State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingLarry Porchia, the Appellant, alleged that emergency medical technicians had denied him medical treatment and transportation to the hospital after negligently misdiagnosing him and/or because he was homeless and uninsured. After EMTs had placed the Appellant on a stretcher, took his vitals, and asked him questions about his condition, the Appellant requested they transport him to the hospital. According to the Appellant's amended complaint, once he informed the technicians that he was homeless and did not have insurance, the technicians diagnosed Porchia with gas pain, removed him from the stretcher, and concluded he did not need to be transported to the hospital. Porchia would later need to undergo emergency surgery, which he was informed would not have been necessary if he had received treatment earlier. The district court dismissed Porchia's complaint after concluding that his claims were barred by the public duty doctrine and the Good Samaritan statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted Porchia's allegations as true and considered whether failing to render medical assistance or provide transport based solely on a patient's socioeconomic status qualified as an affirmative act exempted from the public duty doctrine. First, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the specific duty exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply here. The paramedics did not have a duty to transport a patient who did not require further medical attention based on their medical expertise. This lack of duty was further supported when the technicians made no specific promise to Porchia to transport him which he could have relied upon to his detriment. The Court also upheld the district court's dismissal of Porchia's negligence claims which were brought on a misdiagnosis theory, viewing a misdiagnosis as akin to an omission, rather than an affirmative action. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the EMTs took affirmative action when they removed the Plaintiff from the stretcher and refused to transport him when they learned of his socioeconomic status and lack of insurance. Finally, the Supreme Court held that dismissing Porchia's claims under Nevada's Good Samaritan statute was improper, as the EMTs' actions could be considered grossly negligent and an aggravated act.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOhio statute prohibited public sector unions from inducing or encouraging the picketing of private residences or private jobs of public officials. Oh.R.C. 4117.11(B)(7) describes employee organizations “[i]nduc[ing] or encourag[ing] any individual in connection with a labor relations dispute to picket the residence or any place of private employment of any public official or representative of the public employer” as an unfair labor practice. Resolving a split appellate court, the Supreme Court held that picketing was an expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, and therefore content-based restrictions on picketing are subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court found that the restriction was content-based because it only restricted activity if it was connected with a labor dispute and done by an employee organization, and that this prohibition failed to clear the compelling government interest hurdle. The Supreme Court did not thoroughly address the distinction between the nominally permitted act of picketing and “encouraging or inducing” picketing. However, a concurrent opinion reasoned that “inducement” and “encouragement” were protected speech, agreed that the regulation was inarguably content-based. Under the statute an organization could discourage its members from picketing, and it could encourage its members to picket on any issue whose message was not related to an on-going labor dispute—thus meaning the content of the encouragement was the basis for its restriction or permissibility.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn oyster-farming business brought an inverse condemnation claim against the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources based on the Department's decision to build a breakwater and marsh for coastal protection, which allegedly caused sediment and silt to kill the oysters being farmed in Plaintiffs’ oyster beds in the shellfish aquaculture easement held by Plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that Plaintiffs had not alleged a valid inverse-condemnation claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, concluding that the Department’s actions foreseeably resulted in an interference with the private-property rights acquired by the oyster farmers and that the shellfish aquaculture easement acquired from the State created private-property rights that were disrupted by the sediment and silt for which a right to damages for a taking is recognized in Ala. Const. art. I § 23. Because leasehold interests can be taken by eminent domain, and therefore by inverse condemnation, the Court reasoned that easements, another real-property interest allowing the use of a property right held by the owner of the land, can be taken by eminent domain and therefore by inverse condemnation. Accordingly, the Court held that the oyster farmers properly stated claims for inverse condemnation upon which relief can be granted. It further held that because the exception from State immunity based on the taking of property for public use applies, the defense of State immunity was not available as to the oyster farmers' inverse-condemnation claims.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Kitrich Powell was convicted of first-degree murder for the repeated abuse of a four-year-old girl that ultimately killed her. After exhausting his direct appeals, Powell petitioned the Court for postconviction relief, which the district court dismissed as procedurally barred. Powell's claim was based in part on an 18-month delay in obtaining third-party expert witness declarations. The Court found that Powell's delay was unreasonable because he did not allege "any external impediment to the defense prevented him from obtaining both declarations earlier." The Court affirmed, holding that Powell's claims were procedurally barred as (1) trial errors should have been addressed on direct appeal; (2) the petition was untimely; and (3) the petition improperly raised new or previously litigated claims. The Court did not excuse these procedural bars based on Powell's actual innocence of first-degree murder or the death penalty. Even in light of the new evidence, the Court found that no reasonable juror would have been persuaded against conviction. Further, Powell did not prove his actual innocence as he did not challenge the validity of any aggravating circumstance. In dissent, Justice Cherry, joined by Justice Saitta, stated that the Court should have applied a reasonableness test to the timeliness of the late evidence rather than a bright-line rule. Under their test, the dissenters would have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether the delay was reasonable. If reasonable, an evidentiary hearing to determine the merit of Powell's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should have followed. Further, the dissenters would reverse Powell's death sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether Powell could demonstrate he was ineligible for the death penalty considering "the significant evidence his abusive upbringing and psychiatric conditions."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA dairy farmer sued a septic pumping service and its commercial general liability insurers, alleging negligence in storing and applying septage to its fields, which contaminated the water supply and harmed the farmer's cattle. The Supreme Court held that the septage decomposing into the farmer's water supply was an "occurrence" within the meaning of the insurance policies (triggering coverage), and considered a "pollutant" within the meaning of the pollution exclusion of the insurance policies.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingGa. Code Ann. § 31-6-40 requires hospitals to obtain a certificate of need (CON) for specified new health services. The Georgia Department of Community Health promulgated a rule implementing Ga. Code Ann. § 31-6-40 that requires hospitals to obtain a CON prior to the establishment of a new or the expansion and an existing acute care adult psychiatric and/or substance abuse in-patient program. Expansion is defined as the addition of beds. A hospital held a CON for 49 total in-patient beds, 12 of which were under a CON for a psychiatric/substance abuse program. The hospital redistributed beds between the in-patient and psychiatric/substance abuse beds, but never exceed the total of 49 authorized by the CON. The Department issued a cease and desist letter to the hospital claiming that, because of the redistribution, the hospital had exceeded its CON for psychiatric/substance abuse beds, claiming the redistribution resulted in more than 12 beds. The hospital challenged the Department’s decision, arguing that requiring a new CON for bed redistribution was an impermissible expansion of the rule which only required a new CON for increasing bed capacity. The court of appeals ruled in favor of the Department, finding that the Department was authorized to create a category of services requiring a CON even if that service is not listed in the rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new CON was not required for redistribution because the text of the statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 31-6-40, provides for an exhaustive list of the situations that require a new CON and redistribution was not on the list. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Department did not have the authority to expand the list because, if it did, there would be issues with the constitutionality of the authority delegated to the Department.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff brought an action against an oil company claiming, among other things, noneconomic damages for the mental anguish, emotional distress and psychological injuries that she sustained when the company negligently pumped 400 gallons of fuel oil into the basement of her house, which created an environmental hazard that required that the house be demolished. On the issue of noneconomic damages, the oil company moved for summary disposition, arguing that noneconomic damages resulting from real property damage were not compensable. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the oil company, holding that Michigan common law provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is the cost of replacement or repair of the property, and because the Court found no compelling argument for altering the common law, it held that any change in the rule could only come from the Michigan legislature.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs brought a class action against Philip Morris for violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act for using terms "lights" and "lowered tar and nicotine" on cigarette packaging and marketing. Plaintiffs alleged that when smoked under realistic conditions, these cigarettes failed to provide lower tar and nicotine compared to conventional cigarettes. The Defendant raised, among other defenses, Section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act, which provides that the Act shall not apply to "[a]ctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States." The Defendant asserted Plaintiffs' complaint should not go forward because its use of "light" and "lowered tar and nicotine" complied with Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policies. The circuit court rejected the defenses, certified a class of approximately 1.14 million people, and awarded $10.1 billion in compensatory and punitive damages in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court on December 15, 2005 on the basis that the FTC had authorized the use of descriptors "light" and "lowered tar and nicotine," hence barring Plaintiffs' complaint. The circuit court eventually dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate. However, on Dec. 18, 2008, Plaintiffs petitioned for relief from judgment based on new evidence, pointing to an amicus brief the FTC filed in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008), where the FTC indicated it did not authorize cigarette companies to use "light" or "lowered tar and nicotine." The circuit court dismissed the petition for untimeliness, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that the issue before it was whether the statements made by the FTC would have altered the court's resolution of the section 10(b)(1) issue. Holding that plaintiffs were entitled to relief, the appellate court effectively reinstated the original $10.1 billion judgment. The issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the appellate court properly reversed the judgment of the circuit court that denied Plaintiffs' petition brought pursuant to Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a statuary procedure for obtaining relief from final orders and judgments more than 30 days after their entry. Plaintiffs sought to use section 2-2401 to vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court on December 15, 2005 in the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the appropriate means would have been to file a motion in the reviewing court to recall its mandate, because Section 2-1401 does not authorize the circuit court to vacate the judgment of a reviewing court. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and dismissed the cause without prejudice, allowing Plaintiffs to file a motion to recall the mandate in the Supreme Court. The dissent found that the appellate court had properly applied Section 2-1401 because the statutory petition was a new action based on matters not in the original record, and Section 2-1401 contained unconditional language giving the circuit court equitable power to grant relief from judgment to prevent injustice. In 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to recall the mandate that struck down the $10.1 billion judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court also denied Plaintiffs' petition for review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn a lawsuit filed on behalf of Priorities, USA and Rise, Inc., Plaintiffs challenged two Michigan laws: a proof of residency requirement that strictly limits acceptable documents and an automatic registration process which only applies to those older than 17.5 years old. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs’ application to appeal the trial court’s order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn August 2022, the Progressive Leadership Alliance of Nevada (PLAN) appealed to the Supreme Court after a district court denied its petition to block a temporary regulation by Republican Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske, which "allow[ed] counties, if they complied with certain requirements, to hand count votes as their primary vote count method in the November 2022 election." On October 25, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not "abuse[] . . . discretion in . . . finding that PLAN failed to show irreparable harm would result in the absence of an injunction." The Supreme Court reasoned that PLAN failed to show that using hand counting as a primary method to count ballots would cause harm and that no county planned to use hand counting as their primary method for counting votes in the upcoming election. The Supreme Court also noted that the regulation would expire before the next election (unless there was a special election held in the interim).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2016, the New York City Water Board—which collects revenues to keep the City's water and sewer systems financially self-sustaining—approved a 2.1% rate increase, a one-time bill credit of $183 for the fiscal year to all account holders belonging in a particular tax class, as well as assistance programs for multi-unit apartments, seniors and low-income households and a low-consumption rate freeze. The City of New York also announced it would temporarily forbear collecting rents from the Water Board and provided that the savings from the rent forbearance would be passed on to all account holders. Petitioners, which included various landlords not eligible for the bill credit and not-for-profit assistance, commenced an action against the Water Board and New York Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), arguing the Water Board's determinations were irrational, arbitrary, and capricious and exceeded the Board's authority. The Court of Appeals held that the governing statutes provide that water and sewer rates may be determined in accordance with public policy goals, not just economic ones. Specifically, the Court found the Respondents' decision to allocate the relatively modest gain from the rent forbearance so as to be meaningful to a very large category of ratepayer, without requiring a complex application process, was not irrational. Thus, the Court of Appeals could not say the Respondents' actions were utterly arbitrary or unsupported by rational goals.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingLawsuit filed by Promote the Vote 2022 (PTV22) challenging the Michigan Board of State Canvassers’ decision to not put PTV22’s ballot initiative on the state’s ballot. Among other things, the ballot initiative would “amend the [Michigan] Constitution to add a fundamental right to vote;” extend deadlines for absentee ballots for certain voters; provide for drop boxes, postage, ballot tracking and guarantee early voting. PTV22 submitted more than 664,000 signatures when only 425,059 are needed. The measure was challenged and ultimately removed from the ballot. PTV22 alleges that the Board of State Canvassers violated PTV22’s right to due process under the Michigan Constitution by “refusing to certify the Proposal despite the Board approving the Proposal’s petition” and filed a writ of mandamus to force the board to certify the petition. The Supreme Court ordered the Board of State Canvassers to certify the Promote the Vote petition as sufficient for placement on the November 8 general election ballot, reasoning that the proposed amendments would not abrogate any of the constitutional provisions identified by the challenger.