State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff David Bagley sued the Rio Grande State Center (RGSC) and several of its employees (Defendants) following the death of his adult son. Plaintiff’s son had a history of mental illness and had been committed to the RGSC, where he was involved in multiple altercations. In the final altercation before his death, Plaintiff’s son struck an employee and was then restrained and administered anti-psychotic and sedative drugs. Plaintiff’s son calmed down and returned to his room, but shortly after went into cardiac arrest. An autopsy revealed several fractured vertebrae, cracked ribs, a lacerated spleen, and contusions on his head, back, and chest. Plaintiff sued the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In their respective answers, each of the Defendants responded that Plaintiff’s claims were health care liability claims under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). Under the TMLA, health care liability claims must be supported by the serving of an expert report within 120 days after a defendant files an answer. After the 120-day period lapsed, each of the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Immediately prior to the hearing regarding the motions, Plaintiff announced that he was dropping his claims against RGSC and proceeding only against the individual employees. Although the trial court denied all of the motions for summary judgment, all of the original Defendants, including RGSC, appealed. On appeal, the court of appeals held that while each of the claims were health care liability claims, the expert report requirement was federally preempted by Section 1983. The Supreme Court first held that the claims were health care liability claims, as they essentially concerned whether the staff at RGSC had adhered to appropriate standards of care when restraining a patient. Next, the Court considered whether the expert report requirement under the TMLA was preempted by Section 1983. After reviewing precedent, the Court held that the expert report requirement only required Plaintiff to provide an “advance summary” of facts that Plaintiff would have needed to prove at some point in the trial. Because the requirement applies to all plaintiffs asserting health care liability claims, rather than only those asserting claims under Section 1983, and because the requirement would not produce different outcomes if an action was brought in federal court, rather than a state court, Section 1983 did not preempt the expert report requirement under the TMLA. Finally, the Court held that RGSC was a proper party to the appeal, as although Plaintiff had amended his complaint to drop RGSC, dismissal under the TMLA's expert report requirement is both with prejudice and requires the trial court to award attorney's fees to the defendant. The Court remanded the case to the trial court and directed the trial court (1) as to RGSC, to dismiss the claims with prejudice and award attorney's fees; and (2) as to the employee Defendants, to allow Plaintiff 60 more days to comply with the expert report requirement in the interest of justice.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDuring the 2018 Republican primary for a congressional seat, Wendy Rogers ran an ad campaign against her opponent, Steve Smith, implying that he was slimy because he worked at a modeling agency which ran ads on websites linked to sex trafficking. Pamela Young, the owner of that agency, sued for defamation, arguing that she was implicated in the ad. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that because Young was a private figure, the actual malice standard applicable to public figures under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) did not apply. However, because the advertisement concerned a matter of public concern, First Amendment principles constrained state defamation law. The Court concluded that because Young was not referenced by name in the advertisement, and a reasonable listener would not draw the conclusion that Young was personally implicated in sex trafficking, the claim was too attenuated to support liability without chilling political speech. The dissent argued that the jury should have determined liability, and existing protections adequately protect First Amendment concerns.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Defendant appealed his murder and firearm possession convictions resulting from the shooting death of 16-year-old victim, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in allowing his brother's testimony to be impeached with evidence that his brother refused to give a statement to the police on the day after the shooting, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating that while evidence of motive for the homicide is always relevant in a murder trial, the State is not required to prove the Defendant's motive for killing the victim to sustain a murder conviction, since motive is not an essential element of the crime. Responding to the Fifth Amendment objection that Appellant raised at trial with respect to his brother's testimony, the Supreme Court found the State was correct to argue that Appellant did not invoke his own rights and lacked standing to invoke either his brother's right against self-incrimination or due process right not to have his silence used to incriminate him after being advised of his Miranda rights. Georgia courts have specifically held that a criminal defendant has no right to raise alleged violations of another individual's right against self-incrimination or rights under Miranda.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendants Jorge Romero-Millan, Ernesto Hernandez Cabanillas, and Marco Antonio Garcia-Paz are Mexican natives lawfully residing in the United Stated. Each was convicted of possession or use of drugs in violation of Arizona state law. Based on these drug-related convictions, the immigration court ordered that the Defendants be removed from the United States. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that removability depended on whether Arizona's drug possession statutes are divisible as to drug type. Meaning, if the statutes are divisible (list multiple offenses or different sets of elements), courts may convict a defendant multiple times under the same statute without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions if each count encompasses different elements of the statute. The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Arizona Supreme Court: whether Arizona law requires a jury to unanimously determine which drugs listed in Arizona drug possession statutes are specifically involved in the offense. The Court held that Arizona's drug possession statute, ARS 13-3408 requires jury unanimity and declined to answer the questions regarding divisibility of the statutes. The Court determined that because the statute lists each of 95 substances independently as a narcotic drug under the statute, possessing any one of the drugs constitutes a separate and independent criminal offense. The holding could allow those convicted of a drug crime under this Arizona statute to also be separately punished under federal statute for the same single event if the defendant is prosecuted for a different drug type than for which they were prosecuted or convicted.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiffs (an infant teacher, a toddler teacher, a cook, and a cook's assistant) worked for Chicanos Por La Causa (CPLC) in its Head Start facilities. When the 2016 summer break began, the Plaintiffs applied for unemployment insurance benefits from the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES). An ADES deputy granted the benefits, concluding that CPLC did not provide services to or on behalf of an educational institution. CPLC appealed the determinations to the ADES Appeal Tribunal, citing A.R.S. § 23-750(E)(1), which provides that employees working for entities providing “service[s] in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution” shall not be paid between terms “if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in any such capacity” in the next term. The tribunal reversed the deputy's decision, finding that CPLC “provides services to or on behalf of an educational institution” based on the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) CPLC had with each district, which described CPLC’s services as helping school districts. The tribunal also found that the Plaintiffs had reasonable assurance of reemployment for the following school year. Consequently, the tribunal held that § 23-750(E)(5) prohibited the Plaintiffs from using their wages earned at CPLC to qualify for unemployment benefits. Adopting the tribunal’s reasoning, the ADES Appeals Board affirmed the decision. The Plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals, which concluded they were eligible for unemployment benefits, holding that although CPLC provides services to or on behalf of an educational institution, there were insufficient facts to support a determination that the Plaintiffs performed such services. CPLC appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court found that “in order to be disqualified from unemployment benefits under the statute, (1) the employer must have provided services to or on behalf of an educational institution, (2) the employee must have ‘performed’ those services, and (3) the employee must have received assurance of employment in the following year.” Specifically, the Court held that the Department of Labor's interpretation strongly supports its view that § 23-750(E)(5) applies to plaintiffs only if they performed services for CPLC that were supplied to the school districts, and no showing was made here connecting the Plaintiffs’ work to services provided by CPLC to the school districts, which the statute’s plain language requires. The Court remanded the case to ADES to determine whether the two Plaintiffs who were teachers (Rosas and Correa) performed services related to CPLC’s agreements with school districts, which would make them ineligible for benefits. However, for the two Plaintiffs who were employed as a cook and a cook’s assistant (Castillo and Solorzano), the Court found no evidence that their work was connected to the services performed for the school districts, and accordingly they were entitled to unemployment benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner was found guilty by jury of first-degree premeditated murder in 2013. In 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which raised several legal claims without providing factual support for any of the claims (which the Petitioner acknowledged). The State opposed the petition, contending that the Petitioner failed to allege any facts in support of his petition and that Petitioner abused