State Supreme Court Data Tracker
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O'Connell v. Cnty. of Cook, 210 N.E.3d 1251, (Ill. 2022)
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Illinois | 2022 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2022
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Collective Bargaining
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingO’Connell began working for the County in 1999 and participated in the Benefit Fund (Fund), in which the County transferred a portion of his salary to the Fund. In 2001, O’Connell was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and went on paid leave. In 2017, O’Connell exhausted his paid leave, and began receiving disability benefits (50% of his salary). The County Board fired him from his position in July 2019, stopped paying his disability benefit, and stopped making contributions to the Fund on O’Connell’s behalf. O’Connell filed suit alleging that the Illinois Pension Code and Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution entitled him to continued disability benefit payments even though the County terminated his employment. The Supreme Court held that, as a former County employee, O’Connell had a contractual right outlined in the Pension Code to receive the disability benefit contribution to the Fund post-employment because termination of employment does not trigger a loss of disability benefits.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
O’Connell began working for the County in 1999 and participated in the Benefit Fund (Fund), in which the County transferred a portion of his salary to the Fund. In 2001, O’Connell was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and went on paid leave. In 2017, O’Connell exhausted his paid leave, and began receiving disability benefits (50% of his salary). The County Board fired him from his position in July 2019, stopped paying his disability benefit, and stopped making contributions to the Fund on O’Connell’s behalf. O’Connell filed suit alleging that the Illinois Pension Code and Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution entitled him to continued disability benefit payments even though the County terminated his employment. The Supreme Court held that, as a former County employee, O’Connell had a contractual right outlined in the Pension Code to receive the disability benefit contribution to the Fund post-employment because termination of employment does not trigger a loss of disability benefits.
Link to Opinion
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NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. N.Y. State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres., 51 N.E.3d 512 (N.Y. 2016)
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New York | 2016 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
New York
Year:
2016
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingNYC CLASH, a not for profit corporation dedicated to advancing and promoting interests of smokers, appealed a regulation that prohibited smoking in certain areas within parks, historical sites, and recreational facilities operated by the Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation (OPRHP). NYC CLASH challenged the regulation as unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. When determining whether agency rulemaking has exceeded legislative fiat, the circumstances to be considered are whether (1) the agency did more than balance the costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines, but instead made value judgments entailing difficult and complex choices between broad policy goals to resolve social problems; (2) the agency merely filled in details of a broad policy or if it wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance; (3) the legislature has unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement on the issue, which would indicate that the matter is a policy consideration for the elected body to resolve; and (4) the agency used special expertise or competence in the field to develop the challenged regulation. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987). The Court of Appeals weighed those factors and held that the legislature delegated to OPRHP "the authority to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the public in connection with its oversight of the state park system" and the agency acted within the confines of that delegated power in promulgating the regulation at issue.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
NYC CLASH, a not for profit corporation dedicated to advancing and promoting interests of smokers, appealed a regulation that prohibited smoking in certain areas within parks, historical sites, and recreational facilities operated by the Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation (OPRHP). NYC CLASH challenged the regulation as unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. When determining whether agency rulemaking has exceeded legislative fiat, the circumstances to be considered are whether (1) the agency did more than balance the costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines, but instead made value judgments entailing difficult and complex choices between broad policy goals to resolve social problems; (2) the agency merely filled in details of a broad policy or if it wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance; (3) the legislature has unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement on the issue, which would indicate that the matter is a policy consideration for the elected body to resolve; and (4) the agency used special expertise or competence in the field to develop the challenged regulation. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987). The Court of Appeals weighed those factors and held that the legislature delegated to OPRHP "the authority to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the public in connection with its oversight of the state park system" and the agency acted within the confines of that delegated power in promulgating the regulation at issue.
Link to Opinion
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Nunn v. State, 868 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 2015)
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Minnesota | 2015 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2015
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn December of 1995, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of first-degree premediated murder, and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. After entering a judgment of conviction for each offense, the district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release for the first-degree murder offense and a consecutive sentence of 180 months imprisonment for the attempted first-degree murder offense. After failed attempts in 2007 of appealing his conviction and petitioning the Supreme Court of Minnesota for postconviction relief, in 2014 the Petitioner moved to correct his sentence arguing that the consecutive sentences were not authorized under the sentencing guidelines, and that his sentence violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In support of the latter claim, Petitioner, who is African American, argued that his sentence is more severe then sentences of other similarly situated offenders who are not African American. The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that Petitioner received a lawful sentence under the guidelines. The postconviction court also determined that, because Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of purposeful discrimination in support of his equal protection claim, he was not entitled to relief on that ground. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to correct his sentence to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected Petitioner's equal protection claim, noting Petitioner failed to establish proof of a discriminatory purpose which is required when challenging a sentence under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, determining that general statistical data showing racial disparities in sentencing both nationally and in Minnesota were insufficient to support his claim.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In December of 1995, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of first-degree premediated murder, and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. After entering a judgment of conviction for each offense, the district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of release for the first-degree murder offense and a consecutive sentence of 180 months imprisonment for the attempted first-degree murder offense. After failed attempts in 2007 of appealing his conviction and petitioning the Supreme Court of Minnesota for postconviction relief, in 2014 the Petitioner moved to correct his sentence arguing that the consecutive sentences were not authorized under the sentencing guidelines, and that his sentence violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In support of the latter claim, Petitioner, who is African American, argued that his sentence is more severe then sentences of other similarly situated offenders who are not African American. The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that Petitioner received a lawful sentence under the guidelines. The postconviction court also determined that, because Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of purposeful discrimination in support of his equal protection claim, he was not entitled to relief on that ground. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to correct his sentence to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected Petitioner's equal protection claim, noting Petitioner failed to establish proof of a discriminatory purpose which is required when challenging a sentence under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, determining that general statistical data showing racial disparities in sentencing both nationally and in Minnesota were insufficient to support his claim.
Link to Opinion
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Nowell v. City of Wausau, 838 N.W.2d 852 (Wis. 2013)
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Wisconsin | 2013 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2013
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe City of Wausau issued a Class B liquor license to Plaintiff IC Willy's, a tavern, in 2009. IC Willy's was the subject of multiple noise complaints and police service calls, and was frequently out of compliance. After IC Willy's let an event get out of control and failed to meet their own recommendations post-license suspension, the City did not renew its license. IC Willy's asked the circuit court to review the decision de novo, but the it applied certiorari principles. The court of appeals then reversed because IC Willy's had been denied the opportunity to present evidence and the standard inappropriately gave the decision of Wausau's Public Health and Safety Committee to not renew the license a presumption of correctness. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a unanimous decision, holding that certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to renew an alcohol license. Some deference should be given to municipalities in this arena since the regulation of liquor is a matter of local concern.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The City of Wausau issued a Class B liquor license to Plaintiff IC Willy's, a tavern, in 2009. IC Willy's was the subject of multiple noise complaints and police service calls, and was frequently out of compliance. After IC Willy's let an event get out of control and failed to meet their own recommendations post-license suspension, the City did not renew its license. IC Willy's asked the circuit court to review the decision de novo, but the it applied certiorari principles. The court of appeals then reversed because IC Willy's had been denied the opportunity to present evidence and the standard inappropriately gave the decision of Wausau's Public Health and Safety Committee to not renew the license a presumption of correctness. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a unanimous decision, holding that certiorari is the correct standard of review for a court to apply when, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d), it reviews a municipal decision not to renew an alcohol license. Some deference should be given to municipalities in this arena since the regulation of liquor is a matter of local concern.
Link to Opinion
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Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193 (Minn. 2014)
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Minnesota | 2014 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Minnesota
Year:
2014
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingRespondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent committed the crimes at age 17 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) determined that mandatory life-without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders are unconstitutional, and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013), determined that the Miller rule cannot be applied retroactively. Respondent argued (i) that Chambers was wrongly decided; and (ii) he should be granted relief to ensure the fair administration of justice. The Court held that (i) Chambers was not wrongly decided because (a) the Government did not subsequently concede that the Miller rule could be applied retroactively; and (b) the mere fact that the United States Supreme Court applied the Miller rule retroactively does not show that the rule was meant to be retroactive. The Court further held that Respondent should not be granted relief to ensure the fair administration of justice because no exceptional circumstances were present. Specifically, the question of guilt was not close, and Respondent was nearly 18 when he committed the offense.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent committed the crimes at age 17 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) determined that mandatory life-without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders are unconstitutional, and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013), determined that the Miller rule cannot be applied retroactively. Respondent argued (i) that Chambers was wrongly decided; and (ii) he should be granted relief to ensure the fair administration of justice. The Court held that (i) Chambers was not wrongly decided because (a) the Government did not subsequently concede that the Miller rule could be applied retroactively; and (b) the mere fact that the United States Supreme Court applied the Miller rule retroactively does not show that the rule was meant to be retroactive. The Court further held that Respondent should not be granted relief to ensure the fair administration of justice because no exceptional circumstances were present. Specifically, the question of guilt was not close, and Respondent was nearly 18 when he committed the offense.
Link to Opinion
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NorVal Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Lawson, 523 P.3d 5 (Mont. 2022), reh'g denied (Jan. 24, 2023)
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Montana | 2022 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination |
State:
Montana
Year:
2022
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA female employee alleged sexual harassment and subsequent employment retaliation by her supervisor and employer under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-303(1). The employee alleged that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual contact and communication by her supervisor, and then subsequently terminated after she rebuffed his attempts and took a leave of absence from work. The employer, NorVal, alleged that the termination was a result of deficiencies in job performance. The Supreme Court found a causal link in the sequence and timing of events between the employee's complaint of sexual harassment and the employer's subsequent adverse employment action, thus establishing a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. The MHRA, which was closely modeled after the federal Title VII, protects against discrimination on the basis of sex in the workplace, including sexual harassment. The MHRA also protects employees against employer retaliation.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A female employee alleged sexual harassment and subsequent employment retaliation by her supervisor and employer under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-303(1). The employee alleged that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual contact and communication by her supervisor, and then subsequently terminated after she rebuffed his attempts and took a leave of absence from work. The employer, NorVal, alleged that the termination was a result of deficiencies in job performance. The Supreme Court found a causal link in the sequence and timing of events between the employee's complaint of sexual harassment and the employer's subsequent adverse employment action, thus establishing a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. The MHRA, which was closely modeled after the federal Title VII, protects against discrimination on the basis of sex in the workplace, including sexual harassment. The MHRA also protects employees against employer retaliation.
