State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution was the result of an effort to raise minimum wages statewide to combat rising poverty levels. Under the MWA, an employer is subject to a lower minimum wage ($7.25 vs. $8.25) if they provide health benefits to their employees. The MWA also required that any qualifying health benefits had to be made available to an employee and their beneficiaries at a total premium expenditure of no higher than 10 percent of the employee's taxable income received from the employer. The Nevada Office of the Labor Commissioner further adopted regulations providing that employers need only offer the benefits, and that the 10 percent limitation includes a broad range of potential income sources, including tips. Following cases being brought against employers for improperly paying the lower wage, the Supreme Court reviewed the issues brought by the consolidated cases via writ petition, direct appeal, and certified questions. First, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of the MWA, specifically the use of "[o]ffering" within the amendment, suggests that an employer need not actually provide any health benefits to be eligible to pay the lower wage, only make them available to the employee. Second, the Supreme Court held that because tips do not come from the employer, they cannot be used in calculating the 10 percent premium cap.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) to the Nevada Constitution guarantees a base wage to Nevada workers. Under the MWA, if an employer "provides" health benefits, it may pay its employees a lower minimum wage than if no such health benefits are provided. The MWA also provides that an employer must provide health benefits "at a total cost to the employee for premiums of not more than 10 percent of the employee's gross taxable income from the employer." The employees in the consolidated cases argued that employers must do more than offer health benefits to be eligible to pay the lower-tier minimum wage they must actually enroll employees in health benefit plans. The employees further argued that the 10% cap does not include tips in its calculation of taxable income. The Supreme Court held that the language that the MWA "provides" means that an employer need only "offer" a qualifying health plan and the MWA's requirement that health benefit premiums be capped at 10% of the employee's gross taxable income "from the employer" does not allow the employer to include tips in the calculation of taxable income. The Court reasoned that tips should not count toward the taxable income because the MWA expressly prohibits employers from counting tips as part of the minimum wages the employer provides to the employee and tips are not "from the employer" as required by the Nevada Constitution.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff challenged the legal sufficiency of Initiative No. 172 (I-172), which proposed to reclassify cable companies' property tax valuations by amending certain statutes which classify property for purposes of tax assessment. In relevant part, Plaintiffs argued that the I-172 statement fails to provide a true and impartial explanation of the proposed ballot issue because the opening sentence which declares that I-172 "changes the property rates for the video portion of cable television property for companies that provide physically bundled services of cable television, phone and high speed Internet," is not true or impartial, because I-172 would in fact reduce taxes paid by telecommunications companies. Thus, Plaintiffs claimed that voters should at a minimum be informed that by approving this initiative, they would be agreeing that a telecommunications company should pay fewer taxes, and that the voters will be required to pay more. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the language of a ballot measure adequately informed voters that a vote for the initiative would result in a reduction of the taxes to be paid by a telecommunications company as required by Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-312. Further, the fiscal note reflects that the initiative would result in the reduction of state general fund revenue and state special revenue, as well as reductions in incoming revenue from 2015 forward.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingLegislative Referendum 123 (LR-123) was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011 as Senate Bill 426. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. LR-123 provides that if the unaudited ending State general fund balance exceeds 125% of the projected fund balance and this excess balance over 125% is at least $5 million, then a taxpayer could claim the tax credit as to taxes owed for the current year, and could receive a payment from the State if the credit exceeds tax liability and even if the individual had no tax liability. Objectors to the initiative (Plaintiffs) contended that LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to the Legislative Fiscal Analyst (LFA) because the initiative directed the LFA, who is an individual employed by the Legislative Finance Committee (LFC) and serves at its pleasure, to make the calculations required to determine whether the credit-refund threshold is reached. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the grounds that the action was not ripe and therefore not justiciable. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the challenge to LR-123 was justiciable and ripe because the issues were definite and concrete and not hypothetical, they would have had a definite impact on the State treasury and would have required the LFA to predict surpluses and calculations of refunds and payments in August 2013. The Supreme Court next found that (2) the LR-123 was unconstitutional under Articles III and V of the Montana Constitution because the LFA's functions under LR-123 were those of either the Legislature itself, or of an Executive branch official acting under responsibilities properly delegated by the Legislature. Yet such delegation did not occur, and absent proper delegation, the LFA may therefore not "exercise any power properly belonging" to the Executive or Judicial branches of government. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and could not appear on the ballot in November 2012.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs challenged Legislative Referendum LR-126 (LR-126), the purpose of which is to eliminate election-day voter registration and require all electors to register or to change their voter registration information by 5:00 p.m. on the last Friday immediately preceding election day. The Legislature directed that the measure be placed on the ballot at the general election to be held in November 2014, and the measure was submitted to the Attorney General for review and preparation of ballot statements. Plaintiffs challenged the legal sufficiency of the measure on the ground that the title of the bill passed by the Legislature, which will appear on the ballot, is inaccurate and misleading. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the measure's title, which references to National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), is misleading because the NVRA has nothing to do with election-day voter registration, and that such reference suggests that ending same-day voter registration is required by the NVRA and federal law (which Plaintiffs claim is not the case). On review, the Supreme Court noted that Congress passed the NVRA to require states to implement measures to make voter registration easier, and namely to provide a voter registration form with every driver's license application. The Supreme Court found, however, that NVRA does not affect a state's right to decide for itself whether or not to allow election-day voter registration (which was the subject matter of LR-126), such that inclusion of this reference may lead to confusion in the voting booth. Yet the Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General that his legal sufficiency review did not authorize him to withhold a legislative referendum from the ballot "for an alleged substantive constitutional infirmity," and directed the Attorney General to revise the ballot statement rather than declare LR-126 legally deficient and void and to order its removal.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, opponents to Legislative Referendum 127 (LR-127), challenged the legal sufficiency of LR-127, which proposed to eliminate political party primary elections as they traditionally have been held in Montana, replacing them with a system in which all candidates would appear on a single primary ballot. The two candidates who receive the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation. LR-127 was passed by the Montana Legislature in 2013 as Senate Bill 408, and would be put to a public vote at the time of the November 2014 general election. The petition alleged that the Attorney General's approval of the proposed ballot measure for legal sufficiency was incorrect under Montana law, and sought to enjoin the State from placing the measure on the general election ballot. Specifically, Plaintiffs' challenge to LR-127 is that it violates Mont. Code Ann. § 5-4-102 because the title of LR-127 exceeds 100 words, however, the Attorney General argued that the statutory citations of statutes to be amended by the initiative do not count as "words." On review, the Supreme Court noted that the Montana Legislature had not specifically defined "word" for purposes of Mont. Code Ann. § 5-4-102, but concluded that each of the statutory citations in the title of LR-127 is a "word" for purposes Montana law. The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the title of LR-127 was not legally sufficient, as required by law. Although the Supreme Court did not base its ruling on this fact, it also found the title to be "on its face, . . . complicated and confusing." The State of Montana was therefore enjoined from placing LR-127 on the 2014 general election ballot.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision that Plaintiff's inability to find work was not due to his work-related injury, but rather because of economic conditions. After suffering an injury at his construction job, Plaintiff was laid-off by his employer and had difficulty finding work in the construction industry. Defendant-employer argued Plaintiff could not show he we was legally disabled because his inability to find work was due to the economic downturn rather than any physical limitations. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing he was entitled to disability compensation and did not prove his inability to find work was because of his work-related injury.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act (the Act) took effect in January 2014. The purpose of the Act was to protect patients and their physicians and providers from criminal penalties if their patients engage in medical cannabis use. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) adopted Administrative Rules in July 2014 governing enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Act, including the requirement that medical cannabis cultivation centers should not be located within 2,500 feet of an area zoned exclusively for residential use. The Administrative Rules provided that the DOA could award only one cultivation center permit in each of the 22 Illinois State Police districts. Plaintiff Medponics challenged the DOA's decision to award the permit to Curative because Curative's application allegedly contained a flaw: that it was within 2,500 feet of multiple properties zoned as exclusively residential. The DOA disagreed, stating that the location restriction requires a center to be more than 2,500 feet from an area zone exclusively for residential use, and Curative's proposed location satisfied the requirement because no areas in Aurora, where the cultivation center was to be located, were zoned exclusively for residential use. The circuit court found that the districts in question were "zoned exclusively for residential purposes" despite the fact that the districts had granted special use permit exceptions for hospitals, cemeteries, and other establishments. The appellate court reversed, finding that the DOA's position was not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable. The Supreme Court reviewed the relevant provision, defining "area zoned for residential use" as "an area zoned exclusively for residential use" except in municipalities with a population exceeding 2 million, where the definition would be "an area zoned as a residential district or a residential planned development." To avoid rendering this provision superfluous, the Court concluded the DOA would not have included it if it intended the location requirement to be violated any time a proposed cultivation center was within 2,500 feet of an area zoned as a residential district. The Supreme Court found the DOA's interpretation of the location requirement was reasonable and affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPatient brought a negligence action against an orthodontist, alleging that the orthodontist failed to inform him that a dental appliance he was given to treat sleep apnea may dislocate his teeth. The superior court dismissed the action after determining that Plaintiff was required to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM) from an orthodontist rather than an AOM from a board-certified prosthodontist who had specialized in the treatment of sleep apnea for twenty years. Patient appealed. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed. Patient petitioned for certification, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) enhanced credential requirements under the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (Patients First Act) of Section 41 for those submitting AOMs applied only to physicians in medical malpractice actions; in all other actions against a licensed professional, including a dentist, section 27 prescribes the qualifications of the person who may submit an AOM against a licensed professional who is alleged to have acted negligently; (2) a licensed dentist could submit an AOM provided that he had particular expertise in the general area involved in the action; (3) dentist, who devoted significant portion of his practice to the diagnosis and treatment of sleep apnea for over 20 years, had particular expertise necessary to prepare AOM; and (4) trial court failed to hold an effective Ferreira hearing, which requires participants to identify at the conference the general area or specialty involved in the action and whether the defendant was providing professional services within that profession or specialty.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA private nonprofit residential care facility for physically and developmentally disabled persons filed a complaint to recover costs of providing care to an adult resident against resident's parents, who resided in New Jersey, after the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities (NJ-DDD), which had funded the resident's care after he reached age 21, rejected the facility's fees and advised the parents that it would cease paying for the resident's care, under Pennsylvania filial support law (a statute that imposes the duty to financially assist one's indigent spouse, child, or parent), and under theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Following a bench trial, the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, Civil Division, determined that New Jersey's filial law governed, and entered judgment for the parents on all claims. The facility appealed. The superior court affirmed, which the facility appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the superior court and remanded to the court of common pleas, holding that: (1) a true conflict existed between Pennsylvania and New Jersey filial support laws, thus triggering a need for choice of law analysis; (2) Pennsylvania's filial statute, and not the New Jersey statute, controlled the facility's claim against the parents to recover costs of resident's care; and (3) the facility could recover the costs of care provided to the resident from the parents under the theory of quantum meruit.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA grand jury indicted Defendant for first-degree murder and other charges, and Defendant was arraigned the same month. The State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and trial was set. The State later obtained a new indictment of Defendant alleging the same charges as the first indictment but adding other charges. Thereafter, the State dismissed the first indictment and subsequently filed a timely notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Defendant moved to strike the State’s notice of intent, asserting that it was invalid because the State had not timely filed a notice after he was arraigned the first time. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant sought special action relief in the court of appeals and the court of appeals declined jurisdiction. Defendant sought further review, which was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the State dismisses a prosecution and obtains a new indictment, the time limits for filing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty restart, absent bad faith by the State or prejudice to the defendant; and (2) the untimely filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty does not itself invalidate the notice but may result in sanctions, including an order striking the notice.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA police union challenged an interest arbitration panel's decision regarding notification of police officers for court appearances based on the fact that it was not addressed in prior collective bargaining between the city and the union. The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing an arbitration panel to make significant terms and conditions that hadn’t been bargained over part of a collective bargaining agreement would risk re-opening many arbitration awards “under the guise of implementation.” Thus, the Supreme Court held that "an interest arbitration award under the Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111) may embrace only those issues which the submitting party has specifically raised in the notice of arbitration, or which are reasonably considered as subsumed within those issues" and that the manner of notification of police officers regarding court appearances was therefore not in the interest arbitration panel’s authority.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMichael, Hohman, Kluemke, and Dudley, four employees of Precision, which sells seeds, reported Precision to the Department of Agriculture for failing to accurately match the weight of the seed bags to the weight on the labels of the bags. As a result, Precision was ordered to stop production for 10 days while employees worked to ensure bag weights aligned with their labels. After the 10-day production halt, Precision fired twenty-two employees including Michael, Hohman, and Kluemke. Hohman was removed for horseplay with a forklift; Michael was terminated because he spent more time socializing, refused to do certain tasks, and the company needed someone with a more diverse skillset than he possessed; and Kluemke had a poor attitude. Michael, Hohman, and Kluemke filed suit for retaliatory discharge after their firings. Even though their firings occurred after they had reported Precision to the Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court held that Precision was not liable for retaliatory discharge, reasoning that retaliatory discharge claims are a narrow exception to at-will employment, and if an employer has a valid reason for an employee's discharge and the trier of fact believes it, the court will not find for retaliatory discharge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, which included gun ownership advocate organizations and the parents of students in Ann Arbor Public Schools and Clio Area School District, argued that the school districts' policies prohibiting firearms on school property (except for individuals with concealed pistol licenses) violated a Michigan law that prohibits local units of government from enacting ordnances to regulate guns. The Supreme Court held that the policies did not violate the law and school districts can regulate guns because Mich. Comp. Laws §123.1101(b) defines a "local unit of government" as "a city, village, township, or county" and does not expressly include school districts. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Michigan legislature's decision not to include school districts in its definition was intentional and, therefore, the legislature intended to allow school districts to be able to regulate guns. The school districts still have these policies in place.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA school district issued a request for proposal (RFP). The RFP sought quotes from companies that wished to have a contract to do custodial work in the district. Custodial work includes cleaning, such as dusting and mopping, and the general upkeep of a property or facility, such as restocking paper and soap supplies. The people who perform custodial work are called custodians. A union representing the district’s custodian filed a grievance against the district. The arbitrator determined that the district’s issuance of the RFP violated the district’s collective-bargaining agreement with a union, prohibited the use of RFPs in bargaining with the union, ordered the district not to use outside contractors unless or until the parties were at a legal impasse, and declared the formal selection of RFPs to be null and void. The school district moved to vacate the grievance arbitration award, arguing that it violated public policy. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration award did not violate public policy, because a grievance arbitration award only violates public policy if it requires an employer to violate a "well-defined, dominant" public policy "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs, the NAACP, contend that the Act 23 voter ID requirement is invalid because it would severely burden a significant number of qualified voters but is not reasonably necessary or designed to deter fraud or otherwise effect an important government interest. Plaintiffs identify burdens of time, inconvenience and costs associated with Act 23, the photo ID requirement that requires voters to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. Generally stated, these include: Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) issued driver's license; DOT issued photo identification card; United States uniformed service identification card; United States passport; United States naturalization certificate issued within two years preceding the election; federally recognized Wisconsin Native American tribe's identification card; Wisconsin university or college student identification card; and a citation or notice of driver's license suspension. The Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiffs failed to prove that Act 23 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt because the burdens of time and inconvenience associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not undue burdens on the right to vote do not render the law invalid.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA public school teacher Plaintiff claimed that as a result of her protected activities, she suffered the following adverse employment actions: (1) a February 2017 threat from the assistant principal to terminate Plaintiff if she did not alter her students’ grades as instructed; (2) an April 24, 2017 request from the principal that Plaintiff resign; and (3) the termination of Plaintiff’s employment for the upcoming school year, of which she received written notice from the superintendent on May 3, 2017. Exactly one year after receiving written notice of her termination, on May 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a civil action against the school district alleging that she was fired in retaliation for refusing to change her students’ failing grades, for reporting her complaints to human resources and the principal, and for retaining counsel to pursue her claims. The school district argued that that Plaintiff's complaint was barred by a one-year statute of limitations and that the statute began to run on April 24, 2017, when Plaintiff was told that there would not be a spot for her in the following school year. The Supreme Court, however, found that the formal termination of Plaintiff's employment for the upcoming school year reflected in the May 3 letter clearly falls within the definition of an adverse employment action under OCGA § 45-1-4 (a)(5)(“‘Retaliate’ or ‘retaliation’” includes “the discharge . . .by a public employer of a public employee[.]”). And, because Plaintiff undisputedly received notice of the termination on May 3, 2017, her complaint was timely as to this alleged act of retaliation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Walker River Basin reaches from the Sierra Nevada mountain range to Walker Lake. Walker Lake has declined in size over the last 100 years. Since 1902, the use of the Walker River has been litigated and various decrees and procedures have been established to adjust allocations of water rights, including the Walker River Decree established in 1936. Mineral County sought to modify the Walker River Decree citing the impacts on wildlife, resources, and the economy of Mineral County. The district court found that the public trust doctrine could only prospectively prevent granting appropriative rights and any retroactive application of it would constitute a taking. The Ninth Circuit requested certification from the Nevada Supreme Court on the question of whether the public trust doctrine establishing that the state holds navigable waterways in trust for the public permits reallocating water rights previously settled under Nevada's prior appropriation doctrine. The Court concluded the public trust doctrine does not permit the reallocation of water rights already adjudicated and settled under the doctrine of prior appropriation. The Court explained that the impacts on wildlife, resources, and economy of Mineral County did not mean the public trust doctrine could be used to uproot Nevada's entire water system.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minnesota Chamber of Commerce and others brought action against the City of Minneapolis for declaratory relief and temporary injunction against enforcement of a city ordinance that required employers to provide employees with sick and safe leave (i.e., the ordinance requires paid leave for certain qualified reasons to employers who work in the state). The district court granted partial temporary injunctive relief, enjoining the city from enforcing the ordinance against employers located outside of the city boundaries. Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The city amended its ordinance to require leave time accrual only for work performed within the city boundaries and use of leave time only when the employee was scheduled to work within city boundaries. The city and the chamber both moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the chamber's motion in part, enjoining enforcement as applied to any employer residing outside of city boundaries, but denying the motion as to the chamber's claim that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the permanent injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city has the authority to adopt and enforce an ordinance that requires all employers, even when they have no physical presence within the city’s boundaries, to provide paid sick leave to employees working in the city. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that: (i) there was no irreconcilable conflict between the ordinance and state sick-leave statute, and thus the ordinance was not preempted; (ii) state law did not occupy the field of employer-provided sick and safe time and therefore did not preempt local regulation; and (iii) the ordinance did not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine, which "precludes application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state's borders."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) determined that a Minnesota utility's proposed purchase of power from a Wisconsin natural gas generation facility was needed and reasonable because it was a cost-effective resource for meeting the utility's energy needs as it retires older coal-powered resources. The PUC also determined that because the facility was located in another state, it was not subject to Minnesota's permitting and environmental review regulations, and denied a petition for a review of the project under the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The appeals court reversed, concluding that "MEPA requires all state agencies to consider 'to the fullest extent practicable' the environmental consequences flowing from their actions." The Court reversed again, holding that MEPA does not apply to out-of-state projects and no additional environmental assessment was required beyond the factors that had already been considered by the PUC.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMining company that produced silica sand for out-of-state fracking operations challenged a county zoning ordinance prohibiting "local" industrial mining operations in ecologically sensitive areas on the basis that it violated the Commerce Clause and was an unconstitutional taking of property rights. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county, holding that because the production of materials prohibited by the ordinance typically generates pollution and the ordinance applied without regard to state borders, the ordinance was directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that were only incidental. The Court further held that because the mining company's rights under the mineral lease were conditioned on its obtaining a permit to conduct mining, its property rights in the minerals were not sufficiently choate to support a claim that those rights had been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court further noted that no such claim could be brought even if the owner of the land had not partitioned its rights because zoning regulations that do not prohibit all beneficial use of land do not constitute a taking of property under the Minnesota or U.S. Constitution.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingMandamus petitions filed by the Minnesota Voters Alliance, the Republican Party, and various individuals (collectively, the Alliance) were consolidated in a single district court action alleging that certain Minnesota counties and cities had violated the 2020 Minnesota statute governing absentee voting by appointing ineligible individuals to their absentee ballot boards, which are tasked with processing and counting absentee ballots. The district court dismissed the petitions, finding that the Alliance had not proven any of the three elements required for a writ of mandamus: a violation of a duty clearly imposed by law; a public wrong specifically injurious to the Alliance; and a lack of other adequate remedies at law. The appeals court and Minnesota Supreme Court both affirmed the dismissal, limiting their review solely to whether the Alliance had proven a violation of duty. The Court determined that Alliance’s petitions were based on questions of statutory interpretation and subject to de novo review. Under the absentee voting statute, absentee ballot boards must include a sufficient number of election judges and may also include deputy county auditors or deputy city clerks who have received the adequate training in evaluating absentee ballots. The appointment of election judges is governed by a separate statute requiring that each political party must be represented by an equal number of any affiliated election judges appointed to an election board. The Alliance argued that, to guarantee that absentee ballots were subject to balanced partisan review, absentee ballot boards should predominantly be compromised of election judges. Deputy county auditors should only be included as a measure of last resort and deputy county auditors should be subjected to the same appointment restrictions as election judges. The Alliance also argued that only “bona fide” deputy county auditors who had already been appointed and possessed the full powers of a county auditor can be appointed to serve on the absentee ballot board. The Court rejected the Alliance’s arguments, explaining that they would impose additional restrictions on, or negate powers granted to, municipalities, in contravention of the plain statutory language. The Court held that because the Appellees had acted in accordance with the plain language of the statute in appointing the absentee ballot boards, the Alliance failed to prove that the violation of a duty clearly established law had occurred.