the postconviction process by filing a petition for the purpose of staying the statute of limitations for federal habeas relief. The judge presiding over the postconviction petition disqualified Petitioner's motion for cause, rather than referring the motion to the chief judge of the judicial court. The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined this was in error. Although reversal was warranted under an "abuse of discretion," the Supreme Court of Minnesota nonetheless upheld the ruling because the failure to refer Appellant's disqualification motion to the chief judge was harmless because the motion lacked merit (as it was submitted to the Supreme Court of Minnesota without factual support). Accordingly, the postconviction judge did not abuse his discretion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA same-sex couple alleged that a company wrongfully declined to host their wedding ceremony because of their sexual orientation in violation of the state's anti-discrimination law. The Court ruled 5-2 that the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation or public service on the basis of sex, includes sexual orientation. The Court did not decide whether sex discrimination occurred in this case, but affirmed that the protections, rights, and freedoms afforded under the ELCRA extend to sexual orientation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a state trooper, filed suit against his employer New Jersey State Police (NJSP) for racial and disability discrimination. Plaintiff asserted that the NJSP failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disabling medical condition—ulcerative colitis—in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In addition, Plaintiff complained of retaliatory conduct in violation of the LAD, ADA, and New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). The superior court granted a directed verdict for NJSP in part, and, after the trial, entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the remaining claims based on the ADA and CEPA. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) NJSP did not waive its sovereign immunity defense by raising it after the jury's verdict; (2) NJSP was not equitably estopped from raising sovereign immunity defense; (3) CEPA waiver provision did not bar trooper's LAD claim because waiver exception does not apply to those causes of action that are substantially independent of the CEPA claim; (4) the issue of whether NJSP failed to accommodate trooper under the LAD was for a jury to decide; and (5) interests of justice required reinstatement of improperly dismissed LAD claim.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff worked for the City of Aurora (City) from 1992 until she was involuntarily discharged in July 2012. After filing a disability discrimination charge with the Department of Human Rights (Department), she filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging that the City violated the Human Rights Act (HRA) essentially by failing to accommodate her disability. After the Plaintiff successfully moved to strike certain of the City’s affirmative defenses under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act), the circuit court allowed the City to permissively appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule (Rule) 308(a). The circuit court certified the following questions: (1) Whether § 2-102(A) of the HRA prohibits disability harassment and whether Counts I and IV of the Complaint stated cognizable claims under the HRA; (2) If so, does § 102(D) of the HRA apply; and if so, who bears the burden of proof; and (3) Whether the Tort Immunity Act applies where a plaintiff seeks damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. A divided panel of the appellate court answered the certified questions as follows: (1) Yes; (2) Yes, and the burden is on the employee; and (3) the Tort Immunity Act applies but only to the extent of monetary damages. As to the third question only (Question 3), the Plaintiff petitioned for rehearing by the intermediate appellate court or, alternatively, for permissive appeal to the state Supreme Court. The intermediate court granted the permissive appeal. Supported by the Department as an intervenor, the Plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly certified Question 3 to the intermediate court under Rule 308 and even if properly certified, the Supreme Court should answer the question in the negative. The City argued for an affirmative answer to Question 3 and sought certain substantive relief on its other defenses. The Supreme Court explained that Rule 308 allows for certification to the intermediate court only when a substantial ground for disagreement exists. A Rule 308 certification should occur only sparingly and in extraordinary circumstances. Such certified questions are improper where resolution requires “application of the law to the facts of a specific case.” In rejecting the appellate court’s determination that applicable appellate precedent had been impliedly overruled, the Supreme Court noted that “it is questionable at best whether a substantial difference of opinion exists so as to support certification of [Question 3].” And because resolution of Question 3 would leave the City’s ultimate liability undetermined, answering the question would not advance termination of the litigation. The Supreme Court determined that Question 3 was “improperly overbroad, should not have been answered, and does not warrant our review at this time.” Accordingly, the Court declined to answer Question 3 concluding that answering Question 3 would result in an advisory opinion by determining issues not before the Court. The Supreme Court reminded the parties that the mechanism provided for under Rule 315 [discretionary final appeals] is the more appropriate avenue for appellate review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRunzheimer International sued a former employee, David Friedlen, under the terms of a covenant not to compete. Friedlen, who had already worked at Runzheimer for 15 years, was required to sign a non-compete or be fired. He ultimately chose to sign the covenant not to compete. Two years after signing the covenant, Friedlen departed Runzheimer to work for a competitor, precipitating the suit from Runzheimer. Friedlen argued that the covenant was unenforceable because no consideration was received in return. Ultimately, this case resolved a single question regarding restrictive covenants—whether an "employer's forbearance of its right to terminate an existing at-will employee in exchange for the employee agreeing to a restrictive covenant constitutes lawful consideration." The Supreme Court ruled that such forbearance was in fact lawful consideration for the restrictive covenant, and as such the covenant was potentially enforceable, though still subject to reasonableness requirements.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBruce Rushton, a journalist for the Illinois Times, sent a records request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq.) to the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) for settlement agreements in connection with an inmate's death from cancer. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford), a private entity that contracted with the DOC to provide medical care to inmates, had settled a claim with the inmate's estate. Wexford argued that its settlement was "confidential in nature" and not a public record for purposes of FOIA. Wexford refused to provide an unredacted version. As a result, Rushton and the Illinois Times filed a complaint against the DOC for the unredacted copy. Wexford argued that the agreement was not subject to FOIA, because Section 7(2) defines a public record of a contracting agency as a public record of the public body itself if the record "directly relates" to the governmental function. Wexford argued a lack of that relationship since its agreement was a memorialization of an independent business decision to settle a legal claim and never mentioned the inmate's medical condition or the care provided to him. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Wexford, reasoning that a business decision to settle was not directly related to provision of medical services. The appellate court reversed, finding that FOIA should be liberally construed, and one purpose of Section 7(2) was to prevent government entities from evading disclosure obligations by delegating responsibilities to private contractors. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. It reasoned that the public policy behind FOIA, stated in its opening section, was that all persons are entitled to "full and complete information regarding the affairs of government." Interpreting Section 7(2), the Court found that the settlement agreement directly related to the provision of medical care to inmates because the underlying claim was that Wexford failed to provide adequate care and accordingly allegedly inadequate performance of its governmental function. The dissent found that the settlement agreement did not directly relate to Wexford's provision of medical care because the agreement itself did not discuss aspects of the decedent's medical condition or Wexford's provision of care. In addition, Wexford had not settled the claim on behalf of the DOC. The dissent also highlighted that a key justification for requiring settlement disclosure is to vindicate the public's right to know how its resources have been spent, which is not present here as Wexford had not used taxpayer money.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages for dog-bite injuries that he received when a law enforcement officer intentionally released a police dog against him. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him $617,500 in damages. The court of appeals affirmed in a split decision. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding (1) while Plaintiffs cannot assert a negligence claim under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs may base a negligence claim on conduct by the officer that is independent of the intentional use of physical force; and (2) at trial on a battery claim, expert witnesses cannot suggest to the jury that Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), which provides a justification defense for law enforcement officers who use physical force, is the legal standard for deciding the applicability of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-409.