Link to Opinion
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Norman v. State, 215 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Civil Rights |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Civil Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingFlorida's Open Carry Law, or Section 790.053, permits individuals to carry firearms in public so long as the firearm is carried in a concealed manner, and employs a "shall issue" scheme for issuing licenses to carry concealed firearms in public. Under the scheme, the licensing authority has no discretion and must issue an applicant a concealed carry license provided the applicant meets the objective statutory criteria. Dale Norman had a concealed carry license, but was found with his firearm in plain view. He was then charged with open carrying of a weapon, a second-degree misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Norman challenged the constitutionality of Section 790.053. The jury found Norman guilty of openly carrying a firearm, but certified questions related to the open carry law to the Fourth District. The Fourth District found that Section 790.053 was constitutional after applying the U.S. Supreme Court decision of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008) (finding that a ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violated the Second Amendment), and further found that the law was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Norman appealed. To reach this conclusion, the Fourth District found that unlike the law at issue in Heller, the Florida Open Carry Law did not infringe on Florida's constitutional guarantee or the right of self-defense because a citizen may still carry a firearm under the concealed carry licensing scheme. The Florida Supreme Court considered whether Florida's Open Carry Law violates the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the Florida Constitution. The Supreme Court found that the Open Carry law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment, and that the appropriate test for constitutionality was intermediate scrutiny, meaning that to be upheld, the challenged law must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. The Supreme Court then found that section 790.053 met this standard because the governmental interests furthered by Section 790.053 are undoubtedly important, and the restriction reasonably fits the purpose of public safety and reducing gun violence. The Supreme Court further found that Section 790.053 did not violate the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense because the Constitution explicitly authorizes the Legislature to regulate the manner of exercising the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Florida's Open Carry Law, or Section 790.053, permits individuals to carry firearms in public so long as the firearm is carried in a concealed manner, and employs a "shall issue" scheme for issuing licenses to carry concealed firearms in public. Under the scheme, the licensing authority has no discretion and must issue an applicant a concealed carry license provided the applicant meets the objective statutory criteria. Dale Norman had a concealed carry license, but was found with his firearm in plain view. He was then charged with open carrying of a weapon, a second-degree misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Norman challenged the constitutionality of Section 790.053. The jury found Norman guilty of openly carrying a firearm, but certified questions related to the open carry law to the Fourth District. The Fourth District found that Section 790.053 was constitutional after applying the U.S. Supreme Court decision of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008) (finding that a ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violated the Second Amendment), and further found that the law was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Norman appealed. To reach this conclusion, the Fourth District found that unlike the law at issue in Heller, the Florida Open Carry Law did not infringe on Florida's constitutional guarantee or the right of self-defense because a citizen may still carry a firearm under the concealed carry licensing scheme. The Florida Supreme Court considered whether Florida's Open Carry Law violates the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the Florida Constitution. The Supreme Court found that the Open Carry law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment, and that the appropriate test for constitutionality was intermediate scrutiny, meaning that to be upheld, the challenged law must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. The Supreme Court then found that section 790.053 met this standard because the governmental interests furthered by Section 790.053 are undoubtedly important, and the restriction reasonably fits the purpose of public safety and reducing gun violence. The Supreme Court further found that Section 790.053 did not violate the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense because the Constitution explicitly authorizes the Legislature to regulate the manner of exercising the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
Link to Opinion
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Noe v. Velasco, 690 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2024)
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Texas | 2024 | Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion |
State:
Texas
Year:
2024
Topics:
Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a mother of four children, sued her doctor for failing to appropriately perform a sterilization procedure following the birth of her third child. In 2014, Velasco was scheduled to deliver her third child via a cesarean section procedure. Prior to the scheduled operation, Velasco had coordinated to undergo a bilateral tubal ligation (BTL), a sterilization procedure, immediately following the delivery of the child. Velasco further paid for the procedure to occur, and records from the procedure indicated that a BTL had been performed. Nonetheless, Velasco's doctor had not actually performed a BTL, and records from follow-up appointments indicated that the office staff had at no point raised this mistake with Velasco. Around a year later, Velasco became pregnant once more and returned to her doctor's office to inquire about how this was possible. In response, the office refunded Velasco the cost of the BTL, and Velasco went on to deliver a healthy fourth child. Velasco then sued her doctor for medical negligence, fraud, medical battery, and a variety of other claims, seeking to recover damages for medical and related expenses, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the costs of raising her fourth child. The doctor sought summary judgment to all claims, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals affirmed as to most of the claims, however, reversed as to the claim for medical negligence holding that Velasco has produced evidence of duty, breach, and damages. The Supreme Court held that such a claim for medical negligence based on the pregnancy and birth of a healthy child can only compensate for medical costs related to birthing the child. Further, parents who birthed healthy children as a result of medical negligence could not recover for the cost of raising the child as a matter of law, and such parents did not suffer any damage outside of the economic costs of medical care related to the pregnancy. Although Velasco would otherwise be able to recover for the cost of the sterilization procedure, the Court noted that evidence suggested that the office had already repaid that cost to her. In short, the Court summarized, "the birth and life of a healthy child do not constitute an injury under Texas law."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, a mother of four children, sued her doctor for failing to appropriately perform a sterilization procedure following the birth of her third child. In 2014, Velasco was scheduled to deliver her third child via a cesarean section procedure. Prior to the scheduled operation, Velasco had coordinated to undergo a bilateral tubal ligation (BTL), a sterilization procedure, immediately following the delivery of the child. Velasco further paid for the procedure to occur, and records from the procedure indicated that a BTL had been performed. Nonetheless, Velasco's doctor had not actually performed a BTL, and records from follow-up appointments indicated that the office staff had at no point raised this mistake with Velasco. Around a year later, Velasco became pregnant once more and returned to her doctor's office to inquire about how this was possible. In response, the office refunded Velasco the cost of the BTL, and Velasco went on to deliver a healthy fourth child. Velasco then sued her doctor for medical negligence, fraud, medical battery, and a variety of other claims, seeking to recover damages for medical and related expenses, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the costs of raising her fourth child. The doctor sought summary judgment to all claims, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals affirmed as to most of the claims, however, reversed as to the claim for medical negligence holding that Velasco has produced evidence of duty, breach, and damages. The Supreme Court held that such a claim for medical negligence based on the pregnancy and birth of a healthy child can only compensate for medical costs related to birthing the child. Further, parents who birthed healthy children as a result of medical negligence could not recover for the cost of raising the child as a matter of law, and such parents did not suffer any damage outside of the economic costs of medical care related to the pregnancy. Although Velasco would otherwise be able to recover for the cost of the sterilization procedure, the Court noted that evidence suggested that the office had already repaid that cost to her. In short, the Court summarized, "the birth and life of a healthy child do not constitute an injury under Texas law."
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NL Indus., Inc. v. State, 156 A.3d 1043 (N.J. 2017)
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New Jersey | 2017 | Environment, Actions Against Government |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2017
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff NL Industries, Inc., a lead-smelting company, filed claim against the state seeking contribution under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) for environmental-contamination cleanup costs for a coastal site on which company's slag was used on an existing jetty still owned by the state and was used to build a seawall on a riparian land grant from the state before the Spill Act went into effect. The fundamental issue is whether the Spill Act retroactively abrogated the state's sovereign immunity for state action taken prior to the Act's 1977 effective date. If determined that the state can be liable for its activities during the pre-Spill Act time period, then the Supreme Court must decide two other questions that were presented in the appeal: whether the state can be liable under the Spill Act for actions taken as a regulator; and whether state liability under the Spill Act must be harmonized with the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12.3, which, among other things, provides the state with immunity from tort claims for certain categories of discretionary activities. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of first impression, the state sovereign immunity prevails against Spill Act contribution claims based on state activities that occurred prior to the original effective date of the Spill Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that it failed to see any statutory support or legislative intent whatsoever to abrogate the sovereign immunity otherwise applicable to the state's activities occurring before the Spill Act became effective in 1977.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff NL Industries, Inc., a lead-smelting company, filed claim against the state seeking contribution under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) for environmental-contamination cleanup costs for a coastal site on which company's slag was used on an existing jetty still owned by the state and was used to build a seawall on a riparian land grant from the state before the Spill Act went into effect. The fundamental issue is whether the Spill Act retroactively abrogated the state's sovereign immunity for state action taken prior to the Act's 1977 effective date. If determined that the state can be liable for its activities during the pre-Spill Act time period, then the Supreme Court must decide two other questions that were presented in the appeal: whether the state can be liable under the Spill Act for actions taken as a regulator; and whether state liability under the Spill Act must be harmonized with the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12.3, which, among other things, provides the state with immunity from tort claims for certain categories of discretionary activities. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of first impression, the state sovereign immunity prevails against Spill Act contribution claims based on state activities that occurred prior to the original effective date of the Spill Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that it failed to see any statutory support or legislative intent whatsoever to abrogate the sovereign immunity otherwise applicable to the state's activities occurring before the Spill Act became effective in 1977.
Link to Opinion
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Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 30 N.E.3d 154 (N.Y. 2015)
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New York | 2015 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
New York
Year:
2015
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, a construction worker, slipped on ice and fell to the floor while wearing stilts to install ceiling insulation. At issue was whether plaintiff's accident fell within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1). Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals held that, under Melber v. 6333 Main St., 698 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1998), Plaintiff's accident did not fall within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) because the ice upon which he slipped was an ordinary slipping hazard unrelated to an elevation risk.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff, a construction worker, slipped on ice and fell to the floor while wearing stilts to install ceiling insulation. At issue was whether plaintiff's accident fell within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1). Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors engaged “in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure,” except certain owners of one- and two-family dwellings, must “furnish or erect ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person” employed in the performance of such labor. The Court of Appeals held that, under Melber v. 6333 Main St., 698 N.E.2d 933 (N.Y. 1998), Plaintiff's accident did not fall within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) because the ice upon which he slipped was an ordinary slipping hazard unrelated to an elevation risk.
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Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 237 A.3d 986 (Pa. 2020)
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Pennsylvania | 2020 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination, Education |
State:
Pennsylvania
Year:
2020
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Employment Discrimination, Education
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA fourth-grade student was harassed by classmates. Nearly two years later, and past the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act’s (PHRA) 180-day statute of limitations, the student’s mother filed an administrative complaint against the School District of Philadelphia with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging that the school’s teachers and administrators failed to intervene after the child reported the harassment. The Supreme Court held that, unlike Title VII, a federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination, the PHRA’s equitable tolling provision includes minority tolling, which means that a minor whose parent fails to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations for filing an administrative complaint prior to the minor reaching the age of majority is not precluded from filing suit beyond the statute of limitations. While this case takes place outside of the workplace setting, this opinion demonstrates that while Title VII is instructive for interpreting the PHRA, it is not binding.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A fourth-grade student was harassed by classmates. Nearly two years later, and past the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act’s (PHRA) 180-day statute of limitations, the student’s mother filed an administrative complaint against the School District of Philadelphia with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging that the school’s teachers and administrators failed to intervene after the child reported the harassment. The Supreme Court held that, unlike Title VII, a federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination, the PHRA’s equitable tolling provision includes minority tolling, which means that a minor whose parent fails to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations for filing an administrative complaint prior to the minor reaching the age of majority is not precluded from filing suit beyond the statute of limitations. While this case takes place outside of the workplace setting, this opinion demonstrates that while Title VII is instructive for interpreting the PHRA, it is not binding.
Link to Opinion
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New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stein, 868 S.E.2d 5 (N.C. 2022)
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North Carolina | 2022 | Education, Access to Education/Funding, Environment |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2022
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding, Environment
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter releasing hog waste near local lagoons, Smithfield Companies agreed to fund "environmental enhancement activities," which would be distributed in the form of grants to projects enhancing North Carolina's environment. Francis X. Deluca and the Board of Education brought suit, arguing that the funds were misappropriated because they constituted penalties for Smithfield's previous waste pollution. As a penalty, forfeiture, or fine, the funds should have been exclusively given to free public schools. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Board of Education failed to establish a claim for relief for misappropriation of funds. The Supreme Court also held that its decision did not prevent the Board of Education from establishing a new claim in the Trial Division of the General Court of Justice.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
After releasing hog waste near local lagoons, Smithfield Companies agreed to fund "environmental enhancement activities," which would be distributed in the form of grants to projects enhancing North Carolina's environment. Francis X. Deluca and the Board of Education brought suit, arguing that the funds were misappropriated because they constituted penalties for Smithfield's previous waste pollution. As a penalty, forfeiture, or fine, the funds should have been exclusively given to free public schools. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Board of Education failed to establish a claim for relief for misappropriation of funds. The Supreme Court also held that its decision did not prevent the Board of Education from establishing a new claim in the Trial Division of the General Court of Justice.
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New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stein, 840 S.E.2d 194 (2020)
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North Carolina | 2020 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2020
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter hog waste lagoons spilled millions of gallons of waste into North Carolina’s waterways, Smithfield Foods, Inc. entered into an agreement with the Attorney General in which it agreed to commit $50 million to an environmental enhancement grants program administered by the state. The New Hanover County Board of Education brought an action against the Attorney General alleging these payments were "civil penalties" subject to Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution, which stated: "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected...for any breach of the penal laws of the State...shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools." The Attorney General argued that the payments did not constitute civil penalties because they did not stem from a specific enforcement action and did not replace or reduce separately assessed penalties used to support public schools. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, holding that payments relating to environmental violations constituted civil penalties for the purposes of Article IX, Section 7 only if the payments were imposed to punish or deter a particular violation of the state's environmental laws.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
After hog waste lagoons spilled millions of gallons of waste into North Carolina’s waterways, Smithfield Foods, Inc. entered into an agreement with the Attorney General in which it agreed to commit $50 million to an environmental enhancement grants program administered by the state. The New Hanover County Board of Education brought an action against the Attorney General alleging these payments were "civil penalties" subject to Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution, which stated: "the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected...for any breach of the penal laws of the State...shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools." The Attorney General argued that the payments did not constitute civil penalties because they did not stem from a specific enforcement action and did not replace or reduce separately assessed penalties used to support public schools. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, holding that payments relating to environmental violations constituted civil penalties for the purposes of Article IX, Section 7 only if the payments were imposed to punish or deter a particular violation of the state's environmental laws.
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Neville v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 406 P.3d 499 (Nev. 2017)
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Nevada | 2017 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2017
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioner was employed as a cashier at a Las Vegas convenience store which had a time-rounding policy whereby the time recorded by all hourly employees was rounded to the nearest 15 minutes for purposes of calculating payment of wages owed to employees. Because of the time-rounding policy, Petitioner allegedly did not receive wages for work actually performed during the time clocked in before and after his regularly scheduled shift because time was rounded down, discounting the minutes Petitioner worked early or late. The district court dismissed the Petitioner's claims on the basis that no private right of action existed under NRS Chapter 608 and under the Nevada Constitution. The Supreme Court held that NRS 608.140 allows for assessment of attorney fees in a private cause of action for recovery of unpaid wages and explicitly recognizes a private cause of action for unpaid wages. Because Petitioner's claims were for unpaid wages under NRS 608.016 (payment for each hour worked), NRS 608.018 (payment for overtime), and NRS 608.020 through NRS 608.050 (payment upon termination), the Supreme Court granted the petition for extraordinary writ relief and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order dismissing Petitioner's claims for unpaid wages. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the claims but determined that Petitioner had properly stated a private cause of action for unpaid wages.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Petitioner was employed as a cashier at a Las Vegas convenience store which had a time-rounding policy whereby the time recorded by all hourly employees was rounded to the nearest 15 minutes for purposes of calculating payment of wages owed to employees. Because of the time-rounding policy, Petitioner allegedly did not receive wages for work actually performed during the time clocked in before and after his regularly scheduled shift because time was rounded down, discounting the minutes Petitioner worked early or late. The district court dismissed the Petitioner's claims on the basis that no private right of action existed under NRS Chapter 608 and under the Nevada Constitution. The Supreme Court held that NRS 608.140 allows for assessment of attorney fees in a private cause of action for recovery of unpaid wages and explicitly recognizes a private cause of action for unpaid wages. Because Petitioner's claims were for unpaid wages under NRS 608.016 (payment for each hour worked), NRS 608.018 (payment for overtime), and NRS 608.020 through NRS 608.050 (payment upon termination), the Supreme Court granted the petition for extraordinary writ relief and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order dismissing Petitioner's claims for unpaid wages. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the claims but determined that Petitioner had properly stated a private cause of action for unpaid wages.