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minnesota Voters Alliance and certain county election judges (collectively, the Alliance) filed a declaratory judgment action with the court of appeals seeking a determination that parts of a rule promulgated by the Secretary of State concerning the acceptance of absentee ballots conflicted with the absentee voting statute and improperly infringed on the discretion the statute gave ballot board members. The Alliance challenged three aspects of the rule: (1) in the event of a mismatch between the identification number listed on the voter’s application for an absentee ballot and the signature envelope used to return the ballot, any ballot board member can compare the signature on the application and the envelope to determine whether the ballot was returned by the same person to whom it was transmitted; (2) a signature envelope can be rejected for failing to satisfy the statute’s requirement that it be signed by the voter only when the name signed on the envelope is “clearly a different” name than the name printed on the envelope; and (3) a signature envelope cannot be rejected because the voter used a nickname on either the application or the signature envelope. The court of appeals dismissed the Alliance’s claims, concluding that there were no conflicts between the challenged rule and the statute because the statute did not give ballot board members complete discretion to rely on any evidence in determining whether to accept absentee ballots, and because it was possible to comply with both the challenged rule and the statute. Reviewing de novo, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the rule provision permitting any ballot board member (a term that includes election judges, deputy county auditors, and deputy city clerks) to review an absentee voter’s signature in the event of an identification number mismatch conflicted with the plain language of the statute, which exclusively authorized election judges to perform that duty. The Court held that the rule was invalid to the extent of this conflict. The Court affirmed the remainder of the court of appeals’ decision, holding that there was no conflict between the rule and the statute because the statute was silent on what evidence could be used to evaluate whether an absentee ballot satisfied the statutory criteria and the evidence specified by the rule was otherwise consistent with the statute.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Minnesota Voters Alliance (Alliance) filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Minnesota, asserting that the Secretary of State (SoS) was not preventing ineligible voters, such as felons or wards of the state whose voting rights had been revoked, from voting. The Alliance alleged that despite regularly receiving information regarding these ineligible voters, the SoS and other election officials failed to update the statewide voter registration system, which allowed ineligible voters to vote. The Alliance alleged that these “errors” and “wrongful acts” violated the separation of powers doctrine by ignoring court orders and undermined the voting rights of eligible voters. The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the Alliance’s petition. The Court clarified that the Minnesota statute at issue, § 204B.44, is designed to address errors in preparing or printing an official ballot, rather than for general complaints about election administration. Additionally, the Court held that original jurisdiction was not warranted under the facts and circumstances of the specific dispute and that the case should have been brought first in the district court, where any factual disputes can be fully litigated.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of vehicular homicide and claimed that the trial court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of data that law enforcement officers retrieved, without a warrant, from an electronic data recording device on Defendant's vehicle. Before the vehicles were removed from the scene of the collision, an investigator entered the passenger compartments of the vehicles involved in the crash, attached a crash data retrieval (CDR) device to data ports in the cars, and used the CDR to download data from the airbag control modules. The data retrieved indicated that, moments before the collision, Defendant was driving nearly 100 miles per hour. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court had concluded that, whether or not the retrieval of the data was an unlawful search and seizure, the evidence was admissible in any event under the inevitable discovery doctrine, which permits admission of evidence that was obtained through illegal means if it would inevitably have been obtained regardless of the illegality. The court of appeals affirmed, one judge reasoning that the retrieval of data was not a search and seizure at all, and two judges agreeing with the trial court that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied. The Supreme Court held that: (1) retrieval of data from airbag control module was a “search and seizure” that implicated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) warrantless retrieval of data from a module was an unreasonable search and seizure; (3) automobile exception to warrant requirement did not apply; (4) exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement did not apply; (5) statute governing procedure for the filing, consideration, and resolution of motions to suppress does not preclude consideration of exceptions to exclusionary rule, abrogating Gary v. State, 422 S.Ed.2d 426 (Ga. 1992) (Gary held that OCGA § 17-5-30 is the legislature’s unequivocal expression of its desire that evidence seized by means of a warrant that is not supported by probable cause be suppressed); (6) the inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule did not apply; and (7) the good faith exception to exclusionary rule for searches conducted in reliance on binding appellate precedent did not apply. The Supreme Court reasoned that the State failed to identify any recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress, and the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved a challenge to signatures obtained in support of a ballot initiative called the "Invest in Education Act." The challengers claimed that the petition sheets did not contain a description sufficient to comply with A.R.S. 19-102(A). They also claimed that the petition sheets were signed pursuant to a compensation scheme which did not comply with A.R.S. 19-118.01, which prohibits compensation based on number of signatures collected by a circulator. The trial court rejected the 19-118.01 claim but found that the initiative description was insufficient according to 19-102(A) and accordingly enjoined the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the statewide ballot. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on the compensation scheme regarding signatures and reversed on the sufficiency of the description. The Court clarified the standard for sufficiency of description as containing all of the "principal provisions" of the initiative and not using objectively false or misleading information. The Supreme Court found that the proposal's 100-word description sufficiently alerted prospective signatories to the initiative's principal provisions and did not contain any objectively false or misleading information, nor did it conceal a basic thrust of the initiative. The Court also ruled that the payment scheme employed by the petition's circulators did not violate 19-118.01, which prohibits payment of circulators on a per-signature basis. The Court upheld the trial court's decision that the circulator's payment scheme complied with the narrower, correct reading of the statute. The challengers' broad interpretation of payment "based on the number of signatures collected" would create constitutional concerns and, when taken to its logical conclusion, would bar a sponsor from requiring circulators to gather any number of signatures as doing so would constitute payment "based on the number of signatures collected." The hourly payment structure at issue in this case was adjusted in light of a circulator's past productivity and the Court held that it was not "based on the number of signatures collected" as intended by the statute. This issue was later revisited by the Arizona Supreme Court in AZ Petition Partners LLC v. Thompson, 530 P.3d 1144 (Ariz. 2023), which clarified that 19-118.01(A) only prohibits per-signature compensation, which is an amount of payment that can be determined only by counting the number of signatures collected.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff, Brad Molnar, served two terms as a Public Service Commissioner (PSC) representing District #2, in charge of supervising and regulating the operations of public utilities, common carriers, railroads, and other regulated industries in Montana. In 2008, Molnar was serving his first term at the PSC and was also a candidate for reelection to his position. Mary Jo Fox (Fox), a resident of District #2 and campaign manager for Molnar's opponent in the election, filed four complaints against Molnar with the Commissioner of Political Practices (Commissioner), alleging that Molnar had violated the statutory Code of Ethics, Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-101 through § 2-2-304, by accepting gifts of substantial value from two corporations with which the PSC regularly dealt, and by using state resources to aid his reelection campaign and for personal business. A hearing examiner found that Molnar violated Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-104 two times by receiving "gifts of substantial value" from corporate entities, and violated Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-121 five times by using state facilities and equipment for election purposes. The district court affirmed the order, and Molnar appealed. First the Supreme Court ruled that Fox had standing to bring her ethics complaints because the Code of Ethics permits any "person" alleging a violation to file a complaint. Second, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the $1,000 personally received by Molnar from each corporate entity ($2,000 in total) were "substantial gifts" that "would tend to improperly influence a reasonable person in Molnar's position," in violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-104(1)(b)(i). Third, the Supreme Court also agreed with the district court that Molnar improperly used State resources for political purposes in violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-121(3)(a), which prohibits any public officer or public employee from using "public time, facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, or funds to solicit support for ... the election of any person to public office ...." The Supreme Court reasoned that Molnar's fundraising letter bore his PSC-issued email address and phone number, and his campaign website bore his PSC-issued email address, such that Molnar used public facilities to solicit support for his reelection to the PSC. The Supreme Court also found that Molnar had sent campaign emails from a State account (which constitutes a "state facility"). The district Court's ruling was affirmed.