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued a steel mill operator a permit to install (PTI) for an existing source under Michigan's Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA). The PTI authorized the rebuilding of a blast furnace and the installation of three air pollution control devices at the steel mill. Emissions testing revealed that emission sources at the steel mill exceeded the level permitted, and after negotiations the DEQ and the steel mill operator entered into an agreement, pursuant to which the operator submitted an application for a PTI that the DEQ subsequently issued. Environmental groups appealed the DEQ's decision. The steel mill operator moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the petition was untimely filed on the grounds that the Petitioners' right to appeal a PTI for an existing source was based on Michigan's Revised Judicature Act, which broadly governs appeals from orders or decisions made by a state board, commission or agency, under which the applicable period to file the appeal would have been 21 days after the issuance of the permit. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss. Through a plain text reading of the NREPA and applying certain canons of construction, the Supreme Court determined that, on its face, the NREPA provided for judicial review of a permit for an existing source and provided for filing within 90 days after the final permit action.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2014, Plaintiff James Flavy Coy Brown and a similarly situated class of individuals sued the Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services (SNAMHS) and certain other parties (who were dismissed from the case prior to trial) over SNAMHS’s discharging practices. Asserting claims for negligence, negligence per se, and medical malpractice, Brown claimed that SNAMHS routinely involuntarily discharged patients at the Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital, placing them on a Greyhound bus headed out-of-state. Brown referred to this practice as "Greyhound therapy." In his complaint, Brown requested class certification, a permanent injunction against Greyhound therapy, declaratory judgment concerning the violation of the plaintiffs' rights, and damages. A partial summary judgment denied the claims regarding medical malpractice and conspiracy, leaving only claims for negligence and negligence per se. After trial, the jury awarded $250,000 to Brown on the negligence claims. The court then entered a judgment in favor of each class member, yet reduced the damages awarded to the statutory cap of $100,000 per class member. The district court issued an injunction against SNAMHS from using Greyhound therapy for a period of two years. On appeal, SNAMHS argued that the district court had improperly allowed Brown’s negligence claims to go to trial, as Brown’s complaint never asserted negligence claims against SNAMHS. In 2018, prior to trial, the district court had ruled that the only claims Brown asserted against SNAMHS pertained to civil conspiracy and medical malpractice, both of which were dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion when it later reversed course and allowed for the negligence claims to be heard against SNAMHS. Brown had not asserted negligence claims specifically against SNAMHS in either the original or amended complaints, nor had he ever attempted to. Further, because no new issues of fact or law had arisen, no rehearing was justified. The Supreme Court also held that even if Brown had properly pled his negligence claims, he had not adequately established damages by demonstrating any physical injury, or presenting any evidence of serious emotional harm. Justice Pickering dissented, noting that the pleadings had adequately alleged that SNAMHS is liable for the negligence of its administrator, agents, and employees, that the majority had improperly analyzed the district court’s decision on a reconsideration basis, and that emotional distress damages had been adequately established considering the public medical institution-status of the Defendant.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2013, South Carolina enacted the Equal Access to the Ballot Act (2013 S.C. Act No. 61.) (the Act), which would have allowed political parties to nominate candidates by convention, as opposed to an open primary, if they met certain requirements. Section 14 of the Act provided that the Act will take effect "upon preclearance by the United States Department of Justice or approval by a declaratory judgment issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, whichever occurs first." The preclearance requirement came from the federal Voting Rights Act, which had required certain states to seek clearance from the federal government before making changes to their voting laws, as a way to prevent states from enacting discriminatory laws (i.e., poll taxes, etc.). However, that same year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which overturned that portion of the Voting Rights Act. Given the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the Libertarian Party sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Equal Access to the Ballot Act was still in effect. If the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the Act was effective, the Party requested that the South Carolina State Election Commission be ordered to conduct a Libertarian Party primary on June 10, 2014, and place a referendum question on the primary ballot for approval of the use of the convention method for nominating candidates in 2016. On the first question, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied rules of statutory construction and held that the Act became effective on June 25, 2013, the date of the Shelby County opinion. The Court reasoned that because the General Assembly's reason for including preclearance as a contingency for the Act to become effective was to comply with the then-mandatory provisions of the Voting Rights Act when the Shelby County decision removed that requirement, the preclearance contingency in the Act was no longer needed. As to the second question, the Court denied the Party's request to require the Commission to conduct a primary and place a referendum question on the primary ballot. The Court reasoned that the General Assembly intended this requirement to apply only to parties seeking to abandon the open primary method of nominating candidates in favor of the closed convention method, and that the Libertarian Party had already been using the convention method prior to the Act's enactment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingState Representative Tom Young requested inspections of three wooden bridges by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), citing alleged engineering and construction flaws. The Chief Internal Auditor's office of SCDOT made several findings during the inspections. The South Carolina Public Interest Foundation (SCPIF) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment, claiming that the inspections violated Sections 5 and 11 of Article X of the South Carolina Constitution, which states that all taxes levied must be used toward a public purpose and prohibits the expenditure of public funds for a private purpose. SCPIF specifically claimed that because these three bridges were serving as access to private property in a gated community, that an inspection using public funds would contravene the constitutional requirements of using public funds to serve a public purpose. The trial court ruled that SCPIF lacked standing, that the issue was moot, and that there were no exceptions to the mootness doctrine. It also found that the inspections were within the City's police power and allowed under Section 57-3-110 of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that SCPIF lacked standing and that the action did not fall under any exception to the mootness doctrine, but did not consider the constitutionality of the inspection. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and held that SCDOT's inspection was unconstitutional and "ultra vires." First, the Court found that the SCPIF lacked constitutional standing but had public importance standing due to the public interest in preventing the unlawful expenditure of tax money. Second, the Court found a justiciable controversy regarding the inspection's conclusion but agreed that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. Third, citing Article X, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution that all taxes levied must be used towards a public purpose, the Court held that the SCDOT's inspection was unconstitutional because it did not serve a public purpose, benefiting private bridge owners within a gated community instead of the public. Fourth, the Court held that the inspection was "ultra vires" because it was not requested by a municipality, as required by Section 57-3-110(7) of the South Carolina Code. The request from State Representative Tom Young was from a private individual, not the City of Aiken. Justice Kittredge dissented, disagreeing with the analysis on the merits but agreeing with the Court's decision. Kittredge argued that the individual Plaintiffs lacked taxpayer and public interest standing, as SCDOT is authorized to assist local government authorities with public mass transit matters. Justice Pleicones also dissented on the issue of standing, arguing that the plaintiffs had not established public interest or taxpayer standing. Pleicones reasoned that there was no evidence of SCDOT having a pattern of private property inspection in violation of state law, and the Plaintiffs had no special interest in the case beyond that of a general taxpayer.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA retired member of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) sought review of PFRS Board of Trustees' (Board) decision to uphold the Division of Pension and Benefits' denial of the member's request to reassign survivors' benefits from his disabled son as an individual to special needs trust (SNT) in his son's name, due to the Board's strict view of how to implement the word “child” in the survivors' benefits statute. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that SNT was permitted to stand in the son's place as beneficiary to whom survivors' benefits were due as both the federal government's Supplemental Security Income and related medical assistance programs and New Jersey's SNT statutes permit the use of self-settled SNTs. The Supreme Court noted that the Board's action requires a disabled child of a PFRS retiree to choose between abandoning the survivors' benefits earned by his parent or forgoing public assistance programs for his medical needs, such choice is unnecessary and unwarranted, and that the Board advances no legitimate public policy through its rigid interpretation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFollowing an outbreak of hepatitis C connected to unsafe injection practices, health-care facilities advised patients to undergo testing for blood-borne diseases, including hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV. A class of patients brought a negligence claim based on the need to continue undergoing medical monitoring, despite each patient having tested negative for such diseases and showing no present physical injury. As relief, the class sought a court-supervised medical monitoring program at the expense of the health-care facilities. The district court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, characterizing the Plaintiffs' claims as merely noting a risk of exposure to infected blood, which was insufficient to allege an injury. The Supreme Court considered on appeal the extent to which a claim for negligence could be based on the need to continue undergoing medical monitoring. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, holding that a plaintiff does not need to assert a present physical injury when bringing a claim for negligence with medical monitoring as the remedy. Although the Plaintiffs had not alleged that they were actually exposed to contaminated blood, they had adequately alleged exposure to unsafe injection practices, which led them to undergo continuing medical monitoring.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals determined that Plaintiff's work (i.e., removing an old advertisement from a billboard that was raised 59 feet from the ground, attaching extensions using angle irons, nuts, bolts, and nails that would change the dimensions of the billboard to accommodate a new advertisement with different measurements, and then attaching the new advertisement itself) was included in the activities protected under Labor Law § 240(1). Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals found the Plaintiff's work to be "altering," under the definition adopted in Joblon v. Solow, 695 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1998), as the work was "a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure,” that was not “routine maintenance” or “decorative modification."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDebra Nicholas was chief of staff to David Chardavoyne, San Antonio Water System’s (SAWS) CEO. In 2016, Chardavoyne called Nicholas into a meeting with Frank Stenger-Castro, SAWS's general counsel. Stenger-Castro told Chardavoyne and Nicholas that Lisa Spielhagen informed him that she had been repeatedly invited to lunch by Greg Flores, a recently hired VP, and was uncomfortable with the invitations. Stenger-Castro also told them Spielhagen said she felt harassed and would file a formal complaint if the invitations persisted. Nicholas added that Stenger-Castro mentioned that Flores had also invited to lunch a second employee, Sharon Snoga, though Stenger-Castro said he had not personally spoken with Snoga. Stenger-Castro, however, testified that Spielhagen did not complain about sexual harassment or suggest she would file a complaint; rather, she simply found the invitations awkward and inappropriate, and wanted them stopped. He testified he went to Chardavoyne because Flores's behavior was "risky," though he did not believe it violated SAWS's sexual-harassment policy. Chardavoyne and Nicholas testified they met with Flores shortly after their meeting with Stenger-Castro. Nicholas testified Flores admitted to inviting the women to lunch but denied he intended to sexually harass either woman and said he would change. Chardavoyne resigned in 2008. His replacement hired his own chief of staff, and Nicholas was reassigned to an assistant VP position reporting directly to Flores. In 2009, that position was eliminated due to organization-wide cost-cutting measures, and Nicholas was not interviewed for any other position. Nicholas maintains her termination was retaliation for her confronting Flores, and that the retaliation was delayed because Flores had no authority over her until her reassignment in 2009. Nicholas also complains she was not interviewed for subsequent positions despite being qualified. She sued SAWS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) which protects from retaliation employees who oppose discriminatory employment practices, alleging SAWS retaliated against her for opposing a discriminatory employment practice. The jury found Nicholas opposed sexual harassment by counseling or reprimanding Flores, was fired because of it, and awarded her nearly $1 million in damages. SAWS appealed, arguing no reasonable person could have believed sexual harassment under the TCHRA had occurred, and therefore Nicholas did not engage in a "protected activity" under the TCHRA when she confronted Flores. SAWS further argued Nicholas could not show a causal link between her confronting Flores and her eventual termination nearly three years later, and that the trial court failed to apply a statutory damages cap to Nicholas's front-pay damages award. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on all three issues. SAWS sought the Court’s review. The Court found that no reasonable person would believe that a handful of lunch invitations amounted to sexual harassment actionable under the TCHRA, and that "[t]o make out a statutory sexual-harassment claim, the employee must prove more than that she found the harassment offensive." The Court reversed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA mining company built a new vertical excavation shaft at an existing copper mine site. The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) permit authorizing the discharge of water pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), allowed the company to discharge mine site water from the new shaft into Queen Creek, an "impaired waterway" due to the levels of copper present in it. An impaired waterway under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) requires states to identify waters that do not meet water quality standards and establish for those waters a “total maximum daily load . . . at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards,” with specified restrictions. The San Carlos Apache Tribe maintained that the permit was improper because ADEQ issued it before a copper total maximum daily load for Queen Creek was finalized. The ADEQ contended that the new shaft is not a “new source” that would trigger these requirements, and therefore ADEQ properly issued the permit. The Tribe challenged the permit before the Arizona Water Quality Appeals Board, arguing that the new mine shaft was a “new source” of pollutant discharge under the CWA, subject to more stringent performance standards and permitting requirements than “existing sources.” After an administrative hearing, the award of the permit was affirmed. The Tribe appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed ADEQ’s decision. In a split opinion, the court of appeals reversed the decision finding that the new mine shaft was a “mine,” rather than a component of a mine, and therefore a “new source” under the CWA. The Arizona Supreme Court unanimously reversed the appellate court determining that the shaft was not a "new source." The Supreme Court described the three-step test to determine whether a newly constructed source of pollutants is a “new source” under the CWA. The first step evaluates whether the source fits within the definition of “new source” under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, defined as a “building, structure, facility, or installation” that discharges (or may discharge) pollutants, the construction of which began after “applicable” standards of performance were enacted under the CWA. Step two evaluates whether the source fits within one of the criteria listed in federal regulations, under which a “new source” must be either (i) the only source on site; (ii) a total replacement of an existing source at the same site; or (iii) substantially independent of existing sources at the same site. Step three then evaluates whether there are “independently applicable” standards of performance for the new source specifically (rather than the mine site as whole) under the CWA. The Court held that the new shaft did not meet the criterion in Step 2 because the shaft was engaged in the same general type of activity, and integrated with, existing sources at the same mine site and was thus not an independent source (criterion (iii)). Although the Court did not need to evaluate Step 3 after failing Step 2, the Court found that the new shaft was a component of the mine rather than a mine itself because the CWA did not include standards of performance “independently applicable” to mine shafts.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA grand jury indicted Defendant for first-degree murder, among other offenses. The grand jury also found probable cause in support of three aggravating circumstances for the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant filed a motion to remand for a new finding of probable cause, arguing that the grand jury was precluded from considering the aggravating circumstances and that the State’s presentation of the issue denied him the opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing to determine probable cause for the death penalty aggravators. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a capital case defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a grand jury has found that probable cause supports the existence of alleged aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and directed the trial court to grant Defendant’s request and hold an evidentiary hearing, holding that the grand jury lacks authority to determine whether probable cause supports the existence of aggravating circumstances alleged in a capital case, and any grand jury findings concerning aggravating circumstances cannot deprive a defendant of a timely requested evidentiary hearing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a teacher who alleged misconduct by her school's principal. Plaintiff alleged that she was fired as a result of discrimination and/or retaliation in the form of homophobic remarks and falsified reports to the Department of Education. The case was dismissed by the New York Supreme Court, because the court found insufficient evidence to show that the homophobic comments made by the employer were related to the firing. The court stated there was no proof that the Principal would not have made the same decision had the Plaintiff's sexuality been unknown or unconsidered. However, the Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence related to the homophobic remarks and other actions taken against the Plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, and the trial court should determine as a matter of triable fact how much the Plaintiff's sexuality weighed into the firing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant sued the state seeking compensation under Michigan's Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA) after