultimately voted to not adopt the Board of Election's recommendation. However, the Board of Elections later passed a motion again adopting the voting system and demanding that the Commissioners acquire and fund the effort. The Commissioners denied this motion. The Elections Board filed a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court to compel the Commissioners to acquire the selected voting machines. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Elections rightfully led the acquisition search, and the Commissioners had a clear legal duty to acquire the relevant equipment upon the recommendation of the Board of Elections. The Supreme Court therefore granted a writ of mandamus for the Stark County Board of Elections to compel the County's Board of Commissioners to acquire the specific voting machines.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Stark County Board of Elections adopted new voting machines under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3506.02. However, the Stark County Board of Commissioners viewed the Elections Board decision as a recommendation and refused to acquire and install the updated equipment. The Commissioners instead demanded that the Board of Elections provide them with more information about their decision-making process. The Commissioners ultimately voted to not adopt the Board of Election's recommendation. However, the Board of Elections later passed a motion again adopting the voting system and demanding that the Commissioners acquire and fund the effort. The Commissioners denied this motion. The Elections Board filed a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court to compel the Commissioners to acquire the selected voting machines. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Elections rightfully led the acquisition search, and the Commissioners had a clear legal duty to acquire the relevant equipment upon the recommendation of the Board of Elections. The Supreme Court therefore granted a writ of mandamus for the Stark County Board of Elections to compel the County's Board of Commissioners to acquire the specific voting machines.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Stein v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 879 S.E.2d 537 (N.C. 2022)
|
North Carolina | 2022 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2022
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingE.I. du Pont, a chemical company facing mounting liabilities for releasing harmful chemicals into the environment, transferred its assets to two out-of-state successors. The state challenged this significant corporate restructuring as an attempt to avoid liability within North Carolina. The Supreme Court held in favor of the state, and ruled that North Carolina courts could establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state successor by imputing to it the liabilities of its predecessor in certain circumstances.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
E.I. du Pont, a chemical company facing mounting liabilities for releasing harmful chemicals into the environment, transferred its assets to two out-of-state successors. The state challenged this significant corporate restructuring as an attempt to avoid liability within North Carolina. The Supreme Court held in favor of the state, and ruled that North Carolina courts could establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state successor by imputing to it the liabilities of its predecessor in certain circumstances.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Stein v. Kinston Charter Acad., 866 S.E.2d 647 (N.C. 2021)
|
North Carolina | 2021 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2021
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingKingston Charter Academy (Academy), a charter school, received $600,000 from the North Carolina for the 2013-2014 school year on account of financial difficulties. The amount was based on a higher reported number of students enrolled at the school than there actually was. In response, the state brought suit against the school, as well as the Board Chair under the False Claims Act. The Academy raised a sovereign immunity defense, arguing that it is an instrumentality of the state. The Supreme Court held that charter schools were not intended to be agencies or instrumentalities of the state, and therefore should not be able to assert a sovereign immunity defense. The Supreme Court further concluded that the state had adequately demonstrated a claim of relief by alleging that the estimate of student enrollment qualified as an actionable falsehood under the False Claims Act and that the CEO was not entitled to public official immunity.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Kingston Charter Academy (Academy), a charter school, received $600,000 from the North Carolina for the 2013-2014 school year on account of financial difficulties. The amount was based on a higher reported number of students enrolled at the school than there actually was. In response, the state brought suit against the school, as well as the Board Chair under the False Claims Act. The Academy raised a sovereign immunity defense, arguing that it is an instrumentality of the state. The Supreme Court held that charter schools were not intended to be agencies or instrumentalities of the state, and therefore should not be able to assert a sovereign immunity defense. The Supreme Court further concluded that the state had adequately demonstrated a claim of relief by alleging that the estimate of student enrollment qualified as an actionable falsehood under the False Claims Act and that the CEO was not entitled to public official immunity.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Summit Cnty. Republican Party Exec. Comm. v. LaRose, 177 N.E.3d 218 (Ohio 2021)
|
Ohio | 2021 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2021