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Nev. State Eng'r v. Eureka Cnty., 402 P.3d 1249 (Nev. 2017)
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Nevada | 2017 | Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2017
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court previously determined that the State Engineer failed to rely on substantial evidence when finding Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC (KVR) would be able to mitigate conflicts to prior water rights when approving KVR's applications to appropriate water. On remand, the district court granted the petition for judicial review and vacated KVR's permits. KVR and the State Engineer challenged, contending that the district court violated the Supreme Court's mandate by not further remanding to the State Engineer for additional fact-finding. The Supreme Court held that the district court had followed its mandate because the State Engineer had relied on insufficient facts before granting KVR's application, it gave no order to remand to the State Engineer and KVR was not entitled to a do-over after failing to provide substantial mitigation evidence.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Court previously determined that the State Engineer failed to rely on substantial evidence when finding Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC (KVR) would be able to mitigate conflicts to prior water rights when approving KVR's applications to appropriate water. On remand, the district court granted the petition for judicial review and vacated KVR's permits. KVR and the State Engineer challenged, contending that the district court violated the Supreme Court's mandate by not further remanding to the State Engineer for additional fact-finding. The Supreme Court held that the district court had followed its mandate because the State Engineer had relied on insufficient facts before granting KVR's application, it gave no order to remand to the State Engineer and KVR was not entitled to a do-over after failing to provide substantial mitigation evidence.
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Nev. Indep. v. Whitley, 506 P.3d 1037 (Nev. 2022)
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Nevada | 2022 | Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Access/Funding, Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2022
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Access/Funding, Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2017, Nevada SB 539 was signed into law, requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to submit documents to the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) detailing the costs relating to insulin sold in the state. SB 539 also exempted from trade secret protections any information that a pharmaceutical manufacturer or PBM was required to report under the law. Following a lawsuit brought by organizations representing pharmaceutical companies against the Governor, the DHHS director, and the Nevada Legislature claiming that the portion of the bill that eliminated trade secret protections was preempted by the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), DHHS promulgated regulations synchronizing the requirements of SB 539, the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), and the DTSA. Following the bill's enactment, a reporter for The Nevada Independent (TNI) made a public records request to DHHS for all reports that had been received from pharmaceutical manufacturers and PBMs under SB 539. While DHHS responded to the request by providing general information, such as the names of the entities that submitted reports, it excluded information referencing the reported cost of producing the drug, administrative expenditures connected to the drug, and the profit margin earned from the drug. In explaining these omissions, DHHS indicated that divulging the omitted information would constitute misappropriation of trade secrets under the federal DTSA. TNI filed a mandamus action in district court to compel disclosure and challenging the validity of the synchronizing regulations DHHS promulgated in light of the earlier lawsuit. Sanofi-Aventis, a pharmaceutical company, then intervened and presented an affidavit indicating the thorough process undertaken to protect information relating to the costs and pricing of insulin medicines. The district court denied TNI's writ, finding that the omitted reports were protected by confidentiality protections under the DTSA, and that the promulgated regulations were valid under DHHS's broad regulatory discretion. On appeal, the Supreme Court first held that TNI had not adequately demonstrated that the promulgated DHHS regulations were invalid. The Court noted that such agency regulations are presumed valid, that deference is shown to the enforcing agency, although agency regulations cannot contradict the statute meant to be implemented. Here, the Supreme Court held that the promulgated regulations merely created a process by which DHHS could determine whether information submitted under SB 539 would be protected as a trade secret and did not conflict with SB 539. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the information at issue is protected by the DTSA as trade secrets due to the comprehensive practices Sanofi-Aventis utilized to protect the information and the expectation of confidentiality the pharmaceutical companies had when submitted to DHHS.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2017, Nevada SB 539 was signed into law, requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to submit documents to the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) detailing the costs relating to insulin sold in the state. SB 539 also exempted from trade secret protections any information that a pharmaceutical manufacturer or PBM was required to report under the law. Following a lawsuit brought by organizations representing pharmaceutical companies against the Governor, the DHHS director, and the Nevada Legislature claiming that the portion of the bill that eliminated trade secret protections was preempted by the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), DHHS promulgated regulations synchronizing the requirements of SB 539, the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), and the DTSA. Following the bill's enactment, a reporter for The Nevada Independent (TNI) made a public records request to DHHS for all reports that had been received from pharmaceutical manufacturers and PBMs under SB 539. While DHHS responded to the request by providing general information, such as the names of the entities that submitted reports, it excluded information referencing the reported cost of producing the drug, administrative expenditures connected to the drug, and the profit margin earned from the drug. In explaining these omissions, DHHS indicated that divulging the omitted information would constitute misappropriation of trade secrets under the federal DTSA. TNI filed a mandamus action in district court to compel disclosure and challenging the validity of the synchronizing regulations DHHS promulgated in light of the earlier lawsuit. Sanofi-Aventis, a pharmaceutical company, then intervened and presented an affidavit indicating the thorough process undertaken to protect information relating to the costs and pricing of insulin medicines. The district court denied TNI's writ, finding that the omitted reports were protected by confidentiality protections under the DTSA, and that the promulgated regulations were valid under DHHS's broad regulatory discretion. On appeal, the Supreme Court first held that TNI had not adequately demonstrated that the promulgated DHHS regulations were invalid. The Court noted that such agency regulations are presumed valid, that deference is shown to the enforcing agency, although agency regulations cannot contradict the statute meant to be implemented. Here, the Supreme Court held that the promulgated regulations merely created a process by which DHHS could determine whether information submitted under SB 539 would be protected as a trade secret and did not conflict with SB 539. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the information at issue is protected by the DTSA as trade secrets due to the comprehensive practices Sanofi-Aventis utilized to protect the information and the expectation of confidentiality the pharmaceutical companies had when submitted to DHHS.
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Nev. Hosp. Ass'n v. State, 538 P.3d 35 (Nev. 2023) (unpublished disposition)
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Nevada | 2023 | Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2023
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Discrimination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Nevada Hospital Association and numerous other healthcare providers (NHA) sued the Nevada Attorney General, the State Legislature, and the then-Governor for declaratory relief and both a preliminary and permanent injunction to prohibit the enactment of Nevada Senate Bill 329. This bill, which had been codified into the Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act, prohibited certain restrictions that health care providers could include in their contracts with insurers as illegal restraints on trade. NHA argued that the bill violated (1) the Equal Process and Due Process clauses of the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions; (2) the Nevada Constitution's prohibition against special or local laws; (3) Wharton's Rule (a legal construct prohibiting prosecuting multiple individuals for conspiracy to commit an offense when, by definition, the offense can only be committed by two or more individuals); and (4) the dormant Commerce Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued an order and final judgment denying injunctive relief for failure to state a claim upon motion made by the State. NHA appealed only to the extent that it challenged SB 329 as violating the dormant commerce clause. The Supreme Court held that the mere allegation that "SB 329 burdens interstate commerce" failed to meet the notice-pleading standard of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the NHA had argued that their vague claims could be applicable to some hypothetical set of facts, this was insufficient to meet the standard in the Supreme Court's eyes.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Nevada Hospital Association and numerous other healthcare providers (NHA) sued the Nevada Attorney General, the State Legislature, and the then-Governor for declaratory relief and both a preliminary and permanent injunction to prohibit the enactment of Nevada Senate Bill 329. This bill, which had been codified into the Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act, prohibited certain restrictions that health care providers could include in their contracts with insurers as illegal restraints on trade. NHA argued that the bill violated (1) the Equal Process and Due Process clauses of the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions; (2) the Nevada Constitution's prohibition against special or local laws; (3) Wharton's Rule (a legal construct prohibiting prosecuting multiple individuals for conspiracy to commit an offense when, by definition, the offense can only be committed by two or more individuals); and (4) the dormant Commerce Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued an order and final judgment denying injunctive relief for failure to state a claim upon motion made by the State. NHA appealed only to the extent that it challenged SB 329 as violating the dormant commerce clause. The Supreme Court held that the mere allegation that "SB 329 burdens interstate commerce" failed to meet the notice-pleading standard of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the NHA had argued that their vague claims could be applicable to some hypothetical set of facts, this was insufficient to meet the standard in the Supreme Court's eyes.
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Netzer L. Off., P.C. v. State by and Through Knudsen, 520 P.3d 335 (Mont. 2022)
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Montana | 2022 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Health Care, Public Health |
State:
Montana
Year:
2022
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice, Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingMontana's legislative code Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-312 prohibits most employers from requiring employees to be vaccinated. Petitioner, an employer, filed a preliminary injunction against the state of Montana to enjoin the state from enforcing the precursor to the law, HB 702, passed during the 2021 legislative session and codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-312, from preventing him from enforcing a vaccine mandate on his current and prospective employees in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court denied the injunction, holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the prohibition against a vaccine mandate constituted irreparable harm that would warrant an injunction. The Supreme Court also found that the various rights conferred by the Montana Constitution—including the right to clean and healthful environments, to pursue life's basic necessities, and to seek health, safety and happiness—did not require § 49-2-312 to be enjoined in the current case. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions that the district court consider HB 702 on its merits under Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(3), which requires that legislative bills contain only one subject clearly expressed in its title.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Montana's legislative code Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-312 prohibits most employers from requiring employees to be vaccinated. Petitioner, an employer, filed a preliminary injunction against the state of Montana to enjoin the state from enforcing the precursor to the law, HB 702, passed during the 2021 legislative session and codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-312, from preventing him from enforcing a vaccine mandate on his current and prospective employees in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court denied the injunction, holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the prohibition against a vaccine mandate constituted irreparable harm that would warrant an injunction. The Supreme Court also found that the various rights conferred by the Montana Constitution—including the right to clean and healthful environments, to pursue life's basic necessities, and to seek health, safety and happiness—did not require § 49-2-312 to be enjoined in the current case. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions that the district court consider HB 702 on its merits under Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(3), which requires that legislative bills contain only one subject clearly expressed in its title.
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Nelson v. Brooks, 329 P.3d 558 (Mont. 2014)
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Montana | 2014 | Environment, Water Rights |
State:
Montana
Year:
2014
Topics:
Environment, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Montana Supreme Court (Supreme Court) considered a dispute over water rights to a certain well (the Disputed Well). In the early 1950s, a mining claim on the land where the Disputed Well is located was established by Minerals Engineering. In 1976, Minerals Engineering ceased operations on the mine site, and Apex Abrasives (Apex), a company organized by Ernest Nelson, received a mining permit for the same site. Adjacent to the mining site was a ranch owned by Carl Kambich. One document between Minerals Engineering and Kambich titled “Indenture” granted Kambich “the ‘sole and exclusive right’ to a water well ‘on Minerals No. 3 mill site mining claim”’ but contained no further description of the well. Kambich then filed a statement of claim for existing water rights (numbered 41D-40063) on April 15, 1982, describing an unnamed well. When Randall and Ila Mae Brooks purchased the Kambich ranch in 1990, Kambich filed a notice of transfer of water right for claim number 41D-40063 to the Brooks. Nelson objected to the 41D-40063 claim, arguing that since Apex was the successor in interest to Minerals Engineering's mining claim where the Disputed Well is located, it follows that Apex is also the owner of the well itself and therefore had the right to use the associated water. The water court found the Brooks to be the owners of the Disputed Well and related water rights because Nelson failed to overcome the prima facie proof in the statement of claim as required by MCA section 85-2-227 (which provides that a claim of an existing right constitutes prima facie proof of its content until the issuance of a final decree). Nelson appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the water court incorrectly found that the Brooks owned the water rights associated with the Disputed Well. In considering whether the water court erred in concluding that ownership of the Disputed Well for the claim was not dispositive of the ownership of the water right, the Supreme Court explained that a water right is a usufructuary right (a right of use), rather than a right of physical ownership. The Supreme Court affirmed the water court's finding and held that ownership of a mining claim on a parcel does not necessarily give exclusive ownership rights to waters on that same parcel. The Supreme Court did note that the mining claim would have been dispositive of the water right if the mining grant had also granted the use of all water on the property; however, absent any such clause, the mining claim was insufficient to establish a water right.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Montana Supreme Court (Supreme Court) considered a dispute over water rights to a certain well (the Disputed Well). In the early 1950s, a mining claim on the land where the Disputed Well is located was established by Minerals Engineering. In 1976, Minerals Engineering ceased operations on the mine site, and Apex Abrasives (Apex), a company organized by Ernest Nelson, received a mining permit for the same site. Adjacent to the mining site was a ranch owned by Carl Kambich. One document between Minerals Engineering and Kambich titled “Indenture” granted Kambich “the ‘sole and exclusive right’ to a water well ‘on Minerals No. 3 mill site mining claim”’ but contained no further description of the well. Kambich then filed a statement of claim for existing water rights (numbered 41D-40063) on April 15, 1982, describing an unnamed well. When Randall and Ila Mae Brooks purchased the Kambich ranch in 1990, Kambich filed a notice of transfer of water right for claim number 41D-40063 to the Brooks. Nelson objected to the 41D-40063 claim, arguing that since Apex was the successor in interest to Minerals Engineering's mining claim where the Disputed Well is located, it follows that Apex is also the owner of the well itself and therefore had the right to use the associated water. The water court found the Brooks to be the owners of the Disputed Well and related water rights because Nelson failed to overcome the prima facie proof in the statement of claim as required by MCA section 85-2-227 (which provides that a claim of an existing right constitutes prima facie proof of its content until the issuance of a final decree). Nelson appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the water court incorrectly found that the Brooks owned the water rights associated with the Disputed Well. In considering whether the water court erred in concluding that ownership of the Disputed Well for the claim was not dispositive of the ownership of the water right, the Supreme Court explained that a water right is a usufructuary right (a right of use), rather than a right of physical ownership. The Supreme Court affirmed the water court's finding and held that ownership of a mining claim on a parcel does not necessarily give exclusive ownership rights to waters on that same parcel. The Supreme Court did note that the mining claim would have been dispositive of the water right if the mining grant had also granted the use of all water on the property; however, absent any such clause, the mining claim was insufficient to establish a water right.