another man confessed to the crimes Defendant was convicted of. Controversy arose regarding compensation for the 198 days Defendant spent in local detention prior to his wrongful conviction. The Supreme Court held that the text of WICA can be interpreted on its face to not authorize compensation for the time Defendant spent in detention before he was wrongfully convicted of a crime, only after that wrongful conviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue in this appeal was whether Plaintiff—who acknowledged he was lawfully terminated when convicted of a criminal offense while working for defendant—adequately alleged that Defendant violated the antidiscrimination statutes when it denied Plaintiff’s application for employment following the completion of a brief jail sentence. Correction Law article 23-A and Executive Law § 296(15) protect certain individuals convicted of criminal offenses from unlawful discrimination when applying for employment or licensing, preventing employers from denying an application for employment solely because the applicant was previously convicted of a criminal offense, subject to certain exceptions. After reviewing the statutory language, framework, and legislative history, the Court of Appeals determined that nothing indicated a legislative intent to exempt a previous employer from the statutes’ reach. Moreover, the undefined term “application,” read in context and given its ordinary meaning, is reasonably interpreted to refer to a request for employment, an event the Court of Appeals recognized may take various forms in different circumstances and which may trigger coverage under the statutes. The Court of Appeals held that the statutes’ application requirement is met when, viewed objectively and in light of the relevant circumstances, an employer would reasonably understand the communications from a prospective employee to be a request for employment. Under the liberal pleading standard for a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint adequately alleged facts supporting the inference that Plaintiff applied for employment and was denied solely due to his conviction—and did not compel the conclusion that Plaintiff merely protested a lawful termination decision.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA land developer applied for approval of a planned unit development that would include condominium units with a private marina, which required special use approval. The township's planning commission approved the proposal, and a group of individuals appealed to the zoning board, claiming that they would suffer various economic, environmental and ecological harms as a result of the development. The zoning board held that the Petitioners lacked standing because their complaints could be true of any proposed development in the area and they had not demonstrated any special damages that would be different from those sustained by the general public. The Supreme Court determined that Petitioners had standing, holding that the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) does not require an appealing party to own real property and to demonstrate special damages only by comparison to similarly situated property owners. The Supreme Court determined that, in enacting the MZEA, the legislature did not intend to make owning real property a requirement for being "aggrieved," and that determining whether a party is aggrieved needs to be based on a multi-factor analysis that goes beyond mere ownership of real property, though the Supreme Court cautioned that generalized concerns about traffic congestion, aesthetic harms, environmental harms, and the like would not be sufficient without more to establish that one has been aggrieved by a zoning decision. The Court overruled certain decisions of the court of appeals to the extent they required real property ownership as a prerequisite to being "aggrieved" by a zoning decision under the MZEA and special damages to be shown only by comparison to similarly situated real property owners.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA taxpayer sought certiorari review of the town Board of Review's assessment of his property for tax purposes, alleging that the Board erred in classifying the taxpayer's property as "productive forest land" when it should have been classified as "undeveloped land." Under Wis. Stat. Sect. 70.32(2)(a) and (c)2, property classified as "productive forest land" is assessed at full value, while property classified as "undeveloped land" is assessed at 50% of the value. Wis. Stat. Sect. 70.32(2)(c)2 defines "productive forest land" as "land that is producing or is capable of producing commercial forest products and is not otherwise classified under this subsection." "Undeveloped land" is defined by Wis. Stat. Sect. 70.32(2)(c)4 as "bog, marsh, lowland brush, uncultivated land zoned as shoreland...or other nonproductive lands not otherwise classified under this section." In its review of the Board's decision, the Supreme Court considered whether the classification of productive forest land was "supported by evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order or determination in question." The property at issue was a 10-acre parcel of land occasionally used for hunting. The Supreme Court reviewed two maps presented at trial: one from the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, and the other from the U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey. Both maps described the property as "forested" or "wooded," and showed that it was "pretty much all trees." Thus, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented supported the Board's classification of the property as "productive forest land."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff-employee was the owner and president of a Montana corporation who stopped paying himself a salary but continued working, thereafter applying for and receiving unemployment benefits. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry eventually determined that the Plaintiff was ineligible for benefits because the Plaintiff was still working and was thus not unemployed, and therefore imposed a penalty for repayment of benefits disbursed. The Plaintiff brought suit to challenge the penalty, and the lower court held that when the Plaintiff drew no salary, he was eligible for unemployment benefits and was under no obligation to report the hours worked. The Supreme Court overturned, holding that a corporate officer working full-time without pay for his corporation is engaged in employment under Montana's unemployment insurance law, and therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn November 25, 2020, Warren Schmitz filed a petition with the Fulton County Superior Court to contest the results of the November 2020 election for a Georgia house seat in District 52 in Fulton County. In April 2021, the superior court dismissed his petition "based on its determination that [elected representative Shea] Roberts had to be served with the notice of the election contest under OCGA § 21-2-524(f) and its finding that Schmitz failed to exercise diligence to see that Roberts was properly served." Schmitz appealed and argued, among other things, that the trial court did not have authority to dismiss for failure to serve the candidate with notice of the election contest. In affirming the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court said it "long held" that the person bringing proceedings needed to ensure "interested individuals are given proper notice of the election contest" under Swain v. Thompson, 635 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. 2006), and that "the record before the superior court supports the court's finding that Roberts was never served and that Schmitz did not exercise diligence in seeing that she was served." Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's findings on the diligence of service of process "were not clearly erroneous [so] its decision to dismiss the election contest for lack of service under OCGA § 21-2-524(f) did not constitute an abuse of discretion."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBetween July and August 2020, two Georgia voters sought to challenge the voting qualifications of over 14,000 Fulton County registered voters with the Fulton County Board of Elections. The Board stated that it would review the challenges but that it had limited staff resources due to the upcoming election, and federal law "precluded it from removing voters from the voting rolls in advance of the upcoming elections" so it would be "futile" to hold a hearing on the challenges at this time. In August, the Appellants filed for writ of mandamus (to compel performance if no other legal remedy) in the trial court and sought: (1) an "immediate hearing" on the challenges; (2) notice provided to the challenged voters; and (3) a determination of voter eligibility under Georgia law. The trial court subsequently dismissed the motion in October holding that Georgia law did not require the Board to hold a hearing on challenges within a certain period of time (the Board stated that it would hold a hearing in January 2021) and federal law preempted state law in this case so "forcing [the Board] to hold an immediate hearing would constitute an act of futility due to the preemption issue." The voters appealed to the state court of appeals. This appeal was subsequently removed to the state Supreme Court which has exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll cases of election contest" under the state constitution. See Cook v. Bd. of Registrars of Randolph Cnty., 727 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 2012). The court of appeals held that it was appropriate to remove the case to the state Supreme Court because it dealt with "an issue of first impression as to whether OCGA §§ 21-2-229 and 21-2-230 are preempted by the [National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)] and specifically 52 USC § 20507 [regarding] whether the NVRA preempts Georgia statutes governing challenges to a voter's qualifications naturally implicate a voter's fundamental right to vote." The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeal in January 2021 on the grounds that the "appellants' challenge . . . was required to come via an application for discretionary appeal."