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2006, the state's Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation prepared a plan to create a 27-mile system of snowmobile trails between communities in the Adirondack Park Forest Preserve. This plan would require the cutting and removal of thousands of trees, grading and leveling, and the removal of rocks and other natural components from the Forest Preserve to create such snowmobile paths. Plaintiff brought an action alleging the construction of the trails was in violation of the "forever wild" provision (article XIV) of the New York Constitution. This constitutional provision mandated that protected Forest Preserve lands "shall be forever kept as wild forest lands" with the intent of ending commercial destruction and despoliation of the soil and trees and protecting the state's watershed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the level of tree cutting needed to construct these trails exceeded the level of tree cutting permitted by prior court decisions regarding compliance with article XIV. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the planned snowmobile trails violated the State Constitution's "forever wild" provision and that construction of these trails could only be accomplished with a constitutional amendment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff Puglia filed an action against a former employer under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), claiming that his employment was terminated after he complained about his employer's failure to pay him in accord with the Prevailing Wage Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that such state-law claim is preempted by federal labor law on multiple grounds and the appellate court agreed. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that a collective bargaining agreement cannot be used by an employer as a defense to a CEPA claim. Also, the Supreme Court found that whether the Plaintiff was terminated because of his complaints was a question of fact and therefore summary judgment should have been denied.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant was convicted of first-degree murder. Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a hearing in connection with the fact that a juror was Facebook friends with various members of the victim's family and did not disclose these relationships during jury selection, despite not having been asked a question that would have elicited disclosure of those relationships. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the Appellant did not submit sufficient evidence warranting the conclusion that the juror gave false answers during voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias toward him, given that none of the juror's Facebook friends were listed as witnesses in the case, or shared a last name with the victim, and the juror had not interacted with any of those Facebook friends for several years before the jury selection, except for one wedding picture that they "liked" on Facebook.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee working in a correctional facility experienced sexual harassment by an inmate. She requested that the inmate be transferred to the maximum security unit, which was denied. However, the employer offered to transfer the employee to work in another unit. The employee refused and filed suit for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The lower court found for the employer on all claims, and the employee appealed. The Supreme Court held that the employer had made reasonable accommodations in response to the harassment complaints, and that the offer to transfer the employee was a reasonable means of protecting her from sexual harassment, and that it was not pretextual and, therefore, not retaliation. The Supreme Court also held that the employer correctional facility was not negligent in responding to the harassment of the inmate, and thus was not liable as a third party for the sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner employee was let go from her managerial role allegedly for not completing her assigned tasks on time, a termination for good cause which she disputes. The lower court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the employer has met its burden under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), which provides for good-cause termination when the employer loses confidence in a managerial employee. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-904(1)(b). The Supreme Court held that under the Montana common law, the employer has the burden of presenting evidence of reasonable-job related grounds for dismissal, including legitimate business reasons, even for managerial employees for whom the employer has the broadest discretion in handling. Sullivan v. Cont'l Constr. of Mont., LLC, 299 P.3d 832 (Mont. 2013). Once the employer submits this evidence, the burden shifts to the employee to rebut the substantive reason for dismissal as not good cause, or that it was pretextual. Here, the employee failed to sustain that burden, thus summary judgment was awarded to the employer. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that a written warning ten years prior to termination still functioned as adequate written notice as required by the employee handbook.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA father worked a job that exposed him to asbestos fibers that would stay on him when he returned home to his family. Years later, the now adult son of the father died of mesothelioma (cancer associated with asbestos). The surviving family, including the father, sued the former employer of the father alleging the job negligently caused his son's death. The issue at hand is whether an employer who used asbestos materials in its workplace before 1970 had a duty to protect the public from off-site contact with employees who may have been carrying asbestos fibers on their work clothes. The Majority held that there was no duty by the employer to protect the son from exposure to take-home asbestos as there was no special relationship between the two parties and no duty existed based on public policy. In Arizona, to determine whether the family can sustain a claim for negligence the first most important step is to determine whether the employer owed a duty to the employee to conform to a certain standard of care. The duty framework is established not by foreseeability (when a defendant realizes or should realize that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a “foreseeable plaintiff”) but by whether there is a special relationship and public policy. A special relationship is a relationship created by either common law, contractual agreement, or conduct undertaken by the parties such as the relationship between a doctor and a patient or a teacher and a student. There is no special relationship between an employer and an employee's family. Specifically, the son did not have a relationship with the employer and the employer did not have a duty to the son who was not employed by nor had a relationship to the employer. Further, there is also no evidence the son had a contractual relationship with the employer, or held a landowner-invitee/licensee relationship with the employer or suffered an injury on the employer's property. Public policy in Arizona creates a duty based on state and federal statutes and common law. In this case, the family failed to identify a valid public policy creating a legal relationship giving rise to a duty. While public policy can be for the betterment of the state/community, the Court held there needs to be a legal basis for such a policy to create a duty. In the absence of a statute, the court exercises restraint in declaring public policy. Having a general "social concern" for public welfare as could be the case with asbestos and mesothelioma, is not enough for the court to determine a duty of care where one never existed before. Accordingly, the Court held while the employee-father was owed a duty of care from the employer, there is no special relationship or duty between the family of an employee and the employer. The Majority opinion found that a general duty of care, a duty to anyone who is injured by the risk creating conduct even when the harm occurs off premises, surpassed the bounds of Arizona law. There is no history in Arizona law to suggest such a broad understanding of duty. The dissent believed the Majority erred by refusing to recognize the risk of physical injury created by the employer's manner of operating its factory and exposing its workers without warning to toxic asbestos while failing to provide workplace protective measures.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA man killed his girlfriend during a domestic dispute because, he claimed, she was abusive towards him. During his defense, he moved to compel her hospital to disclose her mental health records stemming from a visit she made to the hospital following a domestic dispute in which she assaulted him. The prosecution argued against such records being disclosed due to an Arizona statute governing physician-patient privilege, but the trial court found that the Defendant's constitutional due process rights required such disclosure in camera. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling, reasoning that evidence of her mental illness was material to his justification defense and could potentially establish that his fear of her was not a self-serving opinion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA certified lactation counselor and a nonprofit organization that provided lactation services filed suit against the Secretary of State arguing that the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 43-22A-1 to 43-22a-13, violated due process and equal protection of the Georgia Constitution because it only permitted lactation specialists to obtain licensure if they obtained a certain private certification. The Plaintiffs argued the Act’s licensure requirements lacked any real and substantial connection to public health, safety, and welfare because there is no evidence that providers who obtained a different certification provided below-standard care. The Supreme Court held that the Act (1) imposed a burden on the profession; and (2) Georgia’s proffered interest in promoting access to quality care was an insufficient basis for the Act’s restrictions. While an individual’s right to engage in the employment of their choosing can be restricted in the interest of public health, the choice of one certification over the other was not justifiable. The Supreme Court established a framework to address cases challenging occupational licensing schemes under the Georgia Constitution: (1) the challenger must establish that the act infringes on a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people by showing that (a) the occupation sough is lawful but for the challenged restriction; and (b) the regulation unreasonably interferes with the ability to pursue that occupation free from unreasonable government interference; (2) the government has the burden to prove there is a legitimate interest behind the law that justifies the restriction; and (3) the challenger has the ultimate burden to prove that the regulation unreasonably interferes with their right to practice the occupation of their choosing. In cases involving occupational licenses associated with public health, a burden on the ability to practice will be balanced against the interest in protecting public health and safety.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Employee-Plaintiff was hired via a professional employment organization (PEO), which under Montana law is treated as an employer for employee tort claims. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-8-207(8)(b)(ii). Under Montana's PEO Act, workers with tort claims are exclusively limited to remedies available under the Montana Workers' Compensation Act, and have no other redress against PEOs. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-8-207(8)(b)(i). The employee sued his employer, arguing that the PEO Act is unconstitutional under the Montana Constitution because it extended the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation to both the PEO and its client (the Plaintiff's employer), thus depriving the employee of full legal redress under the Montana Constitution. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-8-207(8)(b)(i); Mont. Const. art II, § 16. The Supreme Court held that the PEO Act did not violate the Montana Constitution because the state has a compelling interest in allowing its citizens the opportunity to pursue employment, and the PEO Act is narrowly tailored to balance the interests of both employers and employees in providing that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for claims against PEOs and their client-employers.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2011, Stacey Miller was diagnosed with hepatitis C and received a series of intravenous injections of lipoic acid. During one of the injections, Miller had an adverse reaction and had to be hospitalized for several weeks, seemingly due to improperly compounded lipoic acid. As a result of these complications, Miller became permanently blind in both eyes. Miller and her husband sued her doctor, the pharmacy that had provided the acid for the treatment, as well as several pharmacists who had produced the acid. The claims brought against the doctor were eventually dismissed, however against the pharmacy and the pharmacists, Miller brought negligence and product liability claims, and breach of implied warranties of "design, manufacture, inspection, marketing, and/or distribution." The pharmacy and pharmacist Defendants argued that the claims asserted by Miller were governed by the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), and moved to dismiss Miller's claims for failure to serve an expert report within 120 days of suing, a requirement under the Act. The Defendants' motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that neither the pharmacy, nor the individual pharmacists were heath care providers, and that the claims brought against them were not health care liability claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the Act and held that Miller's claims were health care liability claims (subject to the Act). Pharmacists are explicitly covered in the delineated types of health care providers covered under the Act, and here, although the pharmacists were compounding pharmacists, their actions still fell under the types of actions protected under the Act. The Court reviewed the Texas Pharmacy Act's definition of "dispense," which includes a pharmacist compounding and delivering medicine to the patient or the patient's agent. The Court applied this definition to the compounding of the lipoic acid, holding that the pharmacists had dispensed the medicine, and therefore engaged in actions covered by the Act. As a result, Miller had failed to comply with the Act and serve the Defendants with an expert report within 120 days of filing suit, and her claims had to be dismissed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2009, South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Toal issued an Administrative Order to ensure compliance with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) of the United States Department of the Treasury. This order was intended to ensure that eligible homeowners received the benefits under HAMP and to provide procedures for handling related issues and foreclosure actions. A revised order was issued in 2011, which included additional obligations to ensure foreclosure intervention occurred in required cases. In December 2016, the United States Congress ended the Making Home Affordable Program, making HAMP inapplicable to new foreclosure actions unless a borrower sought a modification prior to December 31, 2016. The South Caroline Supreme Court determined that, since HAMP had ended, the 2009 and 2011 Orders must be rescinded. As a result, the Mortgagee-Plaintiffs in the instant foreclosure actions were no longer required to comply with federal regulations regarding loss mitigation in South Carolina.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff was a student loan borrower who sought to sue his loan servicer over improper, deceptive, and negligent practices that the servicer had enacted which affected his eligibility for certain federal student loan programs. Plaintiff specifically sought to bring claims under state law, including Montana's Consumer Protection Act. The district court ruled that the Higher Education Act (HEA) expressly preempted Plaintiff's claims, and granted the Defendant loan servicer's motion to dismiss. After reviewing Plaintiff's claims under the preemption doctrine, the Court held that his claims were neither expressly preempted nor preempted via conflict. Further, the Court held that even if the HEA had sought to ensure national uniformity in student loan servicing, allowing Plaintiff's claims regarding unfair, deceptive and negligent practices to go forward would not prevent the Defendant, or any other servicer, from properly complying with the HEA's uniform requirements.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Reed-Kaliher pled guilty to possession of marijuana for sale and attempted possession of a narcotic drug for sale. A superior court judge sentenced Defendant to 1.5 years in prison on the marijuana count and suspended the sentence on the narcotic drug count, imposing three years probation. One of the conditions of Defendant's probation required him to "obey all laws." While Defendant was serving his prison term, Arizona passed Proposition 203, the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (AMMA), which permits "a person who has been diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical condition" to apply for a card identifying the marijuana possessor as a "registered qualifying patient." Defendant had chronic pain resulting from a fractured hip and obtained a "registry identification card” under AMMA so that he could obtain medical marijuana to ease his pain. During the term of Defendant’s probation, his probation officer added a new condition to his probation, specifying that he "not possess or use marijuana for any reason." Defendant opposed this condition and sought relief in the superior court. Defendant claimed that the AMMA's immunity provision shielded him from prosecution, revocation of probation, or other punishment for his possession or use of medical marijuana. That provision specifies that "[a] registered qualifying patient . . . is not subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty in any manner, or denial of any right or privilege . . . [f]or . . . medical use of marijuana pursuant to [AMMA], as long as the patient complies with statutory limits on quantity and location of marijuana use." Defendant requested that the superior court amend his probation conditions to delete the "no marijuana" term. The superior court denied the motion. Defendant filed a special action in the court of appeals, and the court of appeals granted relief. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that (1) the probation officer’s no-marijuana-use condition was prohibited by the immunity provision of AMMA; (2) Arizona state law prohibiting probationers convicted under certain sections from engaging in illegal drug use could not prohibit legal use under AMMA as a condition of probation; and (3) nothing in federal law required state judges to prohibit the use of medical marijuana as a condition of probation, and AMMA prohibited such a condition.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRelevant to this case is a discrepancy between O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(d)(2), which provides for a misdemeanor sentence for aggravated child molestation where the victim is at least 13 years old (among other conditions) and O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b)(2), which provides for a misdemeanor sentence for child molestation where the victim is at least 14 years old. Because the victim in this case was 13 years old, Defendant failed to qualify for the lower sentence he would have received if he had instead committed aggravated child molestation. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was subject to a felony sentence for child molestation despite the fact that he was similarly situated to certain defendants who would have received only a misdemeanor sentence for aggravated child molestation. Contending that there is no rational basis for such disparate treatment, Defendant argued that his equal protection rights were violated. Georgia law classifies aggravated child molestation as an act of child molestation that also physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy. With respect to the sentencing schemes behind these crimes, a first offense of child molestation is punishable by a prison term of five to 20 years, whereas a first offense of aggravated child molestation is punishable by either life in prison or a prison term of at least 25 years followed by probation for life. It was undisputed that Defendant did not commit sodomy yet was imposed a sentence far harsher than members of the comparative class that committed that act as part of the molestation. Upon review, the Supreme Court explained that this point, coupled with a review of the legislative purpose of the statute, formed the Supreme Court’s viewpoint that the act of sodomy cannot be the basis that distinguished defendant from the comparative class. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s order denying Defendant’s challenge of the state’s child molestation statute. Justice Pinson concurred in the judgment, writing separately to note that the Equal Protection Clause's use of "similarly situated" is just a restatement of what the clause requires, rather than a separate analysis that the majority applied to reach its holding. The dissenting justices found no validity in Defendant's equal-protection claim because he did not stand in equal footing with other defendants charged with and convicted of aggravated child molestation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRehfield was the principal of a Catholic school when she alerted teachers about an out-of-state parent who she believed to present a threat based on his emails about his daughter. Although the police issued an arrest warrant for the parent, Rehfield distributed a photograph of the parent, which sparked widespread rumors and false stories about the situation. Following parental uproar, the Diocese in charge of the Catholic school terminated Rehfield. Rehfield sued the Diocese, alleging retaliatory discharge and violations of the Whistleblower Act. The trial court dismissed, holding that Rehfield was employed by a contract which only allowed retaliatory discharge claims to be brought by employees terminable at will. Rehfield was terminated for cause, so the claim was barred. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, as it determined that Rehfield's role made her a "member of the clergy," and that her dismissal could not be heard as it fell under the Ministerial Exception. Under this exception, the first amendment bars courts from reviewing religious institutions' decisions regarding who may speak for the church. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, despite her title, Rehfield functioned as a minister. Rehfield was required to be a practicing Catholic and to specifically abide by the local diocesan handbook, and her role included specific establishment of a Catholic learning environment and furtherance of the Catholic mission. As a result of her ministerial status, Rehfield's dismissal was not protected under the Whistleblower Act.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff voters brought an action against the Secretary of State (Secretary) seeking to have Legislative Referendum No. 119 (LR-119) declared constitutionally defective and to enjoin the State from placing LR-119 on the ballot. LR-119 would have changed Mont. Code Ann. § 3-2-101, which requires that justices of the Montana Supreme Court be elected on a statewide basis, such that each justice would now be elected from one of seven districts of approximately equal population, and the voters of each district could vote for only one justice. Specifically, LR-119 would have the following effect: (1) a candidate for a seat on the Supreme Court must be a "qualified elector" of the district from which the candidate is elected; (2) LR-119 creates seven Supreme Court districts and requires that each justice be elected from a separate district; and (3) LR-119 changes the method of selecting the chief justice from a statewide election to a selection by the seven justices from among their number. The district court granted summary judgment to the voters, finding that (1) Plaintiffs' challenge to LR-119 is justiciable, (2) that LR-119 is unconstitutional on its face because it attempts, through statutory measures, to change the constitutionally established qualifications for Supreme Court justice by adding a new residency requirement, and (3) that LR-119 cannot be salvaged by severing the invalid portions of the referendum. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. In relevant part, the Supreme Court found the matter justiciable because the record is factually adequate to enable the court to make the necessary legal determinations, and that no additional facts would aid the court in its inquiry. Further, the Supreme Court held that LR-119 is constitutionally defective because the Montana Constitution intends Supreme Court justices to be elected and serve on a statewide basis and does not specify district elections—a structure that the Supreme Court found consistent with the justices' statewide appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court thus concluded that LR-119's attempt to alter the structure of the Supreme Court by making it into a representative body composed of members elected from districts is facially unconstitutional, as neither the Legislature nor the people have the power to alter the constitutionally established structure of government by means of a statutory referendum. The district court's decision was affirmed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingParents of J.S. (age eleven) reported to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office that A.R. (age ten) had sexually assaulted J.S. A special prosecutor performed an investigation which included a forensic investigation. The results concluded that the allegations against A.R. were greatly exaggerated. Parents of A.R. then brought a claim against the prosecutor and the State seeking damages based on an alleged violation of A.R.'s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The First Judicial District Court granted prosecutor's motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity and entered summary judgment for the County. Parents appealed. The Court affirmed, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity barred the claims against both the State and the prosecutor. Additionally, the public duty doctrine applied to the investigation, which precluded the personnel from liability for acting according to their duty to protect and preserve the peace.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas brought suit against a court employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation based on his serious mental health condition under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). The Supreme Court held that the PHRA does not apply to the judiciary because, in accordance with separation of powers principles, only the Supreme Court provides protection to court employees through its own rules, policies, and procedures.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury convicted Guillermo Renteria-Novoa of 36 felony sex offenses for which the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole in 85 years. After unsuccessfully exhausting his direct appeals, Renteria-Novoa filed a timely habeas petition and moved for appointment of postconviction counsel. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.750(1), appointment of postconviction counsel is not mandatory but within the discretion of the district court, as Renteria-Novoa did not face the death penalty. The district court found that Renteria-Novoa satisfied the threshold issues for appointment of counsel (Renteria-Novoa was indigent and his petition was not summarily dismissed). However, in considering the non-exhaustive statutory factors—"the severity of the consequences that the petitioner faces, the difficulty of the issues presented, the petitioner's ability to comprehend the proceedings, and the necessity of counsel to proceed with discovery"—the district court found against Renteria-Novoa and declined to appoint him counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court abused its discretion because Renteria-Novoa had limited proficiency in English, faced severe consequences for his 36 felony sex offense convictions, the petition was his only opportunity to assert ineffective assistance of counsel (and other claims not subject to direct appeal), and the petition might have required discovery and investigation of facts outside the record. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for appointment of counsel to assist Renteria-Novoa.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiffs filed suit following the Board of State Canvassers' denial of certification for the Reproductive Freedom For All (RFFA)'s petition, despite the Plaintiff having obtained the requisite signatures. The Supreme Court found that the Board's duty with respect to petitions is "limited to determining the sufficiency of a petition's form and content and whether there are sufficient signatures to warrant certification." The only challenge to the petition was in regard to whether there was sufficient space between certain words of the text of the proposed amendment, but the Supreme Court found that the meaning of the words was not changed by the alleged insufficient spacing between them. Assuming that the challengers' objection to the spacing represents a challenge to the "form" of the petition that the Board properly considered, the petition fulfilled all statutory form requirements, and the Board thus had a clear legal duty to certify the petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the Board of State Canvassers to certify the RFFA petition as sufficient for placement on the November 8 general election ballot.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn December 29, 2022, the Republican National Committee (RNC) filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus against the Clark County Elections Department regarding its process for signature verification. The RNC argued that, because the composition of the group of signature verifiers, the County Registrar "violated his duty under NRS 293B.360(2) to ensure that the 'members of each [special election] board . . . represent all political parties as equally as possible.'" The RNC first sought relief in district court but, after the district court denied their petition, the RNC filed an emergency motion for relief from the Supreme Court. On December 29, the Supreme Court denied the RNC's petition, explaining that the provision of state law (NRS 293B.360(1)) that requires the Registrar to ensure as equal as possible political party representation on boards established for processing ballots did not apply in this case. Rather, the Supreme Court said a different provision "govern[ed] the procedures for verifying the signatures used for mail ballots" and "[t]he statue contains no requirement that a board verify the signatures, nor . . . any requirement therein that signature verification on mail ballot returns is done by persons of different political parties." The Supreme Court also stated that "RNC appears to argue that anyone assisting the Registrar in election efforts is necessarily an election board to which NRS 293.260(2) applies" but that the Supreme Court would not read "such a substantive requirement into a definitional statute in this manner."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA gasoline tank leak caused an explosion in a nearby condominium, killing a resident. The family of the resident brought suit under multiple statutes. The Plaintiff argued that the relationship between the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which implements the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program, and the state Gasoline Storage Act creates a private right of action. The Court held that the statutes contain no explicit or implied private right of action. First, none of the statutes explicitly provide for a private right of action. Second, the Court conducted a four-step analysis to determine if there was an implied right of action. Specifically, the Court analyzed whether (1) the Plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) the Plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The Court found that none of the four requirements were met. The central thread of the Court's opinion was that each of the applicable environmental statutes were meant to benefit the environment as a whole rather than specific individuals; therefore, should be enforced by the state. Accordingly, the Court determined that the statutes do not convey a private right of action.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingOn June 22, 2021, the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act was enacted in South Carolina, containing two provisos restricting the use of mask mandates and virtual education in K-12 public schools. Proviso 1.103 of the Act permitted school districts to offer virtual education programs for up to five percent of their student population. For each student above the five percent threshold, a school district would not receive 47.22% of the per pupil funding otherwise allocated to them by the state. Proviso 1.108 of the Act prohibited school districts and schools from imposing a mask mandate requirement on any students or employees. The Richland School District and a parent of Richland students petitioned the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of these provisos in its original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that neither of these provisos were unconstitutional. First, with respect to Proviso 1.108, the Court noted that it had already discussed the proviso and found it constitutional in the recently decided Wilson v. City of Columbia, Op. No. 28056 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 2, 2021), where the Supreme Court held that the proviso was reasonably related to the spending of tax revenue and, therefore, of the same subject to the rest of the Appropriations Act, and that municipalities were not granted the power to "effectively overrule" the General Assembly merely by declaring a state of emergency. Second, the Court held that the provisos did not deprive children of their rights to education and equal protection under the state constitution. The Court found no evidence to suggest that students were receiving disparate treatment due to the provisos, as the provisos applied equally to all public K-12 schools. Further, the Court noted that the right to an education was not infringed upon by the provisos, nor were students prohibited from wearing masks if they wished.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a middle school teacher who had Type 1 diabetes and was injured in school during a hypoglycemic event, sued the Board of Education, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) for failure to accommodate her diabetes. The superior court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, and denied the teacher's motion for reconsideration on the ground that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because she was not fired or reassigned, and thus did not have a prima facie claim. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants stating that the LAD's broad remedial purpose may permit Plaintiffs to proceed against employers who failed to reasonably accommodate disabilities. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that an adverse employment action is not a required element for a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD and concluded that Plaintiff’s LAD claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition is not barred by the state's Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). This decision clarified the required elements of a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability under the LAD and also held that the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision does not preclude LAD claims because it would purportedly result in a “double recovery” to successful plaintiffs.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Javier Righetti sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus that would direct the district court to enforce his plea. In an attempt to limit the grounds on which the State could seek the death penalty, Defendant Javier Righetti attempted to plea guilty to only certain theories of murder alleged by the State. Specifically, Righetti attempted to plead guilty only to murder by means of torture and felony murder but not that he had murdered the victim willfully, deliberately, or with premeditation. The court rejected this strategy and held instead that Righetti could not plead guilty "à la carte," which impinged on the State's authority to charge a defendant under one or more alternatives theories. Rather, by pleading guilty to murder, without a plea agreement, Righetti necessarily admitted that he committed a willful, deliberate, premeditated murder. The district court therefore correctly rejected Righetti's guilty plea as nonconforming. Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach as to prevent the trial of Righetti. Thus, the Court denied Righetti's requested relief.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee was a Coach Counselor for Rite of Passage (ROP) and signed a Coach Counselor Payroll Declaration, which provided for an unpaid 8-hour "sleep period" in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2012). The employee filed a wage complaint alleging ROP failed to pay her for time worked, and the Labor Commissioner held an administrative hearing where it ruled that the employee had "worked" within the meaning of NRS 608.016 during her sleep period, for which she should have been paid. Whether an employee "worked" as defined in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act is a factual determination made by the appropriate administrator. The Supreme Court found that ROP required the employee to stay on its premises during her sleep period in case an emergency arose and that this requirement benefited ROP as it helped keep the youth safe and promoted bonding between the children and the Coach Counselor. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the Labor Commissioner's determination that the employee had worked during her sleep period based on the definition of "work" and affirmed the district court's judgment denying a petition for judicial review of the Labor Commissioner's ruling.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter his request for an internal affairs report regarding the former civilian head of police department, who allegedly engaged in racist and sexist behavior while in office, was denied by the prosecutor's office, requester filed a complaint against the prosecutor's office and its records custodian, relying on the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and common law. The prosecutor's office argued that there was a need for confidentiality based on witnesses' expectation of privacy. The City of Elizabeth intervened, also emphasizing the need for confidentiality. The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was how to balance the public interest of transparency with the confidentiality in internal affairs. The Court held that OPRA does not permit access to internal affairs reports, but those records can and should be disclosed under the common law right of access—subject to appropriate redactions—when interests that favor disclosure outweigh concerns for confidentiality. Further, the Court ruled that the appellate court should remand the case to the trial judge to review in camera the internal affairs report and to complete the fact-sensitive balancing test to determine whether the requester was entitled to the internal affairs report under common access to public records.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn consolidated actions, patient's estate and patient's husband brought an action against Defendants including physician, hospital's chief executive officer (CEO), and hospital's director of risk management, asserting claims including for malpractice, lack of informed consent, products liability, and punitive damages arising from patient's death from leiomyosarcoma following a laparoscopic hysterectomy performed at the hospital with the use of a power morcellation device. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, which the superior court denied. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) the alleged acts or omissions of physician were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages; and (2) the alleged acts or omissions of hospital executives also were not motivated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful disregard for patient's health and safety and thus could not support an award of punitive damages. Under the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, punitive damages are available only in exceptional cases.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRoberts was the director of medical programs at Malcolm X College and complained to the College about the use of unqualified instructors. Soon after, Roberts was terminated with no cause given, and he sued City Colleges of Chicago alleging retaliatory discharge, violation of the Whistleblower Act, and wrongful termination. The circuit court dismissed the retaliatory discharge and Whistleblower Act counts claiming that the Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a retaliatory discharge claim or violation of the Whistleblower Act. The appellate court affirmed the Whistleblower Act dismissal but reinstated the retaliatory discharge claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the Plaintiff had not sufficiently plead facts supporting his claim of retaliatory discharge. Under this claim, a Plaintiff must show that they were discharged in retaliation of their activities, in violation of a "clearly mandated public policy." Plaintiff argued that his dismissal undermined an Illinois law establishing loan and grant aid programs for students enrolling in postsecondary education, as students were placed at risk of losing their funding if the college lost accreditation due to the appointment of unqualified instructors. However, based on the facts pleaded in the Plaintiff's complaint, no actual breaking of any law occurred. Further, the Court also held that the College had not violated the protections of section 20 of the federal Whistleblower Act, which protects employees from retaliation when they refuse to participate in an activity, the result of which would be a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation. In order to succeed on a section 20 claim, the Court explained that a Plaintiff must show both that they refused to participate in some action, and that the action would have violated some law, rule, or regulation. Similar to the retaliatory discharge claim, the Court held that the Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts that the appointment of the instructors violated any law, rule, or regulation, and accordingly his claim under the Whistleblower Act also failed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff-employee was found to have violated her employer's policies, and was terminated for misconduct. She then filed and received unemployment benefits, but her employer challenged that determination, arguing that the employee was ineligible for unemployment benefits as she was terminated for misconduct. A Hearing Officer from the Department of Labor and Industry conducted an investigation and agreed with the employer that the Plaintiff was ineligible, which was challenged in District Court and subsequently affirmed. The employee appealed the Hearing Officer's factual findings to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that in the context of unemployment compensation, factual findings by a hearing officer that are supported by substantial evidence must be treated as conclusive even when there is also substantial evidence or even a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. Since the Hearing Officer's finding that the employee was terminated due to misconduct was supported by substantial evidence, the Plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRobertson pled guilty to first-degree murder for killing his cellmate in prison. Robertson wished to be executed, and did not object, contest, or rebut the State's evidence, and made clear that if he was not sentenced to death he would commit more premeditated murders until he was. Robertson was evaluated to be competent and was convicted and sentenced to death. Robertson's appointed counsel appealed to the Supreme Court against Robertson's wishes. The Supreme Court upheld the death sentence and held that a stated desire to be executed did not constitute a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that even when a defendant in a death penalty case acts to weaken their potential defense and waive any attendant rights, they have a right to "control [their] destiny" and do so.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingConsolidated appeal stemming from decision of commonwealth court following Supreme Court's remand to that court in Robinson Township, Washington County, Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) reaffirming and expanding effect of that decision due to unseverability of other sections of Act 13. The Supreme Court struck down a provision of Pennsylvania law that required the state to notify only public, but not private, well owners of toxic spills that could affect drinking water. It also struck down a medical “gag rule” provision that would have prevented doctors from discussing chemicals involved in fracking with their patients.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDecision regarding cross-appeals stemming from en banc commonwealth court opinion addressing the constitutionality of Act 13, which contained sweeping legislation affecting the State's environment, particularly related to the exploitation and recovery of natural gas. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the commonwealth court's decision. The Supreme Court's decision contained a number of important findings, including that various citizens had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act; the Act was not protected from review by the political question doctrine; key provisions of the Act were unconstitutional because they violated Pennsylvania's Environmental Rights Amendment in Section 27 of the State's Constitution; and that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from other provisions of Act, such that the other provisions of the Act were enjoined. This decision exemplifies citizens' actions to defeat oil and gas legislation by asserting state constitutional protections to the rights to clean air, pure water, and preservation of the environment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingWhile using a school yard as a short-cut to reach a local diner, Plaintiff was attacked by a stray dog resulting in injuries requiring medical attention. The attack occurred on a Saturday when school was not in session and no school or school-sanctioned events occurred. Arguing that the school's principal and the school district had a duty to prevent future attacks from a known dangerous dog, Plaintiff contended that a resident of an adjacent property owned the dog that attacked her, that the dog slipped its leash and previously had accosted a passersby, and that the principal of the school had notice of the other incident. Nine days prior to the attack on Plaintiff, the principal was notified via letter that the same dog had attacked someone on or near the school property. Further, the principal had notified the local animal control authority on at least two occasions to report the presence of unleashed and unattended dogs on school property. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of the case, a school principal owed no duty of care to a third party who decided to use school property after hours for personal purposes and is injured by a stray animal that is neither owned nor controlled by school personnel. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the imposition of a duty of care to third parties to prevent an attack by a dog owned by a neighbor under these circumstances far exceeds the temporal and physical limits of the authority and ability of the school principal to exercise reasonable care to minimize the risk of harm to those lawfully on the school property. Moreover, absent some ability to control the behavior and location of the dog, imposition of a duty of care does not foster the public interest.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, Rock River-Koshkonong Association, Inc., and Lake Koshkonong Recreational Association, Inc. (collectively, the District) petitioned the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to raise the water levels of an impounded lake and eliminate a winter water level drawdown. Under Wisconsin Stat. Sect. 31.02(1), the DNR is authorized to regulate the level and flow of water in the navigable waters of Wisconsin, and may order benchmarks designating "the maximum level of water that may be impounded and the lowest level of water that may be maintained by any dam." Additionally, according to the statute, the DNR may regulate water levels "in the interest of public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, health and property." The District petitioned the DNR in 2003 to raise the DNR-designated water levels of Lake Koshkonong. After the DNR rejected the petition, the District appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and appealed to the state Supreme Court when that ALJ affirmed the DNR's decision. The Supreme Court held that DNR's interpretation of Wisconsin Stat. Sect. 31.02(1) was entitled to no deference and that, under the public trust doctrine, it lacked authority to protect non-navigable land and non-navigable water above the ordinary high water marker. Instead, the DNR should have relied on its authority under the state's police power (the public trust doctrine is a legal principle establishing that certain natural and cultural resources are preserved for public use). In the DNR's rejection of the District's petition, it sought to extend its authority under the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters, such as wetlands. Currently, the state of Wisconsin only has authority and ownership over the land under navigable waters (e.g., lakes), whereas private property owners have authority and ownership over non-navigable waters (such as creek beds on the edge of property). To lower the threshold for navigable waters could implicate state ownership over currently privately held property. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that applying the state's police power to land above or beyond navigable water to protect navigable waters, is different from asserting the state's authority via the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the DNR may consider water quality standards when making a water level determination under Wis. Stat. Sect. 31.02(1), and must consider all economic impacts of water level determinations (including residential property values, business income, and local tax revenue), not just the direct "hydrologic impacts" of water levels (such as flooding and the utility and enjoyment of riparian access rights).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a non-native English speaker from Argentina, was laid off as part of a company-wide reduction in force and brought action against the company, alleging retaliatory discharge. The employment application between the Plaintiff and the company included a provision requiring the Plaintiff to agree to bring any employment-related cause of action against the company within six months of the challenged employment action and waive any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court granted employer's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint as time-barred, as the Plaintiff filed his complaint nine months after his alleged wrongful termination. The employee appealed. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) a private agreement that frustrates the public-purpose imperative of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) by shortening the two-year limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced; and (2) provision of employment application shortening two-year limitations period for claims under LAD was unconscionable. In other words, the Supreme Court argued that the statute of limitations under the LAD cannot be shortened by private contract.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingRodriguez had been illegally growing marijuana in his home. When a group of bail bondsmen arrived at his home looking for an unrelated person, he allowed them entry, and upon observing the marijuana cultivation, contacted the police. The police proceeded to coerce consent from Rodriguez to enter his home, as they had not secured a search warrant. The police arrested Rodriguez and he was convicted. The police observation of the marijuana cultivation and the coerced consent to enter the home was allowed despite the lack of a warrant under the "inevitable discovery doctrine." The circuit court affirmed. Rodriguez further appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court determined that there had not been any active or ongoing investigation prior to the police coercing their entry into Rodriguez's home. Even though the police claimed that they would have inevitably sought a search warrant if they could not enter the home, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the evidence of the search was inadmissible as a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the inevitable discovery doctrine is only applicable when there is an active ongoing investigation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and remanded the case.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Pedro Rodriguez robbed and murdered a victim with Robert Paul Servin and Brian Lee Allen. Rodriguez was 19 years old at the time of the murder, while Servin and Allen were 16 and 17, respectively. Rodriguez was sentenced to death, while Servin and Allen were ultimately sentenced to life in prison. Notably, Rodriguez challenged his sentence because the district court did not allow the jury to consider evidence of the lesser sentences of his accomplices. First, the Court found that no mandatory authority required admission of such evidence. Considering that Rodriquez was the oldest Defendant and the mastermind of the crime, and given that Allen pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty and Servin's death sentence was excused due to his youth, the Defendants were not similarly situated and the Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit such evidence. Rodriguez also argued his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because he was not the one who actually shot the victim. The Court disagreed and found that Rodriguez's intent to employ lethal force or participation in a robbery with reckless indifference to human life was sufficient to impose the death penalty. Justices Pickering, Cherry, and Saitta dissented arguing that the jury should have been allowed to consider the lesser sentences of Rodriguez's codefendants who were equally or more morally culpable.