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Summit County political party executive committee petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to reappoint the party's candidate, who had already served two terms as a member of the County's Board of Elections, for a third term as a Board member. LaRose had rejected the appointee because of he perceived a culture of dysfunction on the board, and placed responsibility on one person. The rejection letter was based on seven reasons pertaining to the board as a whole and its culture and direction, not the appointee himself. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary had wrongly rejected the reappointment with invalid reasoning and abused discretion. In particular, LaRose was not permitted to reject a recommendation for reasons unrelated to personal misconduct by the recommended appointee.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Summit County political party executive committee petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to reappoint the party's candidate, who had already served two terms as a member of the County's Board of Elections, for a third term as a Board member. LaRose had rejected the appointee because of he perceived a culture of dysfunction on the board, and placed responsibility on one person. The rejection letter was based on seven reasons pertaining to the board as a whole and its culture and direction, not the appointee himself. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary had wrongly rejected the reappointment with invalid reasoning and abused discretion. In particular, LaRose was not permitted to reject a recommendation for reasons unrelated to personal misconduct by the recommended appointee.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. The City of Cleveland v. Russo, 129 N.E.3d 384 (Ohio 2019)
|
Ohio | 2019 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2019
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDuring ongoing contract negotiations with its firefighter's union, the Cleveland's fire chief unilaterally decided to change the start time of the firefighter's 24-hour shift. The firefighters union filed a complaint with the State Employment Relations Board (SERB), arguing this was unfair labor practices in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) (interfering with employees’ selection of a representative for collective-bargaining purposes) and (5) (refusing to bargain collectively with employees’ representative). Shortly thereafter, the union filed a complaint in county court against the city, the fire chief, and the director of public safety. The union sought to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing the order until the mandatory collective-bargaining negotiation process had been completed.
Judge Russo, overseeing the case in county court, rejected Cleveland's argument that her court lacked authority over this collective bargaining dispute, and set a hearing date for a preliminary injunction of the fire department's new shift policy. Cleveland then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, arguing that Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the union’s claims due to the General Assembly’s granting SERB “exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising from rights created by [R.C.] Chapter 4117.” The Supreme Court found that Russo (and courts of common pleas broadly) lacked jurisdiction over unfair-labor-practice allegations cases which are "within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB." The Supreme Court granted the peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered Judge Russo to vacate the orders she had previously entered.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
During ongoing contract negotiations with its firefighter's union, the Cleveland's fire chief unilaterally decided to change the start time of the firefighter's 24-hour shift. The firefighters union filed a complaint with the State Employment Relations Board (SERB), arguing this was unfair labor practices in violation of R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) (interfering with employees’ selection of a representative for collective-bargaining purposes) and (5) (refusing to bargain collectively with employees’ representative). Shortly thereafter, the union filed a complaint in county court against the city, the fire chief, and the director of public safety. The union sought to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing the order until the mandatory collective-bargaining negotiation process had been completed.
Judge Russo, overseeing the case in county court, rejected Cleveland's argument that her court lacked authority over this collective bargaining dispute, and set a hearing date for a preliminary injunction of the fire department's new shift policy. Cleveland then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, arguing that Judge Russo patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the union’s claims due to the General Assembly’s granting SERB “exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising from rights created by [R.C.] Chapter 4117.” The Supreme Court found that Russo (and courts of common pleas broadly) lacked jurisdiction over unfair-labor-practice allegations cases which are "within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB." The Supreme Court granted the peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered Judge Russo to vacate the orders she had previously entered.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Cooper, 775 S.E.2d 809 (N.C. 2015)
|
North Carolina | 2015 | Environment, Water Rights, Actions Against Government |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2015
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe North Carolina Attorney General sought judicial review of the North Carolina Utilities Commission's determination that it was in the public interest to allow the public water utility to utilize a rate adjustment mechanism in order to invest in water infrastructure and improve water quality. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's determination was based upon sufficient findings of fact and was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Commission affirmatively imposed obligations on the water utility to ensure that it would use the rate adjustment mechanism only to make meaningful improvements to its system, and the Commission took meaningful steps to ensure that customers would be charged only after the utility has made improvements to the quality and reliability of its service.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The North Carolina Attorney General sought judicial review of the North Carolina Utilities Commission's determination that it was in the public interest to allow the public water utility to utilize a rate adjustment mechanism in order to invest in water infrastructure and improve water quality. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's determination was based upon sufficient findings of fact and was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Commission affirmatively imposed obligations on the water utility to ensure that it would use the rate adjustment mechanism only to make meaningful improvements to its system, and the Commission took meaningful steps to ensure that customers would be charged only after the utility has made improvements to the quality and reliability of its service.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Va. Elec. and Power Co., 873 S.E.2d 608 (N.C. 2022)