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2012, Montana voters passed Legislative Referendum 121 (LR 121) which denied certain state services, including attending a state university, to individuals defined by law to be "illegal aliens," which encompassed individuals who had entered the country unlawfully but were later admitted for permanent residence. The district court granted the Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance's (MIJA's) request for injunctive relief enjoining the relevant portions of the law that denied various state services before the law went into effect. The State appealed. After ruling that MIJA had associational standing and that the claim was ripe, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision enjoining the law. The Court held that LR 121 was preempted by federal law under field and conflict preemption because the definition of "illegal alien" allowed state officials to determine who qualified as individuals unlawfully remaining in the country, which was a field occupied by the federal government and federal law did not recognize a definition for "illegal alien." With respect to conflict preemption, the Court held that LR 121's disqualification of "illegal aliens" from attendance at a state university conflicts with federal law determining eligibility for federal public benefits (i.e., 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)). Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(B) regulates eligibility for federal public benefits, including attendance at a public university, and is controlled by the definition of "qualified alien" provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b). Section 1641(b), in turn, defines "qualified alien" to include various individuals, including the MIJA affiants who may have entered the country unlawfully but now have lawful immigration status. The Court concluded that because LR 121 would have barred these individuals from attending a Montana university due to its expansive definition of "illegal alien," it was in clear conflict with federal law which would allow such individuals to attend a public university.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Initiative No. 181 (I-181) and seeks an order enjoining the Secretary of State from certifying I-181 for the November 2016 general election ballot. I-181 proposes to enact the "Montana Biomedical Research Authority Act," a law to establish the Montana Biomedical Research Authority (Authority) to review proposals and award grants, funded by state general obligation bonds, to non-profit and for-profit entities for the purpose of promoting the development of therapies and cures for brain diseases and injuries and mental illnesses. Plaintiffs claimed the initiative was unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court had authority to entertain a facial constitutional challenge to a proposed initiative during pre-election review under Mont. R. App. P. 14(4) or in an original proceeding for injunctive relief under Mont. Code Ann. § 3-2-205(2). The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Mont. Code Ann. § 3-2-202(3)(a) to review challenges to ballot measures did not extend to determining the constitutionality of an initiative, which could be challenged after approval pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-316(6) rather than in a pre-election review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Constitutional Initiative 116 (CI-116), commonly known as Marsy's Law, in an original petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed the procedure by which CI-116 was submitted to voters conformed to Montana's constitutional requirements. CI-116 amended Article II of Montana's Constitution by adding a new Section 36, titled Rights of Crime Victims, and enumerating 18 rights to which victims are entitled. Plaintiffs claimed that CI-116 violated the Montana Constitution's single-subject requirement and separate-vote requirement. The single-subject requirement provides that bills developed by the Legislature contain only one subject. The separate-vote requirement states that if more than one amendment is submitted at the same election, each shall be so prepared and distinguished that it can be voted upon separately. In reviewing a proposal for compliance with the separate-vote requirement, courts may consider various factors, such as whether various provisions are facially related, whether all the matters addressed by the proposition concern a single section of the constitution, whether the voters or the legislature historically has treated the matters addressed as one subject, and whether the various provisions are qualitatively similar in their effect on either procedural or substantive law. The Supreme Court ruled that CI-116 did not violate the single-subject requirement because it is a constitutional initiative, as opposed to a bill, and the single-subject requirement does not apply to constitutional amendments. However, the Supreme Court found that CI-116 violated the separate-vote requirement because it substantively changed two or more parts of the Constitution that were not closely related. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found CI-116 to be void in its entirety.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn interest group brought an action against the State seeking to enjoin application of the 2011 Montana Medical Marijuana Act (Act), which repealed the 2004 Act, established by voter initiative, and replaced it with a new statutory framework, which, among other things, limited both the eligibility of patients to qualify for legal protections and the activities of medical professionals and providers of marijuana for medical purposes. The Court addressed the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in determining that the Act's provision requiring the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) to notify the Board of Medical Examiners of any physician who certifies 25 or more patients in a year for medical marijuana fails rational basis review; (2) whether the district court erred in determining that the Act's commercial prohibitions (i.e., a three-patient limit for providers of marijuana products and a restriction against remuneration to providers) fails rational basis review; (3) whether the district court erred in applying strict scrutiny review to the Act's provision prohibiting advertising by providers of medical marijuana; (4) whether the district court erred in determining that the Act's provision prohibiting probationers from becoming registered cardholders for medical marijuana use withstands a facial challenge under rational basis scrutiny; and (5) whether the district court erred in determining that the Act's provision allowing warrantless inspections of medical marijuana providers' businesses by the Department and law enforcement agencies comports with the U.S. and Montana Constitutions' guarantees against unreasonable searches. Regarding (1) because the 25-patient review trigger is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of carefully regulating the distribution of medical marijuana while allowing its limited use for people with debilitating medical conditions, the Court held that the district court erred in determining that the 25-patient review trigger failed rational basis review. Regarding (2), the Court, focusing its review on whether the commercial prohibitions were rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in carefully regulating access to an otherwise illegal substance for serious medical conditions, concluded that the absolute prohibition against remuneration is not reasonable when balanced against the purpose of the legislature in enacting the Act, therefore, upholding the district court's permanent injunction against the remuneration restrictions and declaring that those provisions invalid as violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Montana Constitution. With respect to the three-patient limit for providers of marijuana products, the Court found the three-patient limit to be reasonably related to the legitimate governmental concern of affording a means of treatment while avoiding large-scale commercial marijuana production and, as a result, held that the district court erred in concluding that the three-patient limit failed rational basis scrutiny. Regarding (3), the Court held that because federal law governs the analysis of the issue, an activity that is not permitted by federal law—even if permitted by state law—is not a lawful activity, and accordingly, the advertisement of marijuana is not speech that concerns lawful activity. Regarding (4), the Court found that a facial challenge may succeed only if the challenger can establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged legislation would be valid, and in this case, Plaintiffs cannot argue that the ban on probationer use is invalid under any conceivable set of circumstances. With respect to (5), the Court also held that Plaintiffs failed to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged legislation would be valid, therefore, affirming the district court's ruling.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDuring the 2021 Montana legislative session, the Legislature passed House Bill 176, House Bill 530, Senate Bill 169, and House Bill 506, which were signed into law in April 2021, and modified election requirements in the state. The Supreme Court's ruling focused on House Bill 176 (HB 176) and Senate Bill 169 (SB 169). HB 176 eliminated Montana's Election Day Registration (EDR) mechanism, which allowed voters to both register to vote and cast a ballot on election day, and moved the deadline for late registration from election day to noon the day before the election. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-2-304. SB 169 bifurcated voter identification into two forms: a primary form of identification (e.g.., driver's license, passport), and a secondary form of identification (e.g., student ID card); however, secondary forms of identification are no longer sufficient to vote unless coupled with an additional identification document. SB 169 therefore increased identification requirements in Montana, and in particular for student voters. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-114. Plaintiffs, the ACLU of Montana and several Native American Tribes, sought preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the Secretary of State (Secretary) from enforcing these laws, which they argued were unconstitutional and violated their fundamental right to vote and right to equal protection. Applying strict scrutiny, the district court agreed and enjoined the Secretary pending resolution as to whether a permanent injunction should be granted, finding that the new requirements burdened Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Secretary appealed. Recognizing that the constitutional right to vote “is the basic right without which all others are meaningless” and “the pillar of our participatory democracy,” the Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision. The Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs submitted sufficient credible evidence that both bills would cause them an irreparable injury through the loss of a constitutional right to vote. As to HB 176, the Supreme Court ruled that expert testimony showed that EDR allowed voters not activated early in the election period the opportunity to register and vote, such that the district court had properly concluded that the bill would negatively impact Native Americans. As to SB 169, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly concluded that the bill targeted one class of voters—young people—and would disproportionately impact and violate their right to vote. The Supreme Court also held that allegations of the loss of a constitutional right constitutes an irreparable injury subject to the strict scrutiny standard, which the district court properly applied in this case. The Supreme Court, however, did not reach any conclusion on the ultimate merits of these issues, and only indicated that the district court had not abused its discretion in determining that Plaintiffs had established a threshold prima facie case that SB 169 and HB 176 violated their constitutional right to vote.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to vacate the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) 2017 issuance of a state Montana Pollution Discharge Elimination System (MPDES) permit to Montanore Minerals Corp. (MMC). The Supreme Court held that DEQ unlawfully relied upon an expired 1992 Board of Health and Environmental Sciences (BHES) order, which articulated a specific degradation standard applicable to the then contemplated mining project, in issuing the permit. MMC sought to use an adit, which is a horizontal passage to a mine, to conduct mining operations, which was in the final reclamation (or restoration) stages (after a company called Noranda abandoned its mining project and, therefore closed the adit and started reclamation). MMC therefore applied to renew the MPDES permit, which is required under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) where discharge may be emitted in connection with a project, that had been issued to Noranda, so that it could resume mining operations, and in 2017 the DEQ issued the permit. MEIC, Save Our Cabinets, and Earthworks thereafter filed a complaint seeking a judicial declaration that DEQ's 2017 issuance of the MPDES permit to MMC was unlawful and must be vacated. The district court, and then the Montana Supreme Court, however, found that the operational life of the mine referred to in a 1992 BHES order, and to which the degradation standards articulated in that order applied, ended when Noranda abandoned its project to conduct mining operations. The district court and Supreme Court therefore concluded that DEQ could not rely on the degradation standards articulated in that order. Instead, in issuing the permit, the Supreme Court found that it was necessary for DEQ to conduct a full non-degradation review under then current standards, rather than the standards in the BHES order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC) and the Sierra Club brought an action alleging that the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)'s violated the Montana Water Quality Act (MWQA) and the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) when it renewed Western Energy Company’s Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit (Permit), which allowed discharge from its mine to outfalls into tributaries that either directly or indirectly flowed into the Yellowstone Rivers. All the tributaries were classified as C-3 waters, meaning waters that are subject to certain water quality standards set forth in Section 17.30.629 of Montana’s Administrative Rules (ARM), however, in issuing the renewed Permit, Western Energy Company alleged, and the district court agreed, that the DEQ inappropriately exempted certain tributaries from those water quality standards, and related effluent limitations and outfall monitoring requirements, by reclassifying such as E-2 or E-3 waters, meaning ephemeral streams. Reclassification is something only the Board of Environmental Review (the Board), which is appointed by the Governor to provide policy guidance to DEQ, and not DEQ, is permitted to do. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the DEQ appropriately interpreted Section 17.30.637 of ARM, which provides that “ephemeral streams” are not subject to the particular water quality standards set forth in Section 17.30.629 of ARM, as such exempts any waters, regardless of their classification (C-3 or otherwise), which are determined by the DEQ to qualify as ephemeral streams, from the water quality standards set forth in Section 17.30.629 of ARM and, in turn, effluent limitations and outfall monitoring requirements. That said, the Supreme Court found that the DEQ may have acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it applied its interpretation to one tributary and, thus, applied relaxed effluent limitations and outfall monitoring standards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine, based on a factual hearing, whether the DEQ acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's ballot statement for Legislative Referendum 130 (LR-130) and to either alter the statement or order the Attorney General to revise it. LR-130 proposes to amend state statutes to restrict local governments' powers and abilities to regulate firearms. Plaintiffs claim that the statement of purpose is misleading and fails to identify the measure in a manner that will allow a Montana voter to cast an intelligent and informed ballot. Specifically, they claim that the statement is faulty because it does not identify schools in the listing of local government units affected by LR-130, does not explain that "public assembly," "park," and "school" would be stricken from statutes empowering local government restrictions on the carrying of weapons, and does not state that the Referendum's primary purpose is to eliminate local governments' authority to require criminal background checks on private firearm sales. The Attorney General countered by explaining that Plaintiffs' interpretations and arguments raise legal questions outside the plain language of LR-130 that are beyond the scope of the Attorney General's review for legal sufficiency. The Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General and maintained the statement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingTrap Free Montana Public Lands (Trap Free) filed an ethics complaint against the Montana Department of Fish Wildlife and Parks (FWP) with the Office of the Commissioner of Political Practices (Commissioner). Trap Free alleged that FWP allowed the Montana Trappers Association (MTA) to use an FWP-owned trailer and equipment in MTA's efforts to oppose a ballot initiative in violation of state law. Trap Free specifically alleged that MTA's use of FWP property violated Mont. Code Ann. §§ 2-2-101 and 121, which govern the conduct of public officers and employees. The Commissioner agreed that FWP was responsible for ethics violations. On judicial review, the First Judicial District Court reversed, finding that Montana law prohibits only "a public officer or employee" from using public resources for political advocacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no dispute that MTA members used public resources for a political purpose, however, MTA members are not public employees, and there was also no dispute that FWP employees were not present and did not use the trailer to promote the defeat of the ballot initiative.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn employee alleged that he was officially reprimanded and passed up for a promotion after he rejected his supervisor's unwelcome physical contact. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) issued findings that the employee was not sexually harassed but that the employer had retaliated by singling him out during the promotion consideration process. The lower court overturned the HRC's sexual harassment finding but affirmed the retaliation finding. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court held that the HRC had appropriately rejected the Hearing Officer's findings that Plaintiff did not experience sexual harassment, and that the employer's subsequent verbal reprimand constituted retaliation. The Supreme Court further emphasized the rule that under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, the HRC may reasonably reject a Hearing Officer's evidential findings if they are deemed not to be based on substantial evidence. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-704(2).