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Pennsylvania Secretary of Education withheld $1.6m in funding from districts' education subsidy for students in charter schools enrolled over the caps agreed upon in the schools' written charters. After an administrative hearing, the Pennsylvania Department of Education ordered the Secretary of Education to disburse the withheld funds, and the commonwealth court affirmed on the ground that charter schools were not bound by enrollment caps for any year before state law requiring adherence to such caps went into effect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain text of 24 P.S. § 17-1723-A(d), which states that an enrollment cap agreed to in a charter is effective "whether the charter was approved prior to or approved subsequent to the effective date of this subsection," binds a charter school to any enrollment cap stated in its charter.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIndividuals convicted of felonies completing their sentences on probation, parole, or supervised release sued the Minnesota Secretary of State (1) seeking a declaration that Article VII, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution requires that persons convicted of a felony be restored the right to vote upon being released or excused from incarceration; and (2) challenging the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, which restores the right of persons convicted of felonies to vote upon the expiration of their sentence rather than upon their release from incarceration, on the basis that the statute was contrary to the fundamental right to vote and the equal protection principle embodied in the Minnesota Constitution. The district court granted the Secretary of State’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit, which was affirmed by the court of appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court. Reviewing de novo, the Court first analyzed the language and legislative history of Article VII, Section 1, which provides that a person who has been convicted of a felony cannot vote in Minnesota “unless restored to civil rights,” concluding that it is broader than non-incarceration and requires an affirmative act or other mechanism of the government, such as an absolute pardon or a legislative act that generally restores the right to vote upon the occurrence of certain events. The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that § 609.165 violates the fundamental right to vote, reasoning that the statute is consistent with Article VII, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution, which establishes who has the right to vote and that Plaintiffs did not contend was itself unconstitutional. Turning to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Court found that Plaintiffs met the threshold equal protection inquiry, which requires that the challenged law treat similarly situated individuals differently. The Court determined that all individuals convicted of a felony are similarly situated for purposes of the challenged statute, which affords different treatment to some by restoring their right to vote. The Court next analyzed the applicable standard of review, concluding that strict scrutiny did not apply because the statute addressed the right to a discharge of a felony conviction and did not itself implicate the fundamental right to vote. The Court also determined that Plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence to support a heightened rational basis review, which applies when the "statutory classification demonstrably and adversely affects one race differently than other races.” The Court accepted as “undoubtedly correct” data presented by Plaintiffs showing that a disproportionately higher percentage of Black and Native American Minnesotans are deprived of the right to vote due to a felony conviction than white Minnesotans, but explained that the record before it contained insufficient evidence to show that § 609.165 (rather than larger systemic issues or the status quo established by the Constitution) caused those disproportionate effects. Applying a traditional rational basis standard of review, which examines whether the challenged law is one rational means (not the only means or best means) of achieving a legislative body’s legitimate policy goals, the Court held that § 609.165 does not violate the equal protection principle because it is rationally related to legitimate goals of fostering rehabilitation and removing stigma.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2015, the Nevada Legislature passed the Education Savings Account (ESA) program, which allows public funds to be transferred from the State Distributive School Account into private education savings accounts maintained for the benefit of school-aged children to pay for private schooling, tutoring, and other non-public educational services and expenses. Two separate complaints were filed by Nevada citizens and parents of children enrolled in Nevada public schools challenging the ESA program as violating several provisions of the Education Article in the Nevada Constitution on the basis that, among other reasons, the program was contrary to the legislature's requirement to provide a uniform school system and diverted public school funds to private schools. In one case, the district court rejected all of the constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Plaintiff's facial challenges were without merit. In the other case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction because the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional claim relating to diverting public school funds and the balance of potential hardship to the Plaintiffs' children outweighed the interests of the State. The court, however, rejected the constitutional challenge to the program being contrary to the legislature's duty under the Nevada Constitution to provide a uniform system of schools, including private religious schools. Both decisions were appealed, and because they share common legal questions as to the constitutionality of the ESA program, the Supreme Court resolved them together. First, the Supreme Court found that the ESA program was not contrary to the legislature's duty to provide a uniform system of common schools because the program did not alter the existence of the structure of the public school system by including additional opportunities for school children. The Court reasoned that so long as the legislature maintained a uniform public school system open and available to all students, the constitutional mandate is satisfied. Second, the Supreme Court found that the ESA program did not result in any public funds being used for sectarian purposes in violation of the Nevada Constitution because once the funds are deposited into an education savings account, the funds are no longer "public funds," but instead the private funds of the individual parent who established the account and the parent may choose to use such funds in a variety of participating entities, including religious and non-religious schools. However, third, the Supreme Court found that the use of funds from the State General Fund contravenes the Nevada Constitution and must be permanently enjoined because there is no permissible statutory basis to appropriate money from the State General Fund to the education savings account program and therefore the program is contrary to the requirement that the legislature appropriate money in an amount sufficient to pay for the operation of public schools before enacting any other appropriation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThompson worked as a registered nurse at Scott and White Memorial where she received multiple reprimands for violating the hospital’s personal conduct policy and was informed that any future violation could result in her termination. In May 2016, Thompson learned that divorced parents were having their child seen by two separate neurologists at the hospital, prompting Thompson to become concerned that the child’s medications were not being properly managed. Without discussing with the parents, Thompson called the child’s school nurse and discussed the child’s medications, in the process divulging protected health information. When the school nurse informed Thompson that the child had experienced an increase in behavior issues, Thompson told a supervisor who advised her to alert Child Protective Services (CPS). When the child’s mother learned of the report, she contacted the hospital. The hospital then investigated and learned of Thompson’s call to the school nurse, and the disclosure of protected information. Following this discovery, Thompson was terminated. Thompson sued the hospital for violating a Texas law prohibiting employers from taking any adverse action for making a report to CPS in good faith. The hospital moved for summary judgment, claiming that it terminated Thompson for again violating the personal-conduct policy, and that Thompson would have been terminated regardless of the CPS report. While the trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court held that employers can overcome the protection against employer retaliation for reporting by presenting sufficient evidence to indicate that the termination would have occurred regardless of the reporting action. Here, the Court noted that although termination forms indicated that the report to CPS may have played a role in Thompson’s termination, the evidence presented indicated that the hospital would have nonetheless terminated Thompson for her actions, even if she had stopped short of reporting to CPS.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City of Philadelphia issued a Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO) with employment discrimination that applied to and waived sovereign immunity for the Commonwealth’s municipal agencies, including the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). The FPO's discrimination protection went beyond those provided in the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), including again employment discrimination and discrimination in public accommodations based on race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, familial status, or domestic or sexual violence victim status. Individual plaintiff alleged that SEPTA had violated the FPO by engaging in discriminatory conduct against which the FPO offers protection, but the PHRA does not. In turn, SEPTA filed suit against the City of Philadelphia challenging the FPO, arguing that the City of Philadelphia exceeded its authority by issuing the FPO that waived its state-granted sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court held that, absent an explicit grant from the Commonwealth legislature waiving a municipal agency’s sovereign immunity, the State Human Relations Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over Commonwealth municipal agencies in anti-discrimination matters. If the Supreme Court had ruled for the FPO, the Philadelphia Commission, a municipal entity, would have had jurisdiction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Philadelphia Commission lodged complaints that Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) discriminated against employees and customers on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. The Supreme Court concluded that SEPTA, as it was a Commonwealth agency, was not subject to the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO), which forbids invidious discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by reviewing the statutory language and legislative scheme of SEPTA's enabling legislation, which reflected the legislature's intent to exclude SEPTA from the jurisdiction of the FPO.