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Neiman v. LaRose, 207 N.E.3d 607 (Ohio 2022)
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Ohio | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
Ohio
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe General Assembly created a congressional-district plan that unduly favored the Republican Party because it split counties strategically and was dictated by partisan considerations. As a result, the Ohio Redistricting Commission was required to take over and adopt a new plan. The Commission adopted a new plan on March 2. The League of Women Voters, alongside other petitioners, argued that the new plan again violated Ohio voting regulations because it unduly favored one party over another. The Supreme Court held that the March 2, 2022, congressional-district plan did not comply with the Ohio Constitution and was therefore invalid because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party. Comparative analysis and other metrics showed that the March 2 plan allocated voters in ways that unnecessarily favored the Republican Party by packing Democratic voters into a few dense Democratic-leaning districts, thereby increasing the Republican vote share of the remaining districts. As a result, districts that were otherwise strongly Democratic-leaning were competitive or Republican-leaning districts. In addition, the March 2 plan carved districts around the state’s largest cities to combine Democratic voters in those areas with Republican voters in rural areas, which created more Republican-leaning districts.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The General Assembly created a congressional-district plan that unduly favored the Republican Party because it split counties strategically and was dictated by partisan considerations. As a result, the Ohio Redistricting Commission was required to take over and adopt a new plan. The Commission adopted a new plan on March 2. The League of Women Voters, alongside other petitioners, argued that the new plan again violated Ohio voting regulations because it unduly favored one party over another. The Supreme Court held that the March 2, 2022, congressional-district plan did not comply with the Ohio Constitution and was therefore invalid because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party. Comparative analysis and other metrics showed that the March 2 plan allocated voters in ways that unnecessarily favored the Republican Party by packing Democratic voters into a few dense Democratic-leaning districts, thereby increasing the Republican vote share of the remaining districts. As a result, districts that were otherwise strongly Democratic-leaning were competitive or Republican-leaning districts. In addition, the March 2 plan carved districts around the state’s largest cities to combine Democratic voters in those areas with Republican voters in rural areas, which created more Republican-leaning districts.
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NCAE v. State, 786 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2016)
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North Carolina | 2016 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2016
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe North Carolina Association of Educators, 5 tenured public school teachers, and 1 probationary public school teacher brought suit against the State claiming the Career Status Law (a law that entitles a teacher to a basic set of due process protections to ensure that they are treated fairly before being dismissed) was unconstitutional by constituting a taking of property without just compensation under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and as an impairment of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution. Historically, teachers could earn career status by completing a probationary period and receiving a favorable vote from the school board. The Career Status Law retroactively revoked the career status of teachers who had earned status through that process. The Supreme Court held that sections 9.6 and 9.7 of the Career Status Law were unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause to the extent they retroactively applied to teachers who had already attained career status as the law impaired the contractual rights of those teachers without adequate justification.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The North Carolina Association of Educators, 5 tenured public school teachers, and 1 probationary public school teacher brought suit against the State claiming the Career Status Law (a law that entitles a teacher to a basic set of due process protections to ensure that they are treated fairly before being dismissed) was unconstitutional by constituting a taking of property without just compensation under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and as an impairment of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution. Historically, teachers could earn career status by completing a probationary period and receiving a favorable vote from the school board. The Career Status Law retroactively revoked the career status of teachers who had earned status through that process. The Supreme Court held that sections 9.6 and 9.7 of the Career Status Law were unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause to the extent they retroactively applied to teachers who had already attained career status as the law impaired the contractual rights of those teachers without adequate justification.
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Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Env't Conservation 34 N.E.3d 782 (N.Y. 2015)
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New York | 2015 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government |
State:
New York
Year:
2015
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Natural Resources Defense Council and seven other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought an action to challenge certain provisions in a the state's 2010 General Permit which requires municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) to develop, document, and implement a Storm Water Management Program (SWMP) in compliance with detailed specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). These specifications seek to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater to the maximum extent practicable. In order to obtain initial coverage under the terms of the General Permit, small MS4s are required to submit and complete an accurate notice of intent (NOI) to the DEC. NRDC claims that by allowing small MS4s to gain coverage under the General Permit based upon an NOI reviewed only for completeness rather than provide an opportunity for public hearing, the DEC has created an impermissible self-regulatory system that fails to force local governments to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable and thus violates federal and state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's rejection of NRDC's federal and state law challenges to the General Permit on grounds that DEC has determined that examining NOIs for completeness constitutes a sufficient level of technical regulatory review to qualify a small MS4 for initial coverage under the General Permit, and that these are reasonable judgments that the DEC possesses the discretion and expertise to make in furtherance of its responsibilities under the Environmental Conservation Law.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Natural Resources Defense Council and seven other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought an action to challenge certain provisions in a the state's 2010 General Permit which requires municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) to develop, document, and implement a Storm Water Management Program (SWMP) in compliance with detailed specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). These specifications seek to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater to the maximum extent practicable. In order to obtain initial coverage under the terms of the General Permit, small MS4s are required to submit and complete an accurate notice of intent (NOI) to the DEC. NRDC claims that by allowing small MS4s to gain coverage under the General Permit based upon an NOI reviewed only for completeness rather than provide an opportunity for public hearing, the DEC has created an impermissible self-regulatory system that fails to force local governments to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable and thus violates federal and state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's rejection of NRDC's federal and state law challenges to the General Permit on grounds that DEC has determined that examining NOIs for completeness constitutes a sufficient level of technical regulatory review to qualify a small MS4 for initial coverage under the General Permit, and that these are reasonable judgments that the DEC possesses the discretion and expertise to make in furtherance of its responsibilities under the Environmental Conservation Law.
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Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Cos. v. State Dep't of Bus. & Indus., 524 P.3d 470 (Nev. 2023)
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Nevada | 2023 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2023
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Nevada Division of Insurance (the Division) promulgated regulation R087-20, prohibiting insurers from adversely using consumer credit information changes that occurred during, and for 2 years following, the governor's COVID-19 emergency declaration, which had led to mass unemployment within the State of Nevada. The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), a private, nonprofit insurance trade association whose members include insurers that use consumer credit information to underwrite and rate personal home and auto insurance in Nevada, opposed the Division's adoption of R087-20 and sued to invalidate the regulation after it passed, alleging that the Division had exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority in passing the regulation. The Supreme Court held that the Division acted within its statutory and constitutional authority when it found that using consumer credit score declines against insureds who lost their jobs due to the pandemic, through no fault of their own, during the pandemic and for two years afterwards, would result in unfair actuarial discrimination and lifted the injunction with respect to R087-20.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Nevada Division of Insurance (the Division) promulgated regulation R087-20, prohibiting insurers from adversely using consumer credit information changes that occurred during, and for 2 years following, the governor's COVID-19 emergency declaration, which had led to mass unemployment within the State of Nevada. The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), a private, nonprofit insurance trade association whose members include insurers that use consumer credit information to underwrite and rate personal home and auto insurance in Nevada, opposed the Division's adoption of R087-20 and sued to invalidate the regulation after it passed, alleging that the Division had exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority in passing the regulation. The Supreme Court held that the Division acted within its statutory and constitutional authority when it found that using consumer credit score declines against insureds who lost their jobs due to the pandemic, through no fault of their own, during the pandemic and for two years afterwards, would result in unfair actuarial discrimination and lifted the injunction with respect to R087-20.
Link to Opinion
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Naranjo v. Sukenic, 524 P.3d 1123 (Ariz. 2023)
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Arizona | 2023 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2023
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a post-conviction relief (PCR) court’s decision requiring Israel Joseph Naranjo to disclose materials related to trial counsel’s interviews with three family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of his capital trial. Naranjo, who had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, argued that the disclosure violated attorney work-product protections. The Supreme Court held that the PCR court did not err, finding that Naranjo had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that disclosure of the interview materials was warranted under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(b)(2), which allows for discovery when good cause is shown.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a post-conviction relief (PCR) court’s decision requiring Israel Joseph Naranjo to disclose materials related to trial counsel’s interviews with three family members who did not testify during the penalty phase of his capital trial. Naranjo, who had been convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, argued that the disclosure violated attorney work-product protections. The Supreme Court held that the PCR court did not err, finding that Naranjo had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that disclosure of the interview materials was warranted under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(b)(2), which allows for discovery when good cause is shown.
Link to Opinion
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N/A
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Ohio | N/A | LGBTQ+ Rights |
State:
Ohio
Year:
N/A
Topics:
LGBTQ+ Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingNo cases were identified.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
No cases were identified.
Link to Opinion
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N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hisp. Chambers of Com. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014)
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New York | 2014 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
New York
Year:
2014
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA coalition of interest groups filed suit against the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) and the New York City Board of Health challenging the constitutionality of an amendment to the New York City Health Code, which prohibited New York City restaurants, movie theaters, and other food service establishments from serving sugary drinks in sizes larger than 16 ounces. The Court of Appeals held that the New York Board of Health did not have inherent legislative powers separate and apart from the City Council; therefore, the Board lacked legislative authority to promulgate the amendment to the City Health Code. The amendment was declared invalid and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to enjoin its implementation.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A coalition of interest groups filed suit against the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) and the New York City Board of Health challenging the constitutionality of an amendment to the New York City Health Code, which prohibited New York City restaurants, movie theaters, and other food service establishments from serving sugary drinks in sizes larger than 16 ounces. The Court of Appeals held that the New York Board of Health did not have inherent legislative powers separate and apart from the City Council; therefore, the Board lacked legislative authority to promulgate the amendment to the City Health Code. The amendment was declared invalid and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to enjoin its implementation.
Link to Opinion
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N.Y. C.L. Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 118 N.E.3d 847 (N.Y. 2018)
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New York | 2018 | Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias |
State:
New York
Year:
2018
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Police Misconduct and Bias
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe New York State Civil Rights Law Section 50-a requires that the personnel records of police officers be kept confidential. The New York Civil Liberties Union sought certain disciplinary records from the NYPD pursuant to the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), contending that compliance with this statute is unnecessary where officer's identifying information is adequately redacted (the NYPD was also amenable to disclosing redacted records). The Court of Appeals prevented the disclosure of these redacted documents, arguing that FOIL's exemption from disclosure of records deemed confidential by state or federal statute, save for vis a vis in specific manners and for specific purposes, is mandatory and does not permit government agencies to exercise discretion in whether and how to disclose such confidential records.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The New York State Civil Rights Law Section 50-a requires that the personnel records of police officers be kept confidential. The New York Civil Liberties Union sought certain disciplinary records from the NYPD pursuant to the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), contending that compliance with this statute is unnecessary where officer's identifying information is adequately redacted (the NYPD was also amenable to disclosing redacted records). The Court of Appeals prevented the disclosure of these redacted documents, arguing that FOIL's exemption from disclosure of records deemed confidential by state or federal statute, save for vis a vis in specific manners and for specific purposes, is mandatory and does not permit government agencies to exercise discretion in whether and how to disclose such confidential records.
Link to Opinion
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N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Huber, 74 A.3d 860 (N.J. 2013)
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New Jersey | 2013 | Environment, Conservation Efforts/Green Initiatives, Actions Against Government |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2013
Topics:
Environment, Conservation Efforts/Green Initiatives, Actions Against Government
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingNew Jersey passed the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (FWPA) as a means of protecting its freshwater wetlands from random and unnecessary alterations and disturbances. Pursuant to the FWPA, a single penalty and restoration remedy was imposed on Robert and Michelle Huber (the Petitioners) as a result of FWPA violations committed on their land, which had been developed subject to FWPA permit conditions. On appeal from the final administrative action of the New Jersey Department of Environment Protection (DEP), the Hubers raised for the first time a constitutional argument contesting the right of a DEP inspector to have entered their land without securing a warrant in advance in violation of N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.
