State Supreme Court Data Tracker

Summary of Case Context & HoldingFollowing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022) which overturned Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and reverted abortion related laws to the individual states, Arizona had multiple laws related to abortion that were suddenly in conflict. At issue were two state statutes addressing abortion rights. The more recent law, enacted in 2022, three months before Dobbs, banned abortion after 15 weeks. The older law was an 1864 pre-statehood near total abortion ban that was never formally repealed. The federal decision in Roe had made the 1864 law a non-issue that the state never repealed. However, once Roe was overturned at the federal level by the Supreme Court, it was unclear if the 1864 law was still good law or how the 1864 law would interact with the 2022 law. Initially, the state supreme court held that the statute restricting elective abortion to 15 weeks (the 2022 law) did not repeal the 1864 ban on elective abortion. On April 9, 2024, the state supreme court ruled that the 1864 law could be enforced and would take effect 14 days later. The Supreme Court held that the 2022 law did not create a right to an abortion because the 1864 law was still good law. This result meant that abortion in Arizona was illegal except when “necessary to save” the life of the pregnant individual, but without exception for rape or incest and a sentence of 2-5 years in prison for assisting in an illegal abortion. The state Attorney General (AG) filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the state Supreme Court. The AG also filed a motion requesting that the Court wait to issue its mandate on when the total ban would go into effect for 90 days. The delay would allow the state AG time to potentially file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. On April 24, the state house voted to repeal the 1864 law followed by the Senate on May 1. The governor signed the bill into law on May 2 repealing the 1864 ban. Subsequently, in May, Planned Parenthood filed a motion (joined by the state AG) requesting that the state court wait to issue its mandate enforcing the abortion ban until the repeal of the 1864 law went into effect. The repeal of the 1864 law was slated to happen 90 days after the legislative session ended. On May 13th, Arizona’s Supreme Court granted the motion to delay enforcement of the 1864 abortion ban. The delay of enforcement of the 1864 abortion ban was to last until September 26, 2024 while the repeal of the same 1864 abortion ban by the governor took effect on September 14, 2024. Subsequently, on November 5, 2024, Election Day, Arizonians passed 2024 Arizona Proposition 139 which enacted a right to abortion into the Constitution of Arizona up until fetal viability.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Plaintiff, a former University of Montana employee, alleged that his employer unlawfully disclosed confidential information from his personnel file and refused to renew his employment contract. The employer claimed that the employee was terminated because of prohibited use of employer resources. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's private personnel records—and any associated privacy claims arising from their improper release—stem only from the employment relationship, and are thus governed by the employment contract under contract law rather than the right to privacy guaranteed under the Montana Constitution, or the duty of ordinary care required under Montana law. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10; Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-701. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the privacy and negligence claims, but reversed its holding that the statute of limitations for the employee's defamation and tort claims had run, and remanded for consideration of those issues.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingEmployees brought a class action against an employer, Jones Dairy Farm, for unpaid wages accrued during time spent "donning and doffing" (defined as time spent putting on and taking off any required clothing). Jones Dairy Farm argued that this time was not compensable because the collective bargaining agreement did not provide for compensation for this time. The Supreme Court held that the "donning and doffing" time was integral to the job and, therefore, under Wis. Admin. Code DWD § 272.12(2)(e), could not be modified or eliminated through collective bargaining.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPlaintiff suffered work-related injuries after falling over a ladder at work. Defendant-employer then filed Forms 60 (Employer's Admission of Employee's Right to Compensation) and 61 (the official form used by insurance companies to deny workers' compensation claims) with the Industrial Commission (an agency of the state of North Carolina that administers among other things the state's Workers’ Compensation Act), describing some of the Plaintiff's injuries as compensable and denying the compensability of others, arguing the Plaintiff's current disability was unrelated to the original injury at work. The Commission found that because the employer had admitted compensability for some injuries, it created a rebuttable presumption that Plaintiff's other injuries were causally related to the original accident and injury. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's decision and award of ongoing disability benefits. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings before the Industrial Commission, finding the presumption may not apply to Plaintiff's claim and it was unclear if the Industrial Commission found Plaintiff's further injuries causally related to the original accident independent of the application of the presumption.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe legislature amended the Constitution to limit the authority of the district and county to budget for desegregation compliance expenses for school districts. The Court held that the State did not need to pay the school district's desegregation expenses because the legislature's amendment removed the district and county's authority to budget for desegregation expenses using primary property taxes, which were being used for reimbursement, and instead created a new classification of secondary property tax (ad valorem taxes) for budgetary purposes. Desegregation expenses were not included because only primary property taxes were used for reimbursement purposes, rather than the ad valorem taxes that did not encompass desegregation expenses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals that the State did not need to pay the school district's desegregation expenses.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn December 2013, two Houston taxpayers filed a lawsuit in state court against the City of Houston (City) and then-Mayor Annise Parker challenging the City's provision of benefits to same-sex spouses of City employees who were legally married in another jurisdiction. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (declaring that federal denial of same-sex marriages, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), the City amended its charter and the State amended the Texas Family Code and Texas Constitution to preserve the traditional view of marriage. Plaintiffs argued that authorizing expenditures for same-sex spousal benefits violated Texas' and the City's own DOMAs, because Windsor only addressed the federal DOMA. Plaintiffs sought unspecified actual damages and both temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the City from providing benefits to same-sex employees married outside of Texas. The Mayor and City filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. The trial court denied the pleas and granted the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction, and the Mayor filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court challenging denial of the pleas and the grant of the temporary injunction. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) held that state DOMAs violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and concluded that states cannot exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage or refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the grounds of its same-sex character. Following this ruling, the Mayor filed a brief in the court of appeals, arguing that Obergefell required reversal of the injunction. However, Plaintiffs argued that Obergefell's holding did not require that States pay taxpayer-funded benefits for same-sex relationships. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's temporary injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with Obergefell and De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015), which held certain provisions of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family Code denying same-sex couples the right to marry unconstitutional and enjoined the State from enforcing them. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' petition for review, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, vacated the trial court's temporary injunction and remanded to the trial court. First, the Supreme Court held that De Leon does not bind the trial court in this case, and the court of appeals should not have instructed the trial court to conduct proceedings "consistent with" this federal case, though the trial court could still consider this persuasive case in resolving Plaintiffs' claims. Second, it held that the court of appeals' reversal of the temporary injunction did not preclude Plaintiffs from seeking the same or similar relief on remand. Even though Texas appellate courts hold that dissolution of a temporary injunction bars a second application for such relief, exceptions apply where the second request is based on changed circumstances not known by the applicant during the first application. The Supreme Court reasoned that Obergefell constituted such a "changed circumstance" that Plaintiffs were not precluded from seeking similar or the same relief on remand. Third, the Supreme Court did not express any opinion as to whether Plaintiffs had standing to seek a claw-back injunction for the tax dollars the City already expended on benefits for same-sex spouses, because Plaintiffs never requested an injunction and the trial court never granted one. However, it held that Plaintiffs could seek such an injunction or any other relief on remand. Fourth, the Supreme Court declined to adopt Plaintiffs' instruction that the trial court construe Obergefell narrowly on remand. The Supreme Court reasoned that Obergefell did not hold states must provide publicly funded benefits to married persons, but declined to instruct the trial court how to construe Obergefell on remand because neither party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their positions yet, since the Supreme Court was dealing with an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's orders granting a temporary injunction.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2007, Public Act 94-1111 was enacted into law, adding a new provision to the code which governed the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). The provision allowed an officer or employee of a statewide teachers' union to establish service credit in the TRS for his or her union work prior to becoming certified as a teacher. The individual had to meet a few requirements in order to obtain this benefit. Plaintiff worked as a lobbyist for the Illinois Federation of Teachers from 1997 until his retirement in 2012. In 2006, Plaintiff obtained a substitute teaching certificate and worked for one day as a substitute teacher, qualifying him for the union benefits. Thereafter, Plaintiff contributed significant amounts to the union service. In 2011, the Chicago Tribune published an article which identified the Plaintiff by name and discussed the 2007 law which had allowed him to receive TRS benefits. In 2012, the 2007 TRS amendment was repealed, resulting in the TRS eliminating the service credits Plaintiff had received for his union service and issuing a refund of his contributions. Plaintiff sued the TRS, arguing that the repeal of the 2007 amendment violated the Illinois Constitution's Pension Protection Clause, claiming that the legislation was intentionally enacted with a date cutoff that would affect him. The trial court ruled in favor of the Defendants, determining both that the Plaintiff lacked standing to sue regarding the repeal of the 2007 amendment and that the provision in the original 2007 amendment that limited benefits based on a certain eligibility-cutoff date was special legislation; therefore, its 2012 repeal was valid. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court first held that the 2007 amendment was not special legislation merely because it included an eligibility cutoff date, and that there are numerous rational reasons why a legislature may choose to use such a cutoff date. Further, because the 2007 amendment was not special legislation, its repeal was not necessarily valid. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had put forward no legal justification for the reduction or elimination of pension benefits that the Plaintiff was awarded pursuant to the 2007 amendment. As a result, the 2012 repeal implicated the Illinois Constitution's Pension Protection Clause, which specifies that once a person becomes a member of a public retirement system or pension, subsequent changes that would diminish those benefits can not be applied to that person. Justice Theis wrote a dissent noting that the conditions the 2007 amendment were implemented under suggested that it was constructed and timed in such a way to allow for certain teacher organization employees to pass the deadline. As a result, in Theis's view, this was special legislation and its repeal should have been considered valid.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingHarry Franklin Phillips murdered Bjorn Thomas Svenson in 1982, and his conviction and death sentence for that crime became final in 1998. A postconviction court in 2006 fully adjudicated and denied Phillips's claim that he is intellectually disabled and, under the rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Phillips's intellectual disability claim in 2008. Phillips sought yet another determination of his intellectual disability, relying in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), where the Florida Supreme Court held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), is retroactive to cases where there has already been a finding that the defendant is not intellectually disabled. Contrary to its prior decision in Walls, the Supreme Court held that Hall does not apply retroactively and affirmed the circuit court's order denying Phillips's successive motion for postconviction relief. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court determined that it had clearly erred in its prior analysis of whether Hall warranted retroactive application in accordance with the standards set out in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). The Court focused on the "fundamental significance" prong of the Witt analysis regarding whether a change in the law applies retroactively and determined that Hall does not place beyond the authority of the State the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. Instead, Hall merely more precisely defined the procedure that is to be followed in certain cases to determine whether a person facing the death penalty is intellectually disabled. Hall’s limited procedural rule did nothing more than provide certain defendants—those with IQ scores within the test's margin of error—with the opportunity to present additional evidence of intellectual disability. Thus, Hall does not constitute "a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence."