|
North Carolina | 2022 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2022
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe North Carolina Utilities Commission denied an electric utility's application to calculate its rates by amortizing certain costs associated with the storage, disposal, and removal of coal ash waste over a five-year period, and to earn a return on the unamortized balance of such costs. The Commission explained that authorizing a ten-year period, rather than a five-year period, would strike a fairer balance between shareholders and ratepayers in light of the magnitude of the environmental costs involved and the rate impact to consumers. The electric utility appealed, arguing that the Commission had granted such requests in previous cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that it had adequately explained its reasoning for its departure from previous cases, had thoroughly considered the evidence, and was not subject to stare decisis or res judicata principles as a legislative body.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The North Carolina Utilities Commission denied an electric utility's application to calculate its rates by amortizing certain costs associated with the storage, disposal, and removal of coal ash waste over a five-year period, and to earn a return on the unamortized balance of such costs. The Commission explained that authorizing a ten-year period, rather than a five-year period, would strike a fairer balance between shareholders and ratepayers in light of the magnitude of the environmental costs involved and the rate impact to consumers. The electric utility appealed, arguing that the Commission had granted such requests in previous cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that it had adequately explained its reasoning for its departure from previous cases, had thoroughly considered the evidence, and was not subject to stare decisis or res judicata principles as a legislative body.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Stein, 851 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. 2020)
|
North Carolina | 2020 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2020
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIntervenors, on behalf of consumers, challenged the North Carolina Utilities Commission's decision to allow two electric utilities to reflect the costs associated with the storage, disposal, and removal of coal ash in the cost of service used to establish rates. The Commission argued that the utilities had reasonably incurred these costs in compliance with the Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CAMA), which did not disallow the recovery of such costs. Intervenors argued that CAMA had been enacted in response to a coal ash spill at one of the utilities' facilities, leading to the incurred compliance costs. The Supreme Court ruled (in part) in favor of the Commission, and found that the intervenors failed to demonstrate that (i) the costs were unreasonable; and (ii) the coal ash spill was the main reason for CAMA's enactment. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Commission's decisions to allow the utilities to earn returns on their unamortized coal ash-related costs and to increase their basic facilities charge. However, the Supreme Court (in part) reversed and remanded the Commission's decision to reject an equitable sharing proposal of coal ash-related costs between shareholders and ratepayers because the Commission failed to fully consider the utilities' environmental violations in its reasoning.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Intervenors, on behalf of consumers, challenged the North Carolina Utilities Commission's decision to allow two electric utilities to reflect the costs associated with the storage, disposal, and removal of coal ash in the cost of service used to establish rates. The Commission argued that the utilities had reasonably incurred these costs in compliance with the Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CAMA), which did not disallow the recovery of such costs. Intervenors argued that CAMA had been enacted in response to a coal ash spill at one of the utilities' facilities, leading to the incurred compliance costs. The Supreme Court ruled (in part) in favor of the Commission, and found that the intervenors failed to demonstrate that (i) the costs were unreasonable; and (ii) the coal ash spill was the main reason for CAMA's enactment. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Commission's decisions to allow the utilities to earn returns on their unamortized coal ash-related costs and to increase their basic facilities charge. However, the Supreme Court (in part) reversed and remanded the Commission's decision to reject an equitable sharing proposal of coal ash-related costs between shareholders and ratepayers because the Commission failed to fully consider the utilities' environmental violations in its reasoning.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Wilson v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 777 S.E.2d 176 (S.C. 2015)
|
South Carolina | 2015 | Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
South Carolina
Year:
2015