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff challenged the legal sufficiency of Initiative No. 185 (I-185) under Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-312. I-185 proposed to raise taxes in Montana for tobacco products. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the statement used by the Attorney General to describe the tax increase is deficient because the statement reflects a 33% tax increase on tobacco products, however, such products are already taxed at 50% in Montana such that a 83% tax should instead be reflected. The Attorney General countered that 33% accurately describes the increase from 50% to 83%, and therefore satisfies the statutory requirements and would not confuse voters. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ballot statement satisfied the requirements of Montana law, because the ballot statement used ordinary plain language explaining the general purpose of the proposal, and while it contained a mathematical misstatement, it did not follow that the Court should alter a technical mistake, as the standard of review was not whether a better statement could have been approved, but rather whether the statement complied with Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-312.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingInitiative 166 (I-166) was a ballot initiative that would provide that corporations were not entitled to constitutional rights and were not persons, and that make elected officials prohibit corporate political campaign spending and limit political spending in elections. The Secretary of State (Secretary) received the proposed initiative and submitted it to Legislative Services and then to the Attorney General for review. The Attorney General revised the proponents' statement of purpose but otherwise found that the proposal met the required legal sufficiency review, clearing the path for the proponents of I-166 to start gathering signatures as required under Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-202. Plaintiffs, opponents of the initiative, attacked the validity of I-166, requesting that the court rule that the Attorney General and the Secretary did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to act to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Plaintiffs sued under Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-316(2), which allows opponents of a ballot issue to contest the adequacy of the explanatory statements and of the Attorney General's determination of legal sufficiency. The Supreme Court clarified that the Attorney General's review for legal sufficiency is limited by law to determining whether the petition for a ballot issue complies with the statutory and constitutional requirements "governing submission of the proposed issue to the electors." It does not include consideration "of the substantive legality of the issue if approved by the voters." The petition did not otherwise allege nor did the Supreme Court find that the petition was legally insufficient as to the requirements for submission of a proposed ballot issue under Mont. Code Ann. § 13-27-312. Upon review of the explanatory statements that were approved by the Attorney General, the Supreme Court found that these were "true and impartial," and were in "easily understood language and may not be arguments or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue." Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' petition.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPetitioners, Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights (MSRR) went to the court to seek a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction over proper wording of a ballot statement related to abortion rights. In November 2023, MSRR submitted the text of a proposed constitutional initiative and proposed ballot statements to the Secretary of State. These were then referred to the Attorney General who drafted a fiscal statement but declined to address the ballot statements. The Attorney General claims the ballot fails to comply with the separate vote requirement. The Supreme Court held that the proposed ballot initiative regarding pregnancy and the right to abortion did not violate Montana Constitution's separate-vote requirement because the Attorney General offers no authoritative support for the theory that creating an explicit constitutional right removes protections from other constitutional provisions. The Court did not find that a right to abortion as proposed by MSRR’s ballot initiative would remove the protection provided to the right to abortion from the right to privacy. The Court accepted the petition for original jurisdiction in the form of a declaratory judgment. The Court also ordered the Attorney General to prepare a ballot statement consistent with the applicable statutory requirements and forward those to the Secretary of State within five days.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on abortion there is a ballot initiative over the right to abortion and a dispute arose on the appropriate language to be used on the ballot. Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction arguing the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate whereas the organization’s language was clear and impartial enough that the Attorney General should have approved it for ballot use. The Attorney General argued that there is no statutory mechanism to allow MSRR to challenge the ballot statement. Previously, the Court accepted and granted a declaratory judgment action from MSRR that the Attorney General erred in concluding the organization’s proposed ballot initiative was legally deficient. The Court then ordered the Attorney General to comply with the law and prepare a ballot statement that complies. MSRR did not believe the Attorney General’s proposed language complied with the law and again brought it to the Court for review. The Court concluded it had original jurisdiction and an original proceeding as a declaratory judgment, ordered that the Attorney General’s ballot statement was rejected for failing to comply with the law, and certified the following ballot statement “CI-___ would amend the Montana Constitution to expressly provide a right to make and carry out decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion. It would prohibit the government from denying or burdening the right to abortion before fetal viability. It would also prohibit the government from denying or burdening access to an abortion when a treating healthcare professional determines it is medically indicated to protect the pregnant patient's life or health. CI-___ prevents the government from penalizing patients, healthcare providers, or anyone who assists someone in exercising their right to make and carry out voluntary decisions about their pregnancy.”

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA jury convicted the Defendant of murder and other offenses. In deliberations, however, there was a holdout juror. To defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor argued that the holdout juror should be removed for cause for refusing to engage in adequate deliberations based on the evidence. The foreperson sent a note to the judge from another juror stating, among other things, that the holdout had multiple friends murdered during the past several years and violated her parole once before. The judge asked the foreperson to affirm the allegations in the letter. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. After some deliberation, the holdout juror was eventually removed by the trial court. In Georgia, there must be a sound basis upon which the trial court exercises its discretion to remove a juror, the purpose of which must be to preserve public respect for the integrity of the judicial process. In addition, if there is no certain or obvious basis for a juror’s incapacity, then a hearing or inquiry is the proper exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, since there was no evidence of juror misconduct, the Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of the trial judge’s inquiry into the holdout juror. The trial judge never asked the holdout whether the statements in the note were actually true and if so, whether the juror had lied about or purposefully withheld information. Instead, the judge relied on the hearsay statements of the foreperson and allegations in the note. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the hearing was insufficient into the holdout’s incapacity and misconduct and, consequently, the trial court’s removal of the holdout constituted an abuse of discretion. Finding that the trial court’s error was prejudicial, in addition to an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and two consecutive life-without-parole prison sentences given to the Defendant.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAppellant filed an untimely postconviction petition of his death sentence. In reviewing his petition, the district court held that it was procedurally barred due to this untimeliness. Appellant then appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that the petition was not procedurally barred because (1) the state had withheld impeachment evidence; (2) his attorneys were ineffective throughout the litigation and his prior postconviction petition because they failed to include certain details about his life and background; and (3) he is actually innocent of the death penalty because the aggravating circumstance of "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is unconstitutional. The Court rejected all three arguments and affirmed the district court's ruling that Appellant's postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus was procedurally barred. As to Appellant's first argument, the Court reasoned that the allegedly withheld evidence was not material to Appellant's conviction. As to the second argument, the court reasoned that Appellant's counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to provide evidence on every detail regarding Appellant's substance use and familial issues. The Court noted that evidence might have provided more details about Moore's life, but it would not have altered the picture of Moore that trial counsel presented in any meaningful way. As to Appellant's third innocence argument, the Court noted that the aggravating circumstance that the "murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person" is constitutional under Nevada case law.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff's spouse, a landscaper, was killed on the job. The surviving spouse entered into a workers' compensation settlement agreement with the deceased spouse's employer's insurance provider which included a "workers' compensation exclusion" clause that operated to limit the compensation Plaintiff received to only the compensation she received from the insurance company. In a separate suit, the deceased's estate made a wrongful death claim and obtained a default judgment for $9.525 million that it sought compensation for from the worker's compensation insurer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against the insurer under the employer liability policy?; (2) if so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage ‘‘any obligation imposed by a workers’ compensation . . . law’’ operate to exclude coverage of the estate’s claim for the tort judgment?; and (3) if the estate’s claim is not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers’ compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate’s collection of the tort judgment? The Florida Supreme Court decided as follows: (1) an estate does have standing to bring suit against a liability insurer that may have coverage for the judgment; (2) the provision in the policy does work to bar coverage for any claims arising from bodily injuries for which the deceased's employer was required to pay benefits under the worker's compensation law--in other words, claims covered by worker's compensation insurance; and (3) settlement signed by surviving spouse with worker's compensation insurer included an election of remedies clause that operated to bar the estate from collecting the tort judgment from the worker's compensation insurer.