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAn insurance company sought reimbursement from a resident for a landlord's claim for property damage sustained in a fire that originated in a tenant-owned clothes dryer. The tenant failed to remit payment, and the insurance company sued the tenant for negligence and breach of contract for noncompliance with the reimbursement provision in her lease. A jury failed to find the tenant negligent in causing the fire, but held that the tenant was contractually liable for the loss under the terms of her lease. The trial court subsequently granted the tenant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict rendering a take nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed determining that the lease provision was void and unenforceable. On appeal, the Court considered whether public policy embodied in the Texas Property Code precluded enforcement of a residential-lease provision imposing liability on a tenant for property losses resulting from “any other cause not due to [the landlord's] negligence or fault.” The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part holding: (1) there were circumstances where the disputed lease provision could be enforced without contravening the Property Code and was therefore not per se void as against public policy; and (2) the record did not conclusively establish the factual predicate necessary to preclude its enforcement as the jury merely failed to find that the tenant's negligence caused the fire, but did not make affirmative findings on causation or a positive finding that the tenant was not at fault and did not cause the damage. The Court remanded for consideration of the tenant's remaining defenses to enforcement.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA school reform commission (SRC) for a financially distressed district sought to cancel a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the district and a teacher’s union. The statute authorizing the SRC forbid the cancellation of “teachers’ contracts.” The Supreme Court held that CBAs are “teachers’ contracts” and therefore excepted from the SRC’s cancellation powers.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn this case, the Florida Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of Florida's new death penalty law following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). In Hurst, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that part of Florida's sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, so the Florida legislature enacted a new law requiring that in death penalty cases, a unanimous jury, not the judge, must find all aggravating factors, and at least 10 jurors must recommend the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court determined that this law was also unconstitutional because it did not require a unanimous jury to recommend a death sentence as mandated in Hurst, and as required under Florida's constitution. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that while the death penalty was still valid in Florida, the law requiring only 10 jurors to recommend the death sentence was unconstitutional, and thus invalid. Later in 2020, this decision was partly abrogated by Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 2020), where the Supreme Court held that the weight and sufficiency of aggravating factors outweighing mitigation circumstances in death penalty cases is not an element that need to be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA local Native American church placed religious significance on a 20-by-30-foot site along the San Antonio River. Church members hold religious ceremonies at this location throughout the year, with particular reverence for the surrounding cypress trees and the cormorant birds that nest nearby. Historical evidence indicates that similar spiritual practices have taken place in this area for thousands of years. The sacred area has been located within a municipal park overseen by the City of San Antonio for more than 125 years. Following certain issues with the park, including bird excrement and fallen trees, San Antonio voters approved a bond package for park improvements. The City used the funds to propose an improvement plan that included removing the existing trees and deterring birds from nesting nearby. While the plan was still under consideration, the City temporarily blocked access to the area after a large tree branch fell nearby. A member of the church sued the City, and a federal district court granted immediate relief, requiring the City to remove the tree branch and reopen the sacred area. The Plaintiff further asserted that the City’s improvement plan would destroy the sacred area by eliminating trees and deterring cormorants from nesting, both of which were necessary components of the church’s religious services. In addition to federal and certain state claims, the Plaintiff also argued that the proposed plan violated his rights under the recently implemented Article I § 6-a of the Texas Constitution, which forbids the government from enacting any rule that prohibits or limits religious services. After the district court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Following Plaintiff’s request for rehearing, the Circuit certified the following question to the Texas Supreme Court: whether Article I § 6-a imposed a categorical bar on any limitation of religious services. After reviewing the history of the amendment and similar provisions, the Court held that both the text of the clause and the legislative history of the 2021 amendment suggested that the clause was intended to create a categorical bar, when applicable. The Court then went beyond the certified question to consider whether Article I § 6-a was intended to be so broad as to prevent government actions taken to maintain and preserve public property. The Court answered the expanded question by concluding that the scope of the clause was not unlimited and that certain guardrails must exist. Upon further review of the legislative history and the amendment’s language, the Court determined that the clause was not intended to apply to all government actions broadly, but only to those specifically aimed at affecting religious services. As a result, the preservation and maintenance of public lands did not fall within the scope of Article I § 6-a, and the clause did not apply to the City’s proposed park improvement plan.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm following a jury trial where he represented himself. Prior to trial, Defendant informed the court of his desire to proceed pro se, and represented that he had completed two years of college and had experience with the criminal justice system. The trial court allowed the Defendant to proceed pro se, but incorrectly admonished him that he was eligible for a maximum sentence of 60 years rather than 75 years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court had failed to properly admonish him under Rule 401(a) (Illinois’ rule governing the waiver of counsel) by informing him that he was eligible for a 60-year extended-term sentence rather than the correct 75-year maximum sentence. The Supreme Court held that (1) the trial court had substantially complied with Rule 401(a) despite misstating the sentencing range, as it was correct in all other respects and provided Defendant with a copy of the charging instrument; (2) the Defendant’s waiver of counsel was made freely, knowingly, and intelligently, in part because the record showed he had previously represented himself on appeal in a felony and reiterated his desire to proceed pro se for a speedy trial multiple times; and (3) that there was no basis to conclude the Defendant was prejudiced by the incorrect admonishment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was convicted of first degree murder and attempted armed robbery as a juvenile, sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1) challenging his sentence for murder after his initial pro se postconviction petition was summarily dismissed. Defendant alleged that his de facto life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing court had not first made a finding of permanent incorrigibility or specifically addressed the attendant characteristics of youth discussed in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The Supreme Court explained that both statutory and case law in Illinois contemplate the filing of only one postconviction petition, unless fundamental fairness requires otherwise under the “cause and prejudice” or “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exceptions. The Supreme Court further noted that Defendant had been sentenced under a sentencing scheme that granted the sentencing court the discretion to consider Defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances and to impose less than a de facto life sentence, and that the sentencing court had reviewed an “extensive” presentence investigation report. First, the Supreme Court held that Defendant’s discretionary life sentence comported with the Eighth Amendment without the sentencing court first making a finding of permanent incorrigibility, overruling People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849 (Ill. 2017). Noting that it had to follow frameworks adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that Holman did not accurately reflect Eighth Amendment law following Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021), in which the U.S. Supreme Court found that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility was not required to impose a discretionary life sentence without the possibility of parole on a minor. Second, the Supreme Court held that Defendant’s failure in his initial postconviction petition to raise the Eighth Amendment challenge to the sentence did not prejudice him, as Defendant received the constitutionally required procedure under Miller when the sentencing court reviewed the entire 200-page presentence investigation report, thus barring a successive petition raising an Eighth Amendment claim.