The Supreme Court held that based on the FWPA's integrated scheme governing freshwater wetlands in New Jersey, land subject to FWPA restrictions so important as to be required by law to be filed of record, is subject to the statutory, reasonable right of entry and inspection, but that in exercising that right, the DEP must comply with its processes, which require presentation of credentials before seeking consent to entry at reasonable times. If entry is denied, the DEP Commissioner may order that entry be provided and the DEP shall be entitled, pursuant to the rules of court, to judicial process to compel access to the property subject to the FWPA permit. The Supreme Court reasoned that although the FWPA expects permittee consent, and will penalize the permittee who denies a DEP representative reasonable entry onto property to inspect for compliance with the FWPA, the inspection scheme taken as a whole does not purport to authorize forcible, nonconsensual entry into the backyard of a residential property owner—it only provides a means for the DEP to obtain judicial access to secure a court-issued injunction order authorizing the search to which the DEP is entitled.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
New Jersey passed the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (FWPA) as a means of protecting its freshwater wetlands from random and unnecessary alterations and disturbances. Pursuant to the FWPA, a single penalty and restoration remedy was imposed on Robert and Michelle Huber (the Petitioners) as a result of FWPA violations committed on their land, which had been developed subject to FWPA permit conditions. On appeal from the final administrative action of the New Jersey Department of Environment Protection (DEP), the Hubers raised for the first time a constitutional argument contesting the right of a DEP inspector to have entered their land without securing a warrant in advance in violation of N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.
The Supreme Court held that based on the FWPA's integrated scheme governing freshwater wetlands in New Jersey, land subject to FWPA restrictions so important as to be required by law to be filed of record, is subject to the statutory, reasonable right of entry and inspection, but that in exercising that right, the DEP must comply with its processes, which require presentation of credentials before seeking consent to entry at reasonable times. If entry is denied, the DEP Commissioner may order that entry be provided and the DEP shall be entitled, pursuant to the rules of court, to judicial process to compel access to the property subject to the FWPA permit. The Supreme Court reasoned that although the FWPA expects permittee consent, and will penalize the permittee who denies a DEP representative reasonable entry onto property to inspect for compliance with the FWPA, the inspection scheme taken as a whole does not purport to authorize forcible, nonconsensual entry into the backyard of a residential property owner—it only provides a means for the DEP to obtain judicial access to secure a court-issued injunction order authorizing the search to which the DEP is entitled.
Link to Opinion
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N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 814 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 2018)
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North Carolina | 2018 | Education |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2018
Topics:
Education
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe State Board of Education argued that the statutorily created committee (the Rules Review Commission) is unconstitutional. As a result of this newly created Rules Review Commission, the Board was now legally required to submit its proposed rules and regulations to the Rules Review Commission for approval which they alleged impacted their ability to efficiently produce rules governing public education. The Supreme Court held that the Rules Review Commission was rightfully created and given the authority to review Board proposals. The Supreme Court found that the Rules Review Commission had received adequate guidance to review the rules for three reasons. First, the North Carolina Constitution authorized the General Assembly to delegate authority to the Rules Review Commission to review proposed rules. Second, the General Assembly provided sufficient statutory direction concerning the Rules Review Commission's powers and restrictions regarding its ability to review rules and regulations proposed by the Board such that this delegation of power did not conflict with the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA dictates the rules and processes North Carolina agencies must follow. Finally, the Board still has an opportunity to challenge the Rules Review Commission through a declaratory judgement.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The State Board of Education argued that the statutorily created committee (the Rules Review Commission) is unconstitutional. As a result of this newly created Rules Review Commission, the Board was now legally required to submit its proposed rules and regulations to the Rules Review Commission for approval which they alleged impacted their ability to efficiently produce rules governing public education. The Supreme Court held that the Rules Review Commission was rightfully created and given the authority to review Board proposals. The Supreme Court found that the Rules Review Commission had received adequate guidance to review the rules for three reasons. First, the North Carolina Constitution authorized the General Assembly to delegate authority to the Rules Review Commission to review proposed rules. Second, the General Assembly provided sufficient statutory direction concerning the Rules Review Commission's powers and restrictions regarding its ability to review rules and regulations proposed by the Board such that this delegation of power did not conflict with the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA dictates the rules and processes North Carolina agencies must follow. Finally, the Board still has an opportunity to challenge the Rules Review Commission through a declaratory judgement.
Link to Opinion
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||||
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N.C. Conf. of NAACP v. Moore, 876 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. 2022)
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North Carolina | 2022 | Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering |
State:
North Carolina
Year:
2022
Topics:
Democracy & Voting, Redistricting/Gerrymandering
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA non-profit organization (North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP) brought suit against the North Carolina General Assembly to void amendments that were passed by a General Assembly with 28 of 170 members elected from districts that were illegally gerrymandered based on race. In 2011, the General Assembly redistricted its House and Senate based on the 2010 census. In 2015, North Carolina voters sued the General Assembly saying the redistricting plans were racially gerrymandered and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. See North Carolina v. Covington, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017). But, the North Carolina District Court (affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court) did not require a delay in the upcoming 2016 election due to the racial gerrymandering and instead said the districts simply had to be redrawn in the next legislative session. So, the 2016 legislators were elected by the districts that were held to be racially gerrymandered. Before those 2016 legislators left office, they enacted six bills to amend the North Carolina Constitution dealing with the several topics, including voter ID. The Supreme Court sought to answer the novel question of whether a General Assembly with legislators elected from unconstitutionally racially-gerrymandered districts could place constitutional amendments on a ballot for public ratification. The Supreme Court first found that the question is a justiciable one because the issue of whether the elected legislators could legitimately exercise their sovereign power requires interpretation and application of constitutional provisions which a Court must answer. The Supreme Court rejects the argument that the fact a majority of individual voters voted to pass the amendments cures the deficiency of putting the bills on the ballot in the first place; the Supreme Court says the argument is insufficient because of the power of the legislature and the need to ensure the legislature itself adheres to constitutional principles of democracy. The Supreme Court ultimately holds that the decisions by unconstitutionally elected legislatures are not automatically shielded from scrutiny simply from being "de facto" officers. The Supreme Court says that to allow a "de facto" officer doctrine would unfairly burden voters who reasonably relied on the acts of apparent officeholders. Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine if the amendments passed by an unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered General Assembly (1) immunize legislators from democratic accountability; (2) perpetuate the ongoing exclusion of a category of voters from the political process; or (3) intentionally discriminate against a particular category of citizens who were also discriminated against in the political process leading to the legislators’ election.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A non-profit organization (North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP) brought suit against the North Carolina General Assembly to void amendments that were passed by a General Assembly with 28 of 170 members elected from districts that were illegally gerrymandered based on race. In 2011, the General Assembly redistricted its House and Senate based on the 2010 census. In 2015, North Carolina voters sued the General Assembly saying the redistricting plans were racially gerrymandered and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. See North Carolina v. Covington, 581 U.S. 1015 (2017). But, the North Carolina District Court (affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court) did not require a delay in the upcoming 2016 election due to the racial gerrymandering and instead said the districts simply had to be redrawn in the next legislative session. So, the 2016 legislators were elected by the districts that were held to be racially gerrymandered. Before those 2016 legislators left office, they enacted six bills to amend the North Carolina Constitution dealing with the several topics, including voter ID. The Supreme Court sought to answer the novel question of whether a General Assembly with legislators elected from unconstitutionally racially-gerrymandered districts could place constitutional amendments on a ballot for public ratification. The Supreme Court first found that the question is a justiciable one because the issue of whether the elected legislators could legitimately exercise their sovereign power requires interpretation and application of constitutional provisions which a Court must answer. The Supreme Court rejects the argument that the fact a majority of individual voters voted to pass the amendments cures the deficiency of putting the bills on the ballot in the first place; the Supreme Court says the argument is insufficient because of the power of the legislature and the need to ensure the legislature itself adheres to constitutional principles of democracy. The Supreme Court ultimately holds that the decisions by unconstitutionally elected legislatures are not automatically shielded from scrutiny simply from being "de facto" officers. The Supreme Court says that to allow a "de facto" officer doctrine would unfairly burden voters who reasonably relied on the acts of apparent officeholders. Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine if the amendments passed by an unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered General Assembly (1) immunize legislators from democratic accountability; (2) perpetuate the ongoing exclusion of a category of voters from the political process; or (3) intentionally discriminate against a particular category of citizens who were also discriminated against in the political process leading to the legislators’ election.
Link to Opinion
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||||
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N. Hempstead v. Cnty. of Nassau, 20 N.E.3d 983 (N.Y. 2014)
|
New York | 2014 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
New York
Year:
2014
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Court of Appeals was whether New York education law permits a county to charge back to a town the amount the county paid on behalf of town residents for attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Court of Appeals held that the county can collect chargebacks. Under New York education law, funding for community colleges is derived from the state, the local sponsor, and individual students. For nonresident students, meaning students who live within New York but outside the region where the community college is located, the local sponsor can chargeback the operating costs to towns and cities in the student's county of residence. FIT, which originally only offered two-year associate degree programs, was authorized in 1975 to expand to bachelors and masters degree programs while still being financed and administered as a community college. Because the expansion of degree programs resulted in higher operating costs, in 1994 the state passed a law that obligated the state to reimburse counties for charges incurred for nonresident students attending FIT, but stopped appropriating finds for the reimbursement in 2001. In 2011, the county where FIT is located claimed chargebacks from a town for its nonresident students at FIT. The town argued that the county lacked authority to claim chargebacks because the 1994 statute made the state the sole source for reimbursement and that, even if the county could claim chargebacks that they should be limited to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals found that the county was entitled to claim the chargebacks because the 1994 statute did not expressly or impliedly repeal the law that gave the county the ability to seek chargebacks. Rather reimbursement can be obtained from either the state or the town. The Court of Appeals also found that chargebacks should not be limited to two-year degree programs because the 1975 law that expanded FIT's programs stated that the school should be financed and administered as a community college without limiting it to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals also held that the county had the authority to offset amounts from the towns share of sales tax revenue.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether New York education law permits a county to charge back to a town the amount the county paid on behalf of town residents for attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Court of Appeals held that the county can collect chargebacks. Under New York education law, funding for community colleges is derived from the state, the local sponsor, and individual students. For nonresident students, meaning students who live within New York but outside the region where the community college is located, the local sponsor can chargeback the operating costs to towns and cities in the student's county of residence. FIT, which originally only offered two-year associate degree programs, was authorized in 1975 to expand to bachelors and masters degree programs while still being financed and administered as a community college. Because the expansion of degree programs resulted in higher operating costs, in 1994 the state passed a law that obligated the state to reimburse counties for charges incurred for nonresident students attending FIT, but stopped appropriating finds for the reimbursement in 2001. In 2011, the county where FIT is located claimed chargebacks from a town for its nonresident students at FIT. The town argued that the county lacked authority to claim chargebacks because the 1994 statute made the state the sole source for reimbursement and that, even if the county could claim chargebacks that they should be limited to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals found that the county was entitled to claim the chargebacks because the 1994 statute did not expressly or impliedly repeal the law that gave the county the ability to seek chargebacks. Rather reimbursement can be obtained from either the state or the town. The Court of Appeals also found that chargebacks should not be limited to two-year degree programs because the 1975 law that expanded FIT's programs stated that the school should be financed and administered as a community college without limiting it to the two-year degree programs. The Court of Appeals also held that the county had the authority to offset amounts from the towns share of sales tax revenue.
Link to Opinion
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N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017)
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Florida | 2017 | Health Care, Health Care Discrimination, Health Care Access / Funding |
State:
Florida
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Health Care Discrimination, Health Care Access / Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff underwent corrective surgery for carpal tunnel during which she was placed under general anesthesia. Unbeknownst at the time of the surgery, the anesthesiologist punctured Plaintiff's esophagus. A neighbor found Plaintiff unresponsive after her discharge and brought her to the emergency room where she underwent corrective surgery, resulting in Plaintiff being in a medically induced coma for several weeks, as well as requiring additional surgery and extensive physical therapy. The jury ultimately awarded Plaintiff $4 million for noneconomic damages which the trial court reduced pursuant to the statutory damages cap under Sections 766.118(2)-(3), Florida Statutes (2011). On appeal, the Fourth District, relying on Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014), determined the damages cap was unconstitutional, applying the rationale from McCall (evaluated in the medical malpractice context) to the personal injury context, and reinstated the full damages award. The Florida Supreme Court, also applying McCall, affirmed, applying rational basis review in determining that the damages cap violate the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution. Similarly to McCall, the Court determined the damages cap arbitrarily restricts the recoverable damages for certain classes of people, ruminating that "[s]o long as the caps discriminate between classes of medical malpractice victims, as they do in the personal injury context (where the claimants with little noneconomic damage can be awarded all of their damages, in contrast to those claimants whose noneconomic damages are deemed to exceed the level to which the caps apply), they are rendered unconstitutional by McCall." The Court further determined there to be no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, having already determined in McCall that the "insurance crisis" is largely overstated, and thus "there is no longer a legitimate state objective to which the caps could rationally and reasonably relate." The dissent renewed many of the arguments from the dissent in McCall, noting that the legislature could very well have rationally believed that a cap on noneconomic damages may reduce malpractice awards and alleviate pressure on the healthcare industry. The dissent sternly argued that it is not the place of the court to second-guess the legislature's rationale.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff underwent corrective surgery for carpal tunnel during which she was placed under general anesthesia. Unbeknownst at the time of the surgery, the anesthesiologist punctured Plaintiff's esophagus. A neighbor found Plaintiff unresponsive after her discharge and brought her to the emergency room where she underwent corrective surgery, resulting in Plaintiff being in a medically induced coma for several weeks, as well as requiring additional surgery and extensive physical therapy. The jury ultimately awarded Plaintiff $4 million for noneconomic damages which the trial court reduced pursuant to the statutory damages cap under Sections 766.118(2)-(3), Florida Statutes (2011). On appeal, the Fourth District, relying on Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014), determined the damages cap was unconstitutional, applying the rationale from McCall (evaluated in the medical malpractice context) to the personal injury context, and reinstated the full damages award. The Florida Supreme Court, also applying McCall, affirmed, applying rational basis review in determining that the damages cap violate the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution. Similarly to McCall, the Court determined the damages cap arbitrarily restricts the recoverable damages for certain classes of people, ruminating that "[s]o long as the caps discriminate between classes of medical malpractice victims, as they do in the personal injury context (where the claimants with little noneconomic damage can be awarded all of their damages, in contrast to those claimants whose noneconomic damages are deemed to exceed the level to which the caps apply), they are rendered unconstitutional by McCall." The Court further determined there to be no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, having already determined in McCall that the "insurance crisis" is largely overstated, and thus "there is no longer a legitimate state objective to which the caps could rationally and reasonably relate." The dissent renewed many of the arguments from the dissent in McCall, noting that the legislature could very well have rationally believed that a cap on noneconomic damages may reduce malpractice awards and alleviate pressure on the healthcare industry. The dissent sternly argued that it is not the place of the court to second-guess the legislature's rationale.