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiffs (more than 500 school districts as well as charter school advocates, individuals, and business associations) brought an action challenging Texas's school finance system as violating the Texas Constitution's requirement that the state (1) provide a free public education that is adequate, suitable, and efficient; and (2) not levy an ad valorem tax (i.e., a tax based on assessed property value). The trial court determined that the Texas public school funding system (including for charter schools) was not adequately funded to achieve educational best practices such as meeting core class size goals and programs for struggling students, and was constitutionally inadequate and unsuitable for English language learner (ELL) students (17% of public school students) and economically disadvantaged students (60%). The trial court rejected arguments that the system's alleged structural inefficiencies (including capping the number of charter schools and failing to determine the cost of educating a child) did not make the system "qualitatively inefficient" in violation of the Texas Constitution's requirement to provide a system "effective or productive of results and connot[ing] the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste." The trial court also rejected the argument that the system's provision of at least $1,000 less per weighted student for charter schools, as opposed to public schools, was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that differences in the way similarly situated charter schools and other schools are funded was not arbitrary because charter schools have different funding needs. The trial court also held that the system imposed an unconstitutional ad valorem tax. The state directly appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding in favor of the existing funding system. The Supreme Court held that the school funding system was efficient for the same reasons as the trial court, and also held that the system was adequate and suitable, despite the failure to meet certain educational best practices, because it focused on students as a whole rather than certain demographics, such as ELL students, who struggled more. Specifically, the Court held that the constitutional requirement that the state ensure a "general diffusion of knowledge" did not require adequacy in class size, tutoring, nurses, security guards, and interventions for special needs students. The Court also held that performance disparities for ELL students and economically disadvantaged students did not violate the general diffusion requirement because the requirement considered all students as a whole, and Texas students' overall achievement level based on test scores satisfied the requirement. While the Court stated that Texas's schoolchildren deserved "transformational, top-to-bottom reforms that amount to more than Band-Aid on top of Band-Aid" it nonetheless found that the funding system satisfied minimum constitutional requirements and "decline[d] to usurp legislative authority by issuing reform diktats from on high, supplanting lawmakers' policy wisdom with our own."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2019, the Nevada legislature passed a bill, by less than super majority, Assembly Bill (A.B.) 458, that eliminated future increases in the amount of tax credits available to businesses that donate to certain scholarship organizations without obtaining the two-thirds majority in votes required under the supermajority provision of the Nevada Constitution. Appellants, parents of scholarship recipients and businesses who benefited from the tax credit, challenged the legislation as unconstitutional. The District Court ruled in favor of the legislation's constitutionality and the Appellants thereafter appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered (1) whether Appellants have standing to challenge the legislation and, if so, (2) whether the bill increases public revenue. The Supreme Court held that Appellants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of A.B. 458 because the Appellants demonstrated sufficient evidence to apply the "public importance exception." Pursuant to the "public importance exception," a court may grant standing to a Nevada citizen to raise constitutional challenges to legislation if they demonstrate that the case (1) involves an issue of significant public importance; (2) involves a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position, other than the plaintiff, who will likely bring an action and the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his/her position in court. Here, the court found that (1) the case involves an issue of public importance because it involves the financial concern of a significant number of businesses, organizations, and individuals; (2) the bill challenges the legislature's appropriateness on the basis that is did not meet the requirements under the Nevada Constitution; and (3) there is no one else in a better position to challenge A.B. 458 than Appellants because, as parents of scholarship recipients, a registered scholarship organization, and businesses that have donated and wish to continue to donate to the scholarship organizations in exchange for tax credits, they benefit from the tax credits and are interested in maintaining those benefits. Although the Appellants had standing under the public importance exception, the Supreme Court held that A.B. 458 was not subject to the supermajority provision under the Nevada Constitution. The Court found that because A.B. 458 does not create, generate, or increase public revenue but rather redirects taxes owed to the State General Fund, the supermajority provision does not apply, and A.B. 458 (passed by less than a super majority) is constitutional.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingBy statute, Arizona courts use "innominate" juries, a system in which only the court and parties know the identities of jurors, but courts have discretion to provide access to juror names. A journalist intervened in two criminal cases, seeking access to the names of prospective and impaneled jurors, claiming that the First Amendment creates a presumption in favor of public access. When access was denied, the journalist appealed. Applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Arizona Supreme Court asked (1) “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public”; and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” The Court concluded that although historically juror names were available to the public, access to juror's names did not play a significantly positive role in the functioning of voir dire. The public already has access via attendance at voir dire proceedings, and revealing juror's names would be more likely to cause jurors to withhold information out of fear of embarrassment rather than facilitate truthfulness. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the First Amendment does not provide a qualified right of public access to juror names.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA Medicare beneficiary sued the providers (HPN, the Defendants) of his Medicare Advantage health insurance plan on a theory of negligence. After receiving treatment from a care provider that contracted with HPN, Morrison became infected by hepatitis C directly as a result of his treatment. Morrison sued HPN on a theory of common law negligence, claiming that HPN breached its duty to use reasonable care in investigating and selecting the health care providers it contracts with. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claim was preempted by the federal Medicare Act. Morrison appealed, arguing that the Medicare Act does not preempt state common law negligence claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state common law negligence claims based on the retention and investigation of health care providers under Medicare plans are expressly preempted by the Medicare Act. Justice Cherry wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gibbons, noting that HPN operates as a Nevada-licensed HMO (with both Medicare Advantage and non-Medicare Advantage clients), and that it would be wrong to deny access to these claims to the Plaintiff for mere reason of him being a Medicare recipient. Further, the dissent's reading of the Medicare Act would not expressly preempt negligent claims regarding the selection of a provider.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThis case involved an attempted recall of Mayor Thomas Morrissey of Payson, Arizona. The Arizona Constitution established the required number of signatures for a recall election based on a percentage of the number of voters in the most recent election at which the candidate was voted into that office. Since 2002, all Payson municipal elections had been decided by primary election, so the town clerk determined that the number of required signatures for the recall was based on voting numbers from the 2002 election. This was done in accordance with Arizona legislation that allowed for a mayor to be selected by a Majority of votes in a primary election, or in a runoff general election if no candidate received the Majority of votes in the primary. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the town clerk should have based the required signature number on the 2018 primary election in which Morrissey was voted into office because the votes cast in the primary election effectively elected the mayor and acted as the general election.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe issue before the Supreme Court is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1's six-year statute of limitations applies to the contribution claims authorized under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act). Plaintiff, the owner of a shopping center, brought an action under the Spill Act against heating oil companies and former owners of dry cleaning business at the shopping center for costs of remediating contamination allegedly caused by leaks of heating oil located under the dry cleaning business. In focusing on the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitation does not apply. It reasoned that while the Spill Act is silent as to the applicability of a statute of limitations to contribution claims, language of the statute expressly restricting the defenses available under the Spill Act provides significant support for a conclusion that no statute of limitations applies. In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that the construction they adopted is also supported by the "longstanding view . . . that the Spill Act is remedial legislation designed to cast a wide net over those responsible for hazardous substances and their discharge on the land and waters of this state." Notably, six groups of organizations and individuals were granted leave to appear as amici in this case and all but one argued that the six-year statute of limitation does not apply to Spill Act claims.