Summary of Case Context & Holding16-year old Defendant was charged with second degree murder for shooting a teenaged bystander during an argument, and spent six years in prison before pleading guilty. During this time, the prosecution sought cooperation against the Defendant by his Co-Defendant through various means, then faced administrative delays in beginning the trial. The Court of Appeals held that, despite the absence of bad faith for these delays on behalf of the government, the Defendant's imprisonment for such a long time violated his right to a speedy trial, and dismissed his indictment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn 2014, Defendant, was charged with committing various crimes against a 10-year-old child and pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. Defendant was initially placed on interim probation. Due to Defendant's subsequent arrest on other charges stemming from conduct occurring after his plea, Defendant's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division had authority to reverse a county court order that designated Defendant a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act, based on a risk factor point assessment. In the absence of an erroneous ruling or any applicable statutory or other jurisdictional limitation on the Appellate Division’s authority, the Court of Appeals declined to restrain the Appellate Division from remitting the county order.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant pled guilty to first degree murder after officers allegedly coerced a confession from him through the use of physical abuse and false information. After an article was published investigating police coercion of witnesses in Chicago, the State moved to vacate Defendant's conviction and grant him a new trial. Defendant then filed a verified petition for a certificate of innocence. The trial court denied his petition. The appellate court affirmed, stating that a defendant who pleads guilty is one who "cause[d] or [brought] about his or her conviction" and is therefore barred from obtaining a certificate of innocence under the statute. The Supreme Court reversed and found that the statute did not preclude a defendant from obtaining a certificate just because he had pled guilty. The Court held that the appellate court erred in interpreting the statute to categorically bar certificates for those who have pled guilty because there was no language in the statute that called for that interpretation. Further, as relevant here, the statute required Defendant show he did not voluntarily cause or bring about the conviction. Defendant made that showing by presenting unrebutted evidence of police coercion and physical abuse, but the trial court improperly looked into the underlying record and made its own credibility determinations. There was considerable evidence that his confession was involuntary, therefore, he was entitled to a certificate of innocence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter Defendant struck and killed a pedestrian, her family contacted a lawyer who instructed law enforcement not to question or test his client. Defendant consented to a breathalyzer test at the same time, without being informed of the attorney's communication. Based on prior case law, the Court of Appeals reaffirms that suspected drunk drivers have time-limited rights to seek legal assistance before chemical testing, and this right cannot be waived prior to the police making the accused aware that a lawyer has made contact on the accused's behalf, regardless of whether the accused requested this lawyer.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a caregiver to a physically disabled ten-year old girl, pled guilty to a charge of reckless endangerment arising out a severe skin injury requiring skin grafts that the girl received while in the Defendant's care. Following a civil jury unanimously concluding that the Defendant was not at fault, as well as further evidence coming to light indicating the same, the Defendant moved to vacate the judgement on a claim of "actual innocence." Focusing on matters of law rather than matters of fact, the court of appeals refused to allow her to vacate her guilty plea, finding that the relevant statute does not entitle a defendant who has entered in a guilty plea to move to vacate a conviction, regardless of actual innocence, unless the claim is based on DNA evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court addressed what experts may testify to in cases where child sexual abuse is alleged. The Supreme Court extended three of their prior precedents to hold that experts may not testify to the complaint's veracity because it improperly interferes with the role of the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court held an expert may not testify that children overwhelmingly do not lie when reporting sexual abuse. Further, the Supreme Court held that experts may not testify that a child has been assaulted or abused without physical evidence corroborating the child's account. In both cases here, the Supreme Court remanded for new trials excluding this type of testimony from experts.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder of his infant son based on both the video tape of a 9.5 hour investigation during which police falsely represented that his wife had accused him of the murder, that she would be the target of the investigation if he did not take responsibility, and that his confession would help to save his son's life, who had already died in the hospital. Defendant moved to suppress this interrogation and was denied. The Court of Appeals overturned this denial, reversed the conviction, and directed a new trial, finding that the Defendant's statements were not demonstrably voluntary, as any parent would confess to a crime if they believed it would save their child's life.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingSeventeen-year-old Defendant Storm Lang was charged with four felony counts of sexual abuse, and two misdemeanor counts of sexual abuse stemming from his sexual assault of three children ages 5, 7 and 12 years old. During the sentencing proceeding, the court of appeals decided the Youthful Offender adjudication was inappropriate and reminded Lang that he had waived his right to appeal when he had accepted his plea bargain. Lang challenged both the waiver and the denial of Youthful Offender status arguing that both were invalid and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals decided that Lang was entitled to relief because the trial court mischaracterized the appellate rights waived as encompassing not only an absolute bar to the taking of a direct appeal but also all post-conviction relief separate from the direct appeal and thus, it could not be said that their appeal waivers were knowingly and voluntarily made. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the remainder of the waiver was valid and enforceable, foreclosing review of the Youthful Offender determination.