Link to Opinion
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||||
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Myers v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 922 N.W.2d 47 (Wis. 2019)
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Wisconsin | 2019 | Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2019
Topics:
Environment, Actions Against Government, Water Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingProperty owners Philip and Terrie Myers appealed a decision by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to amend their pier permit for obstruction of waterways and sedimentary damage. The Myers were initially granted a permit in 2001 by the DNR for a pier at their waterfront property on Lake Superior. In 2012 and 2013, following complaints from neighboring properties, the DNR conducted an investigation and requested that the Myers substantially modify their pier, which they declined to do. The DNR then ultimately issued a formal permit amendment that required the Myers to significantly change their pier. The Myers filed a petition for judicial review of the amendment to their permit. The neighbors' complaints alleged that there was shoreline erosion and a loss of riparian property due to the Myers' pier. The DNR then required that the Myers significantly modify their pier in one of two ways, 15 years after the original permit was issued. The Supreme Court held that the DNR did not have the authority to amend a permit after the pier placement was completed. The Supreme Court primarily relied on Wis. Stat. Sect. 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3, finding that once a permit has been issued, it does not carry any ongoing requirements to satisfy the original permitting conditions. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the statute explicitly uses the word "met" to describe satisfying permit conditions, and at the time of issuance, the Myers' pier "met" those conditions.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Property owners Philip and Terrie Myers appealed a decision by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to amend their pier permit for obstruction of waterways and sedimentary damage. The Myers were initially granted a permit in 2001 by the DNR for a pier at their waterfront property on Lake Superior. In 2012 and 2013, following complaints from neighboring properties, the DNR conducted an investigation and requested that the Myers substantially modify their pier, which they declined to do. The DNR then ultimately issued a formal permit amendment that required the Myers to significantly change their pier. The Myers filed a petition for judicial review of the amendment to their permit. The neighbors' complaints alleged that there was shoreline erosion and a loss of riparian property due to the Myers' pier. The DNR then required that the Myers significantly modify their pier in one of two ways, 15 years after the original permit was issued. The Supreme Court held that the DNR did not have the authority to amend a permit after the pier placement was completed. The Supreme Court primarily relied on Wis. Stat. Sect. 30.12(3m)(c)1.-3, finding that once a permit has been issued, it does not carry any ongoing requirements to satisfy the original permitting conditions. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the statute explicitly uses the word "met" to describe satisfying permit conditions, and at the time of issuance, the Myers' pier "met" those conditions.
Link to Opinion
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Myers v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57 (N.Y. 2017)
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New York | 2017 | Health Care, Public Health |
State:
New York
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief to permit "aid-in-dying," whereby a mentally competent, terminally ill patient may obtain a prescription from a physician to cause death. The Plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment that physicians who provide aid-in-dying in this manner are not criminally liable under the State's assisted suicide statutes and injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecution of physicians who issue such prescriptions to terminally ill, mentally competent patients. The Plaintiffs argued the prohibition on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Penal Law provisions prohibiting assisted suicide do not exclude physician assisted suicide. The Court of Appeals found that the prohibition of physician assisted suicide does not violate the equal protection clause and is supported by a rational basis for due process purposes.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief to permit "aid-in-dying," whereby a mentally competent, terminally ill patient may obtain a prescription from a physician to cause death. The Plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment that physicians who provide aid-in-dying in this manner are not criminally liable under the State's assisted suicide statutes and injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecution of physicians who issue such prescriptions to terminally ill, mentally competent patients. The Plaintiffs argued the prohibition on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the New York Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the Penal Law provisions prohibiting assisted suicide do not exclude physician assisted suicide. The Court of Appeals found that the prohibition of physician assisted suicide does not violate the equal protection clause and is supported by a rational basis for due process purposes.
Link to Opinion
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||||
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Myers v. Reno Cab Co., 492 P.3d 545 (Nev. 2021)
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Nevada | 2021 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2021
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingTaxi drivers filed a lawsuit against certain cab companies, alleging that their take-home pay was less than the minimum hourly wage required by the Minimum Wage Amendment to the Nevada Constitution (MWA), which only applies to "employees." Taxicab companies that lease taxicabs to the drivers under agreements approved by the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA) argued that the drivers were independent contractors, not employees, for the purposes of the minimum wage laws. The Supreme Court held that a taxi driver is covered by the MWA if he or she satisfies the economic realities test (a test determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor and under which a court examines the totality of the circumstances and determines whether, as a matter of economic reality, workers depend upon the business to which they render service for the opportunity to work (an employee) or is in business for himself (an independent contractor). The Court remanded to the lower court to determine the disputed factual issues raised by the economic realities test and the NRS 608.0155 test (addressing statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages).
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Taxi drivers filed a lawsuit against certain cab companies, alleging that their take-home pay was less than the minimum hourly wage required by the Minimum Wage Amendment to the Nevada Constitution (MWA), which only applies to "employees." Taxicab companies that lease taxicabs to the drivers under agreements approved by the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA) argued that the drivers were independent contractors, not employees, for the purposes of the minimum wage laws. The Supreme Court held that a taxi driver is covered by the MWA if he or she satisfies the economic realities test (a test determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor and under which a court examines the totality of the circumstances and determines whether, as a matter of economic reality, workers depend upon the business to which they render service for the opportunity to work (an employee) or is in business for himself (an independent contractor). The Court remanded to the lower court to determine the disputed factual issues raised by the economic realities test and the NRS 608.0155 test (addressing statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages).
Link to Opinion
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Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, 193 N.E.3d 1177 (Ill. 2022)
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Illinois | 2022 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2022
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee was injured while working for a subcontractor on a project. Both the subcontractor and the main contractor were covered under the same insurance policy, which paid the employee's medical bills. Despite being owned by the same parent company, the subcontractor and contractor operated as separate entities with distinct financial and operational structures. The employee sued the subcontractor for negligence, claiming it retained control of the worksite and caused the injury. The subcontractor argued it was immune from the lawsuit because it already fulfilled its legal obligations by paying part of the employee’s medical bills from its workers' compensation insurance coverage. The Supreme Court ruled that while workers' compensation protects employers from lawsuits, it does not shield subcontractors from liability for their own negligence.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
An employee was injured while working for a subcontractor on a project. Both the subcontractor and the main contractor were covered under the same insurance policy, which paid the employee's medical bills. Despite being owned by the same parent company, the subcontractor and contractor operated as separate entities with distinct financial and operational structures. The employee sued the subcontractor for negligence, claiming it retained control of the worksite and caused the injury. The subcontractor argued it was immune from the lawsuit because it already fulfilled its legal obligations by paying part of the employee’s medical bills from its workers' compensation insurance coverage. The Supreme Court ruled that while workers' compensation protects employers from lawsuits, it does not shield subcontractors from liability for their own negligence.
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Mullner v. State, 406 P.3d 473 (Nev. 2017)
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Nevada | 2017 | Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2017
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant Troy Lee Mullner appealed his convictions of burglary, robbery, coercion, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. On appeal, Mullner argued, among other things, that the district court erred in considering his 1984 conviction during sentencing because the conviction resulted from an offense committed as a minor (though Mullner was convicted and sentenced as an adult). The Court held that the 1984 conviction could "enhance a defendant’s punishment as an habitual criminal, provided the court had general jurisdiction to sentence the juvenile as an adult." Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument and ultimately affirmed his conviction and sentence.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Defendant Troy Lee Mullner appealed his convictions of burglary, robbery, coercion, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted burglary, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. On appeal, Mullner argued, among other things, that the district court erred in considering his 1984 conviction during sentencing because the conviction resulted from an offense committed as a minor (though Mullner was convicted and sentenced as an adult). The Court held that the 1984 conviction could "enhance a defendant’s punishment as an habitual criminal, provided the court had general jurisdiction to sentence the juvenile as an adult." Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument and ultimately affirmed his conviction and sentence.
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Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 894 N.W.2d 405 (Wis. 2017)
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Wisconsin | 2017 | Health Care |
State:
Wisconsin
Year:
2017
Topics:
Health Care
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAs the basis of this lawsuit, Plaintiff Moya authorized her attorney to collect her health records from Moya's healthcare provider, which is handled by Healthport. Plaintiff's attorney was required to pay the retrieval fee to Healthport to do so. Plaintiff Moya filed a class action on behalf of all other similarly situated persons who had been billed the certification charge and retrieval fee by Healthport, a health data management company, for obtaining their own healthcare records. The question to be answered was whether attorneys requesting medical records on behalf of clients were exempt from the fees the medical provider and data management companies imposed. Plaintiff argued that an attorney with written approval was plainly exempted from paying fees in the statutory language: a “person authorized by the patient” includes “any person authorized in writing by the patient . . . .” Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. Healthport argued that an attorney was not included because they are not authorized to be healthcare agents. Although the circuit court denied Healthport's motion for summary judgment, Healthport won on appeal. Plaintiff's appealed. The Supreme Court held that an attorney authorized by their client in writing via a HIPAA release form to obtain the client's healthcare records is a “person authorized by the patient” under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. and is therefore exempt from certification charges and retrieval fees. In sum, someone qualifies as a “person authorized by the patient” if (1) they are a person; (2) they have a written authorization from the patient via the HIPAA release form; and (3) the patient signed the HIPAA release form to provide her attorney the authorization to receive her health care records.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
As the basis of this lawsuit, Plaintiff Moya authorized her attorney to collect her health records from Moya's healthcare provider, which is handled by Healthport. Plaintiff's attorney was required to pay the retrieval fee to Healthport to do so. Plaintiff Moya filed a class action on behalf of all other similarly situated persons who had been billed the certification charge and retrieval fee by Healthport, a health data management company, for obtaining their own healthcare records. The question to be answered was whether attorneys requesting medical records on behalf of clients were exempt from the fees the medical provider and data management companies imposed. Plaintiff argued that an attorney with written approval was plainly exempted from paying fees in the statutory language: a “person authorized by the patient” includes “any person authorized in writing by the patient . . . .” Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. Healthport argued that an attorney was not included because they are not authorized to be healthcare agents. Although the circuit court denied Healthport's motion for summary judgment, Healthport won on appeal. Plaintiff's appealed. The Supreme Court held that an attorney authorized by their client in writing via a HIPAA release form to obtain the client's healthcare records is a “person authorized by the patient” under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. and is therefore exempt from certification charges and retrieval fees. In sum, someone qualifies as a “person authorized by the patient” if (1) they are a person; (2) they have a written authorization from the patient via the HIPAA release form; and (3) the patient signed the HIPAA release form to provide her attorney the authorization to receive her health care records.
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Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016)
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Florida | 2016 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty |
State:
Florida
Year:
2016
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingMosley was convicted of first-degree murder in 2004, receiving a sentence of death. Mosely sought postconviction relief and a writ of habeas corpus, under multiple claims, including ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. While the Court rejected most of Mosley's claims, an issue arose in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). In Mosley's sentence of death, the jury had recommended the death penalty by a majority of 8 to 4. Under Hurst, the decision of the jury must be unanimous. The Supreme Court made clear that the ruling of Hurst would not apply retroactively to those whose final sentences had already been decided. However, at the time Hurst was decided, Mosley had been convicted but not yet sentenced. Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined that for postconviction defendants like Mosley, Hurst would apply retroactively, and the jury decision must be unanimous to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court remanded the case and ordered a new penalty phase of the trial for Mosley to determine if a jury would unanimously impose a sentence of death, as required by Hurst.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Mosley was convicted of first-degree murder in 2004, receiving a sentence of death. Mosely sought postconviction relief and a writ of habeas corpus, under multiple claims, including ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. While the Court rejected most of Mosley's claims, an issue arose in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). In Mosley's sentence of death, the jury had recommended the death penalty by a majority of 8 to 4. Under Hurst, the decision of the jury must be unanimous. The Supreme Court made clear that the ruling of Hurst would not apply retroactively to those whose final sentences had already been decided. However, at the time Hurst was decided, Mosley had been convicted but not yet sentenced. Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined that for postconviction defendants like Mosley, Hurst would apply retroactively, and the jury decision must be unanimous to impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court remanded the case and ordered a new penalty phase of the trial for Mosley to determine if a jury would unanimously impose a sentence of death, as required by Hurst.
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Mosby v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 234 N.E.3d 110 (Ill. 2023)
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Illinois | 2023 | Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Health Care |
State:
Illinois
Year:
2023
Topics:
Labor, Employment, & Economic Justice, Health Care
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA nurse employed at Ingalls Memorial Hospital filed suit against her employer for violation of the 2008 Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) because her biometric information was used and collected without her consent. BIPA requires that the employer provide employees written consent and notice of the use and collection of their biometric information. Specifically, the nurse’s fingerprints were used and stored in a medication dispensing machine without her consent for the purpose of dispensing medication. The Supreme Court found for the hospital, holding that the collection and storage of the nurse’s fingerprints without providing her notice or obtaining her consent did not violate BIPA because BIPA allows employers to collect information from employees in the course of health care treatment, payment, or health care operations.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A nurse employed at Ingalls Memorial Hospital filed suit against her employer for violation of the 2008 Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) because her biometric information was used and collected without her consent. BIPA requires that the employer provide employees written consent and notice of the use and collection of their biometric information. Specifically, the nurse’s fingerprints were used and stored in a medication dispensing machine without her consent for the purpose of dispensing medication. The Supreme Court found for the hospital, holding that the collection and storage of the nurse’s fingerprints without providing her notice or obtaining her consent did not violate BIPA because BIPA allows employers to collect information from employees in the course of health care treatment, payment, or health care operations.
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Morristown Ass'n v. Grant Oil Co., 105 A.3d 1082 (N.J. 2015)
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New Jersey | 2015 | Environment, Pollution/Contamination |
State:
New Jersey
Year:
2015
Topics:
Environment, Pollution/Contamination
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Supreme Court is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1's six-year statute of limitations applies to the contribution claims authorized under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act). Plaintiff, the owner of a shopping center, brought an action under the Spill Act against heating oil companies and former owners of dry cleaning business at the shopping center for costs of remediating contamination allegedly caused by leaks of heating oil located under the dry cleaning business. In focusing on the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitation does not apply. It reasoned that while the Spill Act is silent as to the applicability of a statute of limitations to contribution claims, language of the statute expressly restricting the defenses available under the Spill Act provides significant support for a conclusion that no statute of limitations applies. In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that the construction they adopted is also supported by the "longstanding view . . . that the Spill Act is remedial legislation designed to cast a wide net over those responsible for hazardous substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this state." Notably, six groups of organizations and individuals were granted leave to appear as amici in this case and all but one argued that the six-year statute of limitation does not apply to Spill Act claims.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1's six-year statute of limitations applies to the contribution claims authorized under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act). Plaintiff, the owner of a shopping center, brought an action under the Spill Act against heating oil companies and former owners of dry cleaning business at the shopping center for costs of remediating contamination allegedly caused by leaks of heating oil located under the dry cleaning business. In focusing on the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitation does not apply. It reasoned that while the Spill Act is silent as to the applicability of a statute of limitations to contribution claims, language of the statute expressly restricting the defenses available under the Spill Act provides significant support for a conclusion that no statute of limitations applies. In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that the construction they adopted is also supported by the "longstanding view . . . that the Spill Act is remedial legislation designed to cast a wide net over those responsible for hazardous substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this state." Notably, six groups of organizations and individuals were granted leave to appear as amici in this case and all but one argued that the six-year statute of limitation does not apply to Spill Act claims.
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Morrissey v. Garner, 461 P.3d 428 (Ariz. 2020)
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Arizona | 2020 | Democracy & Voting |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2020
Topics:
Democracy & Voting
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved an attempted recall of Mayor Thomas Morrissey of Payson, Arizona. The Arizona Constitution established the required number of signatures for a recall election based on a percentage of the number of voters in the most recent election at which the candidate was voted into that office. Since 2002, all Payson municipal elections had been decided by primary election, so the town clerk determined that the number of required signatures for the recall was based on voting numbers from the 2002 election. This was done in accordance with Arizona legislation that allowed for a mayor to be selected by a Majority of votes in a primary election, or in a runoff general election if no candidate received the Majority of votes in the primary. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the town clerk should have based the required signature number on the 2018 primary election in which Morrissey was voted into office because the votes cast in the primary election effectively elected the mayor and acted as the general election.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
This case involved an attempted recall of Mayor Thomas Morrissey of Payson, Arizona. The Arizona Constitution established the required number of signatures for a recall election based on a percentage of the number of voters in the most recent election at which the candidate was voted into that office. Since 2002, all Payson municipal elections had been decided by primary election, so the town clerk determined that the number of required signatures for the recall was based on voting numbers from the 2002 election. This was done in accordance with Arizona legislation that allowed for a mayor to be selected by a Majority of votes in a primary election, or in a runoff general election if no candidate received the Majority of votes in the primary. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the town clerk should have based the required signature number on the 2018 primary election in which Morrissey was voted into office because the votes cast in the primary election effectively elected the mayor and acted as the general election.
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Morrison v. Health Plan of Nev., 328 P.3d 1165 (Nev. 2014)
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Nevada | 2014 | Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Access/Funding |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2014
Topics:
Health Care, Public Health, Health Care Access/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA Medicare beneficiary sued the providers (HPN, the Defendants) of his Medicare Advantage health insurance plan on a theory of negligence. After receiving treatment from a care provider that contracted with HPN, Morrison became infected by hepatitis C directly as a result of his treatment. Morrison sued HPN on a theory of common law negligence, claiming that HPN breached its duty to use reasonable care in investigating and selecting the health care providers it contracts with. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. Morrison appealed, arguing that the Medicare Act does not preempt state common law negligence claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims based on the retention and investigation of health care providers under Medicare plans are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. Justice Cherry wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gibbons, noting that HPN operates as a Nevada-licensed HMO (with both Medicare Advantage and non-Medicare Advantage clients), and that it would be wrong to deny access to these claims to the Plaintiff for mere reason of him being a Medicare recipient. Further, the dissent's reading of the Medicare Act would not expressly preempt negligent claims regarding the selection of a provider.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A Medicare beneficiary sued the providers (HPN, the Defendants) of his Medicare Advantage health insurance plan on a theory of negligence. After receiving treatment from a care provider that contracted with HPN, Morrison became infected by hepatitis C directly as a result of his treatment. Morrison sued HPN on a theory of common law negligence, claiming that HPN breached its duty to use reasonable care in investigating and selecting the health care providers it contracts with. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. Morrison appealed, arguing that the Medicare Act does not preempt state common law negligence claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims based on the retention and investigation of health care providers under Medicare plans are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. Justice Cherry wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gibbons, noting that HPN operates as a Nevada-licensed HMO (with both Medicare Advantage and non-Medicare Advantage clients), and that it would be wrong to deny access to these claims to the Plaintiff for mere reason of him being a Medicare recipient. Further, the dissent's reading of the Medicare Act would not expressly preempt negligent claims regarding the selection of a provider.
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Morgan v. Dickerson, 511 P.3d 202 (Ariz. 2022)
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Arizona | 2022 | Civil Rights |
State:
Arizona
Year:
2022
Topics:
Civil Rights
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingBy statute, Arizona courts use "innominate" juries, a system in which only the court and parties know the identities of jurors, but courts have discretion to provide access to juror names. A journalist intervened in two criminal cases, seeking access to the names of prospective and impaneled jurors, claiming that the First Amendment creates a presumption in favor of public access. When access was denied, the journalist appealed. Applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Arizona Supreme Court asked (1) “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public”; and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” The Court concluded that although historically juror names were available to the public, access to juror's names did not play a significantly positive role in the functioning of voir dire. The public already has access via attendance at voir dire proceedings, and revealing juror's names would be more likely to cause jurors to withhold information out of fear of embarrassment rather than facilitate truthfulness. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the First Amendment does not provide a qualified right of public access to juror names.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
By statute, Arizona courts use "innominate" juries, a system in which only the court and parties know the identities of jurors, but courts have discretion to provide access to juror names. A journalist intervened in two criminal cases, seeking access to the names of prospective and impaneled jurors, claiming that the First Amendment creates a presumption in favor of public access. When access was denied, the journalist appealed. Applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Arizona Supreme Court asked (1) “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public”; and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” The Court concluded that although historically juror names were available to the public, access to juror's names did not play a significantly positive role in the functioning of voir dire. The public already has access via attendance at voir dire proceedings, and revealing juror's names would be more likely to cause jurors to withhold information out of fear of embarrassment rather than facilitate truthfulness. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the First Amendment does not provide a qualified right of public access to juror names.
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Morency v. State Dep't of Educ., 496 P.3d 584 (Nev. 2021)
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Nevada | 2021 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2021
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2019, the Nevada legislature passed a bill, by less than super majority, Assembly Bill (A.B.) 458, that eliminated future increases in the amount of tax credits available to businesses that donate to certain scholarship organizations without obtaining the two-thirds majority in votes required under the supermajority provision of the Nevada Constitution. Appellants, parents of scholarship recipients and businesses who benefited from the tax credit, challenged the legislation as unconstitutional. The District Court ruled in favor of the legislation's constitutionality and the Appellants thereafter appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered (1) whether Appellants have standing to challenge the legislation and, if so, (2) whether the bill increases public revenue. The Supreme Court held that Appellants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of A.B. 458 because the Appellants demonstrated sufficient evidence to apply the "public importance exception." Pursuant to the "public importance exception," a court may grant standing to a Nevada citizen to raise constitutional challenges to legislation if they demonstrate that the case (1) involves an issue of significant public importance; (2) involves a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position, other than the plaintiff, who will likely bring an action and the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his/her position in court. Here, the court found that (1) the case involves an issue of public importance because it involves the financial concern of a significant number of businesses, organizations, and individuals; (2) the bill challenges the legislature's appropriateness on the basis that is did not meet the requirements under the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position to challenge A.B. 458 than Appellants because, as parents of scholarship recipients, a registered scholarship organization, and businesses that have donated and wish to continue to donate to the scholarship organizations in exchange for tax credits, they benefit from the tax credits and are interested in maintaining those benefits. Although the Appellants had standing under the public importance exception, the Supreme Court held that A.B. 458 was not subject to the supermajority provision under the Nevada Constitution. The Court found that because A.B. 458 does not create, generate, or increase public revenue but rather redirects taxes owed to the State General Fund, the supermajority provision does not apply, and A.B. 458 (passed by less than a super majority) is constitutional.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In 2019, the Nevada legislature passed a bill, by less than super majority, Assembly Bill (A.B.) 458, that eliminated future increases in the amount of tax credits available to businesses that donate to certain scholarship organizations without obtaining the two-thirds majority in votes required under the supermajority provision of the Nevada Constitution. Appellants, parents of scholarship recipients and businesses who benefited from the tax credit, challenged the legislation as unconstitutional. The District Court ruled in favor of the legislation's constitutionality and the Appellants thereafter appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered (1) whether Appellants have standing to challenge the legislation and, if so, (2) whether the bill increases public revenue. The Supreme Court held that Appellants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of A.B. 458 because the Appellants demonstrated sufficient evidence to apply the "public importance exception." Pursuant to the "public importance exception," a court may grant standing to a Nevada citizen to raise constitutional challenges to legislation if they demonstrate that the case (1) involves an issue of significant public importance; (2) involves a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position, other than the plaintiff, who will likely bring an action and the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his/her position in court. Here, the court found that (1) the case involves an issue of public importance because it involves the financial concern of a significant number of businesses, organizations, and individuals; (2) the bill challenges the legislature's appropriateness on the basis that is did not meet the requirements under the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position to challenge A.B. 458 than Appellants because, as parents of scholarship recipients, a registered scholarship organization, and businesses that have donated and wish to continue to donate to the scholarship organizations in exchange for tax credits, they benefit from the tax credits and are interested in maintaining those benefits. Although the Appellants had standing under the public importance exception, the Supreme Court held that A.B. 458 was not subject to the supermajority provision under the Nevada Constitution. The Court found that because A.B. 458 does not create, generate, or increase public revenue but rather redirects taxes owed to the State General Fund, the supermajority provision does not apply, and A.B. 458 (passed by less than a super majority) is constitutional.
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Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coalition, 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016)
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Texas | 2016 | Education, Access to Education/Funding |
State:
Texas
Year:
2016
Topics:
Education, Access to Education/Funding
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs (more than 500 school districts as well as charter school advocates, individuals, and business associations) brought an action challenging Texas's school finance system as violating the Texas Constitution's requirement that the state (1) provide a free public education that is adequate, suitable, and efficient; and (2) not levy an ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax based on assessed property value). The trial court determined that the Texas public school funding system (including for charter schools) was not adequately funded to achieve educational best practices such as meeting core class size goals and programs for struggling students, and was constitutionally inadequate and unsuitable for English language learner (ELL) students (17% of public school students) and economically disadvantaged students (60%). The trial court rejected arguments that the system's alleged structural inefficiencies (including capping the number of charter schools and failing to determine the cost of educating a child) did not make the system "qualitatively inefficient" in violation of the Texas Constitution's requirement to provide a system "effective or productive of results and connot[ing] the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste." The trial court also rejected the argument that the system's provision of at least $1,000 less per weighted student for charter schools, as opposed to public schools, was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that differences in the way similarly situated charter schools and other schools are funded was not arbitrary because charter schools have different funding needs. The trial court also held that the system imposed an unconstitutional ad valorem tax. The state directly appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding in favor of the existing funding system. The Supreme Court held that the school funding system was efficient for the same reasons as the trial court, and also held that the system was adequate and suitable, despite the failure to meet certain educational best practices, because it focused on students as a whole rather than certain demographics, such as ELL students, who struggled more. Specifically, the Court held that the constitutional requirement that the state ensure a "general diffusion of knowledge" did not require adequacy in class size, tutoring, nurses, security guards, and interventions for special needs students. The Court also held that performance disparities for ELL students and economically disadvantaged students did not violate the general diffusion requirement because the requirement considered all students as a whole, and Texas students' overall achievement level based on test scores satisfied the requirement. While the Court stated that Texas's schoolchildren deserved "transformational, top-to-bottom reforms that amount to more than Band-Aid on top of Band-Aid" it nonetheless found that the funding system satisfied minimum constitutional requirements and "decline[d] to usurp legislative authority by issuing reform diktats from on high, supplanting lawmakers' policy wisdom with our own."
