Among the many pertinent Supreme Court cases this past term, one in particular put the Court’s jurisprudence on religious freedoms to the test. On the docket this session was Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, a case involving an incarcerated Rastafarian man who sought redress after prison officials forcibly shaved his dreadlocks despite legal religious protections. The Court, however, denied him these protections, and with this decision, the Court has yet again proved that under their standards, there exists an unspoken contingency clause when it comes to the enjoyment of religious freedoms. This double standard around who is able to invoke their freedom of religious expression and win in the Courts prevented Damon Landor, the petitioner in this case, from a victory despite the clear conditions of protection under state, federal, and constitutional law.
The conservative majority handed down a 6–3 decision in this case, ruling against Landor and the viability of this suit. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch, argued that the prison officials who cut Landor’s hair could not be held liable in their individual capacities for violating state law, thus making Landor unable to seek monetary damages. Landor brought his case to the courts under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a federal law intended to cement protections for religious practice regardless of the space or institution. Despite providing documentation that his religious accommodations had been met at previous institutions, officials forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head. However, the majority claims that because officials did not consent to liability, they cannot answer to suits under federal law.
At first glance, a decision from this Court ruling against religious practice may seem at odds with their previous stances on religious freedoms. Rather, this ruling falls directly in line with the Court’s predisposition for upholding conservative Christian rights to religious expression first and foremost. Here, the majority interprets RLUIPA moreso as a contract than federal law, conditionally binding individuals who opt in to accountability. This interpretation allows the Court to opt out of acknowledging Landor’s federal religious protections.
Other cases that have reached the Court’s docket have shown that the Court does frequently rule in favor of religious freedoms and expression petitioners. The vital difference in those cases is the kind of religion that individuals seek redress for — those with beliefs that match those of the conservative justices. In the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case in 2023, the Court ruled in favor of a Colorado website designer, arguing that the state could not require her to create an expressive design displaying a message with which she disagreed. In this instance, designer Lorie Smith cited religious beliefs preventing her from designing a website for a same-sex wedding. Similarly, the Court sided with a religious petitioner in Fulton v. Philadelphia. The unanimous majority ruling stated that the city of Philadelphia could not decline to contract a Catholic organization for foster care placement services. This is despite the fact that the organization would decline same-sex placements with same-sex couples solely because of their LGBTQ+ identities and not any other disqualifying factors. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, a high-media-coverage case involving a high school football coach who included students in team prayers, heralded a similar decision that upheld the right to free religious practice.
A closer examination of the Court’s free exercise history reveals a clear double standard set in place. Religious freedom cases including conservative Christians do overwhelmingly well when in front of the Court. Instead of proving an inconsistency in the Court’s interpretation of religious freedoms, this pattern displays a consistent preference for conservative religious petitioners seeking to claim their constitutional rights. Landor’s case failed the Court’s conservative Christian test. As a Rastafarian man seeking compensation for violation of his religious freedoms, neither state, federal, nor Constitutional law could sway the Court to break their unspoken rule.
Shining a light on the Court’s double standard in religious freedoms protections, the Landor v. Louisiana ruling invites valid concerns about this Court’s ability to hand down justice. More pressingly, this calls into question whether our legal systems truly offer religious freedoms protections. The Court appears firm in its commitment to favor decisions that privilege conservative Christian claimants. Under this style of contingent ruling, you are only legally protected as long as your case includes the Court’s preferred religious values. Disparate treatment of anyone falling outside of the Court’s set standards sends a clear signal to all those bringing forth religious liberty claims. While potentially disincentivizing members of religious minority groups from seeking justice through the courts, Landor v. Louisiana and this pattern of religious freedom jurisprudence pave the way for widening disparity and religious discrimination.
Sinclair Harris is an intern at Alliance for Justice.