Summary of Case Context & Holding17-year old Defendant pled guilty to a designated class E felony sex offense, was designated a Youthful Offender, and sentenced to 10 years' probation. Class E felonies are subject to the same sentences for Youthful Offenders as others convicted of such felonies. At the time of enactment of the relevant Youthful Offenders statute, all class E felonies were subject to only 5 years probation. The statute was later updated so that designated class E felonies were subject to 10 years probation. The Defendant argued that, since the legislature did not specifically update the Youthful Offenders statute to also reflect a maximum 10 years' probation for designated class E felonies, the legislature intended for the Youthful Offenders maximum for such felonies to remain 5 years' probation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that since this claim is unproven, they must rely only on text of the Youthful Offenders statute, which refers back to the amended statute, by which 10 years' probation is allowable.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court found that both the 8th amendment (“cruel and unusual punishment”) and the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual punishment” create a presumption that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a disproportionate sentence for those who commit relevant crimes as a juvenile. Due to this determination, the Court imposed a burden on the prosecution to overcome this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Here, the juvenile defendant convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor, had their case remanded for resentencing under this new framework.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with open murder and mutilation of a dead body. After his arrest, he was taken to jail and read his Miranda rights. The Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, the Defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.” The jail administrator contacted the police and prosecutor. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of Defendant’s request for an attorney, and the court sent an attorney to the jail. After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the jail administrator took the police officers to speak with Defendant and asked the attorney to wait in the jail lobby while the officers determined Defendant’s intentions. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail. He made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. The trial court suppressed the incriminating statements made by the Defendant. The Supreme Court held that “[o]nce it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression of incriminating statements made by Defendant during custodial interrogation and remanded to the trial court.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a noncitizen, faced several charges after attacking the mother of his children. The defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment entitled him to a jury trial given that these offenses carried the risk of deportation. The lower appeals court denied this motion and he was convicted for said deportable offenses. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, in the first case of its kind under its jurisdiction, finding that the Sixth Amendment does indeed entitle a defendant to the right to a jury trial if indicted under deportable offenses.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), a defendant in Michigan appealed his plea deal stemming from murders committed when he was a juvenile. The Court found that the textual differences between the 8th amendment (“cruel and unusual punishment”) and the Michigan Constitution’s ban on (“cruel or unusual punishment”) meant that Michigan provided slightly broader protections than the U.S. Constitution. As such, the Supreme Court held that a life sentence with the possibility of parole for a defendant who committed second-degree murder while a juvenile constitutes cruel or unusual punishment because it effectively denies a meaningful opportunity for release.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, was sentenced to six years in prison as a Class X offender under Section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provided for mandatory sentencing of defendants over 21 with two predicate felony offenses. Defendant argued on appeal that Class X sentencing should not apply because he was 17 at the time of the first offense in 2013, and in 2014, an amendment to the Juvenile Court Act raised the age for exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction from 16 to 17. Applying plain error review to the forfeited claim (because Defendant raised it for the first time in a post sentencing motion), the Supreme Court held that conflicting appellate court decisions before the statutory amendment suggested that the legislature intended to resolve such ambiguity. The Supreme Court thus held the offense underlying Defendant’s conviction as a 17 year old was not a qualifying offense, and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment vacating the Class X sentence and remanding for resentencing.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree child abuse following a jury trial. During the trial, the trial judge asked the defense's medical expert multiple questions that demonstrated partiality. Prior to this decision, there were two formulations of the test for whether a trial judge’s conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality being applied by lower courts: the “unduly influence” standard and the “may well have . . . quite possibly could have” standard. The Supreme Court took the opportunity in this case to offer more substantive guidance and articulate a singular, clear test. The Supreme Court held that a judge’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality and violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct improperly influenced the jury by creating the appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial before a different judge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was charged with home invasion and aggravated unlawful restraint, but could not remember the events due to brain damage from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The State appealed the trial court’s finding that Defendant was not restored to fitness to stand trial, arguing that amnesia was not in and of itself sufficient to support a finding of unfitness. Noting that this issue was one of first impression that the Supreme Court had not previously considered, the Supreme Court looked to People v. Schwartz, 482 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1985), in which the court held that the defendant, Schwartz, was able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceeding against him and thus Schwartz’s amnesia regarding events on the day of his offenses did not render him unfit to stand trial. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that that fitness must be judged based on the totality of the circumstances, including factors like the inability to communicate with counsel and the defendant’s mens rea surrounding the incident. The Supreme Court further held that amnesia as to the events surrounding the crime charged does not per se create unfitness for trial. However, regarding the Defendant specifically, the Supreme Court noted that three psychiatric experts concluded that Defendant had no recollection of the events and two of them also concluded that Defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense would be affected by short-term memory impairments. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that Defendant remained unfit to stand trial because, under the totality of circumstances in this case, such a finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant plead guilty to a reduced charge of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon without a permit (CCW). A Michigan statute allows a court to delay sentencing for 1 year to give the defendant an opportunity to prove eligibility for leniency. The Defendant asked for a sentencing delay to finish college, and the judge scheduled the next hearing for one year and one day after the statutory deadline, so that the court would lose jurisdiction over the case. The prosecution objected, but one year later the court dismissed the case entirely citing lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge demonstrated overt hostility to the prosecution of the case by manipulating the scheduling of sentencing in order to thwart the prosecutor’s charging decision and by entirely dismissing the case. The Supreme Court remanded for sentencing before a different judge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingIn trial court, Defendants in three cases were not allowed to cross-examine police officers regarding allegations of prior misconduct by these officers in unrelated federal lawsuits. The Court of Appeals held that there is no categorical prohibition against such cross-examination, and determination as to whether to permit such inquiries for impeachment purposes lies at the discretion of the trial court judge.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court considered whether Michigan’s then-new sentencing statute introducing an updated framework for sentencing juveniles convicted of first-degree murder violated the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the framework did not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments because the framework does not require a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole. The Supreme Court also affirmed that “[a] judge, not a jury, must determine whether to impose a life-without-parole sentence or a term-of-years sentence.”