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA corrections officer brought action against physicians who treated prison inmates, alleging that physicians were liable for negligently failing to warn the corrections officer that particular inmates had a communicable disease. The Supreme Court held that physicians who treated prison inmates had no duty to warn corrections officers who regularly were in close contact with inmates that a particular inmate had a communicable disease; physician-patient relationship existed only with inmates, not with corrections officers, and policy concerns did not warrant extending physician's duty to warn to third-party non-patients.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingShaw was a former employee of BMW at its manufacturing facility, and was subjected to drug testing by BMW. Shaw tested positive for drugs based on the results of hair testing conducted by the testing lab, Psychemedics Corp. Shaw disputed the test result and submitted a hair sample to a different lab, which concluded that Shaw did not test positive for drugs. BMW declined to rely on the result from the lab retained by Shaw, but did agree to have a second hair specimen tested by Psychemedics Corp. Shaw tested positive again for drugs and lost his job. Shaw brought a negligence action in federal court against the testing lab. The district court certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding whether a testing lab owes a duty of care to the employees tested that can give rise to a negligence action. The Court held that drug-testing companies who perform workplace drug tests on behalf of employers owe a duty of care to the individuals who are tested and may be sued for negligence for failing to properly and accurately perform the drug tests and report the results. The Court noted several basis to support a finding that a laboratory may be sued for negligence, including: (1) the laboratory’s contractual relationship with the employer; (2) the fact that the employee would suffer a direct economic injury, such as loss of employment, if the laboratory was negligent in testing the specimen; and (3) public policy considerations. In this case, the Court answered a certified question that will impact third-party vendors under contract with South Carolina employers to conduct employee drug testing and therefore should review their processes and procedures to determine vulnerabilities for mistakes in the processing of a drug screen. Such mistakes are likely to form the basis of an employee’s negligence claim.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellants are nine parents, individually and as next friends of their minor children who are students attending public schools in the districts of Clark, Washoe, and White Pine Counties (collectively, Shea). Respondents are the State of Nevada, the Nevada Department of Education, Jhone Ebert, in her official capacity as Nevada Superintendent of Public Education, and the Nevada State Board of Education (collectively, the State), all of whom are responsible for implementing Nevada's public education policy. Shea filed a complaint against the State alleging that Nevada's system of public education has failed its students, as evidenced by the State's ongoing poor rankings and continued failure to achieve the standards that she contends are required for a sufficient, basic education under Article 11, Sections 1, 2, and 6 of the Nevada Constitution. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shea's claims presented nonjusticiable political questions. The Supreme Court concluded, after clarifying jurisprudence regarding the political question doctrine, that the plain language of the relevant constitutional provisions demonstrates a clear, textual commitment of public education to the Nevada Legislature by granting the Legislature broad discretionary authority over such matters. Because Shea's claims are inextricably linked to the textual commitment of public education to the Legislature under the Nevada Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that the claims are nonjusticiable.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance against her employer for wrongful termination, and after the administrative procedures were concluded, the employee filed a complaint in the lower court. The employer argued that the statute of limitations had expired while the administrative complaint was pending, and the lower court granted their motion to dismiss. Under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), the statute of limitations for a wrongful discharge act "is tolled until [internal grievance] procedures are exhausted." Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-911(2). The employee appealed. The Supreme Court held, based on the plain text of § 39-2-911(2), that the statute of limitations for wrongful discharge complaints is tolled until the internal procedures are completed, and not after 90 days as construed by the district court.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingCommercial landlord brought a forceable detainer action against a long-term tenant seeking to remove the tenant claiming a superior right of immediate possession under a lease-extension option. While the tenant had a history of frequently defaulting on the lease's rental-payment terms, the landlord regularly accepted late payments when tendered and without protest. The parties had agreed, however, that the landlord's acceptance of late rent would not be a waiver and would not prevent the landlord from enforcing the lease terms in the future. Nonetheless, the tenant asserted the landlord waived the contractual nonwaiver provision. The Court considered whether waiver of a nonwaiver provision could be anchored in the same conduct the parties specifically agreed would not give rise to a waiver of contract rights, and the Court held that it could not. The lease's plain terms permitted the landlord to rely on the contractual nonwaiver clause and accept late rental payments without waiving its right to enforce the lease as written. While the Court did not hold that a nonwaiver provision may never be waived, there must, at a minimum, be some act inconsistent with its terms. The record showed no evidence that the landlord acted inconsistently with the contract's express terms. Nor had the tenant identified any false or misleading representation supporting an equitable-estoppel bar to eviction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a medical malpractice action against a surgeon, alleging that the surgeon failed to obtain her informed consent under the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act prior to removal of a non-malignant brain tumor. Following a jury trial, the court of common pleas entered judgment in favor of the surgeon. The patient appealed. The superior court affirmed, which the patient appealed to the Supreme Court. At issue, in part, was whether the trial court misapplied the common law and the MCARE Act when it instructed the jury that it could consider information provided to the patient by the surgeon's “qualified staff” in deciding whether the surgeon obtained the patient's informed consent to aggressive brain surgery. The Supreme Court held that the duty to obtain informed consent belongs solely to the physician, stating, "[i]nformed consent requires direct communication between physician and patient, and contemplates a back-and-forth, face-to-face exchange, which might include questions that the patient feels the physician must answer personally before the patient feels informed and becomes willing to consent." The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order that had affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the surgeon and remanded for a new trial.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA criminal Defendant submitted the documentation required to argue that he did not have the financial resources to pay the costs of litigation, because he only had approximately $200 in his prison account. The trial court held that his prison account was sufficient to pay the $65.50 filing fee and denied his request to avoid paying the fee. The Defendant failed to apprise the court of his financial obligations when he submitted his documentation. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling in a per curiam decision. However, Justice Wecht filed a concurrence arguing for more clear direction for trial courts so the rule is not misapplied to prisoners. He recommended that the Court's Civil Procedures Rules Committee take time to examine issues relating to the application of the rule and establish guidelines for the trial courts.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA sales associate signed a confidentiality agreement in connection with his employment, which included a non-compete provision. After the employee left for another job with a competitor in California, the employer filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The employer sought damages and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to enforce a noncompete agreement, which restricted the employee from performing similar services anywhere in the United States, because evidence that the employer had conducted business in most states did not establish that it conducted business throughout the United States and, therefore, the agreement's geographical scope was overly broad and likely would not be found reasonable under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.200(4). Additionally, a semantic designation as a nationwide business does not allow a noncompete agreement to extend beyond the territory in which the employer has established business contact and although preliminary injunctions are necessarily granted on incomplete evidence, a reasonable probability of success has to be shown.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingSierra Club appealed a decision by the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission) approving a nonunanimous settlement agreement between Florida Power and Light (FPL) and three other parties, not including Sierra Club. This settlement agreement provided for cost recovery for certain projects, including the Peaker Project which involved the replacement of forty-four gas turbine power units with combustion units. This project was projected to significantly reduce FPL’s air emissions. In approving the settlement agreement, the Commission considered whether it was in the public interest. Such a standard traditionally involves determining the cost and effect on rates and services provided to ratepayers. Sierra Club challenged the Commission’s use of the public interest standard when approving the settlement and the sufficiency of its Final Order. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s approval of the settlement agreement, holding that when reviewing agreements, the public interest standard of review applies, and that Final Orders need not include an independent discussion of every issue raised in anticipation of an agreement’s approval. The Commission is not required to undergo an independent analysis of each project related to the settlement until the public utility seeks cost recovery, in which case what Sierra Club argued for, the prudence standard, meaning an analysis into whether increased rates are prudently invested back into the utility, might be used. Further, the Commission identified over 160 potential issues in the settlement agreement, but no legal requirement exists stating that each issue must be resolved nor does the Commission have to explain why it overruled each of the many objections to the settlement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIntermountain Water Supply Ltd. (Intermountain) held water rights permits to transmit water to Lemmon Valley for municipal use. The permits were for a pipeline to deliver water to Lemmon Valley. The State Engineer granted Intermountain numerous extensions to put the water to beneficial use. Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) sought to cancel Intermountain's permits so that it could acquire the water rights. In 2016, Intermountain filed extension applications indicating it was seeking a buyer for its rights. The State Engineer granted the extension, relying on an affidavit from one of Intermountain's pipeline managers stating that the Company had entered into option contracts and had negotiated a contract with a public utility to distribute the water. The State Engineer rejected SPI's claim that Intermountain was speculating the water (attempting to profit in the water). SPI filed a petition for judicial review of the State Engineer's decision, which the district court denied. SPI appealed. The Supreme Court held that the State Engineer abused his discretion and that a permittee must show evidence of its formal relationship with a third party to satisfy the requirement that a permittee show reasonable diligence to apply the water to beneficial use.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingNV Energy (joint business entity for both Sierra Pacific Power Company and Nevada Power Company) operated two electricity plants powered by coal. If the coal needed to power the mines had been obtained from Nevada mines, it would have been subject to a tax break under Nevada law. However, Nevada mines do not supply the necessary quantity and quality of coal. NV Energy argued the exemption for locally produced coal violated the Commerce Clause. Both the company and Court agreed that the language violated the Commerce Clause. On the issue of whether the language was severable, the Court held it was not severable because the statute as a whole was designed to protect Nevada mines. NV Energy did not receive a refund of the tax however because the Court found it did not pay any higher taxes than its competitors.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn November of 2016, two state senators, Nicole Cannizzaro and Joyce Woodhouse, faced recall petitions following their election victories. After those seeking to recall the senators collected signatures and submitted them to the County Registrar for verification, the two state senators filed petitions under NRS 306.040(2) to strike certain names from the recall petitions. They then filed complaints in district court asserting that the Registrar's process for verifying signatures was flawed because it did not remove invalid signatures. The district court subsequently ordered the Registrar to do a "full verification of the signatures in order to reconcile the strike requests," which showed both petitions did not have enough signatures to qualify, and the district court issued an order that the recall petitions did not satisfy the requirements to hold a special election. The Petitioners seeking recall then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the district court abused its discretion in ordering a full reverification of the signatures because it did not have reason to doubt the initial verification and should not have accepted the results of the subsequent reverification. Rejecting the Appellants position, the Supreme Court held that the parties could challenge whether a petition was sufficient under NRS 306.040(5), the district court could review the factual record, and has the ability to remand to the district court (similar to how it does with agencies) for further factual inquiry. Reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court also said that the district court had "various reasons to order a full verification of the petition signatures" including reconciling strike requests (and the only way to do so was to review all the signatures) and "substantial evidence to call into question the validity of the registrar's statistical verification." The Supreme Court then concluded that the "District Court did not err in accepting these results because nothing in the record indicates that these results were clearly erroneous." The Supreme Court also stated it declined to consider whether the strike requests were permissible under the Nevada Constitution because the Supreme Court avoids considering the constitutionality of a statute unless necessary and here the recall petitions fail regardless of the statute's constitutionality.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTwo Plaintiffs sued an operator of plasma donation centers (CSL) after they were each rejected from donating plasma. The first Plaintiff, Silguero was denied the opportunity to donate due to bad knees, which would have made it difficult for him to transfer to and from the bed used in the plasma extraction process. The second Plaintiff, Wolfe, relies on a service dog to abate symptoms related to anxiety. A CSL clinic rejected her donation as well due to her service dog. Silguero sued CSL in federal district court, alleging that the clinic staff had unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of disability, suing under both the American Disability Act (ADA), as well as under chapter 121 of the Texas Human Rights Code (THRC). The trial court later granted Wolfe’s petition to intervene as a plaintiff, and both the Plaintiffs and CSL agreed that both Plaintiffs qualified as a person with a disability under the ADA and the THRC. Prior to trial, the district court granted CSL’s motion for summary judgment, finding that CSL was not a place of “public accommodation” under the ADA, nor was it a “service establishment” nor a “public facility” under the THRC. The court reasoned that because a plasma donation center pays donors for plasma instead of offering a service for pay, and because the public is not invited to a plasma donation center, but rather is merely offered to sell a good there, it would be incorrect to hold the donation center liable. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that a plasma donation center was not a covered service establishment under the ADA. The Fifth Circuit then certified two questions to the Texas Supreme Court regarding whether CSL was a public facility under the THRC, and if so, what standard should be applied to determine whether CSL committed impermissible discrimination by failing to accommodate the Plaintiffs. On review, the Court considered the enumerated categories of public facilities under the THRC, which incudes commercial establishments that the general public is invited to, as well as a catchall for “any other place of public accommodation” the general public is invited to. The Court held that CSL was a commercial establishment under the plain meaning of the statute, as it acts as a for-profit business to extract plasma and compensate donors. However, CSL further argued that because only certain individuals are allowed to pass the screening process, and because CSL reserves the right to reject certain individuals, the general public is not invited to their facilities. The Court again looked to the plain meaning of “invited” and held that the public is invited under THRC any time that a facility opens its doors and allows members of the public to be present. The Court then turned to the second certified question regarding the applicable standard of discrimination under the THRC, and held that while the statute included language broadly prohibiting discrimination, it was not a strict liability standard. Instead, the Court looked to parallels between the THRC and the ADA to determine that the standard for discrimination under the former should be similar to the latter, and held that a public facility may refuse “unreasonable accommodations” that would “fundamentally alter the nature of its goods, services, or facilities.” Further, a defendant is not liable if they failed to provide aids that are not “necessary” to ensure that individuals with disabilities are treated the same as those without disabilities, or if providing such accommodations would be detrimental to the health or safety of others at the facility. As the Court’s analysis pertained to certified questions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court did not analyze whether the CSL itself would be considered a public facility or whether the actions by the clinic staff amounted to unlawful discrimination under the THRC.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOhio voters approved a constitutional amendment that created a tax-exempt bond fund for making grants to political subdivisions and nonprofit organizations to revitalize and preserve natural spaces. The fund is administered by the Ohio Public Works Commission (OPWC). In 2005, Guernsey CDC Corporation filed for a grant to purchase property to create a "green corridor." The agreement between the OPWC and CDC contained provisions restricting the use of the land and CDC's ability to transfer interest in the land. CDC made several assignments and transfers of the subsurface mineral rights without the OPWC's knowledge or consent. The Supreme Court held that oil and gas leases affect both the mineral and surface rights of a property. The Court also held that the OPWC's transferability restriction was enforceable given the public purpose of land conservation and preservation.