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe State of South Carolina, represented by Attorney General Alan Wilson, filed suit against Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Janssen), alleging violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) related to Janssen’s antipsychotic drug, Risperdal. Janssen was accused of engaging in unfair and deceptive practices by failing to adequately disclose known risks and side effects associated with Risperdal, particularly concerning diabetes, weight gain, hyperprolactinemia (a hormonal imbalance causing serious reproductive issues), and an increased risk of stroke, cardiac arrest, and sudden death in elderly patients. Specifically, the State alleged that Janssen deceptively marketed Risperdal as superior to competing drugs by falsely claiming it posed a lower risk of these adverse effects. Additionally, Janssen was accused of disseminating false information in a "Dear Doctor Letter" (DDL) sent to prescribing physicians in 2003, which downplayed the risk of diabetes associated with Risperdal. Following a jury trial in the Spartanburg County Circuit Court, Janssen was found liable on both claims—the deceptive labeling and the misleading DDL. The jury concluded Janssen’s conduct constituted willful violations of SCUTPA. Subsequently, the trial court imposed civil penalties totaling approximately $327 million against Janssen based on hundreds of thousands of separate violations, calculating penalties per deceptive act. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict that Janssen had willfully violated SCUTPA. However, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty, holding that civil penalties should only be assessed for violations within a three-year statute of limitations period preceding a tolling agreement entered by the parties. Accordingly, the Court lowered the total civil penalties to approximately $124 million. The Court emphasized that Janssen’s deceptive actions had a clear tendency to mislead healthcare providers and consumers, and that the company had deliberately withheld clinical trial results and published misleading marketing information to protect its market share, despite substantial evidence of serious health risks posed by Risperdal.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
The State of South Carolina, represented by Attorney General Alan Wilson, filed suit against Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Janssen), alleging violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) related to Janssen’s antipsychotic drug, Risperdal. Janssen was accused of engaging in unfair and deceptive practices by failing to adequately disclose known risks and side effects associated with Risperdal, particularly concerning diabetes, weight gain, hyperprolactinemia (a hormonal imbalance causing serious reproductive issues), and an increased risk of stroke, cardiac arrest, and sudden death in elderly patients. Specifically, the State alleged that Janssen deceptively marketed Risperdal as superior to competing drugs by falsely claiming it posed a lower risk of these adverse effects. Additionally, Janssen was accused of disseminating false information in a "Dear Doctor Letter" (DDL) sent to prescribing physicians in 2003, which downplayed the risk of diabetes associated with Risperdal. Following a jury trial in the Spartanburg County Circuit Court, Janssen was found liable on both claims—the deceptive labeling and the misleading DDL. The jury concluded Janssen’s conduct constituted willful violations of SCUTPA. Subsequently, the trial court imposed civil penalties totaling approximately $327 million against Janssen based on hundreds of thousands of separate violations, calculating penalties per deceptive act. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict that Janssen had willfully violated SCUTPA. However, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty, holding that civil penalties should only be assessed for violations within a three-year statute of limitations period preceding a tolling agreement entered by the parties. Accordingly, the Court lowered the total civil penalties to approximately $124 million. The Court emphasized that Janssen’s deceptive actions had a clear tendency to mislead healthcare providers and consumers, and that the company had deliberately withheld clinical trial results and published misleading marketing information to protect its market share, despite substantial evidence of serious health risks posed by Risperdal.
Link to Opinion
|
||||
|
State ex rel. Yost v. Rover Pipeline, L.L.C., 191 N.E.3d 421 (Ohio 2022)
|
Ohio | 2022 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2022
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPursuant to the Clean Water Act, Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. applied for section 401 certification from the state of Ohio to establish that any discharge from the pipeline into Ohio's waters would comply with federal law. The state did not respond to Rover's application within one year of submission. When the pipeline discharged pollutants into Ohio water, the state of Ohio sued Rover. The Supreme Court held that the state had waived its right to bring a claim with respect to Section 401 since it did not respond to Rover's application within a year. However, the Clean Water Act does not preclude Ohio from adopting or enforcing their own limitations regarding the discharge of pollutants. Therefore, the state's right to bring a claim against Rover outside of section 401 certification remain intact.
|
|
|
Justice Vote Breakdown
|
Summary of Case Context & Holding
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. applied for section 401 certification from the state of Ohio to establish that any discharge from the pipeline into Ohio's waters would comply with federal law. The state did not respond to Rover's application within one year of submission. When the pipeline discharged pollutants into Ohio water, the state of Ohio sued Rover. The Supreme Court held that the state had waived its right to bring a claim with respect to Section 401 since it did not respond to Rover's application within a year. However, the Clean Water Act does not preclude Ohio from adopting or enforcing their own limitations regarding the discharge of pollutants. Therefore, the state's right to bring a claim against Rover outside of section 401 certification remain intact.
Link to Opinion
|
||||