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant was arrested in connection with the robbery of a bar and the murder of the bar's owner. He was driven to the police station, put in an interrogation room, and advised of his Miranda rights. He requested a lawyer before and after being advised of his rights. Officers then stopped interrogating him, and he spent approximately 24 hours alone, handcuffed to a wall, while he repeatedly requested to use the phone. Despite his requests, he was not allowed to use the phone. Eventually, Defendant agreed to speak with detectives. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he provided a statement. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the statement as involuntary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary. Defendant filed a post trial motion challenging the denial of the motion to suppress, which was denied. The appellate court affirmed and found Defendant's statements to be voluntary. The Supreme Court held that Defendant preserved the argument of involuntariness for review because he had raised it in his motion to suppress, post trial motions, and briefs before the appellate court. Further, the factual and legal bases for his argument had not changed. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the officers had violated the Illinois Criminal Procedure Code by detaining Defendant for 24 hours and preventing him from exercising his invoked right to counsel. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and the incommunicado detention of Defendant for a prolonged period, the Court held that the statements obtained were involuntary and should have been suppressed. However, given the other evidence proffered at trial, the Court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, a 17 year old, pled guilty to one count of criminal drug possession and was sentenced to five years of prison and two years of post-release supervision. Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court failed to address whether he could be considered a "Youthful Offender," a determination for 16- to 19-year old in New York which carries benefits such as a vacated conviction and lesser jailtime. The Court of Appeals found that, despite the fact that Defendant did not ask for a Youthful Offender determination, all there must be a Youthful Offender determination in every case where a defendant may be eligible, and that such defendant cannot waive this right via a plea deal.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingAfter a transgender woman was assaulted with a firearm, prosecutors filed charges against the assailant under the Ethnic Intimidation Act, Michigan’s hate crime law. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that transgender people were not protected under this statute. The Michigan Supreme Court ordered the court of appeals to reconsider its ruling in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which ultimately led the court of appeals to reverse its decision and hold that crimes against transgender people are covered under Michigan’s hate crime law under the category of gender.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was charged with first-degree murder and other related offenses, sought to file a successive postconviction petition based on a claim of actual innocence. At trial, Defendant had made a statement describing conversations with others in which he admitted his participation in the shooting of a victim and the burning of the victim's body. In his petition, Defendant submitted affidavits from three individuals regarding, among other events, a recollection of a shooting incident and observations of an alternate suspect. However, because none of the affiants witnessed the murder or the burning of the body, and because neither specific observations of the victim's murder or the burning of the body were addressed in the affidavits, the circuit court held that these affidavits merely conflicted with the trial evidence and were not conclusive enough to probably change the outcome on retrial. The Supreme Court held that to file a successive postconviction petition based on actual innocence, the new evidence does not need to be completely dispositive of petitioner’s innocence, but rather only be of such a conclusive character as to probably change the result upon retrial. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted the leave-to-file stage focuses not on whether the new evidence is inconsistent with the trial evidence, but rather if it is possible for a trier of fact to accept their veracity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA 17-year-old juvenile was indicted on two counts of criminal sexual assault under the requisite Illinois statute. Because he was 17, the relevant provision of the Juvenile Justice Act (JJA) assigning jurisdiction over the case to the juvenile justice courts did not apply to Defendant and he was to be tried as an adult. After he was indicted, the state legislature amended the JJA such that juveniles under 18 years would be tried in the juvenile justice courts. The JJA, as amended, had a savings clause stating that the amendment applied to "violations committed on or after the effective date" of the amending act, i.e., after January 1, 2014 (after Defendant was indicted). The Defendant subsequently argued that the savings clause violated the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitution as applied to him. The district court agreed, and the State appealed directly to the state Supreme Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court noted that the same standards applied in an equal protection challenge under both the Illinois and U.S. constitutions. Because the "legislative classification" making a distinction based on age did not affect a "fundamental right" or "discriminate against a suspect class," rational basis review applied. The Court held that the age-based classification was rationally related to the legislative intent, therefore, the Defendant did not demonstrate a violation of his right to equal protection and should be tried as an adult.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was a juvenile, was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder with a firearm in a drive-by shooting when he was 16. Defendant was prosecuted as an adult and sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder with a firearm enhancement, and two mandatory minimum sentences of 26 years' imprisonment for attempted murder with a firearm enhancement. Defendant argued on appeal that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders and emphasized that a mandatory sentence scheme for juveniles would prevent the consideration of mitigating factors. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and held that Defendant was entitled to resentencing under an Illinois statute for juvenile offenders that required the sentencing judge to consider mitigation factors and made firearm enhancements discretionary rather than mandatory.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant's driving, appearance, and responses to questions gave an officer probable cause to arrest him on a Driving While Intoxicated. The officer asked the Defendant to step out of the car and searched him, discovering a switchblade, after which the Defendant was arrested. In court, the officer said he did not intend to arrest Defendant until he found the switchblade. The Court of Appeals held that, although the officer hypothetically had the authority to search Defendant as a search "incident to a lawful arrest," since the officer said there would not have been an arrest but for the fruits of his search, the search was not "incident" to the arrest and therefore the Court of Appeals suppressed the knife as evidence and dismissed the indictment.