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiffs (more than 500 school districts as well as charter school advocates, individuals, and business associations) brought an action challenging Texas's school finance system as violating the Texas Constitution's requirement that the state (1) provide a free public education that is adequate, suitable, and efficient; and (2) not levy an ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax based on assessed property value). The trial court determined that the Texas public school funding system (including for charter schools) was not adequately funded to achieve educational best practices such as meeting core class size goals and programs for struggling students, and was constitutionally inadequate and unsuitable for English language learner (ELL) students (17% of public school students) and economically disadvantaged students (60%). The trial court rejected arguments that the system's alleged structural inefficiencies (including capping the number of charter schools and failing to determine the cost of educating a child) did not make the system "qualitatively inefficient" in violation of the Texas Constitution's requirement to provide a system "effective or productive of results and connot[ing] the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste." The trial court also rejected the argument that the system's provision of at least $1,000 less per weighted student for charter schools, as opposed to public schools, was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that differences in the way similarly situated charter schools and other schools are funded was not arbitrary because charter schools have different funding needs. The trial court also held that the system imposed an unconstitutional ad valorem tax. The state directly appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding in favor of the existing funding system. The Supreme Court held that the school funding system was efficient for the same reasons as the trial court, and also held that the system was adequate and suitable, despite the failure to meet certain educational best practices, because it focused on students as a whole rather than certain demographics, such as ELL students, who struggled more. Specifically, the Court held that the constitutional requirement that the state ensure a "general diffusion of knowledge" did not require adequacy in class size, tutoring, nurses, security guards, and interventions for special needs students. The Court also held that performance disparities for ELL students and economically disadvantaged students did not violate the general diffusion requirement because the requirement considered all students as a whole, and Texas students' overall achievement level based on test scores satisfied the requirement. While the Court stated that Texas's schoolchildren deserved "transformational, top-to-bottom reforms that amount to more than Band-Aid on top of Band-Aid" it nonetheless found that the funding system satisfied minimum constitutional requirements and "decline[d] to usurp legislative authority by issuing reform diktats from on high, supplanting lawmakers' policy wisdom with our own."
Link to Opinion
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Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 152 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2014)
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Florida | 2014 | Labor, Employment & Economic Justice |
State:
Florida
Year:
2014
Topics:
Labor, Employment & Economic Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff's spouse, a landscaper, was killed on the job. The surviving spouse entered into a workers' compensation settlement agreement with the deceased spouse's employer's insurance provider which included a "workers' compensation exclusion" clause that operated to limit the compensation Plaintiff received to only the compensation she received from the insurance company. In a separate suit, the deceased's estate made a wrongful death claim and obtained a default judgment for $9.525 million that it sought compensation for from the worker's compensation insurer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against the insurer under the employer liability policy?; (2) if so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage ‘‘any obligation imposed by a workers’ compensation . . . law’’ operate to exclude coverage of the estate’s claim for the tort judgment?; and (3) if the estate’s claim is not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers’ compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate’s collection of the tort judgment? The Florida Supreme Court decided as follows: (1) an estate does have standing to bring suit against a liability insurer that may have coverage for the judgment; (2) the provision in the policy does work to bar coverage for any claims arising from bodily injuries for which the deceased's employer was required to pay benefits under the worker's compensation law--in other words, claims covered by worker's compensation insurance; and (3) settlement signed by surviving spouse with worker's compensation insurer included an election of remedies clause that operated to bar the estate from collecting the tort judgment from the worker's compensation insurer.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Plaintiff's spouse, a landscaper, was killed on the job. The surviving spouse entered into a workers' compensation settlement agreement with the deceased spouse's employer's insurance provider which included a "workers' compensation exclusion" clause that operated to limit the compensation Plaintiff received to only the compensation she received from the insurance company. In a separate suit, the deceased's estate made a wrongful death claim and obtained a default judgment for $9.525 million that it sought compensation for from the worker's compensation insurer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against the insurer under the employer liability policy?; (2) if so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage ‘‘any obligation imposed by a workers’ compensation . . . law’’ operate to exclude coverage of the estate’s claim for the tort judgment?; and (3) if the estate’s claim is not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers’ compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate’s collection of the tort judgment? The Florida Supreme Court decided as follows: (1) an estate does have standing to bring suit against a liability insurer that may have coverage for the judgment; (2) the provision in the policy does work to bar coverage for any claims arising from bodily injuries for which the deceased's employer was required to pay benefits under the worker's compensation law--in other words, claims covered by worker's compensation insurance; and (3) settlement signed by surviving spouse with worker's compensation insurer included an election of remedies clause that operated to bar the estate from collecting the tort judgment from the worker's compensation insurer.
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Moore v. State, 417 P.3d 356 (Nev. 2018)
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Nevada | 2018 | Criminal Justice, Death Penalty |
State:
Nevada
Year:
2018
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Death Penalty
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant filed an untimely postconviction petition of his death sentence. In reviewing his petition, the district court held that it was procedurally barred due to this untimeliness. Appellant then appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that the petition was not procedurally barred because (1) the state had withheld impeachment evidence; (2) his attorneys were ineffective throughout the litigation and his prior postconviction petition because they failed to include certain details about his life and background; and (3) he is actually innocent of the death penalty because the aggravating circumstance of "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is unconstitutional. The Court rejected all three arguments and affirmed the district court's ruling that Appellant's postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus was procedurally barred. As to Appellant's first argument, the Court reasoned that the allegedly withheld evidence was not material to Appellant's conviction. As to the second argument, the court reasoned that Appellant's counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to provide evidence on every detail regarding Appellant's substance use and familial issues. The Court noted that evidence might have provided more details about Moore's life, but it would not have altered the picture of Moore that trial counsel presented in any meaningful way. As to Appellant's third innocence argument, the Court noted that the aggravating circumstance that the "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is constitutional under Nevada case law.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
Appellant filed an untimely postconviction petition of his death sentence. In reviewing his petition, the district court held that it was procedurally barred due to this untimeliness. Appellant then appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that the petition was not procedurally barred because (1) the state had withheld impeachment evidence; (2) his attorneys were ineffective throughout the litigation and his prior postconviction petition because they failed to include certain details about his life and background; and (3) he is actually innocent of the death penalty because the aggravating circumstance of "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is unconstitutional. The Court rejected all three arguments and affirmed the district court's ruling that Appellant's postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus was procedurally barred. As to Appellant's first argument, the Court reasoned that the allegedly withheld evidence was not material to Appellant's conviction. As to the second argument, the court reasoned that Appellant's counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to provide evidence on every detail regarding Appellant's substance use and familial issues. The Court noted that evidence might have provided more details about Moore's life, but it would not have altered the picture of Moore that trial counsel presented in any meaningful way. As to Appellant's third innocence argument, the Court noted that the aggravating circumstance that the "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is constitutional under Nevada case law.
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Moon v. State, 860 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 2021)
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Georgia | 2021 | Criminal Justice, Access to Justice |
State:
Georgia
Year:
2021
Topics:
Criminal Justice, Access to Justice
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury convicted the Defendant of murder and other offenses. In deliberations, however, there was a holdout juror. To defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor argued that the holdout juror should be removed for cause for refusing to engage in adequate deliberations based on the evidence. The foreperson sent a note to the judge from another juror stating, among other things, that the holdout had multiple friends murdered during the past several years and violated her parole once before. The judge asked the foreperson to affirm the allegations in the letter. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. After some deliberation, the holdout juror was eventually removed by the trial court. In Georgia, there must be a sound basis upon which the trial court exercises its discretion to remove a juror, the purpose of which must be to preserve public respect for the integrity of the judicial process. In addition, if there is no certain or obvious basis for a juror’s incapacity, then a hearing or inquiry is the proper exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, since there was no evidence of juror misconduct, the Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of the trial judge’s inquiry into the holdout juror. The trial judge never asked the holdout whether the statements in the note were actually true and if so, whether the juror had lied about or purposefully withheld information. Instead, the judge relied on the hearsay statements of the foreperson and allegations in the note. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the hearing was insufficient into the holdout’s incapacity and misconduct and, consequently, the trial court’s removal of the holdout constituted an abuse of discretion. Finding that the trial court’s error was prejudicial, in addition to an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and two consecutive life-without-parole prison sentences given to the Defendant.
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
A jury convicted the Defendant of murder and other offenses. In deliberations, however, there was a holdout juror. To defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor argued that the holdout juror should be removed for cause for refusing to engage in adequate deliberations based on the evidence. The foreperson sent a note to the judge from another juror stating, among other things, that the holdout had multiple friends murdered during the past several years and violated her parole once before. The judge asked the foreperson to affirm the allegations in the letter. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. After some deliberation, the holdout juror was eventually removed by the trial court. In Georgia, there must be a sound basis upon which the trial court exercises its discretion to remove a juror, the purpose of which must be to preserve public respect for the integrity of the judicial process. In addition, if there is no certain or obvious basis for a juror’s incapacity, then a hearing or inquiry is the proper exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, since there was no evidence of juror misconduct, the Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of the trial judge’s inquiry into the holdout juror. The trial judge never asked the holdout whether the statements in the note were actually true and if so, whether the juror had lied about or purposefully withheld information. Instead, the judge relied on the hearsay statements of the foreperson and allegations in the note. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the hearing was insufficient into the holdout’s incapacity and misconduct and, consequently, the trial court’s removal of the holdout constituted an abuse of discretion. Finding that the trial court’s error was prejudicial, in addition to an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and two consecutive life-without-parole prison sentences given to the Defendant.
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Montanans Securing Reprod. Rts. v. Knudsen, 546 P.3d 183 (Mont. 2024)
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Montana | 2024 | Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion |
State:
Montana
Year:
2024
Topics:
Health Care, Reproductive Rights/Abortion
Justice Vote Breakdown
Justices Political Affiliation
Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on abortion there is a ballot initiative over the right to abortion and a dispute arose on the appropriate language to be used on the ballot. Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction arguing the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate whereas the organization’s language was clear and impartial enough that the Attorney General should have approved it for ballot use. The Attorney General argued that there is no statutory mechanism to allow MSRR to challenge the ballot statement. Previously, the Court accepted and granted a declaratory judgment action from MSRR that the Attorney General erred in concluding the organization’s proposed ballot initiative was legally deficient. The Court then ordered the Attorney General to comply with the law and prepare a ballot statement that complies. MSRR did not believe the Attorney General’s proposed language complied with the law and again brought it to the Court for review. The Court concluded it had original jurisdiction and an original proceeding as a declaratory judgment, ordered that the Attorney General’s ballot statement was rejected for failing to comply with the law, and certified the following ballot statement “CI-___ would amend the Montana Constitution to expressly provide a right to make and carry out decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion. It would prohibit the government from denying or burdening the right to abortion before fetal viability. It would also prohibit the government from denying or burdening access to an abortion when a treating healthcare professional determines it is medically indicated to protect the pregnant patient's life or health. CI-___ prevents the government from penalizing patients, healthcare providers, or anyone who assists someone in exercising their right to make and carry out voluntary decisions about their pregnancy.”
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Justice Vote Breakdown
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Summary of Case Context & Holding
In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on abortion there is a ballot initiative over the right to abortion and a dispute arose on the appropriate language to be used on the ballot. Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction arguing the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate whereas the organization’s language was clear and impartial enough that the Attorney General should have approved it for ballot use. The Attorney General argued that there is no statutory mechanism to allow MSRR to challenge the ballot statement. Previously, the Court accepted and granted a declaratory judgment action from MSRR that the Attorney General erred in concluding the organization’s proposed ballot initiative was legally deficient. The Court then ordered the Attorney General to comply with the law and prepare a ballot statement that complies. MSRR did not believe the Attorney General’s proposed language complied with the law and again brought it to the Court for review. The Court concluded it had original jurisdiction and an original proceeding as a declaratory judgment, ordered that the Attorney General’s ballot statement was rejected for failing to comply with the law, and certified the following ballot statement “CI-___ would amend the Montana Constitution to expressly provide a right to make and carry out decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion. It would prohibit the government from denying or burdening the right to abortion before fetal viability. It would also prohibit the government from denying or burdening access to an abortion when a treating healthcare professional determines it is medically indicated to protect the pregnant patient's life or health. CI-___ prevents the government from penalizing patients, healthcare providers, or anyone who assists someone in exercising their right to make and carry out voluntary decisions about their pregnancy.”
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