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court considered the de novo legal issue of whether a guilty plea prevents a defendant from asserting an actual innocence claim under Illinois’ Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Defendant was charged in 2014 with armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant accepted a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to one count of armed violence in exchange for a sentence of 15 years imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition attaching an affidavit from Davie Callaway to support a claim of actual innocence with respect to possession of the cocaine and firearm, in which Callaway stated that he was the sole owner of the cocaine and that Defendant had no knowledge of its presence. The appellate court looked to People v. Cannon, 263 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. 1970), but the Supreme Court noted that the relevant statements from Cannon, in which the court found claims that were included in a defendant's petition but not subsequently argued upon appeal to lack merit, were merely dicta. The Supreme Court held that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from asserting an actual innocence claim under Illinois’ Post-Conviction Hearing Act, though the defendant must provide new, material, noncumulative evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a new trial would probably result in acquittal. Because it was not unreasonable for the Court to question Callaway’s truthfulness under the circumstances of Defendant’s case, in which Callaway only came forward after discussing the case with Defendant in prison and had expressed feeling bad for Defendant, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s petition in his specific case.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingPinkney was charged with five felony counts of election forgery under MCL 168.937 and six misdemeanor counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition under MCL 168.957 for having submitted petitions with falsified dates in connection with an effort to recall the mayor of Benton Harbor. The issue was whether a defendant could be convicted of election-law forgery under MCL 168.937, which provides for fine or imprisonment if a person is found guilty of forgery, generally. The Supreme Court held that MCL 168.937 did nothing more than provide the punishment for the already-committed offense of election-law forgery, and did not create a chargeable offense. The Supreme Court reasoned that there was no evidence that the Legislature intended to incorporate the common-law definition of forgery, that the statutory history of the Election Law provided further support for the conclusion that the statute was a penalty provision, that construing MCL 168.937 as creating the separate, substantive offense of forgery would render the other relevant statutes surplusage. The defendant was not properly charged with the substantive offense of election-law forgery, and the judgment was reversed and remanded to the trial court.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Court of Appeals held that Defendant was properly assessed points under Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment instrument risk factor 9, which concerns the “Number and Nature of Prior Crimes,” for his prior New Jersey conviction for lewdness. The court of appeals determined that reliance on the underlying conduct of a prior foreign conviction is appropriate as a matter of law for purposes of assessing points under risk factor 9 and that the New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders and courts should apply the “essential elements” test set forth in In re North v. Bd. of Exam'rs of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y., 871 N.E.2d 1133 (N.Y. 2007) when considering whether to assess points for the prior foreign conviction. Under that test, Defendant’s New Jersey conviction was comparable to the New York offense of endangering the welfare of a child. It was therefore proper to assess him 30 points for his prior criminal history. The Court of Appeals also held that the New York Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders may rely on youthful offender adjudications and juvenile delinquency findings as "reliable indicators of wrongdoing" in connection with assessing "an offender's likelihood of re-offense and danger to public safety," even though they are not technically criminal convictions.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingA police officer stopped Defendant's car because of a nonfunctioning center brake light. Defendant, who exhibited signs of intoxication, was given—and failed—a portable breathalyzer test. Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192) and two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause to justify the seizure. The sole issue on appeal is whether the officer's belief that Defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by operating a vehicle with a nonfunctioning center stop light was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeals concluded that the officer's interpretation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was objectively reasonable because the law mandates that motor vehicles must be equipped with at least two functioning stop lamps. Therefore, the courts below erred as a matter of law in granting Defendant's suppression motion.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, who was 15 at the time of his station-house confession, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault after being automatically transferred to criminal court. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his confession should be suppressed as involuntary, in part because of ineffective assistance by counsel at the pretrial suppression hearing. Defendant did not allege threats, mistreatment, or coercion by the police, nor did he claim to have failed to understand the interrogation process or ask to speak to an adult. The Supreme Court noted that the relevant factors in examining the totality of the circumstances of the confession were (1) Defendant's age; (2) his limited experience with the criminal justice system; (3) any possible police deception; and (4) the time, legality, and duration of the questioning. The Supreme Court found that Defendant failed to establish that even if Defendant’s counsel had offered evidence of diminished mental capacity at the suppression hearing or requested a pretrial fitness hearing, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been acquittal. The Supreme Court further held that even though the conduct of police may not have been exemplary, the police made a reasonable attempt to notify a concerned adult (as required by statute) and the detective assigned as a youth officer did not act improperly.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingThe Supreme Court extended its holding in People v. Taylor, 987 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. 2022) to eighteen-year-olds just past the cusp of being considered “juvenile.” As in Taylor, the Supreme Court considered scientific and social-science research regarding the neuroplasticity of the adolescent brain that leads to impulsivity, recklessness, and risk-taking. The Supreme Court also considered that young persons will inevitably serve more time than older offenders making that sentence less proportional to their crimes. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that automatic condemnation to die in prison at eighteen was cruel and the logic about why children differ from adults for sentencing applies in equal force to eighteen-year-olds. The defendant had his sentence vacated and case remanded for re-sentencing under this new rule.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingUsing the emergency lights on his unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe, a federal marine interdiction agent with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) stopped the driver of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger for driving dangerously on a public highway. After pulling the driver over, the agent waited in his truck for police officers who, upon arriving at the scene, searched the vehicle and arrested defendant for criminal possession of a weapon. The question on this appeal is whether the courts below properly relied on this Court's decision in People v. Williams, 829 N.E.2d 1203 (N.Y. 2005), in granting Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered. The trial court concluded that suppression was warranted under Williams because, by activating his emergency lights to pull the driver of the vehicle over and approaching the car with the Buffalo police officer, the agent "acted under the color of law with all the accouterments of official authority and could not effect a citizen's arrest." The Court of Appeals decided that Williams is inapposite because the CBP agent who stopped Defendant was not considered a federal law enforcement officer with peace officer powers pursuant to CPL §2.10 and CPL §2.15, he could not have improperly circumvented the jurisdictional limitations on the powers reserved for those members of law enforcement under CPL § 140.25. Therefore, the trial court should have denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the gun found as a result of a traffic stop, called in by the agent, and the appellate court erred by affirming suppression of the evidence.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant, charged with murder based on confessions during an interrogation, was assessed by psychiatric experts to have issues of concentration, memory, intelligence and auditory hallucinations. His counsel at trial decided not to execute subpoenas for or otherwise review these assessments as evidence of Defendant's mental weakness, which could have rebutted the voluntariness of his admissions, due both to poor strategy and a misunderstanding of criminal discovery law. After sentencing, Defendant obtained new counsel which moved to vacate the conviction, arguing trial counsel's failures represented ineffective representation. The Court of Appeals held that Defendants' right to representation was violated by his counsel's failure to secure and review crucial documents to Defendant's case. A strategy involving "a total failure to investigate the facts of a case, or review pertinent records," does not constitute meaningful representation.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingDefendant moved to dismiss charges of driving while his ability were impaired in front of a judge in city court, who denied the motion. This same judge then proceeded over both the bench trial in which the Defendant was ultimately convicted, and the county court trial in which the Defendant appealed this conviction. The Court of Appeals decided that a judge who presided at a trial may not act as the appellate judge in the same case, as they would likely not be or appear to be an impartial jurist. This ban does not apply to judges who proceed over different stages of a trial, since at this stage there is still the availability of further appellate review.

Summary of Case Context & HoldingCity of Chicago police officers responded to a call about a person with a gun at a park. Responding officers approached a group of teenagers, and the 19-year-old Defendant first walked away before running out of the park. An officer witnessed him remove an uncased pistol from his waistband and throw it on the ground. The gun was found to be fully loaded. Upon arrest, the Defendant did not present a valid Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) card. The State charged the Defendant with one count of unlawful use of a weapon and six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) for having a loaded, uncased, and immediately accessible weapon both on his person and in public, without a valid FOID card, while under the age of 21. The trial court found the Defendant guilty on all seven counts. On the Defendant’s post-trial motion, the trial court vacated its guilty finding on the UUW charge because the State failed to carry its burden. The trial court also requested supplemental briefing on the constitutionality of the AUUW statute’s mandatory imprisonment sentence, under the proportionate penalties clause and the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, both facially and as applied. After oral argument, the trial court found the provisions of the AUUW statute unconstitutional and instead entered a guilty finding on lesser included offenses of UUW. The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the trial court had effectively acquitted him. But the fact that the trial court had initially entered a finding of guilt indicated that the State had established the factual prerequisites for guilt such that no acquittal occurred on the subsequent unconstitutionality finding. On the merits, the Defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional under: (1) the right to bear arms; (2) the due process rights under the federal 14th Amendment and the state constitution; (3) the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution; and (4) the federal and state constitutional due process and equal protection provisions. During the period between the trial and the appellate sitting, the Supreme Court issued an opinion finding a portion of the relevant statute unconstitutionally infringed on the right to carry a gun on one’s person. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill. 2013). The Supreme Court therefore extended Aguilar which unconstitutionally prohibited the carrying of a gun on one’s person in a public way. The Supreme Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that this finding rendered the remainder of the statute unconstitutional because those provisions were severable. The Defendant also challenged the AUUW statute’s prohibition on minor possession of a weapon and the requirement of a valid FOID card. First, the Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment is not absolute, and that because age is not a suspect class, the legislature must only exhibit a rational purpose in restricting and conditioning the right of those under 21 years of age to possess a firearm. Neither did the age and FOID requirements violate the Defendant’s federal or state equal protection rights. Again, the Supreme Court stated that strict scrutiny did not apply because neither subsection “burden[ed] a fundamental right at the core of the second amendment” and because age is not a suspect class. The legislature had a rational purpose in preventing those under 21 from possessing in public a handgun. Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s finding that the FOID requirement violated the Defendant’s due process rights both facially and as applied by imposing “special burdens” on him and those similarly situated. The FOID Card Act required a minor wishing to possess a gun to obtain parental consent. But because both of Defendant’s parents had felony convictions preventing them from obtaining their own FOID cards, he argued that he could not provide the requisite consent. The Supreme Court rejected this as-applied challenge because the trial court failed to conduct a trial or establish an evidentiary record on this issue. The Supreme Court also rejected the facial challenge because, even if such a minor as the Defendant could not obtain parental consent, the statute provided a mechanism for special review of permit applications by the Director of the Department of State Police. The Supreme Court concluded by finding that the statute’s sentencing provision was unconstitutional. In particular, a portion of the statute incorporated and required a finding under another portion of the statute and was not severable from that other portion, which was unconstitutional. And having found the portion of the statute unconstitutional due to the Second Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court declined to address the Defendant’s argument brought under the proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution.